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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
TWELVE CERTAIN MEN: THE IMPACT OF EMOTIONAL APPRAISALS ON JUROR 
DECISION-MAKING  
by 
Stephen W. Joy 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Ryan J. Winter, Major Professor 
 Our jury system is predicated upon the expectation that jurors engage in systematic 
processing when considering evidence and making decisions.  They are instructed to interpret 
facts and apply the appropriate law in a fair, dispassionate manner, free of all bias, including that 
of emotion.  However, emotions containing an element of certainty (e.g., anger and happiness, 
which require little cognitive effort in determining their source) can often lead people to engage 
in superficial, heuristic-based processing. Compare this to uncertain emotions (e.g., hope and 
fear, which require people to seek out explanations for their emotional arousal), which instead 
has the potential to lead them to engage in deeper, more systematic processing.    
 The purpose of the current research is in part to confirm past research (Tiedens & Linton, 
2001; Semmler & Brewer, 2002) that uncertain emotions (like fear) can influence decision-
making towards a more systematic style of processing, whereas more certain emotional states 
(like anger) will lead to a more heuristic style of processing.  Studies One, Two, and Three build 
upon this prior research with the goal of improving methodological rigor through the use of film 
clips to reliably induce emotions, with awareness of testimonial details serving as measures of 
processing style.   
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 The ultimate objective of the current research was to explore this effect in Study Four by 
inducing either fear, anger, or neutral emotion in mock jurors, half of whom then followed along 
with a trial transcript featuring eight testimonial inconsistencies, while the other participants 
followed along with an error-free version of the same transcript.   Overall rates of detection for 
these inconsistencies was expected to be higher for the uncertain/fearful participants due to their 
more effortful processing compared to certain/angry participants.  These expectations were not 
fulfilled, with significant main effects only for the transcript version (with or without 
inconsistencies) on overall inconsistency detection rates.  There are a number of plausible 
explanations for these results, so further investigation is needed. 
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Chapter I 
 
Literature Review 
Historical belief—one shared by fairly well-respected and enlightened thinkers 
such as Aristotle (325 BC/1998), Sigmund Freud (1920), and Immanuel Kant 
(1781/1958)—holds that emotion and reason are two mutually exclusive and 
independently operating components of cognition.  This conception is still widely 
endorsed today among laypersons as well as by many psychologists, psychiatrists, 
lawyers, legislators, and other cognoscenti who continue to believe in this sort of 
segregated, bilateral relationship between the emotion-oriented side of cognition and the 
more conscious, reason-based nature of cognition. Yet other psychologists maintain that 
while the two domains may seem mutually exclusive on the surface, they are in fact 
interrelated and interactive components within a larger scheme. This distinction fomented 
a decades-long debate between respected factions of psychologists with Zajonc (1980, 
1984) arguing in favor of the independent, isolationist viewpoint, and Lazarus (1984, 
1999) supporting the more interconnected, holistic account.  While much of the 
disagreement can be characterized as an inability to operationalize terminology and 
concepts in a mutually satisfactory manner, there remains no conclusive empirically 
verifiable resolution to the debate.  Nevertheless, in part because of research placing 
increased attention on the role of cognition within emotion (Schorr, 2001), a broader 
agreement acknowledging the permeable boundaries and overall synergy between 
cognition and emotion has generally prevailed, and it is under this conception that the 
current research shall proceed. 
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The legal system of the United States is based upon a form of common law, which 
allows for consistency over time and across situations by deference and adherence to 
precedent.  Our laws are designed to be predictable and consistent in their application, 
which leaves little room for the presumptively volatile, unpredictable emotional 
component in making determinations of guilt and punishment in the criminal courts, and 
responsibility, liability, compensation, and damage awards in civil proceedings. The 
contemporary legal view subscribes to the notion that reason and emotion are wholly 
distinct entities, and that from a practical policy-oriented, procedural, and legislative 
perspective, every effort should be undertaken to ensure that the subjective, 
unpredictable, capricious element of emotion does not invade the purview of stalwart, 
detached, clinical reason of law.  This segregated, compartmentalized viewpoint is 
acknowledged by Judge Richard A. Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, who states that “the law itself is conventionally regarded as a bastion of 
‘reason’ conceived of as the antithesis of emotion, as operating to rein in the emotionality 
of the behavior that gives rise to legal disputes” (Posner, 1999, p. 309).  However, in a 
position not uniformly shared across the field, Posner recognizes the impossibility of 
creating a bright-line rule for the treatment of emotion in the legal system, an undertaking 
every bit as overwhelming as establishing a comprehensive method for regulating 
information or beliefs, and as such, the role of emotion must therefore necessarily depend 
upon the context of the situation and the content of the particular law in question.  There 
are a litany of exceptions to the more commonly held isolationist rule across many 
domains of the law—excluding highly prejudicial evidence at trial for fear that it may 
unduly influence the jury by way of emotional influence (Federal Rule of Evidence 403); 
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mens rea requirements in criminal law; the apprehension of fear as a constituent element 
for the tort of assault; pain, suffering, and mental anguish considerations in damage 
calculations, and more. 
The legal system does not have a specific, broadly applicable policy in place for 
how to account for the role of emotion—nor should it, given the spectacular range of 
influences emotion can have on different participants at different times and under the 
many different circumstances within the legal process as a whole.  Pattern jury 
instructions uniformly advise jurors to set aside their emotions when evaluating evidence 
and deciding upon a verdict (see Florida Standard Jury Instructions – Civil, Section 700; 
Florida Standard Jury Instructions – Criminal, Section 3.10), just as evidence can be 
excluded from admission to the jury on the grounds that it could be so emotionally 
charged as to unduly influence the jury’s interpretation of its weight, and also because it 
could color perceptions of subsequent unrelated evidence.  Conversely, emotion can be 
tolerated, scrutinized, and even emphasized in other circumstances ranging from 
calculating damages for emotional distress to victim impact statements during the penalty 
phase of capital sentencing.  These contrasting and conflicting treatments of emotion are 
not limited to statutory construction and legislated instructions, but are even illustrated by 
the individual personalities and dogma of our ultimate interpreters of statutory intent, the 
esteemed members of our Supreme Court.  During the first decade of the twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court included two justices of total polar contrasts in terms of 
personality, emotionality, and style of reasoning.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and John 
Marshall Harland shared the bench of our nation’s highest court from 1902 through 1911, 
and were diametric opposites from one another in nearly every regard—upbringing, 
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temperament, decision-making processes, writing style, and more—besides their mutual 
motivation to interpret the law as fairly and as thoroughly as possible in their own unique 
manner. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., whose legal mind is most often criticized for being 
so neutrally dispassionate and coldly detached that some of his opinions seem almost 
amoral, especially in comparison with those of Justice Harland, whose critics assert that 
he twisted the law to suit his own morality above all else (Pillsbury, 1999).  Despite their 
many contrasts, both Justices were exceedingly careful and thorough in their two 
different approaches to the law, and both were driven to arrive at the “right” answers in 
their own unique ways.  Their methods of jurisprudential reasoning and the role which 
emotion played in their analyses were so disparate as to be complimentary in some ways, 
in a manner somewhat parallel to the dual-process models of cognition.  For instance, 
Harlan’s style was analogous to heuristic or experiential processing, with unequivocal, 
clearly defined, quick judgments motivated in a manner such that: 
 Harlan’s faith in justice may be the simplest to explain because it comes in the 
most familiar form: a belief in certain substantive principles of right and wrong.  
A man of few doubts, his view of justice was shaped by a set of core religious, 
moral, and political beliefs about the nature of the American ideal. (Pillsbury, 
1999, p. 349) 
In the alternative, Holmes’s style was more similar to systematic or rational processing, 
with a greater degree of attention paid to nuance, and a methodical, deliberate, careful 
consideration of information both on its own and within a larger context: 
Holmes’s faith in justice was both more procedural and more metaphysical than 
Harlan’s.  Holmes doubted the existence of clear principles of right or wrong, at 
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least in the sense that Harlan believed.  Holmes saw justice as a process, a 
struggle toward ultimate insight sometimes partially glimpsed but never fully 
gained.  Holmes sought particular and often contingent truths, not all-
encompassing, ever-lasting Truth. (Pillsbury, 1999, p. 349-350) 
 Despite their differences, both Justices’ styles of adjudication were heavily 
influenced by the role of emotion.  Harlan’s on a more visible, heart-on-a-shirt-sleeve 
level, but also Holmes’s global, unifying sense of legal philosophizing, both of which 
illustrate that despite the tendency of the common law, with all of its deference to 
precedent and adherence to consistent predictability and a widespread insistence to the 
contrary, our notion of justice—and therefore the entire legal system itself—does in fact 
incorporate emotion all the way to its very core.  However, no matter how inextricably 
linked emotion may be to the system as a whole, as a policy matter on a procedural level, 
we must take steps to ensure that jurors are processing evidence in an effortful, 
systematic, engaged manner, and that they refrain from determining guilt or liability 
based on their emotions, or that they are in any way unduly influenced by their 
emotions—an outcome which this research seeks to confirm can and does occur in subtle 
and unexpected ways.   
The idiosyncracies of our foremost legal authorities and the narrow range of 
tacitly approved exceptions aside, the widespread and traditional “mutually exclusive” 
perspective does not completely block the intersection of emotion and the law.  There is 
an effort to better understand the intricacies and nuances of their interplay, with 
contributions coming from multiple perspectives—lawyers (Bandes, 1999; Blumenthal, 
2005a, 2005b, 2010), philosophers (Deigh, 1999), economists (Korobkin & Ulen, 2005), 
 6 
 
cognitive (Forgas, 2010), social (DeWitt, Richardson, & Warner, 1997; Inbar & Pizarro, 
2009), bio- (Goodenough & Prehn, 2004; Salerno & Bottoms, 2009) psychologists, and 
more are working towards this same interdisciplinary goal, whether through the practice 
of law, medicine, experimental investigation, or theoretical debate.  This variegated, 
collective inquiry seeks to eventually create a unified, coherent, holistic, and, most 
importantly, interdisciplinary acknowledgement of the fact that the law does not operate 
in an emotional vacuum, devoid of any influence of or interference from affective states 
and their direct impact on cognition, experience, and behavior within the legal realm.  
This effort is necessary because it is clear that emotions at the time of a decision can 
influence outcomes independent of the basis of the emotion itself (Loewenstein, Weber, 
Hsee & Welch, 2001). 
Maroney (2006) set out to help distill the various ways in which the relationship 
between law and emotion is, can be, and should be studied.  Defining both “law” and 
“emotion” is a thorny task, with different empirical definitions for emotions, feelings, 
mood, and affect, which are all subtly different depending on whose body of research one 
happens to be considering. Thus, simply operationalizing the relevant terms to be used 
can present unique compatibility issues.  Nevertheless, Maroney proposed the following 
six methods and goals: 
 Emotion-Centered Approach:  Analyze how a particular emotion is, could be, or 
should be reflected in law 
 Emotional Phenomenon Approach: Describe a mechanism by which emotion is 
experienced, processed, or expressed, and analyze how that emotion-driven 
phenomenon is, could be, or should be reflected in law 
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 Emotion Theory Approach: Adopt a particular theory (or theories) of how the 
emotions may be approached or understood, and analyze how that theory is, could 
be, or should be reflected in law 
 Legal Doctrine Approach: Analyze how emotion is, could be, or should be 
reflected in a particular area of legal doctrine or type of legal determination 
 Theory of Law Approach: Analyze the theories of emotion embedded or reflected 
within a particular theoretical approach to the law 
 Legal Actor Approach: Examine how a particular legal actor’s performance of the 
assigned legal function is, could be, or should be influenced by emotion 
(Maroney, 2006, p. 126) 
The current paper will address aspects of each of these six approaches.  In 
Chapter 2, it will first examine the historical role of emotion within the legal system and 
how conceptions have evolved through time, trial, and error (much like our common law 
approach to precedent). Next, in Chapter 3, I will cover the dual-processing theories 
which provide the underpinnings of the proposed research.  After establishing the 
theoretical framework, Chapter 3 will also explore how past conceptualizations of 
emotion, which emphasized the importance of valence, are quaintly archaic, with more 
contemporary theories concentrating on the subcomponents and building blocks 
(“appraisals”) of emotion.  This paper will focus on one appraisal in particular—that of 
certainty—which has recently emerged through empirical study as a key element in the 
overall experience of emotion, including its behavioral, cognitive, and decisional 
consequences.  Chapter 3 will conclude with an exposition of the role of emotion in 
decision-making, culminating with the two specific emotions at the center of my studies, 
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anger and fear.  Chapter 4 will integrate each of the aforementioned topics, assembling 
them all into the basis for the proposed research.  The characteristics of the emotional 
appraisal of certainty, including the way it has been demonstrated to supplant past 
theories that emotional valence determines processing style, as well as how jurors process 
information and make decisions will all be emphasized.  Chapters 5 and 6 will explain the 
procedure and methodology of Studies One and Two, which will improve upon previous 
research by Semmler and Brewer (2002) by creating a finely tuned trial transcript for the 
purpose of investigating the processing style and decision-making of mock jurors.  
Creating a trial transcript version featuring verifiable detection rates of inconsistencies 
will provide for a baseline basis of comparison that will allow for a greater degree of 
precision in qualifying my findings.  Chapter 7 will detail the methodologies of Study 
Three, which is focused on the selection, effectiveness, and implementation of film clips 
as a means of reliably eliciting emotions among participants.  Chapter 8 provides an 
overview of how Studies One through Three integrate to inform the procedure and utility 
of Study Four, which will fill the void left by extant research in order to more fully 
explore the relationship of certainty appraisals of emotion on overall perceptiveness and 
processing style of mock jurors.  Chapter 9 will conclude with a brief summary of 
potential real-world applications of these findings as well as logical extensions for future 
research. 
There is no shortage of psychological research on emotion or legal decision-
making, but there is a surprising dearth of research focused on both of them in tandem. 
More specifically, there is little research that focuses on the influence that emotions 
might have on legal decision-making.  The purpose of the current research is in part to 
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confirm past research (Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Semmler & Brewer, 2002) that uncertain 
emotions (like fear) can influence decision-making towards a more systematic style of 
processing, whereas more certain emotional states (like anger) will lead to a more 
heuristic style of processing.  The current research is also designed to explore how 
processing style impacts overall comprehension of information and decision-making 
processes.  
Chapter II 
Civil Justice System Overview 
As evidenced by the litany of legal dramas unleashed by American film and TV 
studios each year, the very nature of crime provides fertile soil for emotional 
involvement.  However, our criminal justice system has a specific body of policy (no 
matter how inconsistent, unsupported by empirical data, or inelegant it may be to 
implement) that governs when, how, why, and to what extent various legal actors may 
acknowledge or incorporate their emotions into the legal process.  Some circumstances 
require a blanket disregard of emotional response, such as jurors’ wholesale repudiation 
of information learned via pretrial media publicity, whereas other determinations such as 
victim impact statements and other aspects of sentencing procedures hinge upon emotion.  
However, the civil justice system generally provides fewer opportunities for emotional 
engagement through news and entertainment media—one need look no further for 
evidence of this imbalance than to consider how few books, movies, and television 
programs revolve around civil law in comparison to criminal law.  Torts, contractual 
disputes, liability determinations, damage calculations and the like rarely make for 
compelling theater fraught with emotional investment in the same way that procedural 
 10 
 
crime dramas can.  Just as the entertainment industry focuses its overwhelming emphasis 
on the criminal justice system to the exclusion of the civil justice system, so too does the 
body of psychological research with respect to the impact of emotion within the legal 
system.  Nevertheless, despite the comparative banality of much of civil law, there 
remains a significant role for emotion to play within the process, along with a field of 
inquiry ripe for study.  
Within the common law system of the United States, civil justice is dedicated to 
issues involving disputes between private (i.e., non-governmental) parties or 
organizations concerning what amounts to economic interests—essentially, any non-
criminal matter between two parties where there exists a potential for economic damages 
or recovery.  Examples of civil cases include contractual disagreements, defamation, 
personal injury, copyright, and wrongful death claims.  Civil cases may involve causes of 
action that are also subject to criminal charges, which are litigated in a separate and 
distinct criminal court system.  The primary distinctions between criminal and civil cases 
are that in criminal cases, the defendant, who is presumed innocent until proven guilty, 
faces charges from the government.  The government’s burden of proof required for a 
guilty verdict is that the evidence must support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and if found guilty, the defendant may face sentences ranging from probation to 
incarceration to a death sentence, in addition to financial penalties.  In contrast, a civil 
case is filed by a non-governmental plaintiff, and the plaintiff must prove beyond a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is liable for the damages alleged.  If the 
defendant is found guilty, they can be liable for compensatory damages (designed to 
return the plaintiff to their original state) as well as punitive damages (designed to act as a 
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deterrent to similar future behavior by the defendant or other, similar parties), but any 
prospect of punishment related to one’s personal freedom are not applicable to the civil 
justice system.  Because most civil cases are basically a matter of money, the broad 
doctrines of civil justice tend to have very economics-based, pragmatic views at their 
core.   
Legal decision-making. 
The legal realm tries to characterize human decision-making as a purely rational, 
calculating process vis-à-vis the rational-choice theory, which has at its core the notion 
that when making choices, humans always try to maximize their expected utility through 
rational actions and decisions with respect to anticipated costs and benefits resulting from 
the choice itself (Montgomery, 2006).  While there is no single, unified Rational Choice 
Theory of human decision-making calculus (see generally Korobkin & Ulen, 2000), 
critics assail the clinically sterile economist’s perspective for being an incomplete and/or 
inaccurate summary of human decision-making because we are not always purely 
rational actors, and we do not always make optimal choices.  This is partly because it is 
sometimes impossible to fully and accurately estimate the potential outcomes in a cost-
benefit analysis—but mainly because psychological literature is fraught with examples of 
how we act in counterintuitive, suboptimal, or seemingly inexplicable yet predictable 
ways.  One empirical example of how emotions and appraisal tendencies can affect the 
very basis of the Rational Choice Theory—the cost/benefit analysis—was conducted by 
Raghunathan and Pham (1999) wherein participants were experimentally induced into 
either anxious or sad moods and were then offered a choice of a high risk/high reward job 
or a job with low risks and low rewards.  Those participants who were anxious sought to 
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reduce uncertainty by more frequently selecting the low-stakes job because it was a more 
reliable, dependable option, whereas the sad participants preferred the uncertain, high-
stakes job because of its possibility for greater mood improvement through the 
replacement of loss.  These same unpredictable, inefficient and/or suboptimal decision-
making strategies can often manifest within the legal realm or within domains that 
eventually are at issue in a court of law, and both by parties and by jurors. 
Such a distinction in preferences between anxious and sad decision-makers 
suggests that to some extent, emotional interference on decision-making could influence 
the course of an investigation if it affects the parties involved. The examples are virtually 
limitless if we imagine the extent to which emotion could influence legal decision-
makers’ processing styles due to reliance on heuristics as opposed to deliberate, logical, 
rational, careful analysis.  Utilizing heuristic processing during trial proceedings could 
invoke the representativeness heuristic (assessments of eyewitness credibility as 
illustrated by the “taxicab problem” of Kahneman & Tversky 1973; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), the availability heuristic (decision-makers inappropriately considering 
personal anecdotal experiences as dispositive of larger overall trends and tendencies; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), egocentric and optimistic biases (erroneously evaluating 
likelihood of harm, risk calculations, reasonableness and forseeability of outcomes as 
they relate to both oneself and others, which is of particular concern when considering 
negligence claims; Weinstein, 1980; Ross & Sicoly, 1979), hindsight bias (believing the 
known outcome to be more likely than it really was simply based on the fact that it 
occurred; Kamin & Rachlinski, 1995; Sanchirico, 2003), outcome bias (distorted 
evaluation of the quality of a decision given the known outcome; Baron & Hershey, 
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1988), counterfactual thinking (constructing alternate courses of action that could have 
had different outcomes for the events which led to the trial; Wiener et al. 1994), and other 
types of cognitive tendencies contrary to the economist’s view of human beings as 
dispassionate, rational actors.  Other examples include the use of technically incorrect lay 
definitions of legal rules when determining verdicts as well as the comparison of case 
facts to “crime prototypes” which are each juror’s idealized, generic expectation of what 
the crime typically involves (V. L. Smith, 1991).  Jurors are also vulnerable to less 
cognition-oriented heuristics such as placing undue emphasis on the complexity of the 
testimony given by experts or people perceived to be in positions of authority (Cooper, 
Bennett, & Sukel, 1996), the physical attractiveness of the defendant (Lieberman, 2002), 
the sheer number of plaintiffs (Horowitz & Bordens, 2000), and the volume of evidence 
entered (Weinstock & Flaton, 2004).  The more jurors rely on these sorts of heuristics, 
the less likely they are to be able to reason capably and thoroughly, to understand 
evidence both singularly and as a part of a larger picture, and to apply their conclusions 
towards a verdict in accordance with judicial instruction (Greene & Ellis, 2007).  
Chapter III 
Cognition and Emotion 
In order to examine how emotion influences jurors, it is first necessary to consider 
how cognition is related to emotion.  Several prominent cognitive processing models are 
applicable to the way in which jurors process information.  Specifically, the family of 
dual-process models lends itself particularly well to juror decision-making.  There are 
multiple idiosyncratically distinctive theories based upon the same general framework, 
but the overall purview of the dual-process models is that decision-making related to 
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persuasive messages can take place in one of two ways.  Fundamentally, the dual-process 
models of decision-making posit that persuasion can occur as a result of an effortful, 
deliberate consideration of information, or from a less involved, approximate, and almost 
automatic method of processing.  While the terminology used to describe the two systems 
may vary (for instance, E. R. Smith and DeCoster [2000] describe associative versus rule-
based processing; Strack and Deutsch [2004] use impulsive versus reflective processing; 
Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, and Trope [2002] discriminate between reflexive and 
reflective systems), and each distinct model is distinguished by more than mere changes 
in nomenclature, their general concepts are much more alike than dissimilar. 
One of the most popular of these dual-process models is the elaboration likelihood 
model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) which provides that attitude and decision-making 
is accomplished through one of two primary mechanisms, either the central route or the 
peripheral route.  These two routes each depend on the same factors (the source of the 
information, the content of the information, the context of the information, and the 
decision-maker themselves) but depending on the relative strength of these characteristics 
along a continuum, the decision-maker will be more or less likely to either change or 
maintain their attitude.  The most critical determinant in this process is the likelihood of 
elaboration, or the probability that the decision-maker will engage in complex, dedicated, 
meaningful cognition in order to arrive at an attitudinal outcome.  The central route of 
persuasion prototypically involves higher-ordered thinking, careful analysis, logical, 
effortful evaluation, contemplation, and close scrutiny of multiple sides of the issue 
(dubbed “elaboration” according to the ELM), whereas the peripheral route of persuasion 
includes less effortful degrees and forms of cognition, often relying on stereotypes, 
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mental shortcuts, and “lazier” styles of lower-level processing.  The ELM is based upon 
the different factors that contribute to the overall likelihood of how much elaboration is 
expected to occur along a continuum, given the details of the source, content, context, 
and decision-maker. 
Motivation is an important criterion in determining whether the central or 
peripheral route will be taken and whether an attitude change will result.  The recipient of 
the communication must be motivated to process the information in order to process 
according to the central route. Without sufficient motivation, such as a high degree of 
self-relevance for the information, or a high need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), 
then there is little chance that the central route to persuasion will be employed rather than 
the peripheral route.  Similarly, if the message recipient lacks the ability to process the 
information, whether because of high cognitive load, insufficient knowledge, or if the 
subject matter is simply beyond their innate level of comprehension, then the central 
route is unlikely to be used above the peripheral route.  If the peripheral route of 
persuasion is activated due to low motivation or low ability to process the information 
within the message, then the recipient will either engage in some sort of peripheral 
processing (simple heuristics, cognitive biases, adherence to balance theory [Heider, 
1958]) which can result in a mild, often temporary and impermanent form of attitude 
change, but absent any readily employed heuristic or biases, the attitude will remain 
unchanged.  If the recipient has sufficient motivation and ability to process the 
information, then the message content itself must also be sufficiently different from 
preexisting thoughts in order for the central route of persuasion to be used.  Otherwise, 
lacking any informational novelty, the recipient will simply maintain their original 
 16 
 
attitude.  The final critical determining factor of likelihood of elaboration under the ELM 
is whether the processing ultimately prompts some form of change to the recipient’s 
cognitive structure, the chances of which are increased if the recipient is able to rehearse 
their thoughts or reflect on the issue over time.  If all of these conditions (motivation, 
ability, novelty, and cognitive change) are met, then the attitude in question will change 
according to the central route, which will be a more enduring, firmly-held belief that is 
more likely to influence future behavior than a fleeting, peripherally accomplished 
attitude change. 
The ELM is closely associated with another similar dual-process theory of 
attitude change, the heuristic-systematic processing model (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman, & 
Eagly, 1989; see also Petty & Wegener, 1999).  The HSM is substantially similar to the 
ELM in that they both propose that the processing of information involves two 
mechanisms that differ in terms of the overall level of motivation and cognitive resources 
required.  The more involved central route of ELM is roughly analogous to the systematic 
style of processing in HSM, with the less involved peripheral route of ELM being 
substantially similar to the heuristic processing style of HSM.  Both theories are 
predicated upon the assumption that because of efficiency and attentional overload 
concerns, and irrespective of individual differences in preferred depth of processing, we 
generally tend to expend the least amount of effort necessary to arrive at the optimal, or 
at least a satisfactory, outcome (cf. Allport, 1979; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Operario & 
Fiske, 1999; Simon, 1956).  In addition, the primary determinants of which style of 
processing a perceiver will engage in are personal motivation or relevance, as well as 
cognitive ability (Chen & Chaiken, 1999).  The two models do differ in some ways, 
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mostly with respect to their treatment of two assumptions.  The ELM assumes that 
accuracy is a critical motivator, and that the relative levels of motivation to process 
information accurately and to arrive at accurate conclusions is a prime determinant of 
processing route according to the elaboration continuum (Petty & Wegener, 1999), 
whereas the HSM does not postulate that various types of motivations have a direct 
impact on processing style (Chen & Chaiken, 1999).  The other main distinction between 
the two theories has to do with how they propose that their two systems operate in 
relation to each other.  The ELM favors a mutually exclusive, either/or approach, wherein 
the levels of motivation, ability, nature of processing, and changes in cognitive structure 
each determine in sequence whether central or peripheral processing will occur.  The 
ELM dictates that the threshold in each of these dimensions must be sufficiently 
exceeded in order for central processing to result, otherwise peripheral processing occurs, 
and that the two routes of processing cannot operate simultaneously in coordinated 
cooperation with each other concerning the same information.  On the other hand, the 
HSM places no restrictions on how its two styles of processing can combine to work on 
the same task simultaneously in parallel as long as motivation and ability (which requires 
both aptitude and time) thresholds are sufficiently satisfied.  These minute distinctions 
are more important to consider (and merit further exploration) in contexts with other 
applications than the current research.  For the purposes of the experiments at hand, 
because the differences between exclusive versus simultaneous processing and the role of 
motivational biases are not fundamentally critical factors, the two models will hereinafter 
be viewed in rough equivalence. 
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These models of cognition have been extensively used to investigate the way that 
jurors process information.  For example, Dewitt et al. (1997) demonstrated that, 
consistent with predictions according to the ELM, when mock jurors lack the requisite 
motivation to process scientific evidence in a thorough and effortful manner, they are also 
less likely to pay close attention to dispositive arguments presented throughout the course 
of the trial.  Similarly, according to the HSM’s position that the utilization and degree of 
reliance upon heuristics is greatest when there is motivation to process systematically but 
the necessary background familiarity with the subject matter is lacking (Chaiken et al., 
1989), Cooper et al. (1996) found that jurors relied upon source credibility heuristics 
(Hovland & Weiss, 1951) to make determinations regarding extremely complex 
testimony beyond their ken, but when complicated testimony was within their realm of 
understanding, jurors engaged in systematic processing and disregarded source credibility 
as an indicator of accuracy.  Not surprisingly, heuristic versus systematic styles of 
processing by jurors have been associated with differences in overall evidence recall, 
level of consideration given to evidence, and confidence in verdict (Honess & Charman, 
2002), and even the very verdict outcome itself (Bourgeois, Horowitz, & ForsterLee, 
1993; Horowitz, Bordens, Victor, Bourgeois, & ForsterLee, 2001).   
Need for cognition.  
In addition to the unique situational variables which can contribute towards the 
use of a particular processing style according to these two dual-processing models, there 
are also fundamental, innate individual characteristics that help dictate style of 
processing.  Chief among these is the notion of a stable, internal “need for cognition” 
(NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) which is a single, unifying factor isolated through factor 
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analysis of individual difference studies (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, 
& Rodriguez, 1986; Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983) and which can be reliably 
measured with the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, 
& Kao, 1984;  in particular, see Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996 for a detailed 
overview).  This important factor is based upon Cohen, Stotland, and Wolfe’s (1955) 
conception of need for cognition as an expression of the extent to which a person is 
motivated to reduce tension stemming from cognitive ambiguity.  Their original 
definition was adapted by Cacioppo and Petty (1982) to become a more overarching 
construct where a person’s relative need for cognition was represented as a point along a 
continuum that described the degree to which a person appreciates, enjoys, and seeks out 
the opportunity to engage in effortful cognition.  Need for cognition should not be 
misunderstood as a need in the sense of a biological imperative or a fundamental drive, or 
as an outcome-centered means of goal attainment, but rather as the byproduct of an 
intrinsic satisfaction with one’s own enduring, engaging cognitive efforts, the degree of 
which in turn determines one’s preferred style of processing (Cacioppo, et al., 1996).  
People high in need for cognition demonstrate an active curiosity which impels them to 
seek out information and to thoroughly and effortfully analyze it, whereas people low in 
need for cognition do not derive the same enjoyment from the process of processing, and 
are instead cognitive misers (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) who prefer to avoid engaging in the 
effortful, involved evaluation of new information.  Despite their preference to avoid 
effortful thought, individuals low in need for cognition differ from those high in need for 
cognition in terms of motivational appetite, not necessarily due to less intellectual ability 
to process effortfully.  Such a distinction is akin to how a person’s motivation to engage 
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in challenging, effort-intensive physical activities is associated with—but is not 
dispositive of—the capability of engaging in physical exertion (Cacioppo et al., 1996).   
Need for cognition has been the focus of extensive research because of the 
robustness of the Need for Cognition Scale (NFC; 34-item version by Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982; 18-item short version, Cacioppo et al., 1984) and its core relationship with a wide 
range of individual characteristics, whether broad factors like age, income, and years of 
education, or narrowly defined personal traits such as gender role orientation, intrinsic 
motivation, and social anxiety (see generally Cacioppo et al., 1996).  Need for cognition 
(via the NFC) has also been used as a dependent measure for many empirical 
examinations of various aspects of effortful information processing such as attitudes, 
attitude change, cognitive efforts, cognitive responses, recall, and perception of 
persuasive arguments.  Commonly used indicators of NFC (several of which are 
incorporated into the present research) include the measurement of information recall (as 
a result of a greater degree of thought and extent of elaboration on relevant information, 
high NFC individuals will recall more information than low NFC individuals), 
responsiveness to persuasive messages of varying quality (high NFC individuals are more 
predisposed to expend the cognitive effort necessary to meaningfully distinguish between 
high and low quality arguments than are low NFC individuals), responsiveness to 
peripheral and/or heuristic cues (low NFC individuals tend to exhibit a greater degree of 
reliance on simple heuristic or peripheral processing cues when evaluating incoming 
information than are high NFC individuals), and other approaches (Cacioppo et al., 
1996).  Because motivation to process effortfully is one of the critical determinants of 
processing style according to both the ELM and HSM, individuals high in NFC who 
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derive satisfaction from engaging in effortful processing styles are inherently more likely 
to process information according to the central or systematic approaches (Petty, 
Cacioppo, Sedikides, & Strathman, 1988).   
Just as motivation is necessary to process effortfully, so too is the ability to do so.  
A closely related but distinctly independent factor that interacts with need for cognition is 
the concept of cognitive load.  No matter how motivated a person might be to process 
information in a thorough, careful manner, if they are distracted, occupied, mentally 
deficient, or otherwise prevented from putting forth the necessary effort, they will resort 
to peripheral or heuristic processing by default.  Small and Lerner (2008) found that 
angry participants were less inclined to give further assistance to welfare recipients than 
were sad participants (who made a greater effort to evaluate the decision fairly), but once 
the sad participants were placed under additional cognitive load, their decisions were 
more in line with angry participants.  However, when the angry participants were 
subjected to increased cognitive load demands, their decision-making did not differ from 
the no-load condition, suggesting that the addition of cognitive load inhibited the degree 
of effortful processing that sad participants were otherwise prone to engaging in, yet 
angry participants gave little effort to fully contemplate their decision with or without 
cognitive load demands.   
Differing levels of need for cognition have been shown to influence the way in 
which real jurors understand, evaluate, and consider evidence proffered by expert 
witnesses, as well as overall verdict determinations in civil cases (McAuliff & Bull-
Kovera, 2008).   McAuliff and Bull-Kovera found that jurors higher in NFC were more 
cognizant of methodological strengths and weaknesses present in expert testimony than 
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were their lower NFC counterparts, a distinction that was reflected in their respective 
verdicts.  Beyond this straightforward example of NFC moderating the relationship 
between the degree of scrutiny given to evidence and verdict preferences, Shestowsky 
and Horowitz (2004) found that NFC had a more complex role within deliberating groups 
of mock jurors.  During mock deliberations, high NFC participants were judged to have 
been more persuasive and more involved in proceedings than low NFC participants, yet 
their arguments were not rated as any more logically organized or valid.  Furthermore, 
they also found that participants lower in NFC were more attuned to variations in 
argument strength than the high NFC jurors.  This indicates that the way in which NFC 
relates to understanding, awareness, and consideration of evidence is not necessarily a 
binary, linear predictive variable.  For example, Leippe, Eisenstadt, Rauch, and Seib 
(2004) found that among mock jurors in a criminal case, when considering a strong case 
in favor of the prosecution, those individuals with a more moderate level of NFC found 
the defendant guilty at a greater rate than did both low and high NFC participants, 
indicating that NFC can be a complex and multivariate dimension across different 
circumstances, particularly at both extremes of its spectrum.  Such variegated findings 
suggest that despite the robustness of the Need for Cognition Scale itself, and general 
agreement over the basic principles associated with NFC, it is a dimension which requires 
continued investigation to more fully understand how it applies across different 
processing-related conditions and as an important independent trait within existing 
frameworks of cognitive processing. 
In addition to the ELM, HSM, and other dual-process theories which differ in the 
way they parse the two competing modes of processing and whether (and how) the two 
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systems can operate in relation to each other, the cognitive-experiential self-theory 
(CEST; Epstein, 1994; Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) offers a dual-
process perspective that is more inclusive of the overall characteristics that define the two 
processes and which does not critically rely on specific, sequential, mutually-exclusive 
mechanisms.  Furthermore, in addition to recognizing the individual differences and 
situational variables that influence processing style in much the same way as the ELM 
and HSM, CEST accounts for the role of emotion into the overall predictive model as 
well.  CEST is based on the notion that we create our own “theory of reality” which 
involves a global viewpoint as well as our own self-image as it relates to our world.  
CEST draws on notable personality theories (those of Freud, 1920; Rogers, 1959; Adler, 
1927; and Allport, 1961; among others) to establish that our primary goal is to lead an 
emotionally satisfying life, and it is a consequence of this marriage of emotion and 
cognitive processing that CEST best lends itself to the focus of the current investigation.  
The greater emphasis on the role of emotion within the unconscious elements of CEST 
provides for a more irrational unconscious than many contemporary cognitive theories 
include, but at the same time, the role of emotion in information processing is both 
adaptive in the sense that it compares incoming information to emotional reactions from 
prior experiences, while also being motivationally oriented, which allows for a model that 
is better supported from an evolutionary standpoint than other, more psychoanalytically-
based conceptions of the unconscious. 
The less frequently invoked system is a more logic-based, conscious “rational” 
system predicated upon beliefs. The rational mode of processing “is a deliberative, 
effortful, abstract system” (Epstein, 1994, p. 715) which operates largely independent of 
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emotional influence in an active, evidence-driven, analytical manner, similar to the 
central route of processing under the ELM and the systematic approach of HSM.  
Because of its effortful nature, and a focus geared more towards a long-term outlook, the 
rational system is used sparingly in daily operations compared to its complementary 
system.  However, the two systems within CEST are capable of operating in tandem, 
simultaneously influencing one another through parallel engagement, unlike the more 
exclusive and directly competing processes in other dual-process theories. 
The more dominant system that controls most of our behavior according to CEST 
is a quick, automatic, preconscious, affect-oriented “experiential” system where the 
fundamental constructs are neatly organized schemas (which can be either motivational 
and goal-oriented or descriptive, which involve broad generalizations about the nature of 
oneself and the world) that are based upon prior emotional experiences.  The experiential 
system, which roughly corresponds to the ELM’s peripheral route and the HSM’s 
heuristic approach, is a gut-level style of processing that at its most elemental 
corresponds more closely with these two “default” types of processing.  At a more 
advanced level, it is able to involve creativity, intuition, and can even include abstract 
and/or generalized forms of reasoning (Epstein, 1994), especially when utilized in 
cooperation with the rational system.  Because one’s affective state is often directly 
associated with (and incorporated within) the experiential system, without any deliberate 
consideration of that fact, the outcomes produced via experiential processing can often be 
interpreted as more “compelling” or “heart-felt” because they are aligned with one’s 
affective state, as opposed to the relatively emotionally neutral tendencies of rational 
processing.  Also, because this cooperative synergy between affect and experiential 
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processing is rarely the focus of deliberate, intentional consideration, the rational system 
typically neglects to account for or control this influence since it is usually operating 
silently in the background of cognition. 
Since the rational style of processing under CEST is so fundamentally similar to 
the central or systematic routes of processing according to the ELM and HSM, a 
modified version of the original Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) is 
used to identify an individual’s preferences for the rational style of processing according 
to the Rational-Experential Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; 
Pacini & Epstein, 1999).  However, since the counterpart to the rational mode of 
processing is rooted in emotion and drawing from past experiences, which is a separate 
dimension rather than simply a polar opposite along the same dimension, the REI also 
includes the Faith in Intuition scale (FI).  The FI measures the extent to which a person 
relies on their hunches or gut feelings when making decisions.  These two dimensions are 
independent, which allows for different types of decisions to be made according to either 
method, a duality best illustrated by what is termed the ratio-bias phenomenon (Epstein & 
Pacini, 1999) which is based on the finding that when faced with low probability events, 
we often judge an odds ratio comprised of smaller numbers to be less likely than an 
identical ratio on a larger scale (such as the feeling that having 10 chances out of 100 
affords a greater likelihood of selection than if one’s chances were only 1 out of 10).  
Rationally, we understand that our odds are absolutely equivalent in both situations, but 
experientially, when listening to our hunches, we tend to prefer the larger ratio.  Pacini 
and Epstein (1999) demonstrated that according to the REI, individuals more predisposed 
to rational processing were correspondingly associated with exhibiting greater degrees of 
 26 
 
logical, economically optimal choosing behaviors than individuals less prone to rational 
processing.  This coexisting contrast between knowing one thing and feeling another 
illustrates how the two systems of processing according to CEST can function 
independently.  Nevertheless, the REI (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) has been shown to be 
predictive of several different personality factors. 
Krauss, Lieberman and Olson (2004) found a reliable pattern when using CEST 
as a conceptual framework for juror evaluation of evidence.  Inducing rational processing 
styles among mock jurors in a future dangerousness proceeding prompted those jurors to 
be more impressed by actuarial testimony, characterized by detailed statistical projections 
and data analysis, whereas participants induced to process experientially were primarily 
influenced by clinically oriented expert testimony that did not require the same level of 
logical consideration of evidence as the actuarial testimony.  Lieberman (2002) found 
that in awarding damages in a civil suit, mock jurors who had been induced to process 
information in an experiential mode displayed a greater degree of leniency (expressed 
though lower damages awarded) for attractive defendants who had been found liable in 
comparison to otherwise equivalent unattractive defendants, but that mock jurors who 
had been primed to process information in a rational mode displayed no such extra-legal 
bias. 
Information processing models of emotion, which present cognition as a complex 
and multifaceted operation of independent yet interrelated systems, emerged in the 1940s 
and 1950s but gained favor in the later 20th century due in part to the broad, 
comprehensive nature of the theory (addressing a broad spectrum of cognitive elements 
such as language, vision, attention, recall, judgment, and reasoning) and an open-ended 
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scope able to incorporate and accommodate additional, more specialized models and 
theories.  Information processing models involve four primary themes as they relate to 
cognition and emotion (Dalgleish, 2003).  First is the assumption that cognitive 
processing is a finite resource which must be judiciously allocated, like a computer’s 
RAM.  This limited reservoir of cognition therefore requires that we selectively allocate 
our attention such that the most important incoming stimuli are afforded the necessary 
amount of devotion.  Like a computer’s operating system, this automatic prioritization 
scheme apportions resources according to where they are needed most, in the case of 
emotions, emphasis is allocated particularly to those stimuli that are unique, unexpected, 
or changing.  Second, the information processing models of emotion require an 
organizational scheme for cognitive endeavors, akin to a computer’s process tree.  
Despite some past debate, the currently accepted design favors a hierarchy of distinct 
components, organized according to similar tasks, goals, and processes in order to 
facilitate quicker performance (see generally Dalgleish, 2003).  Information processing 
models also include provisions to account for parallel processing of information by 
different systems independently and simultaneously to improve flexibility.  Finally, 
information processing provides for two competing motivations—top-down, which is 
generally active, deliberate, and goal-driven; and bottom-up, which is more perceptually 
based and reactive, a division which has been supported by functional magnetic 
resonance imaging research (Ochsner, et al., 2009). 
 One specific information processing theory of emotion is Bower’s network theory 
(Bower, 1981) which is highly dependent on levels of association such that similarly 
grouped or categorized elements organize themselves as “nodes”, which can be 
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visualized as different electrons (including stimuli, both automatic and deliberate 
responses, and any other related or similarly classified concepts and constructs) orbiting 
around a common emotion node nucleus.  Bower provided evidence for the model by 
demonstrating mood inductions that would lead to state-dependent performance in line 
with the induced moods in a variety of contexts, including social judgments, perceptual 
tasks, and recall efforts.  However, this model proved to be too simplistic.  It relied upon 
painting with an extremely broad, gestaltish brush to the exclusion of more nuanced, 
discrete components of emotion.   
 The overbroad clumsiness of Bower’s theory (1981) was improved upon by 
Forgas’s Affect Infusion Model (1994, 1995).  It ameliorated Bower’s flaws with explicit 
boundary conditions and ideas on how it can be applied more fluidly.  The affect infusion 
model relies upon affective priming (Forgas & Bower, 1987) whereupon memories for 
stimuli are associated with a particular affective state.  When encountering new stimuli, 
these pre-existing pairings facilitate access to familiar experiences and previous 
reactions, which then shape and guide presently occurring perceptions.  Once this 
emotional priming has taken place, affect infusion is particularly likely in situations that 
are complex, demanding, and which feature open, constructive, substantive processing 
(Fiedler & Stroehm 1986, Forgas 1992, 1993; Forgas & Bower 1987). 
Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s theory (1987) is an improvement, providing more 
specific accounts and greater detail within its framework, which revolved around a 
hierarchy of processing efforts dedicated to planning for and achieving goals.  Emotions 
are thought to act as a conduit to help determine optimal goal outcomes through partly 
automatic planning and top-down prioritization of processing efforts.  The theory is based 
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on five primary emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, anger, and disgust, each oriented in 
some relation to goal satisfaction) which combine and blend with one another to create 
other emotions which are also goal-oriented in nature.  This combinational 
characterization of emotional components provided the bedrock for later appraisal-based 
theories and models which remain today, and which form the basis for the current 
inquiry. 
History of valence and emotion research.  
The most basic, fundamental characteristic associated with the experience of 
emotion is valence.  Some emotions are pleasant to experience, some distinctly 
unpleasant, while still others are neutral and depend on context, meaning, and 
concomitant emotions to qualify as having any sort of polar charge.  Because overall 
valence of emotion is the broadest brush with which empirical examination is possible, 
doing so often only yields similarly broad conclusions, just as it did with respect to 
Bower’s (1981) network theory.  Early psychological research examining the influence of 
emotion on decision-making tended to focus exclusively on valence, and the opinion that 
valence was the foremost predictor of emotional influence on cognition and decision-
making persisted until relatively recently (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, Rucker, 2000; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2000).  Valence was thought to be the primary determinant in the 
emotion/decision-making relationship as recently as 1998 when Elster proclaimed that 
“the only relevant aspect of emotion is their valence” (p. 64) when referring to the role 
that valence plays in economic “cost-benefit analysis” forms of emotional decision-
making, and some researchers (Forgas, 2010) continue to contend that valence and broad 
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mood states are the most critical aspects of how emotions influence decision-making, 
even in light of research that suggests otherwise. 
Theoretical proposals and empirical investigations began to depart from the 
overly simplistic valence-based accounts during the mid-1980s through the work of a 
small group of researchers essentially independently arriving at the same conclusions 
(Ellsworth, Roseman, & C. A. Smith; Scherer; & Frijda; see Schorr, 2001).  These 
seminal efforts were dedicated to the notion that the experience of emotion is a more 
complex and nuanced affair than the prevailing view that emotion was simply a product 
of the interaction between one’s pleasantness of feeling and one’s level of arousal.  
Broadly speaking, this new movement suggested that emotions were comprised of several 
substituent, interrelated factors called appraisals.  These early models emphasized 
different types and aspects of appraisals, with Roseman (1984) characterizing emotions 
according to dimensions of appetitive or aversive motivations, certainty, and agency; 
Scherer (1984b) proposing factors of novelty (suddenness and familiarity), intrinsic 
pleasantness, goal significance (concern relevance and outcome probability), agent and 
motive of cause, and compatibility with standards (both external and internal); and Frijda 
(1986) suggesting that emotion depends on characteristics related to change, familiarity, 
valence, focality, certainty, intent (of oneself and others) and value relevance.  The most 
widely-accepted and enduring of the appraisal theories is that of C. A. Smith and 
Ellsworth (1985), which, building upon the ideas of Roseman (1984) and Scherer (1984a) 
through experimental investigation, was in response not only to the myopic 
valence/arousal overemphasis, but also to the then-prevailing notion that “opposite” 
emotions varied along one single, polar continuum.  They also sought to remedy 
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methodological blunders and to generally fill the theoretical void of existing emotion 
research.  Through a variety of methods, they ultimately distilled emotion into 6 
orthogonal dimensions: pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, attentional activity, self 
versus other responsibility/control and situational control, and mapped 15 core emotions 
according to each of these underlying appraisal dimensions (see Figures 1, 2, & 3).  
 C. A. Smith and Ellsworth (1987) improved the reliability of their 1985 findings 
which had all been based upon recall, recollection, and/or imagined feelings by instead 
examining the emotions and appraisals associated with an upcoming event in the near 
future (students just prior to taking an exam) and compared their reports to subsequent 
responses upon receiving grades on the exam.  Most participants at both times reported at 
least two emotions blending together to form overall affect.  Their findings more or less 
echoed previous conclusions to confirm that their earlier (1985) assumptions and findings 
based upon recalled emotion were in fact valid and highly consistent.  Although anger 
was not associated with high degrees of certainty after receiving grades in this study, 
there exists the possibility that anger was still present yet was subordinate to the feelings 
of uncertainty about one’s future when associated with all of the normal consequences 
thought to accompany receiving a poor grade.  That is, this circumstance was an atypical 
manifestation of anger, and more typical instances of anger do have appraisals of 
certainty associated with them (Ask & Granhag, 2007a; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001; 
Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Litvak, Lerner, Tiedens, & Schonk, 2010; Tiedens & Linton, 
2001). 
 
 32 
 
  
 
Figure 1. Smith & Ellsworth’s (1985) Symmetric Individual Differences 
Multidimensional Scaling emotional dimension location plots for Pleasantness (X-axis) 
and Anticipate Effort (Y-axis). Principal components analysis with varimax rotation 
yielded similar results. 
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Figure 2. Smith & Ellsworth’s (1985) Symmetric Individual Differences 
Multidimensional Scaling emotional dimension location plots for Certainty (X-axis) and 
Attentional Activity (Y-axis). Principal components analysis with varimax rotation 
yielded similar results. 
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Figure 3. Smith & Ellsworth’s (1985) Symmetric Individual Differences 
Multidimensional Scaling emotional dimension location plots for Self/Other 
Responsibility/Control (X-axis) and Situational/Human Control (Y-axis). Principal 
components analysis with varimax rotation yielded similar results. 
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 Beyond valence. 
Appraisal-based efforts soon took center stage over valence in emotion research.  
Valence research itself yielded the basis for its ultimate disfavor, providing several 
converging illustrations of how different emotions of the same valence can lead to 
different results across a variety of dimensions—antecedent appraisals (C. A. Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985), estimations of likelihood (DeSteno et al., 2000), facial expressions 
(Keltner, Ekman, Gonzaga, & Beer, 2003), autonomic responses (Levenson, Ekman, & 
Friesen, 1990), police investigations (Ask & Granhag, 2007a), tolerance for risk, 
optimism, self-relevant and irrelevant judgments (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), as well as 
central nervous system operations (Panksepp, 1982).  Lerner and Keltner (2000) 
continued to kick the legs out from under prior valence-based models by demonstrating 
that two negatively valenced emotions (anger and fear) had markedly different influences 
on judgment—specifically risk perception.  In line with other anger research, angry 
participants made optimistic assessments of risk whereas sad participants made 
pessimistic judgments.  If mere valence was the most powerful influence of emotion on 
decision-making, then anger and fear should have resulted in identical (or at least similar) 
outcomes of decisions.  Instead, the two seemingly similar (negative) emotions led to 
widely divergent consequences.   
Lerner and Keltner (2001) provide additional basis for excluding valence as a 
meaningful variable of interest within decision-making contexts by comparing two 
emotions (happiness and anger) which are opposed in valence yet share appraisal themes 
of certainty and control.  Using Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) “Asian disease 
problem” risk preference framing paradigm, happy and angry participants both reacted to 
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risk perception in similar ways, but both were different than fearful participants.  Such a 
divergence indicates that it is more likely that the similar appraisal themes underlying 
happiness and anger (both being high in certainty and control) guided judgment as 
opposed to valence—otherwise, angry and fearful participants should have yielded more 
similar results.  In addition to replicating their earlier findings, to address the possibility 
that this trend might be due to dispositional characteristics rather than experimental 
manipulations, Lerner and Keltner’s next study pre-tested participants for their stable 
traits of being either angrier, more fearful, or happier by at least 1 standard deviation 
above the mean than average.  Six to eight weeks prior to the decision-making portion of 
the study, participants were tested and compared according to scales measuring 
dispositional fear, anger, and happiness, as well as Weinstein’s (1980) scale of optimism 
for the likelihood of various positive and negative future life events.  Because past 
research on emotional priming indicates that priming is most effective when judgment 
targets are more ambiguous in relation to the primed emotion (Uleman & Bargh, 1989), 
Lerner and Keltner proposed that the degree of certainty and controllability of the judged 
event’s appraisal tendencies should moderate the effects of dispositional anger and fear 
on evaluations of risk when certainty and control-related appraisal tendencies are primed 
ahead of time.  That is, ambiguous target events should be more conducive to appraisal 
tendencies shaping judgment than target events unequivocally perceived to be certain and 
controllable or uncertain and uncontrollable.  For ambiguous judgments, they found that 
angry participants and happy participants did not differ significantly from one another, 
but that they both differed significantly from fearful participants in degree of optimism in 
risk estimates.  For non-ambiguous judgments, both angry participants and fearful 
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participants were equivalently pessimistic, and were both significantly less optimistic 
than happy participants in terms of perception of risk.  To summarize, when events were 
ambiguous in the relevant dimensions, fear and anger had different results on judgment, 
which supports the appraisal-tendency model and is contrary to a valence-based 
approach.  However, when events were unambiguous, appraisals had less of an influence 
on judgment and valence was a better predictor for the interaction of emotion and 
decision-making.  Additional examples of how appraisals and attributions are more 
predictive of processing style include Tiedens (2001), which found that when interpreting 
the behavior of other people, angry participants made inferences based on scripts and 
schemas, (a heuristic style of processing), whereas sad participants tended to consider a 
wide range of possibilities when examining the motives of others, which is a more 
systematic approach to processing.  Also, Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., (1994) 
demonstrated a greater reliance upon stereotyping for angry decision-makers than among 
sad decision-makers, and that angry decision-makers found peripheral, non-critical 
source attributes to be more persuasive than message content itself.  The present 
dissertation will similarly look at the emotions of fear and anger, focusing more on the 
appraisals associated with these emotions rather than the mere valence of emotions. 
Appraisal theories. 
Despite coming into vogue with researchers in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
notion of appraisals has been around much longer.  The term “appraisal” was first coined 
by Magda Arnold (1960) to describe the sort of intuitive, instinctual, instantaneous, 
adaptive evaluations to characterize the singularities of different emotions.  She viewed 
emotion as the resulting experience associated with reactions to environmental changes.  
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One of her contemporaries, Richard Lazarus (1966) was an early appraisal theorist whose 
ideas form the bedrock of most subsequent appraisal-based theories.  First, he maintained 
that emotions have a near boundless range due to the potential for subtle gradations and 
distinctions in the emotional experience thanks to the unique way in which each human 
brain perceives its environment.  Second, he argued that emotion was a fluid, ongoing 
event that could be recharacterized and adjusted cyclically through time such that the 
emotion would evolve and adapt through time and reappraisal.  Frijda (1986) echoed this 
cyclical conceptualization of emotion by suggesting that situations guide emotional 
responses through appraisals, and in turn, emotional responses guide perception of 
situations. 
Aside from a constellation of assorted variations on the theme, the fundamental 
underlying principle in all the various appraisal theories is the notion that emotions are a 
fluid, reactive, transitory/transitional process.  Such a process-based account is contrary 
to earlier, more static, categorical positions that view emotion as a sort of ingrained, 
automatic response pattern of intertwined cognitive, behavioral, and biological 
components (Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Ekman, 1972).  While different appraisal theories 
propose different sequences (and each model predicts different sequences for different 
situations—the inherent flexibility and adaptability of emotion being the very basis of 
this categorization/characterization of emotion), there is a sort of general sequential 
framework to which most emotional experiences adhere according to appraisal theories.  
Typically, the first appraisal is something akin to novelty stemming from a change in the 
environment at large, whether mental, social, or physical.  An evaluation then takes place 
to determine whether the event is irrelevant (and can thus be ignored) or relevant (which 
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requires additional attention).  If the event is relevant, the next step in most models is to 
gauge whether the event is favorable or unfavorable to the perceiver (Zajonc, 1980).  This 
is a largely automatic and nearly instantaneous process.  Next, appraisals are formed.  
The specific appraisals which theoretically unfold depend on which appraisal theory is 
under consideration, but they generally concern issues of certainty, predictability, the 
ability to act in response, un/favorability with respect to one’s own goals, power, agency, 
and accordance with social standards.  This process continues in a repetitive, cyclical 
pattern until resolution is achieved or deemed impossible.  The first emotional response 
to a change in the environment can provoke behavior with consequences that directly 
impact the trajectory or outcome of the situation itself, leading to continued reappraisals.  
Furthermore, there can be secondary responses to the initial response, thereby further 
influencing the situation, and when appraisal tendencies have been activated, they will 
make it more likely for future appraisals to be perceived along those same dimensions, 
resulting in continued emotional influences on all aspects of a situation.  Whether 
appraisals themselves are precursors or sources of emotion (evaluation of the 
environment causes resultant corresponding emotion; Zajonc, 1980), or whether they are 
considered specific, discrete sub-components of emotion (different emotions result from 
different combinations of constituent appraisals; Scherer, 1984b; Kappas, 2001) is a 
matter of some debate, but for the most part, critics of appraisal theory tend to adopt the 
former viewpoint whereas appraisal theorists embrace the latter.  The constituent 
accounting allows for an infinitely variable range of emotional experiences, shaded with 
nuance and subtle distinctions, which is one of the characteristics that makes the model 
so appealing and useful to emotion researchers. 
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As previously alluded to, counterintuitive findings of seemingly similar emotions 
having distinctly opposed impacts on decision-making led to the formulation of the 
Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001).  The Appraisal-
Tendency Framework (ATF) is founded on several assumptions.  First, it assumes that 
emotion causes changes (whether physical, behavioral, and/or cognitive) which can linger 
beyond the initial emotion-provoking event and can influence subsequent decision-
making.  Second, it assumes that emotions are associated with specific appraisals which it 
defines as the underlying messages or meanings taken from the experience of the emotion 
in response to the emotion-eliciting event.  Based upon these assumptions, the ATF 
asserts that individual emotions lead to the tendency to appraise upcoming developments 
according to the central appraisal dimensions which prompted the emotion in the first 
place.  This is the appraisal tendency— the process in which “emotion activates a 
cognitive predisposition to appraise future events in line with the central-appraisal 
dimensions that triggered the emotion” (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, p. 477). Emotions shape 
judgment and decision-making within situations related to the overall appraisal of the 
event.  Emotions prompt specific cognitive, motivational, biological, and behavioral 
processes, which then in turn control the effect of emotion on judgment and decision-
making. 
Uncertainty and certainty appraisals specifically. 
In keeping with the trend of setting aside valence in favor of constituent 
appraisals, the current studies will emphasize the specific appraisal dimensions of 
certainty and uncertainty, and how they in turn influence information processing and 
decision-making. Certainty, as defined by C. A. Smith and Ellsworth (1987) is “the 
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extent to which the person understands or is sure of what is happening or is going to 
happen in the situation” (p. 475).  Beyond relevance and conduciveness/motivational 
bases, certainty or probability is one dimension that most appraisal theorists account for.  
Without some measure of probabilistic likelihood of any given outcome, any fully 
informed emotional or behavioral response is impossible, because after all, we are 
primarily concerned with the outcome of the event, not necessarily the event itself.  For 
instance, some prospective emotions like hope, anxiety, and fear are characterized by 
high levels of uncertainty because they are based on the future outcome of an event being 
unknown or unresolved.  In contrast, when dealing with events that have happened or are 
expected to occur, responses are based upon measures higher in certainty which guide 
emotions like anger, disgust, and happiness accordingly (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; C. 
A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tiedens & Linton, 2001).  The greater degree of certainty 
we feel, the less motivation we have to process in an effortful, systematic manner since 
we are under the impression that we already have a sufficient amount of information to 
correctly understand and react to the situation (Feigenson & Park, 2006).   
Appraisals of certainty and uncertainty have led to a number of proposed theories 
to account for the mechanisms which drive the relationship between a given emotion and 
its cognitive consequences.  Bar-Anan, Wilson, and Gilbert (2009) proposed (and 
confirmed) the “uncertainty intensification hypothesis” which is the notion that 
concomitant experience of uncertainty during emotional experiences will synergize with 
the predominant emotional state to intensify the relative pleasantness or unpleasantness 
of the event itself.  Possible reasons for this effect include the notion that uncertainty 
increases attention and prolongs cognitive accessibility of the emotion-eliciting event 
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(Wilson, Centerbar, Kermer, & Gilbert, 2005) which might lead to intensifying reactions 
simply through continued consideration.  In the alternative, the curiosity associated with 
uncertainty may increase emotional involvement and engagement moreso than a more 
certain event, which in turn intensifies the emotional state due to the greater levels of 
attention devoted to it. 
Certainty appraisals are a key component within different dual-process theories of 
persuasion.  For example, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, (Loewenstein et al., 2001), 
which is similar in nature to the rational and experiential dimensions at the core of 
Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory (Epstein, 1994; Epstein & Pacini 1999; Pacini & 
Epstein 1999), emphasizes the role of affect at the exact moment of decision-making 
because emotional reactions to risk or uncertainty are often different from purely 
cognitive analysis, and when there is a disconnect between emotional reaction to risk 
(and/or uncertainty) and cognitive evaluation, emotion often trumps the more purely 
consequentialist, cognitive, cost-benefit analysis.  Also, with respect to the Heuristic-
Systematic Model of persuasion (Chaiken et al., 1989), the sufficiency threshold 
hypothesis requires a minimum level of certainty in one’s judgment of message accuracy 
in order to determine that enough cognitive effort has been expended on a task.  If the 
minimum threshold of confidence is not met, additional cognitive effort is required and 
systematic processing results.  If the threshold level of certainty has been attained, then 
we know that additional effort is not necessary because it will not change our decision—
if we are confident and certain in our judgment, further expenditure is just gilding the 
lily—and heuristic processing will result. 
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Emotion induction techniques. 
Previous studies examining the impact of mood on decision-making typically 
looked at induced moods of either positive or negative valence from one context and their 
effects on cognition in another context characterized by dual processing models 
consisting of either heuristic processing or systematic processing (Chaiken et al., 1989; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, Schwarz, 1990).  These earlier studies typically found that 
people who had been induced to feel traditionally negatively valenced emotions would be 
predisposed towards a more systematic style of processing, while those people who were 
induced to feel positively valenced emotions favored the use of more heuristic styles of 
processing (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz & Strack, 1990; Mackie & Worth, 1989; 1991).  
These valence-oriented studies proposed different mechanisms of action for their findings 
including capacity arguments (that a state of cognitive overload results from the fact that 
positive emotions are intricately intertwined with other conceptual notes; Mackie & 
Worth, 1989; 1991) and motivational bases (in order to maintain or achieve positive 
states by avoiding or remedying negative states, we must utilize systematic thought 
processes; Bless et al., 1990; Wegener & Petty, 1994; Wegener, Petty, & S. M. Smith, 
1995).  Bless et al. (1996) modified the notion that happiness lessens the motivation to 
deeply process information.  They found that while reliance on general knowledge 
structures was directly related to the degree of unhappiness (when tested for recognition 
memory by filling in details of a story about people going out to dinner, happier people 
substituted generic, script or schema-consistent assumptions more frequently), but that 
happiness did not lessen cognitive performance in all circumstances.  In fact, happy 
participants even exhibited more accurate recall when performing two tasks 
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simultaneously (listening to stories while completing a puzzle task requiring high levels 
of concentration), though only when the stories contained little or no script-inconsistent 
information.  This suggests that rather than a decrease in motivation to process deeply 
being associated with positive moods, that a more accurate summary is that there is 
simply greater reliance on general knowledge structures when happy. 
Another account is informational utility, which has two supporting theories, one 
of which being the “affect-as-information” model which proposes that mood states 
function as situational indicators and/or to guide our judgment such that negative states 
are indicative of threats to our goals and therefore careful, deliberate, systematic 
processing is required.  Conversely, the affect-as-information model suggests that 
positive emotional states indicate safety and comfort with our state in relation to goals 
and therefore superficial, generalized, heuristic processing is all that is necessary (Bless, 
2000; Bless et al., 1996; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 2003).  Informational 
utility also forms the basis of the “mood as input” approach which is the notion that a 
positive affective state serves as a sort of litmus test to indicate that we have enough 
information to formulate a decision (Martin, Abend, Sedikides, & Green, 1997; Martin, 
Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993).  The mood as input conception suggests that the sense of 
overall certainty that is associated with positive moods leads to heuristic processing 
instead of systematic processing (Martin et al., 1993) because it is easier for people in 
positive moods to meet the sufficiency threshold of certainty required for decisions than 
it is for people in negative moods (Chaiken et al., 1989).  Each of these different models 
of how affect affects cognition are centered solely around the valence of the emotion, 
which, while obviously among the most fundamental attributes of emotion and a natural 
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starting point for investigation, is far too broad of a dimension upon which to base an 
entire spectrum of decision-making theories.  The nature of this mischaracterization was 
highlighted by the simple observation that two negatively valenced emotions—anger and 
sadness—each have dramatically different influences on processing style in that sadness 
facilitates deeper, effortful, systematic processing whereas anger provokes basic, 
unsophisticated, heuristic processing styles (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; 
Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Tiedens, 2001). 
The current research is focused on further identifying the relationship between 
emotional appraisals (specifically that of certainty) and its impact on processing style, 
which will require that I experimentally induce emotion.  Previous studies have 
successfully induced various emotions through a variety of research designs (for 
comprehensive reviews and comparative effectiveness of different induction methods, see 
Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011; Martin, 1990; Philippot, 1993; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, 
& Hesse, 1996), but due to the desire to maintain maximum consistency across 
participants, minimize the risk of ineffective inductions due to half-hearted efforts by 
participants (an issue which can sabotage autobiographical writing exercises as a means 
of induction), and on the basis of the overall relative reliability that has been established, 
the current research induced emotional states through the use of film clips (Gross & 
Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007).  Each of the film clips used to 
experimentally manipulate emotion has been extensively validated and confirmed to be a 
reliable means of inducing emotion (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 
2007), though the effectiveness of each film’s emotional elicitation among the current 
sampling frame was experimentally tested and verified prior to any theoretical reliance 
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upon them.  Since the focus of this effort revolves around appraisals of certainty, the 
emotions of fear (characterized by an appraisal of uncertainty) and anger (characterized 
by an appraisal of certainty) were induced.  The anger-inducing clips were a bullying 
scene from My Bodyguard (1980) and a scene featuring South African police abusing and 
shooting anti-apartheid protestors from Cry Freedom (1987); the fear-inducing clips were 
of a boy playing in a deserted hallway from The Shining (1980) and a basement chase 
scene from The Silence of the Lambs (1991); neutral, non-emotional control clips of a 
screen-saver featuring abstract shapes and a nature scene from Alaska’s Wild Denali 
(1997) were also used (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007; see 
Appendix A).  
Emotions dictating information processing methods and decision-making. 
In order to investigate the impact of certainty appraisals on information 
processing style and ability, it is important to start by considering the several ways that 
broader emotions have been demonstrated to influence cognition.  First, emotions have 
been shown to dictate information processing methods.  For example, Fiedler (2000) and 
Forgas (1998; 2000) propose that in a broad, valence-based sense, sad/negative moods 
generally lead to or improve more careful, deliberate, elaborate, analytic, systematic 
processing.  They also maintain that moderately positive moods facilitate creative 
thinking, forming associations, and inductive reasoning compared to neutral moods.  
Similarly, others argue that happy moods foster more heuristic thinking and “top-down” 
processing (Bless et al., 1996, Park & Banaji, 2000), whereas negative moods lead to 
more “bottom-up”, deliberative processing (Forgas, 2003; Park & Banaji 2000; Petty, 
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Fabrigar & Wegener, 2003), to the exclusion of heuristics and automatic processing 
according to the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).   
Emotional valence directing judgments. 
Other research has shown that emotional valence can influence judgments directly 
and in accordance with the emotional orientation, a phenomenon generally known as 
mood (or affect) congruence effects.  Mood congruent effects manifest when ambiguous 
information is interpreted in a manner consistent with whatever affective state the 
observer happens to be in (Bower, 1981; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Petty et al., 2003).  An 
example of mood congruent effects is the practice of cognitive priming, in which 
emotions seep into judgment and shape perceptions and decision-making accordingly 
(Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). 
Emotions suggesting informational context for decision-making. 
The inferential mechanisms at the core of the affect-as-information models 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 2003) are another possible explanation for mood congruent 
effects on decision-making.  Because this theory incorporates a sort of internal inventory 
of one’s own emotional state, which is then used to inform the context for decision-
making, any lingering emotional state we might be experiencing will be interpreted as a 
reaction to the target of our decision task.  Affect-as-information theories for the 
influence of emotion on decision-making and the appraisal tendency theory are each 
applicable to both direct and incidental effects of emotions, though affect-as-information 
tends to rely more on direct effects whereas the appraisal tendency theory is generally 
more attuned to incidental effects (Feigenson & Park, 2006).  
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The current investigation (and nearly all citations of significant utility within) is 
focused on the role of incidental affect (that which is not directly relevant to or stemming 
from the decision task itself) on decision-making, not the more straightforward and 
obvious effects of integral affect which is a direct result or is directly related to the 
decision itself.  Incidental affect influences decision-making through the reliance upon 
current feelings as an indicator of information—the affect-as-information model.  When 
affect is presumed to be somehow relevant to the decision itself, it can be heuristically 
relied upon to help inform the decision.  However, according to Lerner and Keltner’s 
cognitive awareness hypothesis (2000), if the feelings are thought to be due to some other 
outside influence—especially if the decision-maker is made aware of the possibility that 
their affect may be due to an unrelated, external factor—then there is no heuristic use of 
feelings as a diagnostic indicator, and they cease to have any impact on decision-making 
(Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1993; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  For this 
reason, the current experiments ensured that emotional inductions were seen as separate 
and distinct from the case facts.  
There will be no manipulation of valence because of findings that disconfirm the 
existence of a “cross-valence” effect—anger and sadness do not influence judgments 
related to circumstances that are positively valenced (Keltner, Ellsworth et al., 1993).  
Schwarz (1990) says that this is due to the fact that only similarly valenced events (either 
recalled or predicted) are relevant to the judgment tasks at hand.  Because the subject 
matter at issue in civil trials is typically unpleasant or neutrally valenced at best, there is 
no need to examine the effects of valence in this circumstance. 
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How specific emotions fit in with processing and decision-making models. 
Depending on the individual characteristics of the trial, emotions that jurors are 
potentially likely to experience run the gamut of the emotional spectrum, including all 15 
discrete emotional states isolated by C. A. Smith and Ellsworth (sadness, shame, fear, 
surprise, hope, frustration, boredom, disgust, guilt, contempt, anger, interest, happiness, 
challenge, and pride; 1985, 1987).  Because anger and fear are highly similar to one 
another according to most of C. A. Smith and Ellsworth’s categorical dimensions of 
appraisal (with the notable exception of certainty, which is addressed in the current 
dissertation), and because they are each directly relevant to the sorts of emotions that 
real-life jurors report feeling (Antonio, 2006; Landau, 2011), inducing these two specific 
emotions will permit us to directly investigate the role of certainty appraisals on 
processing style and decision-making. 
C. A. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) determined that anger is best characterized as 
being unpleasant, involving a high degree of anticipated effort, a sense of human agency 
involvement as well as other-responsibility/control, and a fair amount of certainty which 
was associated with no clear approach or avoidance dimension.  They found that the 
prototypical anger-inducing experience revolves around someone else doing something 
perceived as unfair which has negative repercussions for the individual perceiver across a 
broad range of circumstances.  In comparison, they determined that fear is best 
characterized as an unpleasant condition associated with high degrees of effort, a sense of 
situational control as well as other-responsibility/control, and extremely high degrees of 
uncertainty concerning whether it will be possible to avoid or escape a highly unpleasant 
development for the perceiver, and that, like anger, the uncertainty was also not 
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associated with any particular approach or avoidance characterization.  The prototypical 
fearful experiences involved a wide range of scenarios, ranging from facing the 
possibility of arrest for possession of drugs at a rock concert, to discovering a prowler 
near one’s home, being robbed, being chased by a vicious dog, getting lost in the 
wilderness, and losing control of a car or bicycle during challenging conditions.  The 
situational versus human control dimension, on which anger was originally loaded 
towards situational control appraisals (compared to fear, which was loaded more towards 
human control appraisals), was later discovered to be less replicable across different 
contexts (C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1987).  For the current purposes, it is assumed to be 
essentially equivalent among jury decision-makers.   
The manner in which these two distinct emotions can affect processing has been 
studied across multiple tasks and research paradigms, including in both dispositional and 
induced emotional states.  In social judgment contexts as well as guilt determinations, a 
greater reliance upon stereotypes (a form of heuristic processing; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 
1985), heuristics, and source credibility cues over message content were utilized by angry 
decision-makers (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 1994; Tiedens & Linton, 2001).  Fewer 
informational cues were used by angry participants when determining liability in a 
personal injury case (along with exhibiting a greater degree of punitiveness; Lerner et al., 
1998), and the rate and veridicality of detecting inconsistencies in trial testimony among 
angry participants (Semmler & Brewer, 2002), was poorer than less angry participants.  
This final characteristic of angry jurors is a dimension which the current series of studies 
will investigate by improving upon and extending Semmler and Brewer’s research. 
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Stable, trait-based measures of dispositional anger have been shown to be 
negatively related to assessments of perceived risk, whereas dispositional fear has been 
found to be positively related to risk judgments (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001).  
Similarly, participants induced to feel anger consistently estimated their degree of 
personal risk and likelihood of suffering personal harm in a more optimistic and risk-
tolerant manner than did participants induced to feel sad or fearful (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, 
Lerner, & Small, 2005; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 
2001).  The finding that two emotions of similar valence have diametrically opposed 
influences on cognition and decision making serves as a perfect reference to further 
illustrate the possible mechanisms (Tiedens & Linton, 2001) that drive the Appraisal-
Tendency Framework (ATF; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001).  To view these examples of 
the ATF through the lens of Bower’s (1981) associative network theory and Forgas’s 
(1995) Affect Infusion Model, we would conclude that fearful appraisals activate a 
network of response featuring low levels of coping potential and certainty, but that angry 
appraisals would activate a network comprised of responses involving high levels of 
coping ability and certainty.   
The affect-as-information account (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 
2003), while initially constructed to incorporate the role of valence at informing 
processing style and decision-making, can simply be adjusted to focus beyond the 
polarity of an emotion.  Instead, we can expand the scope of the model to consider the 
types of appraisals that are activated in response to the situation, which in turn help 
determine how best to govern cognition.  For example, instead of positively valenced 
emotions signaling that all is well and that nothing requires intense attention, this same 
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outcome can be achieved through appraisals high in certainty.  Similarly, rather than 
negative emotions indicating the potential for threat or unpleasantness, appraisals low in 
certainty communicate the message that effortful processing may be required.   
The motivation-oriented hedonic contingency account (Wegener & Petty, 1994; 
Wegener et al., 1995) of processing states that we will only engage in systematic 
processing if it is likely to result in a desirable outcome—if we are in a negative mood, 
we will not process systematically if we expect that doing so will worsen our mood, nor 
will we do so if in a positive mood and we expect it will lessen our mood.  Conversely, it 
holds that we process systematically if we expect it will improve a negative mood or 
maintain a positive mood.  Like the information-based accounts, the motivational basis is 
similarly updated by simply substituting appraisal tendencies where valence was once 
incorporated, and acknowledging that the mechanism proceeds according to a much more 
fine-tuned design taking into account the precise nature of appraisals in comparison to the 
broader, general character of valence.  By interpreting emotional appraisals, we can 
compare the themes to our innate motivational drives in order to determine how to best 
process information and/or react to it.  For instance, when we are in an uncertain mood 
state, the motivation to reduce uncertainty (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) prompts us to 
consider altering our circumstance in some way, which requires more careful processing 
than does simply maintaining the status quo, so when people are experiencing appraisals 
related to uncertainty, then they will likely process information in a more careful, 
deliberate manner.  Besides influencing our style of processing, appraisal tendencies can 
also dictate how we respond to information, as illustrated by the increased risk tolerance 
in gambling decision-making tasks which sadness promotes (motivated by the interest of 
 53 
 
improving mood), compared to the increased risk aversion which appraisals of anxiety 
provoke, motivated by the interest of reducing uncertainty (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). 
In the current research, I will demonstrate the contrasting ways in which 
appraisals of certainty (via anger induction) and uncertainty (via fear induction) 
differentially dictate the way mock jurors process information.  I will also explore how 
appraisals of certainty and uncertainty shape the way mock jurors make decisions, as well 
as how information processing style itself directly influences decision-making.  I will 
show that the appraisal tendencies associated with certainty and uncertainty will guide 
processing and outcome effects, which they facilitate in accordance with both 
informational and motivational mechanisms. 
Chapter IV 
Emotions in Legal Decision-Making 
 Investigators (and other decision-makers, including jurors) are social hypothesis 
testers who generally practice hypothesis-consistent testing, which amounts to seeking 
consistent, confirmatory evidence over that which suggests that perhaps a different 
hypothesis is more accurate (Trope & Liberman, 1996).  In fact, when presented with 
ambiguous evidence, we often tend to frame it within a context complimentary to our 
current hypothesis, and that in order for ambiguous information to be considered in a 
truly objective manner, we require high motivation, ample cognitive resources, and to 
have already preconstructed alternative, viable hypotheses in addition to the primary 
hypothesis (Trope & Lieberman, 1996).  To test this relationship, Ask and Granhag 
(2007b) manipulated the motivation levels and cognitive ability of police investigators 
through varying time pressure constraints when evaluating new evidence in a homicide 
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case.  They found that investigators without any sort of time pressure were more sensitive 
to new information and were flexible in terms of altering their preconceptions of the case 
theory, while those investigators under time pressure did not take into account any of the 
new information about the case and did not change their assessment of the case.  Ask and 
Granhag (2007b) also found that a reduction in processing capacity increases the degree 
to which preconceptions and assumptions are acceded to, and inversely, the degree to 
which subsequent evidence is carefully evaluated among police investigators. The 
demonstration that an external factor which increases cognitive load can dictate 
processing styles and overall consideration of evidence among experienced police 
investigators suggests that similar factors could direct the processing style of jurors at 
trial, who are less familiar with the practice of evaluating evidence than seasoned police. 
Even during the very earliest stages of an investigation, emotions can shape 
cognition to such an extent that heuristic processing and cognitive biases could influence 
whether a case proceeds to trial.  Building off Keltner, Ellsworth et al., (1993) who found 
that emotions can influence attributional tendencies to emphasize either personal (when 
angry) or situational (when sad) responsibility for events,  Ask and Granhag (2007a) also 
incorporated research on attribution tendencies and their influence on cognition (Lerner 
& Keltner, 2000) to consider how criminal investigators may change the way in which 
they judge reliability of witness statements depending on attributional tendencies of their 
emotional state.  They demonstrated that police investigators induced to feel sad tended 
to consider a wider variety of evidence (characteristics associated with both the 
witnessing conditions as well as the credibility of the witness themselves) and were more 
aware of inconsistencies within witness statements than investigators induced to feel 
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angry, who tended to only consider factors associated with the credibility of the witness 
and who did not detect witness inconsistencies to the same degree.  The sad investigators 
were better able to consider the consistency of witness statements with respect to the 
main theory of the case investigation, which is a more effortful form of processing, 
compared to the angry investigators who did not attend to the consistency between 
statements and their own hypotheses, indicating a more heuristic form of processing.   
Ask and Granhag (2007a) suggested that judging reliability was akin to causal 
attribution, and that similar to the earlier findings of Keltner, Ellsworth et al., (1993), 
angry investigators would be predisposed to ascribe greater significance to personal 
information whereas the sad investigators would place more credence upon the 
diagnosticity of situational variables.  The wider range of evidence types considered and 
the greater degree of awareness of inconsistencies among the sad investigators indicates 
systematic processing, whereas the angry investigators’ reliance on less evidence of a 
more simple nature is representative of heuristic processing.  Practical implications of 
Ask and Granhag (2007a) are easily adapted from police investigators to jurors.  Just as 
the emotional state of investigators was shown to influence the degree of open-minded, 
careful, deliberate consideration a police officer gave to new evidence, so might the 
emotional state of a juror influence the evaluation of evidence in the same manner.  
Those decision-makers (whether investigator or juror) who only utilize superficial, 
heuristic processing due to their emotional state and its accompanying appraisals might 
rely too much on their preconceptions and initial judgments to the exclusion of 
subsequent informative evidence.  Similarly, an increased reliance on stereotype-
consistent cues by angry decision-makers (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 1994) can also 
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bias the way in which new information is processed and evaluated.  These findings can 
also be troubling within the context of the confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998) such that 
when police have a suspect early in the investigation, or when jurors decide their verdict 
prior to hearing both parties present all of their available evidence, the elevated certainty 
appraisals associated with anger can increase the threshold which the decision-maker 
requires in order to change their mind because the superficial processing of information 
leaves the full scope of the evidence ignored.  Furthermore, all subsequent ambiguous 
information may also be perceived according to the preexisting expectations and 
conclusions.   
Certainty and uncertainty appraisals within the legal context.  
Uncertainty has been shown to lead to systematic thinking across a variety of 
contexts.  For instance, Weary and Jacobson (1997) demonstrated a trait-dependent 
correlation among people who report being in a persistent and pervasive state of 
uncertainness in that they are more inclined to process information in a systematic 
manner than people who are chronically certain.  Other studies focusing on the depressed 
and the pathologically dysphoric arrived at similar findings of increased levels of 
systematic processing compared to non-depressed populations (Edwards & Weary, 1993; 
Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993; Yost & Weary, 1996).  Non-clinical 
illustrations of the relationship between certainty and processing elsewhere in psychology 
include the motivational drive of reducing dissonance stemming from personal 
uncertainty through the use of social comparison strategies (Festinger, 1954), and that 
these social comparisons involve even greater degrees of systematic processing when a 
person is uncertain regarding their own opinions (Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995).  These 
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diverse effects prompted Tiedens and Linton (2001) to investigate whether the certainty 
and uncertainty appraisals associated with specific emotions in one context could 
influence the style of processing used in a subsequent and unrelated information 
processing domain.  Building off of Lerner and Keltner’s (2000, 2001) Appraisal-
Tendency Framework, they predicted that appraisals of certainty within emotions were 
more critical predictors of processing effects than emotional valence.  Specifically, they 
asserted that uncertainty leads to systematic, effortful processing (the outcome or ultimate 
impact of the emotion eliciting event is still unresolved, therefore it is adaptively 
beneficial to carefully consider the situation) whereas certainty leads to more heuristic, 
script-based processing (the outcome and impact are seen as fixed and determined, 
therefore it is fruitless to devote any more cognitive effort to the issue than is strictly 
necessary).  Tiedens and Linton proffered that emotions associated with high levels of 
certainty (such as happiness and anger) ought to dictate the way people feel in later 
situations as well as the type of subsequent processing a person will be likely to engage 
in.   
To test their theory of certainty appraisals dictating information processing, 
Tiedens and Linton (2001) conducted a series of four experiments.  In the first study, in 
order to determine whether certainty appraisals of emotions foster appraisal-congruent 
judgments as predicted by both the network models (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995) and the 
affect-as-information theories (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), they induced 
participants to feel either positive or negative emotions that were either certain 
(positive—happy, negative—disgust) or uncertain (positive—hopeful, negative—fear) 
through autobiographical written narratives.  Participants were asked to make predictions 
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concerning eight different general knowledge issues (sports records, legislation, tuition 
increases, and the like) for a year into the future and to indicate the level of their certainty 
for each of their responses.  They expected that there would be certainty appraisal 
congruency such that those participants induced with certain moods would give higher 
certainty ratings than those in uncertain moods.   They found that in the induced certainty 
conditions, participants were more certain of their subsequent, unrelated predictions, 
building on Clore and Parrott’s (1994) findings that emotionally induced certainty 
influences judgment, and like Keltner, Ellsworth et al. (1993) and Lerner and Keltner 
(2000, 2001) found, that congruency effects are possible in a broad range of emotional 
ranges and contexts.  This provided them with the basis for their larger hypothesis that 
certainty can influence depth of processing. 
Tiedens and Linton’s (2001) second experiment on the influence of certainty 
appraisals focused on depth of processing to further inform the valence versus appraisal 
tendency debate.  It built on existing dual process theories concerning the relationship 
between positive moods and heuristic processing versus negative moods and systematic 
processing (Bless et al., 1990; Mackie & Worth, 1991; Schwarz et al., 1991), and also 
adapted Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al. (1994) which established that both happy and 
angry emotion-induced participants were similarly influenced by source credibility 
heuristics, but that sad participants were not.  This was the beginning of the end for the 
valence-based accounts, and Tiedens and Linton’s model suggested that certainty 
appraisals are the deciding factor in terms of whether systematic or heuristic processing 
will result. 
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To plumb the issue of depth of processing, they induced both positively and 
negatively valenced emotions that were either high in certainty (positive—contentment, 
negative—anger) or low in certainty (positive—surprise, negative—worry), and then 
presented participants with a persuasive essay concerning the issue of grade inflation.  
Half of the participants were told that the essay was written by a well-regarded professor 
(a high credibility source), while the other half—who read the exact same essay—were 
told that the author was a student from a local community college (a low credibility 
source).  Following the reading of the essay, participants were asked to rate how much 
they agreed with the sentiments expressed in it.  If certainty appraisals are the driving 
force behind selection of processing style rather than emotional valence, then the certain 
(content or angry) participants should be more influenced by the source credibility 
information than by the message itself, expressed by greater credibility ratings for the 
essay purportedly written by a professor than the essay believed to be written by a 
community college student.  Their expectations were founded upon the fact that 
deference to source credibility cues above message content is a common exemplar of 
heuristic processing (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).  On the other hand, if uncertain (surprised 
or worried) participants processed the information contained in the essay more 
systematically, they would provide more equivalent ratings of persuasiveness for the 
essays regardless of authorship.  Predictably, they found that certainty and source had a 
main effect on persuasion but that valence did not, and Certainty X Source was the only 
significant two-way interaction.  Certain participants saw a large difference in 
persuasiveness according to source credibility, whereas uncertain participants saw no 
difference because they were likely attending to the quality of the message rather than the 
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status of the author.  Their findings further support the appraisal tendency account of 
information processing above the purely valence-based theories. 
Dual process theories of attitude change (Chaiken et al., 1989) apply across a 
wide range of contexts, so after considering the appraisal versus valence debate vis a vis 
persuasion and persuasiveness-related heuristics, they next investigated how the 
likelihood of relying upon stereotypes (Bodenhausen, 1993; Bodenhausen, Kramer, et al., 
1994) to make inferences about another person’s attributes (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; 
Chaiken et al., 1989) might inform the debate.  There is widespread agreement across 
studies that positive moods facilitate heuristic processing while negative moods promote 
systematic processing, but again, this narrow view that valence is the key is too simplistic 
for something as complex as the use of stereotyping and prejudice, which involve a 
whole host of different negative emotions (and each in different ways) in their 
promulgation (E. R. Smith, 1993; Bodenhausen, Kramer, et al., 1994).  To refine this 
issue, Tiedens and Linton (2001) considered two negatively valenced emotions differing 
in certainty—fear, which is high in uncertainty, and disgust, which is high in certainty.  
To further support the appraisal account and reject the valence model, emotional certainty 
would have to impact degree of stereotyping such that participants in negative certain 
moods (disgust) would process heuristically as shown through a greater tendency to 
activate and rely on stereotypes than participants in negative uncertain moods (fear). 
Instead of using the autobiographical writing emotion induction technique of 
Experiments 1 and 2 (and Bodenhausen, 1993), Tiedens and Linton (2001) used reliably 
pre-tested film clips (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Rosenberg & Ekman, 1994) to induce 
fear (The Shining) or disgust (a scene from the movie Maria’s Lovers featuring a rat 
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crawling into a man’s mouth), and also measured participant certainty about the emotion-
eliciting event itself (the film clips) and subsequent unrelated tasks.  The appraisal 
questionnaire had only one certainty-related question (“How certain are you about what 
will happen next in the film?”) to prevent participant suspicion, but also asked 
participants to rate pleasantness of the film and how much attention they had paid to it 
out of concern that perhaps the content or emotional tenor of the two clips might 
unequally affect attention levels, which in turn could have influenced the degree to which 
they processed information in upcoming tasks. 
The stereotyping task was presented as a second study concerning attitudes 
toward educational policies regarding ethical and legal infractions, and participants were 
told that they would later be given the opportunity to adjudicate a case to help determine 
whether outcomes were consistent with student perceptions of fairness.  Prior to reading 
the case, participants were asked to indicate their certainty that they would be able to 
decide the resolution of the case in the optimal manner.  After the pre-decisional certainty 
measure, participants read a case involving a student who had been accused of cheating 
by a professor.  The professor alleged that the student added to his answers on an exam 
after it had been graded and returned, while the student maintained that they did not alter 
their answer, and that that the teacher’s assistant who graded the exams must have 
overlooked that part of their answer and had incorrectly marked it wrong.  In the 
stereotype-salient condition, the student was described as “a well-known athlete on the 
basketball team”.  Past research has uncovered a stereotype among students that student-
athletes are more likely to engage in cheating or academic dishonesty than non-athlete 
students (Bodenhausen, Kramer, et al., 1994).  In the other condition, no such description 
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was included and the case materials were otherwise identical.  Following the case, 
participants had to give their opinion on a 1-11 scale of how likely it was that the student 
was lying, that the disputed portion of the test had been added after grading, and how 
dishonest the student was.  They also had to indicate what they thought would be an 
appropriate punishment, if any, and were asked to rate (1-11) their enjoyment, anger, 
disgust, and fear while watching the film clip earlier. 
They found that their disgust and fear manipulations both held, there was no 
difference in anger ratings across conditions, there was no difference in attention ratings, 
and that the disgust emotional induction resulted in greater degrees of certainty than fear.  
They made sure to check for any differences in valence because if it emerged that the 
disgust and fear manipulations varied at all in terms of overall valence, then any results 
might have been due to valence and not certainty distinctions.  There was no difference in 
pleasantness between fear and disgust clips, but there was a difference in enjoyment with 
the fear clip being rated as more enjoyable than the disgust clip.  This finding was 
unexpected, though it provided for an additional element of diagnosticity through a direct 
comparison between the certainty account and the valence account. Their contention that 
certainty drives processing would predict more stereotyping/heuristic processing among 
the certain (disgusted) participants than the uncertain (fearful) participants, but the 
opposing valence-based approach would predict that the more enjoyable experience 
should result in greater use of stereotyping.  Tiedens and Linton (2001) expected to find 
an interaction between emotion and athlete-ness wherein the disgust-induced (certain) 
participants would be more influenced by the inclusion of athlete status than those 
participants in the fear induction (uncertain) condition, which was exactly what they 
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found.  The most basic outcomes of Experiment 3 were replicating the findings of 
Experiment 2—that increased certainty leads to more heuristic, general knowledge-based 
processing than does uncertainty, and extending the certainty-appraisal-congruency 
findings to the domain stereotype activation.  More importantly though, Experiment 3 
also uncovered more of the mediation at work—that appraisals of certainty carry over to 
into other situations and powers the mechanism of mood effect from one domain to 
another, unrelated subsequent situation, and that certainty-appraisal congruence mediates 
processing style. 
Tiedens and Linton (2001) leveled criticisms at the existing body of valence-
oriented work that those studies did not control for the possibility that extraneous 
differences besides valence (i.e., certainty) might have been driving the findings.  
Nevertheless, their own Experiments 1-3 each also suffered from this uncomfortable 
weakness—for example, fear and disgust differ in more underlying appraisal 
characteristics than simply their associated degrees of certainty.  To address this issue, 
Experiment 4 was designed to look at a single emotion under conditions of certainty 
versus that same emotion under conditions of uncertainty—rather than two distinct and 
potentially confounding emotions.  They decided that rather than looking at two distinct 
emotions on opposite ends of the spectrum of certainty like they had done previously, 
that instead a single emotion from the middle portion of the certainty spectrum with a 
wide range of potential to vary towards both extremes would allow for the elimination of 
any potential confounds stemming from the use of completely separate and distinct 
emotions.  They elected to examine sadness because it is considered to be more uncertain 
than happiness or neutral non-emotion, but considerably less uncertain than fear, a more 
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typically uncertain emotion.  C. A. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) plotted sadness as being 
just slightly more uncertain than certain, but still quite close to the middle of the axis (see 
Figure 2).  They later (Ellsworth & C. A. Smith, 1988) claimed that this central location 
of sadness is an indication that certainty is not typically an important component of 
sadness, and that the interplay between sadness and certainty appraisals is fluid and 
dynamic, with uncertain sad states being every bit as common as certain sad states.  
Tiedens and Linton asserted that in conditions of certainty-oriented sadness, there would 
be a greater likelihood of heuristic processing than in conditions of more uncertainty-
oriented sadness which would promote more systematic processing. 
Experiment 4 featured three sad emotion induction conditions varying according 
to certainty appraisals (certain, uncertain, and no certainty component), and a fourth, non-
emotional, non-certainty inducing control condition.  They used a persuasion paradigm 
featuring either a strong or weak argument, which discriminates between systematic 
processors (who are able to distinguish convincing messages from unpersuasive ones) 
and heuristic processors (who will not process thoroughly enough to notice any 
differential levels of persuasiveness).  Tiedens and Linton expected to find that the sad/no 
certainty participants’ processing styles should be nearly identical to the sad/uncertainty 
participants as far as being systematic because both are low on certainty, whereas the 
sad/certainty appraisal participants should be more heuristic in their style of processing.  
Experiment 4 had three objectives: to keep emotion constant while manipulating only 
certainty, to further explore sadness since it has been widely used in earlier research on 
emotions and processing, and to incorporate more meaningful measures of processing 
styles than had been used in the past.   
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They induced emotion the using the same sort of autobiographical experience 
writing task from Experiments 1 and 2 (writing about an experience when they felt sad 
and certain vs. sad and uncertain vs. sad vs. describing minutia from the previous day’s 
events as the control condition).  The “second study” persuasive message manipulation 
was presented as market research for advertising a camcorder.  The weak argument and 
strong argument conditions both included some of the same material (that it was a good 
product, superior to competitors’ models, and one worth purchasing) but differed in terms 
of supplemental information.  The weak argument condition emphasized information 
unrelated to the overall quality of the camera (the available colors for the accompanying 
tote bag, a lens cleaning rag, and a long extension cord) while the strong argument 
materials covered more meaningful characteristics directly related to the quality of the 
camera (color and picture quality, battery life).   
They found further evidence to bolster results from Experiments 2 and 3 where 
emotions higher in certainty prompt less substantive processing than uncertain emotions.  
They improved upon those results in that very little other than degree of certainty was 
different between conditions—all participants felt similar sadness, and experimental 
conditions only varied with respect to certainty.  The sad/certain participants were less 
able to discriminate between varied levels of argument strength than were the 
sad/uncertain or just the sad.  Also, because the sad and the sad/uncertain conditions had 
such similar results, it affirms Tiedens and Linton’s position that most studies which 
induce sadness to examine processing effects are actually inducing an emotional state that 
is high in uncertainty.  The neutral “control” condition, while varying considerably from 
the three sad conditions, still allowed for meaningful conclusions.  The neutral condition 
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prompted less systematic processing than the sad condition, and the sad/uncertain 
condition also differed from the neutral condition in most respects.  The sad/certain was 
most similar to the neutral condition, which raised the question of just how important 
emotion is in this situation if the sad and certain participants were the most 
indistinguishable from the neutral, control participants. 
Overall, Tiedens and Linton (2001) established the importance of appraisals with 
respect to the content (through emotionally congruent judgments) and the processing 
style (by determining the depth of processing) for decision-making efforts.  From a 
directly applied standpoint, it demonstrated that angry people bear a greater degree of 
certainty than sad or fearful people, which leads those highly certain processors to a more 
pronounced reliance on heuristic processing—automatically assessing higher credibility 
ratings for opinions proffered by “experts”, having less facility at distinguishing strong 
from weak arguments, and overall attending more towards superficial cues than to 
argument quality when evaluating persuasive messages.  From a more theoretical 
perspective, it buttresses the general finding of past research (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; 
Keltner, Ellsworth, et al., 1993; Lerner et al., 1998; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001) that 
established the wide-ranging prevalence of emotional congruent judgments in later, 
unrelated tasks.  More importantly, it also broadened the appraisal congruency field by 
confirming the extent to which certainty appraisals can influence depth of processing, 
effects which were mediated by certainty appraisals such that when certainty was 
examined independent of emotion, it was a causal determinant of the type of processing 
that would be used.  Ultimately, it showed that greater degrees of emotional certainty—as 
opposed to only emotional valence—are directly related to heuristic processing, (which, 
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in turn, includes being more persuaded by heuristic cues), while feelings of less certainty 
are associated with systematic processing and finding persuasive messages with a more 
rational, logical basis to be most compelling. 
Types of inconsistencies that jurors may face. 
As Tiedens and Linton (2001) demonstrated, appraisals of certainty can not only 
influence processing style, but also responses to persuasion.  Jurors can be exposed to a 
virtually limitless array of potential evidence, bounded only by the scope of what can be 
at issue in a legal matter.  However, research has shown that one of the most powerfully 
persuasive decision-making cues which jurors are faced with in their role as triers of fact 
is that of inconsistent testimony (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 
1995; Brewer & Hupfeld, 2004; Potter & Brewer, 1999), though the 
consistency/accuracy, accuracy/credibility, and consistency/verdict relationships are 
themselves somewhat varied and inconsistent (Brewer & Burke, 2002; Brewer, Potter, 
Fisher, Bond, & Luszcz, 1999).  For example, mock jurors found that inconsistent 
statements made by a 6-year old rendered that witness as seeming less credible than when 
the same inconsistent statements were proffered by a 10- or 30-year old witness (Leippe 
& Romanczyk, 1989).   
In fact, at their very most basic, all trials boil down to the issue of inconsistency in 
one form or another, and it is up to triers of fact to decide which account is more likely 
(see generally Pennington & Hastie, 1986; 1988; & 1992 for how jurors assemble facts 
and reconcile conflicting evidence and arguments).  One party claims one thing, and the 
opposing party claims the opposite, whether the issue at odds is a contractual dispute 
between multinational corporations or a grisly murder.  But on a narrower scale, 
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inconsistent testimony can take several forms, whether through internally inconsistent 
statements where one witness contradicts themselves (and the conflicting information can 
be offered exclusively within their testimony, during pretrial statements, or between 
pretrial statements and testimony), or through two witnesses offering directly competing 
and mutually exclusive testimony.  Inconsistency within testimony can also vary 
according to whether it concerns details that are central to the matter at hand or peripheral 
details which do not directly inform matters. 
In order for inconsistent testimony to influence juror decision-making, it must 
necessarily be perceived, and in order for it to be perceived, jurors must be processing 
information in an effortful manner—centrally, systematically, or rationally, and not 
peripherally, heuristically, or experientially (according to the ELM, Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986; HSM, Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Wegener, 1999; or CEST, Epstein, 1994; 
Epstein & Pacini 1999; Pacini & Epstein 1999, respectively).  Past research has shown 
that processing style can impact mock jurors’ perception of evidentiary persuasiveness 
such that given the same case facts, rational processors find one type of evidence 
(actuarial testimony) more persuasive than do experiential processors, and that 
experiential processors find an alternative type of evidence (clinical testimony) more 
persuasive than rational processors in judgments of a defendant’s potential for future 
dangerousness in capital cases (Krauss, et al., 2004).  On top of that, other research has 
shown that emotional appraisals of certainty can dictate information processing style 
(Ask & Granhag, 2007a; Tiedens & Linton, 2001), so it follows that emotional appraisals 
of certainty can influence information processing and therefore detection of 
inconsistencies, which should in turn guide decision-making tendencies of jurors. 
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To test this hypothesis (one which the current research intends to revisit and 
bolster in multiple critical respects), Semmler and Brewer (2002) manipulated mock 
jurors’ moods (neutral vs. sad) and the testimonial inconsistency of the trial transcript 
(consistent vs. inconsistent) with the expectation that sad jurors would process 
information in a more effortful manner, which could be demonstrated via a greater degree 
of inconsistency detection in comparison to jurors in a neutral emotional state.  However, 
they did not find that sad participants detected inconsistencies at a statistically significant 
rate greater than emotionally neutral participants.  Sad jurors reported inconsistencies 
more accurately than did neutral mood participants, though they found no main effect of 
mood or the Mood x Consistency interaction they expected.  These null results were 
thought to be due to relatively low rates of inconsistency detection in all conditions.  The 
inconsistency detection data trended toward significance, so I am optimistic that through 
several improvements in methodology, the expected results will emerge.  Although they 
did not intentionally experimentally manipulate anger, they did discover that among those 
participants reporting a greater sense of anger, overall rate of inconsistency detection was 
impaired.  This suggested to them that some element of anger elicits less effortful 
processing.   
Semmler and Brewer did not incorporate the appraisal tendency framework 
(Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001; see also Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; and Han, Lerner, & 
Keltner, 2007 for more advanced accounts of emotional appraisals influencing processing 
style and decision-making), which, in combination with several methodological 
shortcomings, compromised the overall conclusiveness of their findings.  The current 
series of studies incorporates the appraisal tendency framework as an important 
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determinant of processing style and decision-making among mock jurors, and also 
systematically improves upon Semmler and Brewer’s various methodological weaknesses 
(particularly through more rigorous development and pretesting of materials; see 
Methods, below) in order to better establish the role of emotion, emotional appraisals of 
certainty (which have been effectively induced, manipulated and measured via online 
research in the past; see Wiener, et al., 2007), processing style, and decision-making 
among mock jurors.  I expected to find that emotional appraisals of certainty would 
dictate the style of processing used by mock jurors, which would determine their degree 
and accuracy of detecting testimonial inconsistencies, which in turn will have influenced 
a number of other dimensions such as verdict, certainty, and confidence. 
Chapter V 
Study One:  Identifying Detection Rates of Individual Inconsistencies 
Method 
Theoretical Basis 
 In order to ensure the greatest degree of reliability and validity for the materials 
and measures to be used in this study, as well as to improve on methodological 
weaknesses within existing research, several steps are necessary in order to fully 
reconsider Semmler and Brewer’s (2002) efforts. 
Because the main focus of this series of four studies is to examine the manner in 
which emotion influences the processing and awareness of trial evidence, I first needed to 
confirm that participants were noticing the various testimonial inconsistencies when 
reading and listening to the transcripts.  If participants were unable to detect any 
inconsistencies (i.e., a floor effect) or they were able to detect all inconsistencies (i.e., a 
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ceiling effect), it would be difficult to ascertain whether certain versus uncertain 
emotions lead participants to find fewer or more inconsistencies, respectively.  
The inconsistencies used in prior research (Semmler & Brewer, 2002) on the role 
of emotion on processing style of mock jurors involved the use of two types of 
inconsistencies, those that could best be described as either inferential inconsistencies 
(requiring some element of consideration and deduction on the part of the participant, 
such as an eyewitness claiming to have seen something that they later describe as having 
been hidden by a blind curve) or non-inferential inconsistencies (which merely required 
recognition and comparison of discrepant information, such as referring to the business 
logo on a truck as belonging to two different oil companies when describing the same 
truck during separate lines of questioning).  For the purposes of the current efforts, I 
dispensed with the logical inconsistencies and instead focused exclusively on factual 
inconsistencies.  Simplifying inconsistencies in this way will yield two main benefits.  
First and foremost, because the general hypothesis being tested has yet to bear 
statistically significant results, it seemed prudent for nascent investigations to revolve 
around the detection of cognitively simple, straightforward inconsistencies rather than 
truly tricky, multiply nuanced, complex combinations of deductive reasoning.   Second, 
doing so will provide for more definitive analysis rather than collapsing multiple, distinct 
dependent variables (detection rates of both inferential and non-inferential 
inconsistencies, which may not necessarily be interchangeable) into a single rate of 
detection.   
In addition to any cognitive distinctions which may exist between the processes 
required to identify simple versus complex inconsistencies, the materials used by 
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Semmler and Brewer (2002) also included a wide range of conspicuousness, which may 
also have contributed to some unexpectedly low effect sizes in their study.  For example, 
in terms of ceiling effects, one logical inconsistency involved the witness testifying about 
events that preceded a car accident he was involved in as a passenger.  The witness 
initially stated that his wife, who was driving, had time to flash their headlights to warn 
an oncoming truck to avoid the accident. Then, when answering a follow up question, he 
testified that there was no time for her to react to the unfolding accident.  In the text 
below, note how much time his wife Celia had to react to the oncoming truck (emphasis 
added in italics):  
Prosecution: Did the truck appear to swerve or deviate from it’s course at any 
time prior to impact, Mr White ? 
Witness: Yes, it did. I remember that Celia had time to flash the lights a couple of 
times… [emphasis added] it swerved to our left. 
Prosecution: At what speed were you travelling ? 
Witness: I reckon it was only about 40km/h. We had slowed down to take the 
corner. 
Prosecution: At what speed in your estimation was the truck travelling ? 
Witness: It must have been over 60km/h. We had slowed down, it came towards 
us very quickly.  Celia didn’t have time to do anything. [emphasis added] 
Prosecution: Did the truck appear to slow down or brake at any point ? 
Witness: No it didn’t brake at all. As I said it happened very quickly. There was 
this petrol truck, or Ampol truck and the trailer across the road coming straight for 
us and…. It was very quick.  There was no way Celia could have avoided it. 
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(Semmler & Brewer, 2002, stimulus material obtained via personal 
communication, N. Brewer, July 2, 2010; see Appendix B.) 
These directly conflicting accounts—that Celia had time to flash the lights a 
couple of times versus the statement indicating that she did not have time to react—
require some consideration of context and comparison of information to inductively 
detect the inconsistency, but the fact that the two contrary evidentiary “units” are so 
proximate to one another may have mitigated the complexity of the logical reasoning 
necessary for detection, so that all participants detected the discrepancy.  Another logical 
inconsistency used by Semmler and Brewer (2002) occurred when the prosecuting 
attorney questioned the victim, who described his view of an oncoming truck as 
occurring after he rounded a blind corner. After several question and answer exchanges 
as well as procedural interjections from the judge spanning approximately a page and a 
half of printed testimony, as well as cross examination by the attorney for the defense, the 
same victim/witness made the contradictory statement that he had seen the truck 15 
meters before rounding the bend (emphasis added in italics): 
Prosecution: When did you first notice the truck ? 
Witness: When we rounded the left hand bend just before where the accident 
happened. You couldn’t see around the corner because at that point the road is 
actually bending [emphasis added] around the steep hill on the left. 
 
[…approximately 1.5 pages of additional testimony…] 
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Judge: Thank you Mr Spence. Mr Warwick, you may now cross-examine the 
witness. 
Defence: Thank you Your Honour. Good morning Mr White. My name is Melvin 
Warwick and I am the attorney for the defence in this case. I have some questions 
to ask you about the accident which took place on Mount Barker Road in which 
you were involved. The justice system demands that the jury have a clear picture 
of these events, so please answer the questions as accurately as possible. {Pause} 
At what point did you think you saw the truck on the wrong side of the road ? 
Witness: I’d say at least 15 meters before we rounded the bend. [emphasis added] 
Before the accident scene, I could see that it was on the wrong side of the road. I 
could see the paint of the Mobil symbol and the chrome trailer shining through the 
trees.  (Semmler & Brewer, 2002, stimulus material obtained via personal 
communication, N. Brewer, July 2, 2010; see Appendix B.) 
The distant relationship between conflicting units of information may also have been 
rendered even more imperceptible for participants by the vagueness of language used in 
the two ostensibly conflicting statements, creating floor effects where none of the 
participants detected the inconsistency. 
The varying range of conspicuousness and “ease of detection” is not limited only 
to the characteristics of the logical inconsistencies, but also may have complicated 
participants’ ability to detect less cognitively demanding factual inconsistencies.  For 
example, when the victim mentioned two separate oil companies names when describing 
the truck that was involved in the accident (Mobil and Ampol), this inconsistency 
depends on issues of brand awareness, market saturation, logo recognizability, and other 
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idiosyncratic factors dependent upon the participants’ familiarity with the petroleum 
industry in their home country of Australia. Compare this to detecting a conflicting 
statement by the victim regarding whether the truck was halfway or 3/4ths of the way 
across the middle of the road prior to the accident, which depends upon a different set of 
cognitive skills such as mental visualization abilities and spatial orientation acuity. 
 To include such a wide variety of inconsistency types is not necessarily a 
weakness in design, but to assume that all inconsistencies are equally likely to be 
detected by participants and then to analyze them en masse, particularly in the absence of 
any efforts to pre-test for baseline detection rates without any emotional components, 
seems an ineffective and incomplete basis for making any real conclusions. Because each 
distinct inconsistency must, by definition, involve discrete factors, information, and bases 
of comparisons, and because we cannot assume that every individual perceives, 
processes, and integrates information identically when identifying an inconsistency, it is 
impossible to truly distinguish and analyze every sort of inconsistency according to its 
constituent characteristics since this can also vary depending on the traits of each person.  
These differences—those specific to the ease of detecting a given inconsistency, as well 
as those between individual participants—will persist whether there is only one style of 
inconsistency to detect or multiple subclasses of different inductive/deductive reasoning 
techniques required, which is why at this preliminary stage, the more streamlined and 
cognitively similar I can make the inconsistencies, the less likely it is that multiple effects 
may overshadow or obscure one another.  
 To be clear, Semmler and Brewer’s theoretical basis, expectations, and 
hypotheses as they relate to the impact of emotion on processing were sound—the 
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execution simply left room for several confounding factors which could have been the 
basis for the inconclusive nature of their findings.  The current investigations attempt to 
improve upon these various faults by first obtaining baseline detection rates for 
inconsistencies, which will in turn allow me to use only those inconsistencies known to 
be devoid of floor or ceiling effects in order to later test my main hypothesis concerning 
the effect of high or low certainty appraisals on cognitive processing style and the 
detection of inconsistent information.   
Participants 
 One hundred sixty-one undergraduate students at Florida International University 
were recruited through Sona Systems, the Psychology Department Research Management 
system to participate in a web-based study on “Juror Decision-Making in Civil Trials” in 
exchange for course credit.  Because this was an online study, several safeguards were 
used to exclude those participants who did not give the study their undivided attention 
(see Appendix C for detailed criteria and procedures undertaken for data reduction 
purposes), which resulted in a total of 100 participants.  The sample was predominantly 
female (76%; 24% male), Hispanic (70%; 20% White/Caucasian; 6% African American; 
3% Native American; 1% Asian), and ranged in age from 18 to 60 years old (M = 22.41, 
SD = 5.12).  Participants’ highest level of education was well-balanced, with 26% in their 
freshman year, 24% in their sophomore year, 25% in their junior year, 22% in their senior 
year, and 3% having completed some professional or graduate-level education.  Over half 
the sample (54%) was not currently employed, with 34% holding part-time employment 
and 12% working full-time, and 7% had served on a jury before (5% civil; 2% criminal). 
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Design 
 Because my objective for Study One was to simply identify which (if any) of the 
15 inconsistencies from my trial transcript were detected by no more than 66% of 
participants and no less than 33% of participants, there was no experimental manipulation 
or treatment group, and therefore there was no control group and random assignment was 
not necessary.  Study One was a one-group post-test only non-experimental design in 
which the overall rates of detection for each of the 15 testimonial inconsistencies were 
evaluated independently and in comparison to each other.  Study One is essentially a pre-
test to validate that the inconsistencies to be included in the later experimental versions of 
the trial transcript are within the optimal “Goldilocks zone” of detectability (those that 
fall between ceiling and floor effects – that is, those that are “just right”). 
Materials 
 Trial transcript. 
Since the varying degree of obviousness may have been one of the several factors 
contributing to Semmler and Brewer’s (2002)  unexpectedly sparse significant results, my 
research materials will involve an abbreviated transcript based on a real Florida personal 
injury case (Hibbard et al. v. McGraw et al., 918 So. 2d 967; 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 
18878; 30 Fla. L. Weekly D 2714).  The real case involves an automobile accident with 
many similarities to the trial transcript used by Semmler and Brewer (see Appendix B).  
By merging and incorporating Semmler and Brewer’s fact patterns and four non-
inferential inconsistencies with the facts from Hibbard v. McGraw, the resulting trial 
transcript will allow me to more accurately determine the strength and overall baseline 
detection rates of their inconsistencies. However, my transcript also includes 11 new 
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inconsistencies created for the current research (see Appendix D for trial transcript and 
Appendix E and Table E1 for descriptions of inconsistencies and relevant testimony) in 
order to have an ample number of inconsistencies to select from for inclusion in the 
transcript to be used in Studies Two and Four. The current study thus aims to find 
inconsistencies that are as isolated from both floor and ceiling effects as possible.   
Measures to determine rate of detection for each inconsistency. 
After their participants listened to the trial transcripts, Semmler and Brewer 
(2002) showed the participants several examples of the types of testimonial 
inconsistencies that can occur in a trial prior to having them answer questions about the 
content of the testimony.  By providing such examples, Semmler and Brewer may have 
potentially indicated to participants that there had been inconsistencies in the testimony 
which they might not have noticed otherwise.  Since the detection of inconsistencies is 
the basis for the primary dependent measures, any potential interference with 
participants’ recognition or awareness between exposure to the inconsistencies and 
measurement could distort the actual degree of detection reflected by the measures. To 
avoid tipping my hand or telegraphing my research objective at the outset, I expected to 
more definitively determine the overall degree of detection/ease of detectability for each 
inconsistency by first asking very broad, open-ended questions and then funneling down 
to more specific, narrowly-tailored, forced-choice questions (see Appendix F for the 
exact questions and format). 
By starting off with eight open ended questions (e.g., “Were there any 
eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes in terms of 
describing the exact nature of events related to the accident?”), I intended to elicit 
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responses which would indicate what inconsistencies participants had noticed without 
phrasing the questions in an unduly suggestive manner.  This free response style of 
question presented at the outset is in direct contrast to the more “point blank” questions 
presented at the end of the measures.  These point blank questions directly asked 
participants about each inconsistency while still maintaining some degree of experimental 
control and avoiding the influence of demand characteristics.  My reasoning for 
“funneling” the questions from broad to narrow in this manner (starting with broad, open-
ended questions, then short answer, then multiple choice, then true/false, then the 
virtually point-blank questions) is that if participants were to accurately report 
inconsistencies with little direct questioning right from the outset of the questionnaire, it 
is more diagnostic of an inconsistency detection than correctly responding to a true/false 
or point blank question toward the end of the questionnaire.   
Procedure 
Participants logged on to their secure FIU Sona Systems account to receive the 
link to the study itself, securely hosted online at Qualtrics.com, FIU’s online survey 
resource.  After giving their consent to participate (see Appendix G for Study One 
Informed Consent) in a study purportedly to assist a local attorney evaluate the merits of 
appealing the outcome of a trial, participants were asked to listen to an audio file 
embedded on the website to ensure that their computer would be able to play the audio of 
the trial transcript.  If their computer could not play the audio, participants were told to 
log off and access the site through a different computer, and not to proceed further until 
they were able to access the audio file.  After verifying that their computer was properly 
equipped, participants were reminded that they must complete the study all at one time, 
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and that they should read along with the upcoming onscreen testimony as the audio 
played simultaneously, which allowed participants to encode information both visually 
and auditorily. This should be another improvement over the prior research by Semmler 
and Brewer (2002), which only presented the trial transcript auditorily.  Participants were 
required to click on a button to proceed to each subsequent page in order to keep them 
engaged, and the “proceed” button did not activate on any page until that page’s audio 
concluded.  Furthermore, total time spent on each page was recorded in order to later 
identify and exclude any participants who did not click to proceed in a reasonable length 
of time and who therefore likely did not give their full, undivided attention to the 
materials (see Appendix C for Data Reduction Techniques).   
After participants finished reading along with and listening to the transcript, they 
were asked to rate the credibility of each witness on a seven point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (Completely Lacks Credibility) to 7 (Completely Credible) and then on the next 
page, to rate the persuasiveness of each witness on a seven point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (Not Persuasive At All) to 7 (Very Persuasive) (see Appendix H).  Following the 
witness credibility and persuasiveness ratings, participants answered the battery of broad 
(i.e., open-ended) to narrow (i.e., point blank) inconsistency detection measurement 
questions (see Appendix F), provided demographic information (see Appendix I), and 
were then debriefed (see Appendix J), thanked, and instructed to log off and close their 
web browser. 
Subjective Scoring 
 To avoid any potential for research bias, all responses to the open ended and short 
answer question types were each coded by two research assistants blind to the hypothesis 
 81 
 
or intent of the study (see Appendix K, Open Ended Question Coding Instructions and 
Appendix L, Short Answer Question Coding Instructions).  Both research assistants were 
furnished with a copy of the trial transcript (see Appendix D) and the description of all 15 
inconsistencies (see Appendix E) and instructed to familiarize themselves with the details 
of all testimony, particularly the information related to the inconsistencies.  Next, I met 
with the two of them together to explain the procedures and coding criteria and to answer 
any questions they might have had, and I provided them with a practice file comprised of 
responses given by participants who did not complete the full study and were eliminated 
from consideration in the final data set as well as responses that I composed myself in 
order to illustrate the types of distinctions and decisions I expected they would have to 
make.  After the research assistants completed the practice data set individually, we met 
again to discuss the reasoning for how we coded each answer.  At that point, the research 
assistants were given the real data set and instructed to code it individually, and to save it 
as a separate file.  After they completed individual coding, they met to discuss their 
coding, each having the opportunity to discuss any uncertainties or ambiguities with the 
other.  They were instructed to discuss all discrepancies in coding with each other to the 
extent that they both were comfortable with the final interpretation they recorded, 
regardless of whether they were in full agreement.  They were told to listen to the other 
arguments and to come to an agreement if possible, but if not, that they should not 
hesitate to stand by their own decisions. My goal was not to have two identical scoring 
files after their meeting, but rather to have two scoring files that they each stood behind.  
Afterwards, using a separate rubric/decision criteria for the short answer questions (see 
Appendix L), they followed this same multi-step process of meeting with me, scoring 
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practice data individually, meeting with me to discuss the practice data, individual 
scoring of the real data, discussion with each other, and submitting their pre- and post-
discussion scorings to me.   
Results 
Inter-rater Reliability for Subjectively Scored Questions 
 To confirm that the research assistants were each coding the data according to the 
same rules of interpretation, and because I knew the distribution to be non-normally 
distributed (see Appendix M), I conducted a Kendall’s tau-b test to measure the 
correlation coefficient between the two scorers.  Among the open ended questions, two 
inconsistencies were not reported by any participants by either scorer, so for the 
remaining 13 inconsistencies, the average correlation of their “Yes” codings before 
discussion was very high (τΒ = .86, p < .001), as was the average correlation of their 
“Yes” codings following discussion (τΒ =.96, p < .001).  Similarly, for the short answer 
questions, with one inconsistency not being reported by any participants by either scorer, 
the average correlation of their “Yes” codings for the remaining 14 inconsistencies before 
discussion was very high (τΒ =.77, p < .001), as was the average correlation of their “Yes” 
codings following discussion (τΒ =.89, p < .001). 
Comparing Overall Detection Rates of Each Inconsistency 
 The benefits of tapering from broad styles of questions to very narrow, direct 
questions for the inconsistency detection rate measures outweigh the drawbacks of 
relying on a single type of measure, but those benefits come at the expense of having to 
make multiple comparisons of multiple inconsistencies using multiple measures, which 
required the construction of several scoring schemes to most thoroughly interpret the data 
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and identify the optimal testimonial inconsistencies for later use (see Appendix M for 
scale construction background). 
 Upon evaluation of all 15 inconsistencies using both the Strict and the Loose 
scoring schemes, eight inconsistencies were detected at overall rates within the range of 
detectability that I sought, while seven of them did not fall within my target range 
according to either scoring scheme.  The Loose criterion identified eight inconsistencies 
with detection rates between 33% and 66%, while the Strict criterion identified five 
inconsistencies with detection rates between 33% and 66%, though the three that were 
not identified were very close (PI 10-color: 32.4%, PI 11-Jared: 32.4%, and PI 9-Year: 
30.8%) and were retained because of their comfortable margin within the Loose criterion 
(PI 10-color: 38.0%, PI 11-Jared: 38.4%, and PI 9-Year: 38.4%).  In fact, the overall 
mean detection percentage rate for the eight inconsistencies I will retain was appreciably 
greater using the Strict scoring scheme (M = 36.58%) than the mean detection percentage 
rate using the Loose scoring scheme (M = 25.39%) for the seven inconsistencies I will 
eliminate from the trial transcript (see Table 1 for the overall detection rates for all 15 
inconsistencies according to both scoring schemes, and Tables M1 and M2 for detection 
rate percentages of all 15 inconsistencies across all question types and treatments in each 
scoring scheme). 
Discussion 
 In addition to identifying those inconsistencies suitable for continued use, the 
results from Study One illustrate that it is very difficult to create questions (or even 
question types) that are uniformly diagnostic for all inconsistencies.  Tables M1 and M2 
show that some questions or types of questions elicited greater rates of detection than 
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others, and that the detection rates for each individual inconsistency does not necessarily 
follow the same stable, linear trajectory predicted (and intended) by the “funneling down 
from broad to narrow” array of questions.  In fact, some rates of detection decreased 
through the course of questioning for some inconsistencies, which provides additional 
support for the methodological justification of including an array of question types to 
establish a mean detection rate for each inconsistency rather than simply relying on the 
validity of a single type of measure as Semmler and Brewer did in their 2002 study. 
 The eight inconsistencies found by anywhere from 31% to 52% of participants 
will be retained for use in the remainder of the present research.  While results from 
Study One are promising in terms of the solidly middling rates of detection for those 
eight inconsistencies, to be maximally confident in their utility for Study Four, it is 
critical that I verify that they remain detectable at roughly the same rate in the absence of 
the seven inconsistencies I will be removing from the trial transcript.  It is possible that a 
cumulative, combinative effect was driving the overall rate of detectability, and Study 
Two will help to determine whether that is the case. 
Chapter VI 
Study Two: Verifying Trial Transcript Stimulus Materials 
Method 
Theoretical Basis 
 To ensure that the eight testimonial inconsistencies identified in Study One retain 
the same approximate detection rates in the absence of the seven eliminated testimonial 
inconsistencies (see Appendix N for the version of Johnson v. McGraw featuring only the 
eight inconsistencies), I undertook essentially the same procedure in Study Two, with the 
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primary difference being the number of inconsistencies in the trial transcript.  However, 
retesting the inconsistency detection rates also afforded me the opportunity to control for 
another one of the confounds which potentially tainted Semmler and Brewer’s (2002) 
results—the emotional influence of the trial transcripts themselves.  All four versions of 
their trial transcripts (Inconsistent Testimony/Neutral Emotion, Inconsistent 
Testimony/Sad Emotion, Consistent Testimony/Neutral Emotion, and Consistent 
Testimony/Sad Emotion, see Appendix B) were found to increase both sadness and anger 
among their participants, which could explain their lack of significant effects.  The fact 
that even their ostensibly emotionally neutral fact patterns had some emotional impact 
could very easily have blurred any distinctions between their manipulated conditions and 
control groups.  When creating the Johnson v. McGraw trial transcript stimulus materials, 
my intention was to create a realistic presentation of a civil trial for maximum ecological 
validity, but also to create a trial transcript that would be unlikely to arouse any emotional 
response (in contrast to Semmler and Brewer’s materials, some of which featured a 
widower’s testimony recounting how he and his young son watched their wife and 
mother slowly die over the course of 20 minutes inside the mangled wreckage of their 
automobile which also held the family’s young daughter trapped in the backseat).  To 
determine whether my trial transcript elicited any emotional response, I measured 
participants’ emotional state before and after listening to and reading along with the trial 
transcript (see Appendix O for I-PANAS-SF, Thompson, 2007 and PANAS-X, Watson & 
Clark, 1994).   
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Participants 
 Sixty-four undergraduate students at Florida International University were 
recruited through Sona Systems, the Psychology Department Research Management 
system to participate in a web-based study on “Juror Decision-Making in Civil Trials” in 
exchange for course credit.  Because this was an online study, several safeguards were 
used to exclude those participants who did not give the study their undivided attention 
(see Appendix P for detailed criteria and procedures undertaken for data reduction 
purposes), which resulted in a total of 27 participants.  The sample was predominantly 
female (70%; 30% male), Hispanic (67%; 11% African American; 7% White/Caucasian; 
4% Asian, and 11% Other), and the 25 who input their age ranged in age from 19 to 44 
years old (M = 23.96, SD = 5.16).  Participants were predominantly upperclassmen, with 
41% in their senior year, 22% in their junior year, 15% in their sophomore year, 15% in 
their freshman year, and 7% having completed some professional or graduate-level 
education.  Over half the sample (52%) was not currently employed, with 33% holding 
part-time employment and 15% working full-time, and one participant (4%) having 
served on a civil jury. 
Design 
 Just as in Study One, my objective for Study Two was to evaluate the suitability 
of stimulus materials for use in later studies (specifically, to replicate roughly equivalent 
rates of detection for the remaining eight inconsistencies in the absence of the seven 
redacted inconsistencies from the Study One trial transcript, and to determine whether the 
trial transcript induced any emotions), so absent any experimental manipulation, random 
assignment and the inclusion of a control group was not necessary.  Study Two featured 
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only one group of participants, but because of its dual purposes, it can be characterized 
from two perspectives.  In terms of the detection rate confirmation aspect of Study Two, 
it is best described as a one-group post-test only non-experimental design, while the 
emotional impact aspect is best described as a one-group pre-test/post-test design.  In 
essence, Study Two serves as the final verification and validation of the trial transcript 
stimulus materials. 
Materials 
 Trial transcript. 
 Study Two used a modified version of the Johnson v. McGraw fictional trial 
transcript used in Study One.  The version used in Study Two contained only those eight 
inconsistencies identified in Study One as having a rate of detection between 31% and 
52%; the seven inconsistencies having lower rates of detections were redacted from the 
trial transcript with consistent information replacing the inconsistent details (see 
Appendix N for the trial transcript with eight inconsistencies, and Appendix R for 
descriptions of the remaining inconsistencies and relevant testimony.) 
 Emotion measures. 
 To obtain a baseline measure of emotional state without unduly emphasizing 
emotional states or introspective self-evaluation, I used the 10-item International Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule Short Form (I-PANAS-SF, Thompson, 2007; see 
Appendix O).  The I-PANAS-SF does not include any emotion ratings analogous to 
anger, so to maximize utility for my specific purposes, I appended “Angry” and “Mad” to 
the scale since one of the critical manipulations in Study Four is inducing some 
participants to feel anger.  To obtain a more thorough measurement of emotional state 
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immediately after exposure to the trial transcript, participants completed the 61-item 
(adding Mad) Specific Affect Scales of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule- 
Expanded (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994; see Appendix O) following the final 
witness’s testimony. 
 Measures to determine rate of detection for each inconsistency. 
 Remaining consistent with the inconsistency detection rate measures from Study 
One, I used the same battery of questions in the same order of question style, starting 
with very broad, open-ended questions, and tapering down to more specific short-answer 
questions, then multiple choice, true/false, and the most direct “point blank” questions 
(see Appendix Q for the full list of inconsistency detection questions.)  The exact order of 
presentation remained randomized within question style subsections, but I eliminated 
those questions concerning inconsistencies that failed to reach the desired threshold of 
detectability rates in Study One. 
Procedure 
Participants logged on to their secure FIU Sona Systems account to receive the 
link to the study itself, securely hosted online at Qualtrics.com, FIU’s online survey 
resource.  After giving their consent to participate (see Appendix S for Study Two 
Informed Consent) Study Two used the same cover story, computer compatibility 
confirmations, instructions for following along with the trial transcript, reminder to 
complete the study all at once, page view duration verification, and data reduction 
techniques (see Appendix P for Study Two Data Reduction details) as used in Study One.   
Participants completed the brief, 12-item I-PANAS-SF (Thompson, 2007; see Appendix 
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O) before reading and listening to the trial transcript version with eight inconsistencies 
(see Appendix N). 
Immediately after participants finished reading along with and listening to the 
transcript, they completed the 61-item PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994; see Appendix 
O) to gauge their emotional state after having been exposed to the trial transcript.  They 
were then asked to rate the credibility of each witness on a seven point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (Completely Lacks Credibility) to 7 (Completely Credible) and then on 
the next page, to rate the persuasiveness of each witness on a seven point Likert scale 
ranging from 1-Not Persuasive At All to 7-Very Persuasive (see Appendix H).  Following 
the witness credibility and persuasiveness ratings, participants answered the battery of 
broad (i.e. open-ended) to narrow (i.e point blank) inconsistency detection measurement 
questions (see Appendix Q), provided demographic information (see Appendix I), and 
were then debriefed (see Appendix J), thanked, and instructed to log off and close their 
web browser. 
Subjective Scoring 
 Consistent with the safeguards employed in Study One, to avoid any potential for 
research bias, all responses to the open ended and short answer question types were again 
each coded by the same two research assistants blind to the hypothesis or intent of the 
study using the same guidelines and scoring rubric from Study One (see Appendix K, 
Open Ended Question Coding Instructions and Appendix L, Short Answer Question 
Coding Instructions).  Both research assistants were furnished with a copy of the new 
trial transcript featuring only eight inconsistencies (see Appendix N) as well as a new 
listing of the inconsistencies without the seven inconsistencies eliminated after Study 
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One (see Appendix R).  Next, I met with the two of them to make sure they were 
comfortable making the transition back to scoring the open ended questions after last 
having scored data according the short answer criteria.  All three of us were comfortable 
enough that we agreed it was unnecessary to undergo the same incremental rounds of 
coding practice data interspersed with meetings and expositions prior to coding the actual 
data.  They first coded the open ended data individually, then met to discuss their 
reasoning with each other, and made any changes they wished to make after the benefit of 
debate.  They each returned both open ended data files to me (one from before 
discussion, one from after discussion), at which point I gave them the short answer data 
to code individually, then discuss with each other, and to once again make any necessary 
revisions following discussion. 
Results 
Inter-rater Reliability for Subjectively Scored Questions 
 To confirm that the research assistants were each coding the data according to the 
same rules of interpretation, and because I knew the distribution to be non-normally 
distributed (see Appendix T), I conducted a Kendall’s tau-b test to measure the 
correlation coefficient between the two scorers.  Among the open ended questions, one 
inconsistency was not reported by any participants by either scorer, so for the remaining 
seven inconsistencies, one correlation (PI 5-model) was non-significant, but the average 
correlation of their “Yes” codings before discussion was high for the other six (τΒ = .83, p 
< .001).  Following discussion, the average correlation of their “Yes” codings for all 
seven (including the formerly nonsignificant) inconsistencies was very high (τΒ =.92, p < 
.001).  Similarly, for the short answer questions, with one inconsistency not being 
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reported by any participants by either scorer, and a different inconsistency (PI 7-hair) 
showing a non-significant correlation before discussion, the average correlation of their 
“Yes” codings for the remaining six inconsistencies before discussion was very high (τΒ 
=.87, p < .001), as was the average correlation of their “Yes” codings for all seven 
(including the formerly non-significant) inconsistencies following discussion (τΒ =.92, p 
< .001).  Following the submission of all four sets of scorings (open ended before and 
after, short answer before and after) by both research assistants, I asked them about the 
two separate non-significant before values, which they explained had simply stemmed 
from a slight difference in the criteria for distinguishing a “Yes” response from a 
“Partial” response, but that upon discussion for each set of data, the discrepancy was 
noted and rectified, which was reflected in the strong associations between all post-
discussion scores. 
Confirming General Detection Rates of Each Inconsistency 
 Overall, using the trial transcript featuring only eight inconsistencies, rates of 
detection were generally lower, with PI 7-Hair and PI 9-Year being exceptions (see 
Tables T1 and T2 in Appendix T for exact rates), which suggests that perhaps some 
cumulative effect might have contributed to greater detection rates when using the 
transcript featuring 15 inconsistencies.   The exact decrements for any particular 
inconsistency, question type, or scoring scheme is of less interest than the fact that mean 
rates of detection remained high enough to allay concerns of floor effects, leaving room 
for a potential decrease in detection rate under experimental conditions in Study Four.  
According to both the Strict scoring scheme, which ranged in overall detection rates from 
19.98% for PI 11-Jared to 39.26% for PI 9-Year (M = 28.22%, SD = 7.22%) and the 
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Loose scoring scheme, which ranged in overall detection rates from 24.68% for PI 11-
Jared to 54.72% for PI 7-Hair (M = 36.90%, SD = 10.47%), there remains a serviceable 
range for potentially lower rates of detection.   
 The rate of chance for guessing the correct answer (which would be scored as a 
detection) for the point blank questions provides an additional means of validating these 
eight inconsistencies.  There is only one correct answer among three answer choice 
options (see Appendix Q), which means that (at least assuming an equal likelihood of 
each choice being selected at random) random chance would allow for a minimum 
“detection” rate of approximately 33%.  However, the point blank detection rates (M = 
48.61%, SD = 9.20%) leave a buffer of approximately 15% which can be used to 
demonstrate a decrease in detection rates under experimental manipulations in Study 
Four. 
 The multiple choice questions (see Appendix Q) also offer a reliable means of 
determining detection rates, as they are not so vaguely worded that a participant might 
have noticed the inconsistency at issue, and yet might not understand the intent of the 
question while also avoiding a level of directness that could allow for a correct answer 
based solely upon deductive guessing since two specific answer options must be selected 
in order to count as a detection.1  Overall average detection rates of each inconsistency by 
all 27 participants in Study Two ranged from a low of 14.81% for PI 5-Model, PI 10-
                                                 
1 Because there are two specific selections per correct answer, the probability of randomly choosing the 
right pair of options is very low.  With four reasonable alternatives, plus a “none of the above” option as 
well as an “I don’t know” option, the probability of randomly selecting the correct two options is .067 even 
when eliminating the “none of the above” and the “I don’t know” choices from consideration.  Set aside the 
logical absurdity of choosing any of the four reasonable options in conjunction with “none of the above” 
and/or “I don’t know” (in other words, treating all six response options as equally viable with equal 
probability of being selected, and considering all combinations ranging from the choice of only one option 
through the choice of all six), and the probability of randomly selecting the correct response drops to .016, 
effectively eliminating the possibility of artificially high detection rates due to random guessing. 
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Color, and PI 11-Jared, and a high of 37.04% for PI 7-Hair and PI 9-Year (M = 24.07%, 
SD = 9.70%), which leaves a comfortable margin for Study Four even after controlling 
for as much as 6.7% of the detections having been due to random chance. 
Measuring Emotional Impact of Trial Transcript 
 Participants completed the I-PANAS-SF to measure their emotions prior to 
reading and listening to the trial transcript, and then the PANAS-X to measure their 
emotions after reading and listening to the trial transcript, and by comparing the pre- and 
post- transcript ratings for the twelve emotions included in the I-PANAS-SF pretest, I 
was able to determine what emotional responses the trial transcript elicited.  However, in 
order to establish what statistical tests to use in making that determination, I first needed 
to verify whether the data was normally distributed.  Pre- and post- transcript ratings for 
Alert, Determined, Attentive, and Active all displayed values less than twice the absolute 
value of the standard error for skewness (SE = .45) and kurtosis (SE = .87) so by that 
measure they are considered normally distributed, while post- transcript ratings of 
Inspired displayed skewness of 1.32, and Upset, Hostile, Ashamed, Nervous, Afraid, and 
Angry each had one or both values beyond the limits of normality for both pre- and post- 
transcript ratings.  Even though four emotions satisfied the requirements for normality 
according to skewness and kurtosis parameters, all eleven pre- and post- transcript 
emotional measures significantly deviate from a normal distribution according to the 
Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .05), so I will use nonparametric tests to compare pre- and post- 
transcript emotion ratings. 
 I used Kendall’s tau-b to examine the correlation coefficients between each 
emotion rating.  With the exception of Hostile, pre- and post- transcript emotion ratings 
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were generally at least moderately positively correlated (see Table 1), but of particular 
note is that both Afraid (τΒ = .90, p < .001) and Angry (τΒ = .74, p < .001) were very 
strongly positively correlated, indicating that because pre- and post- ratings were 
relatively consistent, the trial transcript did not have much effect on these two emotions 
of critical focus in my study. 
 Because of the non-normal distribution of data, I could not use a repeated 
measures t-test to compare the means of each emotion rating before and after exposure to 
the trial transcript, so I relied upon Wilcoxon signed-rank tests instead.  Seven of the 
eleven emotions did not exhibit a statistically significant change following exposure to 
the trial transcript, but ratings for Inspired (Z = -3.25, p = .001, r = .63), Nervous (Z = -
2.54, p = .011, r = .49), Determined (Z = -3.03, p = .002, r = .58), and Active (Z = -2.37, 
p = .018, r = .46) each decreased following the trial transcript (see Table 2 for pre- and 
post- transcript descriptive statistics and Wilcoxon signed-ranks test results).  These 
specific decreases in ratings following the trial transcript do not present any particular 
concern, as they are not unforeseen or unreasonable consequences to having followed 
along with a mundane transcript of a civil trial or to nearing the completion of what in 
many ways amounts to a homework assignment. 
Discussion 
 The eight inconsistencies featured in this version of the trial transcript should 
provide ample opportunity for detection rates to both increase and decrease from these 
baseline rates I have established.  The presence of experimental control conditions in 
Study Four will provide additional reliability for comparing detection rates.  Also, the 
trial transcript itself does not elicit any potentially confounding emotional responses.  The 
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validity and effectiveness of experimental emotion induction manipulations comprises 
the focus of Study Three, and then Study Four will look at the emotion inductions in 
conjunction with the trial transcript, examining whether the inductions are substantially 
durable enough to remain in effect even beyond the trial transcript. 
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Table 1 
Study Two: Kendall’s tau-b Correlations Between Pre- and Post- Transcript Emotion 
Ratings 
Emotion Correlation Coefficient Significance (2-tailed) 
Upset .367* .036 
Hostile .275 .141 
Alert .517** .001 
Ashamed .866** < .001 
Inspired .379* .024 
Nervous .477** .006 
Determined .445** .006 
Attentive .442** .007 
Afraid .900** < .001 
Active .496** .002 
Angry .741** < .001 
Note. n = 27. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 2 
Study Two: Descriptive Statistics and Wilcoxon Signed-Test Results for Emotion Ratings Before and After Transcript 
 Before After         
   Percentile   Percentile         
Emotion Min Max 25 50 75 Min Max 25 50 75 
Neg 
Ranksa 
Neg 
Rank 
Means 
Pos 
Ranksb 
Pos Rank 
Means Ties Z p  r 
Upset 1 5 1 1 2 1 5 1 1 2 5 5.20 5 5.80 17 -.155c .877  
Hostile 1 3 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 2 4 3.75 4 5.25 19 -.427c .669 
 
Alert 1 5 3 3 4 1 5 2 3 4 10 9.40 6 7.00 11 -1.435d .151 
 
Ashamed 1 5 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 3 2.50 1 2.50 23 -1.000d .317 
 
Inspired 1 5 1 3 4 1 4 1 1 2 14 9.29 2 3.00 11 -3.253d .001 .63 
Nervous 1 5 1 2 2 1 4 1 1 2 11 7.27 2 5.50 14 -2.543d .011 .49 
Determined 1 5 2 4 4 1 5 1 2 4 16 9.63 2 8.50 9 -3.035d .002 .58 
Attentive 1 5 3 4 5 1 5 3 3 4 11 7.41 4 9.63 12 -1.279d .201  
Afraid 1 5 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 4 2.50 0 0.00 23 -1.890d .059  
Active 1 5 2 3 4 1 5 1 2 3 15 9.23 3 10.83 9 -2.365d .018 .46 
Angry 1 5 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 2 2 2.50 2 2.50 23 .000e 1.000  
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Note. n =27.  aNegative ranks are ranks in which the pre- transcript rating was greater than the post- transcript rating, indicating an 
overall decrease in rating.  bPositive ranks are ranks in which the post- transcript rating was greater than the pre- transcript rating, 
indicating an overall increase in rating.  cZ scores based on negative ranks.  dZ scores based on positive ranks.  eThe sum of 
negative ranks equals the sum of positive ranks.
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Chapter VII 
Study Three: Verifying Emotion Induction Manipulations 
Method 
Theoretical Basis 
 Semmler and Brewer’s mixed findings (2002) should not come as any great 
surprise—whether due to a paucity of moderately detectable inconsistencies or the 
possibility that effects due to unintentionally induced emotions may have competed with, 
detracted from, or even overshadowed the effects of their experimentally manipulated 
emotional conditions.   There are two additional possibilities which might also explain 
their results, each having to do with their experimental induction of emotions.  First, and 
the most easily rectified, is the fact that they relied upon the content of the trial transcript 
itself as the means of emotional induction.  This is problematic because their independent 
variable (inducing sadness based on details of the trial transcript) was in some ways 
identical to their dependent variable (the detection of inconsistencies with the testimony) 
since both are based on participants noticing (or not noticing) and interpreting (or not 
interpreting) informational details from the same root source.  The low degree of 
experimental control afforded by this almost circular, self-contained design can be 
remedied by inducing emotion through a means wholly separate and independent from 
the trial transcript.   
 The second possible pitfall having to do with Semmler and Brewer’s emotion 
induction is their specific choice of which emotion to examine.  The emotion they 
induced (sadness) is characterized by greater appraisals of uncertainty than certainty, but 
it is closer to neutral in terms of levels of certainty than to either extreme end of the 
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spectrum (see Figure 2).  Their findings may have been inconclusive because there was 
not enough of a distinction between their experimental and control conditions, or due to 
the unusual nature of sadness itself.  Sadness is a highly complex emotion in terms of 
constituent appraisal tendencies (C. A. Smith & Ellsworth 1985; 1987) so it may have 
been a brash choice to induce as the target emotion at such a nascent stage of exploratory 
investigation.  I have avoided both predicaments by choosing to induce two separate 
emotions differing in their level of certainty appraisals (fear, which is low in certainty, 
and anger, which is high in certainty) as well as by including a third emotionally neutral 
control condition.  I chose to use fear and anger because they are highly similar to one 
another in nearly all appraisal dimensions besides certainty (C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985; see Figures 1, 2, and 3), so comparing the two will allow for a neater design with 
more potential for contrast than Semmler and Brewer’s efforts. 
 There are several popular methods which researchers have used to induce emotion 
in participants to varying degrees of effectiveness (see generally Lench, et al., 2011; 
Martin, 1990; and Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot, 2010), but due to concerns over 
highly variable participant investment using methods such as the writing of 
autobiographical statements and other emotion induction methods, I used film clips to 
induce discrete emotions.  Film clips have been successfully used to induce emotions in a 
variety of prior research on the relationship between emotion and cognition (appraisals 
influencing judgments of trustworthiness, Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; fMRI examinations 
of emotional regulation, Goldin, McRae, Ramel & Gross, 2008; timing of emotion 
regulation strategies, Sheppes & Meiran, 2008), and have been found to be the most 
broadly effective of induction methods (Westermann et al., 1996) but concerns of 
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generalizability and uniformity have prompted several efforts to identify a battery of film 
clips that can be used to reliably induce emotion.  Philippot (1993) compiled a selection 
of film clips for French-speaking participants, while Gross and Levenson (1995) 
independently identified 16 film clips that were shown to elicit eight discrete emotions, 
with care taken to isolate those films which prompt only one distinct emotion (rather than 
a general, diffuse valence, or a constellation of concomitant emotions) and to maximal 
intensity.  The use of these 16 clips to induce emotions was further supported by 
Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007), which provides a primer on the use of film clips to 
elicit emotions in experimental settings.  Despite being a relatively new research 
paradigm, emotion has been successfully induced in online experimental designs in a 
variety of ways, including the Velten procedure, autobiographical recall, mood-
suggestive photographs, picture-illustrated emotive texts, and video clips (Göritz, 2007; 
Göritz & Moser, 2006; Verheyen & Göritz, 2009; Verleuer, Verhagen, & Heuvelman, 
2007; Wiener et al., 2007), so I expected that video clips shown online would be a 
successful means of emotion induction (such clips are agreed to be among the most 
robust means of emotion induction; see Gross & Levenson, 1995; Lench, et al., 2011; 
Martin, 1990; Philippot, 1993; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007; Schaefer, et al., 2010; 
Westermann et al., 1996) .  Study Three was undertaken to confirm the effectiveness of 
my emotion inductions because it is a somewhat new combination of two separate, yet 
previously successful experimental methodologies.  In order for Study Four to have 
meaningful results, I need to be absolutely sure that my method of inducing fear, anger, 
or no emotional state are each effective.  Additionally, by confirming the effectiveness of 
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this type of experimental manipulation, favorable results will strengthen the basis for 
similar emotional induction methods in future research. 
Participants 
 Three hundred nineteen undergraduate students at Florida International University 
were recruited through Sona Systems, the Psychology Department Research Management 
system to participate in a web-based study entitled “Watching Movies” in exchange for 
course credit.  Because this was an online study, several safeguards were used to exclude 
those participants who did not give the study their undivided attention (see Appendix U 
for detailed criteria and procedures undertaken for data reduction purposes), which 
resulted in a total of 249 participants.  The sample was predominantly female (75%; 25% 
male), Hispanic (66%; 14% White/Caucasian; 12% African American; 4% Asian, and 
5% Other), and they ranged in age from 18 to 49 years old (M = 22.07, SD = 4.64).  
Participants were predominantly upperclassmen, with 34% in their senior year, 21% in 
their junior year, 12% in their sophomore year, 27% in their freshman year, and 3% 
having completed some professional or graduate-level education.  Over half the sample 
(52%) was not currently employed, with 32% holding part-time employment and 16% 
working full-time, and seven participants (3%) had previously served on a civil jury 
while two participants (1%) had served on a criminal jury. 
Design 
 Study Three was essentially run twice with the findings from the first effort 
(identifying which emotionally neutral film clip to use as my control, as well as 
uncovering unexpected wrinkles in induction techniques; see Appendix W for details) 
informing the design and objectives for the second iteration which is the focus here.  
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Study Three was a 2 (emotion induction technique: with vs. without autobiographical 
perspective-taking writing exercise) x 4 (induction target emotion/level of certainty and 
associated film clips: fear/low certainty: boy playing in hallway from The Shining [1980] 
and basement chase scene from The Silence of the Lambs [1991] as well as anger/high 
certainty via clips featuring police abusing protestors from Cry Freedom [1987] and a 
bullying scene from My Bodyguard [1980]; see Appendix A) pretest-posttest mixed 
factorial design.  In short, the goal of Study Three was to identify and confirm the most 
effective techniques to experimentally induce fear and anger among my sampling frame. 
Materials 
 Emotion induction. 
 Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007, see Appendix A) recommend two film clips 
that they found to reliably induce fear (a basement chase scene from The Silence of the 
Lambs [1991] and a boy playing in hallway from The Shining [1980]) as well as two film 
clips they found to reliably induce anger (police abusing protestors from Cry Freedom 
[1987] and a bullying scene from My Bodyguard [1980]).  The neutral/no emotion 
inducing film clip I would use as a control in Studies Four was validated and selected 
during the preliminary phase of Study Three (see Appendix W). 
 Each participant was randomly assigned to a condition featuring only one of the 
four film clips.  Approximately half of the participants were randomly assigned to a 
condition in which after they watched the clip, they were instructed to write a few 
sentences recounting the clip from a first-person perspective as if they had been 
experiencing the events depicted themselves.  The other participants were not asked to 
engage in this perspective-taking exercise.  This manipulation was conducted in order to 
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test whether the writing task bolstered or weakened the effectiveness of the emotion 
inductions (see Appendix W for additional background on this undertaking). 
 Emotion measures. 
 To obtain a baseline measure of participant emotional state prior to them watching 
a film clip without unduly altering their emotional states or introspective self-evaluation, 
I provided participants with the 10-item International Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule Short Form (I-PANAS-SF, Thompson, 2007; see Appendix O).  The I-PANAS-
SF does not include any emotion ratings analogous to anger, so to maximize utility for 
my specific purposes, I appended “Angry” to the scale since one of the critical 
manipulations in Study Four is inducing some participants to feel anger.  To obtain a 
more thorough measurement of emotional state immediately after exposure to their 
randomly assigned film clip (and after those participants in the perspective-taking 
condition completed the writing assignment), all participants completed the 60-item 
Specific Affect Scales of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule- Expanded (PANAS-
X; Watson & Clark, 1994; see Appendix O).  Participants also completed the Post Film 
Questionnaire (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007; see Appendix A). 
Procedure 
 Just as in Studies One and Two, participants logged on to their secure FIU Sona 
Systems account to receive the link to the study itself, securely hosted online at 
Qualtrics.com, FIU’s online survey resource.  After giving their consent to participate 
(see Appendix V for Study Three Informed Consent) Study Three used the same 
computer compatibility confirmations, reminder to complete the study all at once, page 
view duration verification, and similar data reduction techniques (see Appendix U for 
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Study Three Data Reduction details) as used in prior studies.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to all conditions. 
 Following their granting of consent and verifying the compatibility of their 
computers, participants completed the twelve item I-PANAS-SF to establish their 
baseline emotional ratings.  Participants then watched one of the four film clips, after 
which those participants assigned to the writing task conditions were instructed to “please 
describe the film clip you just watched as if you were there to experience it in person” in 
a few sentences before proceeding, while those participants not assigned to the writing 
task continued directly to the PANAS-X.  Next, participants completed Rottenberg, Ray, 
and Gross’s (2007) Post Film Questionnaire concerning the emotions they experienced 
while watching the film clip.  They then answered demographic questions (see Appendix 
I) and were thanked, debriefed (see Appendix J), and instructed to close their web 
browser. 
Results 
General Effectiveness of Films as Means of Induction 
 In order to accurately compare postfilm emotions of different groups, I first 
needed to confirm that there were no differences between groups prior to the emotional 
inductions.  Analysis of variance with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons 
showed no significant differences between the eight experimental groups for any of the 
twelve emotions rated on the I-PANAS-SF pretest: upset, F(1, 7) = 1.45, p = .185, η2 = 
.04; hostile, F(1, 7) = 1.22, p = .289, η2 = .03; alert, F(1, 7) = 1.07, p = .385, η2 = .03; 
ashamed, F(1, 7) = 0.61, p = .748, η2 = .02; angry, F(1, 7) = 1.51, p = .164, η2 = .04; 
nervous, F(1, 7) = 0.50, p = .834, η2 = .01; determined, F(1, 7) = 0.66, p = .705, η2 = .02; 
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attentive, F(1, 7) = 0.29, p = .957, η2 = .01; afraid, F(1, 7) = 1.97, p = .060, η2 = .05; 
active, F(1, 7) = 1.08, p = .377, η2 = .03; inspired, F(1, 7) = 1.50, p = .168, η2 = .04; mad, 
F(1, 7) = 1.43, p = .195, η2 = .04.  My next step was to simply check whether (and if so, 
which) emotion ratings changed during each film clip by conducting a repeated measures 
t-test for each of the twelve emotions rated both before and after the induction procedure 
(see Tables 3 through 10 for pre- and post- film clip means on a scale from 1-very 
slightly or not at all to 5-extremely).  This round of testing confirmed in a very general 
sense that each of the four film clips seem to be inducing the correct emotions as 
intended, with The Shining and The Silence of the Lambs each yielding increased ratings 
for nervous and afraid, both with and without the writing task, while the clips from Cry 
Freedom and My Bodyguard are each leading to increased ratings for hostile, angry, and 
mad under both writing task conditions.   
 However, there were also several minor adverse effects, such as the My 
Bodyguard clip significantly increasing afraid ratings in the no writing task condition (M 
= 1.20, SD = 0.41) in comparison to pretest afraid ratings (M = 1.00, SD = 0.00), t(29) = 
2.69, p = .012, d = 0.49, but this rather small difference is even smaller when considering 
the absolute minimum ratings given during the pretest.  Of slightly greater cause for 
concern is that the clip from The Silence of the Lambs elicited a statistically significant 
increase in anger ratings from the pretest (M = 1.23, SD = 0.49) to the post-film ratings 
(M = 1.46, SD = 0.82), t(34) = 2.26, p = .030, d = 0.38, in the no writing task condition, 
but even so, this is a relatively small increase from a very low baseline level.  The Cry 
Freedom clip, however, yielded potentially confounding results in both induction 
conditions.  Those participants who did not engage in the writing task in addition to the 
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film clip emotion induction showed a statistically significant increase in afraid ratings 
from the pretest (M = 1.03, SD = 0.16) to the posttest (M = 1.43, SD = 0.69), t(36) = 3.83, 
p < .001, d = 0.63, but this increase is also starting from a reference point just barely 
above the minimum possible level.  The participants who undertook the writing task 
showed a much more dramatic and troublesome increase from pretest afraid ratings (M = 
1.19, SD = 0.68) to the levels reported following the film clip (M = 2.58, SD = 1.50), 
t(20) = 3.82, p = .001, d = 0.83, which is quite a strong effect.  I evaluated these and other 
condition-specific results more closely in my next step of analysis. 
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Table 3 
Study Three: Contrast of Mean Emotion Ratings Before and After The Shining Film Clip and Perspective Taking Writing Task 
 Before Film After Film Difference*   95% CI  
Emotion M SD M SD M SD t(37) p LL UL Cohen’s d
Upset 1.48 0.89 1.53 0.76 0.05 0.96 0.34 .737 -0.26 0.37 0.05 
Hostile 1.26 0.60 1.21 0.53 -0.05 0.57 -0.57 .571 -0.24 0.13 -0.09 
Alert 2.89 1.35 3.21 1.19 0.32 1.65 1.18 .244 -0.23 0.86 0.19 
Ashamed 1.16 0.49 1.08 0.27 -0.08 0.27 -1.78 .083 -0.17 0.01 -0.29 
Angry 1.37 0.71 1.37 0.67 0.00 0.62 0.00 1.000 -0.20 0.20 0.00 
Nervous 1.42 0.60 2.24 1.30 0.82 1.35 3.71 .001 0.37 1.26 0.60 
Determined 3.32 1.16 2.32 1.40 -1.00 1.25 -4.92 <.001 -1.41 -0.59 -0.80 
Attentive 3.58 0.89 3.50 1.06 -0.08 1.00 -0.49 .628 -0.41 0.25 -0.08 
Afraid 1.18 0.39 2.24 1.39 1.24 1.34 5.67 <.001 0.79 1.68 0.92 
Active 3.03 1.30 2.11 1.20 -0.92 1.15 -4.95 <.001 -1.30 -0.54 -0.80 
Inspired 2.87 1.30 1.74 1.03 -1.13 1.17 -5.98 <.001 -1.51 -0.75 -0.97 
Mad 1.32 0.70 1.24 0.49 -0.08 0.54 -0.90 .373 -0.26 0.09 -0.15 
Note. CI = Confidence Interval of the Difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  *After minus Before; positive values 
indicate an increased rating. 
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Table 4 
Study Three: Contrast of Mean Emotion Ratings Before and After The Silence of the Lambs Film Clip and Perspective Taking 
Writing Task 
 Before Film After Film Difference*   95% CI  
Emotion M SD M SD M SD t(21) p LL UL Cohen’s d 
Upset 1.18 0.39 1.55 0.67 0.36 0.66 2.59 .017 0.07 0.66 0.55 
Hostile 1.14 0.47 1.27 0.63 0.14 0.56 1.14 .266 -0.11 0.38 0.24 
Alert 2.73 1.24 3.32 1.29 0.59 1.22 2.27 .034 0.05 1.13 0.48 
Ashamed 1.18 0.50 1.14 0.64 -0.05 0.65 -0.33 .747 -0.33 0.24 -0.07 
Angry 1.14 0.35 1.32 0.65 0.18 0.73 1.16 .257 -0.14 0.51 0.25 
Nervous 1.45 0.80 2.09 1.27 0.64 1.36 2.19 .040 0.03 1.24 0.47 
Determined 3.09 1.63 2.00 1.15 -1.09 1.23 -4.16 <.001 -1.64 -0.55 -0.89 
Attentive 3.64 1.09 3.55 1.06 -0.09 1.06 -0.40 .693 -0.56 0.38 -0.09 
Afraid 1.14 0.35 1.77 0.75 0.64 0.90 3.31 .003 0.24 1.04 0.71 
Active 2.32 1.25 1.86 1.17 -0.45 1.10 -1.94 .066 -0.94 0.03 -0.41 
Inspired 2.27 1.49 1.32 0.95 -0.95 1.29 -3.47 .002 -1.53 -0.38 -0.74 
Mad 1.18 0.39 1.18 0.39 0.00 0.53 0.00 1.000 -0.24 0.24 0.00 
Note. CI = Confidence Interval of the Difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  *After minus Before; positive values 
indicate an increased rating. 
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Table 5 
Study Three: Contrast of Mean Emotion Ratings Before and After Cry Freedom Film Clip and Perspective Taking Writing Task 
 Before Film After Film Difference*   95% CI  
Emotion M SD M SD M SD t(20) p LL UL Cohen’s d
Upset 1.29 0.56 3.90 1.22 2.62 1.28 9.35 <.001 2.03 3.20 2.04 
Hostile 1.00 0.00 1.90 1.22 0.90 1.22 3.40 .003 0.35 1.46 0.74 
Alert 3.05 1.28 3.43 1.43 0.38 1.53 1.14 .268 -0.32 1.08 0.25 
Ashamed 1.19 0.40 1.90 1.26 0.71 1.23 2.66 .015 0.15 1.27 0.58 
Angry 1.14 0.36 3.67 1.46 2.52 1.50 7.69 <.001 1.84 3.21 1.68 
Nervous 1.52 0.68 1.90 1.18 0.38 1.20 1.45 .162 -0.17 0.93 0.32 
Determined 3.67 1.32 2.24 1.41 -1.43 1.60 -4.09 .001 -2.16 -0.70 -0.89 
Attentive 3.62 1.16 3.67 1.28 0.05 1.72 0.13 .900 -0.73 0.83 0.03 
Afraid 1.19 0.68 2.58 1.50 1.38 1.66 3.82 .001 0.63 2.14 0.83 
Active 3.05 1.47 2.05 1.24 -1.00 1.26 -3.62 .002 -1.58 -0.42 -0.79 
Inspired 3.05 1.63 1.57 0.98 -1.48 1.91 -3.54 .002 -2.35 -0.61 -0.77 
Mad 1.24 0.54 3.24 1.61 2.00 1.55 5.92 <.001 1.29 2.71 1.29 
Note. CI = Confidence Interval of the Difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  *After minus Before; positive values 
indicate an increased rating. 
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Table 6 
Study Three: Contrast of Mean Emotion Ratings Before and After My Bodyguard Film Clip and Perspective Taking Writing Task 
 Before Film After Film Difference*   95% CI  
Emotion M SD M SD M SD t(29) p LL UL Cohen’s d 
Upset 1.17 0.38 2.87 1.48 1.70 1.60 5.82 <.001 1.10 2.30 1.06 
Hostile 1.03 0.18 1.67 1.09 0.63 1.10 3.16 .004 0.22 1.04 0.58 
Alert 2.93 1.17 2.90 1.21 -0.03 1.25 -0.15 .884 -0.50 0.43 -0.03 
Ashamed 1.10 0.31 1.53 0.94 0.43 0.94 2.54 .017 0.08 0.78 0.46 
Angry 1.07 0.25 2.47 1.46 1.40 1.45 5.28 <.001 0.86 1.94 0.96 
Nervous 1.43 0.82 1.50 0.78 0.07 0.87 0.42 .677 -0.26 0.39 0.08 
Determined 3.43 1.28 2.16 0.99 -1.27 1.46 -4.75 <.001 -1.81 -0.72 -0.87 
Attentive 3.50 1.01 3.07 1.28 -0.43 1.19 -1.99 .056 -0.88 0.01 -0.36 
Afraid 1.37 0.89 1.13 0.35 -0.23 0.97 -1.32 .199 -0.60 0.13 -0.24 
Active 2.57 1.10 2.10 1.12 -0.47 1.22 -2.09 .046 -0.92 -0.01 -0.38 
Inspired 2.40 1.10 1.37 0.85 -1.03 1.19 -4.76 <.001 -1.48 -0.59 -0.87 
Mad 1.03 0.18 2.37 1.65 1.33 1.60 4.55 <.001 0.73 1.93 0.83 
Note. CI = Confidence Interval of the Difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  *After minus Before; positive values 
indicate an increased rating. 
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Table 7 
Study Three: Contrast of Mean Emotion Ratings Before and After The Shining Film Clip and No Writing Task 
 Before Film After Film Difference*   95% CI  
Emotion M SD M SD M SD t(35) p LL UL Cohen’s d
Upset 1.53 0.84 1.61 0.93 0.08 1.05 0.48 .638 -0.27 0.44 0.08 
Hostile 1.19 0.58 1.50 1.00 0.31 1.01 1.82 .078 -0.04 0.65 0.30 
Alert 3.03 1.34 3.19 1.33 0.17 1.30 0.77 .446 -0.27 0.61 0.13 
Ashamed 1.08 0.28 1.11 0.40 0.03 0.45 0.37 .711 -0.12 0.18 0.06 
Angry 1.25 0.65 1.22 0.48 -0.03 0.61 -0.27 .786 -0.23 0.18 -0.05 
Nervous 1.33 0.68 2.42 1.36 1.08 1.30 5.02 <.001 0.64 1.52 0.84 
Determined 3.33 1.53 2.36 1.38 -0.97 1.48 -3.93 <.001 -1.47 -0.47 -0.66 
Attentive 3.47 1.38 3.72 1.06 0.25 1.13 1.33 .193 -0.13 0.63 0.22 
Afraid 1.11 0.32 2.19 1.31 1.08 1.40 4.64 <.001 0.61 1.56 0.77 
Active 2.67 1.37 2.03 1.21 -0.64 1.40 -2.74 .010 -1.11 -0.17 -0.46 
Inspired 2.94 1.55 2.00 1.20 -0.94 1.37 -4.13 <.001 -1.41 -0.48 -0.68 
Mad 1.31 0.62 1.19 0.58 -0.11 0.57 -1.16 .254 -0.31 0.08 -0.19 
Note. CI = Confidence Interval of the Difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  *After minus Before; positive values 
indicate an increased rating. 
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Table 8 
Study Three: Contrast of Mean Emotion Ratings Before and After The Silence of the Lambs Film Clip and No Writing Task 
 Before Film After Film Difference*   95% CI  
Emotion M SD M SD M SD t(34) p LL UL Cohen’s d
Upset 1.34 0.64 1.77 1.03 0.43 1.14 2.21 .034 0.04 0.82 0.37 
Hostile 1.09 0.28 1.69 0.93 0.60 0.88 4.03 <.001 0.30 0.90 0.68 
Alert 2.63 1.33 3.66 1.08 1.03 1.62 3.76 .001 0.47 1.58 0.64 
Ashamed 1.11 0.40 1.09 0.28 -0.03 0.45 -0.37 .711 -0.18 0.13 -0.06 
Angry 1.23 0.49 1.46 0.82 0.23 0.60 2.26 .030 0.02 0.43 0.38 
Nervous 1.60 0.77 2.20 1.16 0.60 1.26 2.81 .008 0.17 1.03 0.47 
Determined 3.37 1.21 2.34 1.39 -1.03 1.29 -4.70 <.001 -1.47 0.58 -0.79 
Attentive 3.51 1.07 3.80 1.05 0.29 0.96 1.77 .086 -0.04 0.61 0.30 
Afraid 1.11 0.32 2.00 0.97 0.89 0.96 5.44 <.001 0.55 1.22 0.92 
Active 2.86 1.35 2.49 1.25 -0.37 1.31 -1.68 .102 -0.82 0.08 -0.28 
Inspired 2.89 1.30 1.74 1.09 -1.14 1.46 -4.64 <.001 -1.64 -0.64 -0.78 
Mad 1.17 0.38 1.17 0.38 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 -0.08 0.08 0.00 
Note. CI = Confidence Interval of the Difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  *After minus Before; positive values 
indicate an increased rating. 
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Table 9 
Study Three: Contrast of Mean Emotion Ratings Before and After Cry Freedom Film Clip and No Writing Task 
 Before Film After Film Difference*   95% CI  
Emotion M SD M SD M SD t(36) p LL UL Cohen’s d
Upset 1.32 0.67 4.00 1.11 2.68 1.33 12.20 <.001 2.23 3.12 2.01 
Hostile 1.14 0.35 1.70 0.97 0.57 0.93 3.72 .001 0.26 0.88 0.61 
Alert 3.00 1.25 3.22 1.34 0.22 1.72 0.77 .449 -0.36 0.79 0.13 
Ashamed 1.08 0.28 1.97 1.24 0.89 1.26 4.29 <.001 0.47 1.31 0.71 
Angry 1.16 0.37 3.68 1.36 2.51 1.48 10.31 <.001 2.02 3.01 1.69 
Nervous 1.41 0.72 1.49 0.80 0.08 0.80 0.62 .539 -0.18 0.35 0.10 
Determined 3.00 1.22 2.03 1.21 -0.97 1.26 -4.71 <.001 -1.39 -0.55 -0.77 
Attentive 3.41 1.09 3.68 1.03 0.27 1.28 1.28 .208 -0.16 0.70 0.21 
Afraid 1.03 0.16 1.43 0.69 0.41 0.64 3.83 <.001 0.19 0.62 0.63 
Active 2.62 1.26 2.11 1.29 -0.51 1.28 -2.44 .020 -0.94 -0.09 -0.40 
Inspired 2.32 1.38 1.46 1.04 -0.86 1.53 -3.44 .001 -1.38 -0.35 -0.57 
Mad 1.14 0.35 3.14 1.29 2.00 1.39 8.72 <.001 1.54 2.46 1.43 
Note. CI = Confidence Interval of the Difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  *After minus Before; positive values 
indicate an increased rating. 
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Table 10 
Study Three: Contrast of Mean Emotion Ratings Before and After My Bodyguard Film Clip and No Writing Task 
 Before Film After Film Difference*   95% CI  
Emotion M SD M SD M SD t(29) p LL UL Cohen’s d
Upset 1.17 0.38 2.77 1.48 1.60 1.43 6.13 <.001 1.07 2.13 1.12 
Hostile 1.17 0.46 1.53 0.78 0.37 0.96 2.08 .046 0.01 0.73 0.38 
Alert 3.43 1.25 3.53 1.28 0.10 1.12 0.49 .630 -0.32 0.52 0.09 
Ashamed 1.03 0.18 1.47 0.86 0.43 0.86 2.77 .010 0.11 0.75 0.50 
Angry 1.07 0.25 2.37 1.33 1.30 1.34 5.30 <.001 0.80 1.80 0.97 
Nervous 1.33 0.76 1.27 0.52 -0.07 0.78 -0.47 .645 -0.36 0.23 -0.08 
Determined 3.40 1.30 2.80 1.45 -0.60 1.16 -2.83 .008 -1.03 -0.17 -0.52 
Attentive 3.73 0.94 4.00 0.83 0.27 0.52 2.80 .009 0.07 0.46 0.51 
Afraid 1.00 0.00 1.20 0.41 0.20 0.41 2.69 .012 0.05 0.35 0.49 
Active 3.00 1.34 2.37 1.50 -0.63 1.03 -3.36 .002 -1.02 -0.25 -0.61 
Inspired 2.90 1.37 1.90 1.45 -1.00 1.31 -4.17 <.001 -1.49 -0.51 -0.76 
Mad 1.10 0.31 2.13 1.22 1.03 1.19 4.76 <.001 0.59 1.48 0.87 
Note. CI = Confidence Interval of the Difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  *After minus Before; positive values 
indicate an increased rating.
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Comparing Relative Effectiveness of each Film Clip and Induction Technique 
 In order to evaluate the effectiveness of emotion induction for each of the four 
film clips, I first looked to the emotions rated during the PANAS-X posttest which bore 
the closest relationships to my broader constructs of fear and anger.  “Mad” and “anger” 
ratings were used as an analogue for assessing anger, while “afraid,” “nervous,” “scared,” 
and “frightened” were used as representations of fear.  I compared the two fear target 
clips to each other for postfilm ratings of the six benchmark emotions while also 
comparing the presence or absence of the writing task.  Separate 2 x 2 (fear film levels x 
writing task) factorial analysis of variance conducted for each of the six benchmarks 
yielded no significant differences except for afraid, where the film clip showed a 
significant main effect, F(1, 127) = 4.03, p = .047, η2 = .031, with participants who 
watched The Shining rating afraid higher (M = 2.31) than participants who watched The 
Silence of the Lambs (M = 1.89) on a scale from 1-very slightly or not at all to 5-
extremely.  Because afraid ratings are obviously such a critical dimension in my overall 
goal of inducing fear and high levels of uncertainty through the use of film clips, this was 
a very important distinction I considered when making my ultimate choice of which film 
clip best induces fear and uncertainty. 
 I conducted the same series of separate 2 x 2 (film x writing task) factorial 
analysis of variance for the postfilm ratings of each of the six benchmark emotion 
comparing only the clips intended to induce anger.  There was a significant main effect 
on angry ratings for the specific film seen F(1, 114) = 22.96, p < .001, η2 = .168 such that 
those participants who watched the Cry Freedom clip gave much higher ratings on angry 
(M = 3.67) than did those who watched the clip from My Bodyguard (M = 2.42).  There 
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was also a significant main effect of film clip on mad ratings F(1, 114) = 12.07, p = .001, 
η2 = .096 wherein Cry Freedom resulted in higher ratings (M = 3.17) than My Bodyguard 
(M = 2.25).   
 Viewed in isolation, these two relatively strong differences would suggest that 
Cry Freedom might make a much better film for my purpose of inducing anger.  
However, that preference is based solely on effectiveness for inducing anger.  It is 
equally imperative that the film clips I use must elicit only their intended emotion and not 
the opposing one as well.  For this reason, the otherwise powerful emotional impact of 
the Cry Freedom clip dramatically loses viability for my specific needs.  A 2 x 2 (film x 
writing task) factorial analysis for variance in postfilm ratings of frightened revealed a 
main effect for the film, F(1, 114) = 26.52, p < .001, η2 = .189 with Cry Freedom having 
a greater frightened rating (M = 2.07) than My Bodyguard (M = 1.20).  The same analysis 
for scared showed a main effect for the film, F(1, 114) = 17.14, p < .001, η2 = .131 with 
Cry Freedom having a greater scared rating (M = 1.76) than My Bodyguard (M = 1.23), 
as well as a main effect for the writing task, F(1, 114) = 13.85, p < .001, η2 = .108 with 
those who completed the writing task having a greater scared rating (M = 1.85) than did 
the induction format without the writing task (M = 1.27).  These two main effects were 
qualified by a significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 114) = 4.09, p = .046, 
η2 = .035, which a simple effects analysis for the writing task indicated that the mean 
scared ratings given by those participants who engaged in the writing task were 
significantly greater (M = 1.76) than those who did not complete the additional task (M = 
1.28) which indicates that the  writing task led to greater scared ratings (F(1, 114) = 
16.56, p = .004, η2 = .108).  An accompanying simple effects analysis for film clip also 
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indicated a significant difference in the mean scared ratings given by those participants 
who watched the Cry Freedom clip (M = 1.76) than those given by participants after 
watching the My Bodyguard clip (M = 1.23), indicating that the Cry Freedom clip 
significantly increased scared ratings compared to the My Bodyguard clip (F(1, 114) = 
15.60, p = .003, η2 = .108). 
 Not surprisingly, given the near interchangeability of the words, afraid ratings 
showed similar effects to the scared ratings among those same participants who watched 
either of the two film clips intended to induce anger.  After a 2 x 2 (film x writing task) 
factorial analysis for variance in postfilm ratings of afraid, a significant main effect for 
the writing task emerged (F(1, 114) = 13.16, p < .001, η2 = .103) with those participants 
who completed the writing task having given significantly greater afraid ratings (M = 
1.73) than those who did not complete that task (M = 1.33).  A significant main effect for 
film clip also emerged (F(1, 114) = 31.94, p < .001, η2 = .219), with participants who 
watched the Cry Freedom clip reporting greater afraid ratings (M = 1.84) than those who 
watched the My Bodyguard clip (M = 1.17).  Just as with scared ratings, these two main 
effects showed a significant interaction between the two factors (F(1, 114) = 16.64, p < 
.001, η2 = .127).  A simple effects analysis for instruction type showed that those 
participants who engaged in the writing task reported significantly greater afraid ratings 
(M = 1.73) than those participants who did not complete the writing task (M = 1.33) 
which again indicates that the writing exercise strengthened feelings of being afraid (F(1, 
114) = 41.34, p < .001, η2 = .103).  Another simple effects analysis for film clip also 
indicated a significant difference in the mean afraid ratings given by those participants 
who watched the Cry Freedom clip (M = 1.84) than those given by participants after 
 119 
 
watching the My Bodyguard clip (M = 1.17), indicating that the Cry Freedom clip 
significantly increased afraid ratings compared to the My Bodyguard clip (F(1, 114) = 
28.12, p < .001, η2 = .127). 
 Finally, the last relationships of note among the six benchmark emotion ratings 
for those participants who watched either of the anger inducing film clips relates to the 
dimension of nervousness, an emotion characterized by a high degree of uncertainty.  I 
conducted the same 2 x 2 (anger films x writing task) factorial analysis for variance in 
postfilm ratings given for nervous, which demonstrated a significant main effect for both 
the writing task, F(1, 114) = 4.48, p = .036, η2 = .038, and for film clip, F(1, 114) = 4.12, 
p = .045, η2 = .035.  These effects showed that mean ratings for nervousness were greater 
among those participants who underwent the writing task in addition to the film clips (M 
= 1.70) than for those participants who simply watched the film clips (M = 1.38).  The 
participants who saw the Cry Freedom film clip gave significantly higher responses (M = 
2.07) for nervous than participants who watched the My Bodyguard clip (M = 1.20).  Two 
of my goals for Study Three were to identify which film clips to use in order to most 
effectively induce anger or fear, as well as to determine whether the two part induction 
procedure featuring the autobiographical, perspective taking writing task was more or 
less effective at inducing my two target emotions than just watching the film clip without 
the writing task.  These two objectives were critical to the success of my larger goal for 
Study Three, which was to finalize an empirically verified means of reliably inducing and 
measuring not simply the broader emotions of anger and fear, but rather inducing (and 
determining how to reliably measure) high and low levels of the more specific appraisal 
of certainty.  As such, discovering significant main effects for a highly resemblant 
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dimension like nervousness was very diagnostic and dispositive—it was utterly contrary 
to my purposes to have my anger induction leading to increased uncertainty, so because 
both the Cry Freedom clip and the writing task each exhibited main effects leading to 
greater levels of nervousness, my final emotion/certainty induction techniques became 
more apparent. 
 In order to even further confirm that the clip from My Bodyguard was superior to 
the clip from Cry Freedom, and having known that the  writing task complicated the 
emotion induction to such a degree that eliminating it from consideration was the most 
prudent course of action, using responses from only those participants who were not 
instructed to complete the writing task, I ran a multivariate analysis of variance with the 
two anger-inducing film clips (Cry Freedom and My Bodyguard) as the independent 
variables and postfilm ratings of afraid, shaky, nervous, jittery, scared, and frightened as 
the dependent variables.  There was a significant effect, F(6, 60) = 3.13, p = .01, η2 = 
.238.  Follow-up univariate tests with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons 
showed significance for shaky, F(1, 65) = 10.02, p = .002, scared, F(1, 65) = 7.54, p = 
.008, and frightened, F(1, 65) = 10.10, p = .002.  After watching Cry Freedom, mean 
ratings for shaky (M = 2.16), scared (M = 1.43), and frightened (M = 1.87), emotions 
which should not be elicited during the anger induction film clip, were each significantly 
greater than after watching the My Bodyguard clip, with mean ratings of 1.34 for shaky, 
1.10 for scared, and 1.20 for frightened. 
 Taken together, this array of unique and recursive main effects and interactions 
suggest that with respect to the anger induction manipulations, the Cry Freedom clip and 
the writing task combine to cause significantly increased ratings of fear and uncertainty-
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related emotions.  In essence, either the Cry Freedom film clip or the writing task could 
each reduce the overall range of my certainty manipulations, but the Cry Freedom clip 
along with the writing task in particular would be the very worst choice to use as my 
anger induction technique.  
 After having conclusively determined that the My Bodyguard clip was preferable 
to the Cry Freedom clip, I needed to confirm that the more effective means of induction 
was in fact to avoid having participants engage in the writing task.  To do this, I 
conducted an individual analysis of variance on the postfilm ratings for each of the six 
benchmark emotions (angry, mad, afraid, nervous, scared, and frightened) I had selected 
to most accurately illustrate induction effectiveness for any differences due presence or 
absence of the writing task after having watched the My Bodyguard clip.  No statistically 
significant differences emerged, however ratings for scared were close to statistical 
significance F(1, 58) = 3.95, p = .052, η2 = .064 (note that no Bonferroni adjustment to 
the p value for significance was necessary since there was only a single comparison 
made).  However, at this level of non-significance, the mean scared ratings among 
participants who completed the writing task (M = 1.37, SD = 0.67, 95% CI [1.18, 1.56]) 
was greater than those reported by the participants who did not engage in the writing task 
(M = 1.10, SD = 0.31, 95% CI [0.91, 1.29]).  Despite being just outside the limits of 
statistical significance, the proximity presents a potential problem should values fluctuate 
slightly.  Because I wished to minimize any potential for fear-based or uncertain 
emotions to increase after having watched the anger/certainty inducing film clip, it 
seemed judicious to err on the side of caution and elect to eliminate the writing task 
component of the inductions. 
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 In contrast to the myriad considerations and comparisons required to sensibly 
evaluate the two anger induction films and the value of the writing task in this context, a 
2 x 2 (fear films x writing task) factorial analysis of variance for the postfilm ratings of 
each of the six benchmark emotion comparing only the clips intended to induce fear, 
there was only one significant main effect among all six of the benchmark emotion 
ratings I looked at.  The mean ratings for afraid were significantly greater for The Shining 
(M = 2.31) compared to The Silence of the Lambs (M = 1.89), which, even though it is 
not an especially large difference, nevertheless presented a very compelling reason why I 
should use the clip from The Shining to experimentally induce fear, F(1, 127) = 4.029, p 
= .047, η2 = .031.  To confirm that there would be no drawbacks to eliminating the 
writing task with respect to inducing fear and uncertainty with the clip from The Shining, 
I conducted the same series of individual analyses of variance on the postfilm ratings for 
each of the six benchmark emotions with or without the writing task after having watched 
The Shining, and no differences even approaching statistical significance emerged. 
 My final step to confirm that watching film clips from The Shining and My 
Bodyguard without the writing task was the optimal method of inducing fear and anger, 
respectively, was to run a multivariate analysis of variance with The Shining, The Silence 
of the Lambs, and My Bodyguard film clips as the independent variables (having 
conclusively rejected Cry Freedom, there was no benefit to be gained from including it at 
the expense of statistical reliability) and all 61 postfilm emotion ratings from the 
PANAS-X as the dependent variables.  Afraid, nervous, scared, frightened, and jittery 
ratings were each significantly greater for participants who watched either The Shining or 
The Silence of the Lambs than for those who watched My Bodyguard.  Angry, mad, 
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disgusted, irritable, sad, upset, and ashamed ratings were each significantly greater for 
participants who watched My Bodyguard than either The Shining or The Silence of the 
Lambs.  Fearless, bold, and loathing ratings were all significantly greater for participants 
who watched My Bodyguard than The Shining, while alone and lonely ratings were 
significantly higher after having watched The Shining than My Bodyguard.  Shaky and 
sheepish were both greater among participants who saw the clip from The Silence of the 
Lambs than those who saw My Bodyguard, but there was no significant difference 
between viewers of The Shining and either of the other two movies for these emotions.  
Table 12 features complete pairwise comparisons for all 19 emotions with at least one 
significant difference between movies. 
 Since I intended to use the emotion inducing film clips for the slightly novel 
purpose of inducing certainty, I wanted to confirm that the inductions as I had 
implemented them were effective to the same extent as when they were validated by 
Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007).  See Tables 13 and 14 for mean emotion ratings on 
the Post Film Questionnaire (see Appendix A) for both The Shining and My Bodyguard 
ratings from the present study in comparison to Rottenberg et al.’s ratings.  My findings 
tracked quite well with the original data set, which lends validity and credibility to my 
design. 
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Table 11 
Study Three: Pairwise Comparisons of Significant Differences in Postfilm Emotion 
Ratings 
Emotion Film I Film J 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) SE pa 
95% CI for 
Differencea 
LL UL 
Afraid 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.194 .235 1.000 -.379 .768 
My Bodyguard .994* .245 .000 .397 1.592 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining -.194 .235 1.000 -.768 .379 
My Bodyguard .800* .247 .005 .199 1.401 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining -.994* .245 .000 -1.592 -.397 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.800* .247 .005 -1.401 -.199 
Nervous 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.217 .261 1.000 -.418 .852 
My Bodyguard 1.150* .272 .000 .489 1.811 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining -.217 .261 1.000 -.852 .418 
My Bodyguard .933* .273 .003 .268 1.599 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining -1.150* .272 .000 -1.811 -.489 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
-.933* .273 .003 -1.599 -.268 
Scared 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
.222 .255 1.000 -.398 .843 
My Bodyguard 1.122* .265 .000 .476 1.769 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining -.222 .255 1.000 -.843 .398 
My Bodyguard .900* .267 .003 .249 1.551 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining -1.122* .265 .000 -1.769 -.476 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.900* .267 .003 -1.551 -.249 
Frightened 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.029 .260 1.000 -.605 .662 
My Bodyguard .800* .271 .012 .140 1.460 
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The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining -.029 .260 1.000 -.662 .605 
My Bodyguard .771* .273 .017 .107 1.436 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining -.800* .271 .012 -1.460 -.140 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.771* .273 .017 -1.436 -.107 
Shaky 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.336 .245 .522 -.933 .261 
My Bodyguard .383 .255 .409 -.238 1.005 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining .336 .245 .522 -.261 .933 
My Bodyguard .719* .257 .019 .093 1.345 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining -.383 .255 .409 -1.005 .238 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
-.719* .257 .019 -1.345 -.093 
Jittery 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
-.113 .254 1.000 -.732 .505 
My Bodyguard .672* .264 .038 .028 1.316 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining .113 .254 1.000 -.505 .732 
My Bodyguard .786* .266 .012 .138 1.434 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining -.672* .264 .038 -1.316 -.028 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.786* .266 .012 -1.434 -.138 
Angry 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.235 .217 .845 -.763 .294 
My Bodyguard -1.144* .226 .000 -1.695 -.594 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining .235 .217 .845 -.294 .763 
My Bodyguard -.910* .227 .000 -1.463 -.356 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining 1.144* .226 .000 .594 1.695 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.910* .227 .000 .356 1.463 
Mad 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.023 .186 1.000 -.430 .476 
My Bodyguard -.939* .194 .000 -1.410 -.467 
The Silence of The Shining -.023 .186 1.000 -.476 .430 
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the Lambs My Bodyguard -.962* .195 .000 -1.436 -.487 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining .939* .194 .000 .467 1.410 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.962* .195 .000 .487 1.436 
Disgusted 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-1.662* .238 .000 -2.242 -1.082
My Bodyguard -2.500* .248 .000 -3.104 -1.896
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining 1.662* .238 .000 1.082 2.242 
My Bodyguard -.838* .250 .003 -1.446 -.230 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining 2.500* .248 .000 1.896 3.104 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.838* .250 .003 .230 1.446 
Surprised 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.885* .310 .016 -1.639 -.131 
My Bodyguard -.894* .322 .020 -1.680 -.109 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining .885* .310 .016 .131 1.639 
My Bodyguard -.010 .325 1.000 -.800 .781 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining .894* .322 .020 .109 1.680 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
.010 .325 1.000 -.781 .800 
Scornful 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
-.520* .205 .038 -1.019 -.021 
My Bodyguard -1.106* .213 .000 -1.626 -.586 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining .520* .205 .038 .021 1.019 
My Bodyguard -.586* .215 .023 -1.109 -.062 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining 1.106* .213 .000 .586 1.626 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.586* .215 .023 .062 1.109 
Irritable 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.159 .246 1.000 -.757 .439 
My Bodyguard -1.244* .256 .000 -1.867 -.622 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining .159 .246 1.000 -.439 .757 
My Bodyguard -1.086* .257 .000 -1.713 -.459 
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My Bodyguard 
The Shining 1.244* .256 .000 .622 1.867 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
1.086* .257 .000 .459 1.713 
Fearless 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
-.113 .292 1.000 -.823 .598 
My Bodyguard -.756* .304 .044 -1.496 -.015 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining .113 .292 1.000 -.598 .823 
My Bodyguard -.643 .306 .114 -1.388 .102 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining .756* .304 .044 .015 1.496 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.643 .306 .114 -.102 1.388 
Sad 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.351 .198 .239 -.833 .132 
My Bodyguard -.922* .206 .000 -1.425 -.420 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining .351 .198 .239 -.132 .833 
My Bodyguard -.571* .208 .021 -1.077 -.066 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining .922* .206 .000 .420 1.425 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.571* .208 .021 .066 1.077 
Alone 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.391 .246 .344 -.207 .990 
My Bodyguard .972* .256 .001 .349 1.596 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining -.391 .246 .344 -.990 .207 
My Bodyguard .581 .258 .079 -.046 1.208 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining -.972* .256 .001 -1.596 -.349 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
-.581 .258 .079 -1.208 .046 
Upset 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
-.160 .274 1.000 -.827 .506 
My Bodyguard -1.156* .285 .000 -1.849 -.462 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining .160 .274 1.000 -.506 .827 
My Bodyguard -.995* .287 .002 -1.693 -.297 
My Bodyguard The Shining 1.156* .285 .000 .462 1.849 
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The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.995* .287 .002 .297 1.693 
Bold 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.166 .271 1.000 -.827 .495 
My Bodyguard -.761* .282 .025 -1.449 -.073 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining .166 .271 1.000 -.495 .827 
My Bodyguard -.595 .284 .117 -1.288 .097 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining .761* .282 .025 .073 1.449 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
.595 .284 .117 -.097 1.288 
Lonely 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
.426 .214 .149 -.096 .949 
My Bodyguard .850* .223 .001 .306 1.394 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining -.426 .214 .149 -.949 .096 
My Bodyguard .424 .225 .187 -.124 .971 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining -.850* .223 .001 -1.394 -.306 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.424 .225 .187 -.971 .124 
Ashamed 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.025 .131 1.000 -.293 .344 
My Bodyguard -.356* .136 .031 -.687 -.024 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining -.025 .131 1.000 -.344 .293 
My Bodyguard -.381* .137 .020 -.715 -.047 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining .356* .136 .031 .024 .687 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
.381* .137 .020 .047 .715 
Sheepish 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.232 .108 .105 -.496 .032 
My Bodyguard .078 .113 1.000 -.197 .353 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining .232 .108 .105 -.032 .496 
My Bodyguard .310* .114 .023 .033 .586 
My Bodyguard The Shining -.078 .113 1.000 -.353 .197 
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The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.310* .114 .023 -.586 -.033 
Loathing 
The Shining 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
-.175 .180 .994 -.613 .262 
My Bodyguard -.561* .187 .010 -1.017 -.105 
The Silence of 
the Lambs 
The Shining .175 .180 .994 -.262 .613 
My Bodyguard -.386 .188 .130 -.844 .073 
My Bodyguard 
The Shining .561* .187 .010 .105 1.017 
The Silence of 
the Lambs
.386 .188 .130 -.073 .844 
Note. Based on estimated marginal means; emotion inductions featuring only film clip, 
no perspective-taking writing task.  
a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons.  
*p < .05. 
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Table 12 
 
Emotion Ratings While Watching The Shining 
 
Current Study 
Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross 
(2007) 
 Malesa Femalesb Malesc Femalesd 
Emotion M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Amusement 2.33 2.35 1.93 2.30 1.39 1.37 0.83 1.23 
Anger 0.44 0.73 0.63 1.33 0.65 1.27 0.17 0.38 
Confusion 3.33 2.35 4.67 2.62 2.91 2.26 1.92 2.25 
Disgust 0.44 1.33 0.93 1.86 0.39 0.78 0.00 0.00 
Embarrassment 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.00 
Fear 5.00 2.40 4.85 2.58 3.26 2.03 4.61 2.07 
Happiness 0.67 1.00 0.15 0.46 0.96 1.22 0.19 0.75 
Interest 5.22 2.77 4.41 2.59 4.61 1.27 3.89 1.72 
Sadness 1.22 2.44 1.26 1.70 0.70 1.26 0.17 0.45 
Surprise 3.11 3.66 2.11 2.47 1.74 2.05 1.08 1.65 
an = 9. bn = 27. cn = 23. dn = 36. 
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Table 13 
 
Emotion Ratings While Watching My Bodyguard 
 
Current Study 
Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross 
(2007) 
 Malesa Femalesb Malesc Femalesd 
Emotion M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Amusement 1.57 1.81 0.91 1.73 1.34 1.61 0.61 1.12 
Anger 3.29 1.60 5.87 1.94 5.03 1.82 5.36 1.39 
Confusion 2.43 3.26 4.39 2.33 1.21 1.11 1.82 2.21 
Disgust 3.57 2.64 6.22 1.59 4.69 1.61 4.94 1.80 
Embarrassment 0.29 0.49 1.52 2.66 1.10 1.76 0.61 1.25 
Fear 0.43 0.79 1.78 2.43 1.62 1.57 2.15 2.00 
Happiness 0.57 1.51 0.04 0.21 0.76 1.33 0.42 0.90 
Interest 4.43 1.81 4.09 2.95 3.66 2.02 3.15 1.62 
Sadness 2.86 3.08 4.39 2.64 3.07 2.12 4.21 2.13 
Surprise 2.43 2.57 3.87 3.06 1.66 1.97 1.21 1.76 
an = 7. bn = 23. cn = 27. dn = 33. 
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Discussion 
 The goal of Study Three was to determine which combination of film clips and 
overall induction technique worked best for eliciting only anger and only fear among my 
sample.  In spite of a few unexpected findings (namely, the volatility of responses elicited 
by the highly provocative Cry Freedom film clip and the unpredictable effects of the 
writing task), through a series of careful comparisons, I was able to identify the best way 
to induce only the emotion I wanted and (not the competing emotion) for both 
experimental conditions of interest.  This is a fundamental cornerstone of my final study, 
so it was imperative to thoroughly pretest and validate the emotion induction techniques 
in this manner. 
Chapter VIII 
Study Four: Effects of Emotional Appraisals of Certainty on Juror Information 
Processing and Decision-Making 
Method 
Theoretical Basis 
 Study Four was the final stage of my research undertaken to determine whether 
mock jurors’ style of information processing was guided by their overall levels of 
certainty appraisals.  After having meticulously validated both the baseline detection rates 
of the eight inconsistencies within my trial transcript as well as the effectiveness of my 
method of emotion induction, Study Four addressed my overarching research objective—
whether the rate of detection for testimonial inconsistencies was dependent in part upon 
emotional state and certainty. 
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As a secondary research question, Study Four also allowed me to gauge whether 
the relationship between certainty and inconsistency detection rate could potentially carry 
through to influence a jurors’ ultimate function of rendering a verdict.  By keeping all 
inconsistencies loaded in one direction such that they should weaken the Plaintiff’s 
position (or at least not substantiate it in any way) and by spreading them among multiple 
witnesses instead of confining them all to one single witness (the Plaintiff) as Semmler 
and Brewer (2002) did, Study Four had the potential to alleviate any unintended 
overemphasis on witness credibility or potential attitudinal backlash concerning frivolous 
lawsuits, legitimacy of tort claims, or the natural suspicions that can arise when faced 
with high-dollar damage requests.  By more evenly spreading around inconsistencies 
among additional witnesses, this comparison allowed me to more accurately establish 
whether differences in comprehension and verdict emerge between the consistent and 
inconsistent trial summaries in the neutral emotion induction control condition. 
Participants 
Two hundred ninety-two undergraduate students at Florida International 
University were recruited through Sona Systems, the Psychology Department Research 
Management system to participate in a web-based study on “Juror Decision-Making in 
Civil Trials” in exchange for course credit.  Because this was an online study, several 
safeguards were used to exclude those participants who did not give the study their 
undivided attention (see Appendix X for detailed criteria and procedures undertaken for 
data reduction purposes), which resulted in a total of 198 participants.  The sample was 
predominantly female (75%; 25% male), Hispanic (73%; 14% White/Caucasian; 6% 
African American; 2% Asian; 0.5% Native American; and 4% Other), and ranged in age 
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from 18 to 47 years old (M = 22.78, SD = 4.33).  Participants’ were predominantly 
upperclassmen, with 33% in their junior year, 24% in their senior year, 20% in their 
sophomore year, 19% in their freshman year, and 2% having completed some 
professional or graduate-level education.  Just less than half the sample (48%) was not 
currently employed, with 39% holding part-time employment and 13% working full-time, 
and 5% had served on a jury before (3% civil; 2% criminal). 
Design 
 After creating and validating the trial transcript stimulus materials and the rates of 
detection for the eight inconsistencies I chose to retain in Studies One and Two, and 
confirming the effectiveness of emotion induction though the use of film clips in Study 
Three, Study Four included two different test sessions.  The first measured participants’ 
general overall emotional state (via the modified, twelve-item I-PANAS-SF used in 
Study Three; see Appendix O) as well as their preferred styles of cognition via the Need 
for Cognition Scale (NFC; see Appendix Z) and decision-making strategies via the 
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI-40; see Appendix AA)  in order to contrast rates of 
inconsistency detection with stable traits.  The second test session represented the 
culmination of the prior three studies, which used a 2 (trial transcript version: with vs. 
without testimonial inconsistencies) x 3 (film clip emotion/certainty induction: The 
Shining [fear/uncertain] vs. My Bodyguard [anger/certain] vs. Alaska’s Wild Denali [no 
emotion/neutral control]) between subjects factorial design.  The central dependent 
measure was the rate of inconsistency detection, with secondary dependent measures of 
verdict/liability as well as credibility and persuasiveness ratings for all witnesses.  
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Materials 
 Session one: trait-based scales. 
 Just as in the prior studies, this study required each participant to log on to FIU’s 
Sona Systems website from a computer of their choosing in order to complete both 
sessions.  During the first session, after participants consented to participate (see 
Appendix AB), I measured various trait-based characteristics of each participant in order 
to better understand my primary variables of interest to be measured during the second 
session.  The first session included the modified 12-item I-PANAS-SF (see Appendix O), 
the Need for Cognition scale (NFC; 18 item version; Cacioppo et al., 1984; see Appendix 
Z), and the Rational-Experiential Inventory  (REI-40; Pacini & Epstein, 1999; see 
Appendix AA). 
Session two: emotion inductions, trial transcripts, verdict, witness ratings, 
inconsistency detection questions, and emotion and film ratings. 
The second session included the three film clips selected based on Study Three 
(The Shining, My Bodyguard, and Alaska’s Wild Denali) as well as two versions of the 
trial transcript from Studies One and Two, with one version featuring the eight 
testimonial inconsistencies chosen during Studies One and Two (see Appendix N), and a 
control version without any testimonial inconsistencies (see Appendix AC).  Participants 
also read jury instructions concerning liability and completed a verdict form (see 
Appendix AD), followed by a form for damage awards, if applicable (see Appendix AE).  
After rendering their verdict and awarding damages if they found for the plaintiff, the 
next page featured a list of all witnesses who testified and asked participants to rate the 
credibility of each witness on a seven-point scale ranging from Completely Lacks 
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Credibility to Completely Credible (see Appendix H, Witness Credibility Ratings), 
followed by another page with a similar seven-point scale rating the persuasiveness of 
each witness from Not Persuasive at All to Very Persuasive (see Appendix H, Witness 
Persuasiveness Ratings).  Next, participants completed the same series of open ended, 
short answer, multiple choice, true/false, and point blank inconsistency detection 
questions used in Study Two (see Appendix Q), followed by the 61-item version of the 
PANAS-X then the post-film questionnaire used by Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007, 
see Appendix A) and were then thanked for their participation, debriefed (see Appendix 
J), and instructed to log off and close their browser.  
Procedure 
Session one:  pretesting for trait-based characteristics. 
 A two-part design was necessary so that participants were not unduly primed by 
the content of the various trait measurement scales they completed during Part One, and 
also due to concerns that prolonged participation prior to the emotion induction and 
introduction of the trial transcript itself would lead to ineffective emotion induction, 
respondent fatigue, high dropout rates, and suboptimal attention levels among those 
participants who finished.   
During the first session, participants accessed the secure website through FIU’s 
Sona Systems.  Participants completed their informed consent form (see Appendix AB), 
and then completed the modified 12-item I-PANAS-SF, followed by the Need for 
Cognition scale, the Rational-Experiential Inventory, and demographic information.  
Measuring these personal characteristics not only provided a baseline measurement for 
cognitive styles and emotional tendencies in an environment free of emotional content, 
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but also potentially allowed for a greater understanding of how emotion influenced 
information processing and decision-making in the second session.  After completing 
these surveys, participants were thanked, debriefed, and reminded to please participate in 
the second phase of the study for additional credit, and that they should make sure to wait 
until receiving a notification email before completing Part Two.  
Session two:  emotion and decision-making. 
 Study Four was conducted in two parts with a delay of no less than 48 hours 
between sessions.  While participants were urged to complete Part Two no more than one 
week after completing Part One, practical realities of the participant pool and a less than 
breakneck pace of enrollment dictated that I relax my requirement for a narrow and 
uniform latency period to some extent2.  I did not want participants to complete Part Two 
too soon with Part One still fresh in their minds, so I reminded them in several different 
places at the beginning and end of Part One and at the beginning of Part Two that I would 
email them once it was okay for them to complete Part Two a couple of days after they 
completed Part One.  Quirks of the Sona Systems research administration website 
prevented me from including any sort of time-based restricted access on an individual 
basis, so inevitably some participants did not notice or chose not to heed this requirement.  
As such, I excluded from analysis any participants who began Part Two less than 48 
hours after completing Part One.   
                                                 
2 While the latency period was of no critical significance for the variables of interest, I nevertheless tried to 
ensure that the break between each session was relatively consistent for each participant by emailing 
reminders to those who I could see had signed up for Part Two prematurely or who hadn’t completed Part 
Two after a full week of eligibility.  Ultimately, the latency period for completion ranged from 2.06 days to 
45.97 days (M = 8.66, SD = 6.44), but those values are skewed by the two lengthiest gaps—45.97 and 
42.08 days, and excluding those two, the longest delay was 24.81 days (M = 8.24, SD = 5.18). 
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During the second session, participants again accessed a secure website through 
FIU’s Sona Systems.  Upon completing the informed consent for Part Two (see Appendix 
Y), participants were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions and 
were asked to confirm that their computer was capable of playing the different types of 
files used before proceeding to the emotion induction portion of the study.   
Emotion induction. 
Participants watched one of the three video clips which the results of Study Three 
had confirmed to induce either fear (The Shining), anger (My Bodyguard), or no 
emotional response (Alaska’s Wild Denali).  Participants were told that this portion of the 
study was an unrelated experiment for a different project that was appended to the design 
at the request of the psychology department in order to ensure that the amount of credits 
earned for participating in the civil trial study was not excessive.  To ensure that 
participants effortfully attended to the emotion inducing film clip, they were instructed to 
pay close attention while watching the clip because they would be tested on it at the end 
of the study.   
Trial transcript. 
Participants next read along with the audio recording of the trial transcript.  
Approximately half of the participants were assigned to the control condition featuring 
the straightforward, internally consistent trial transcript with no inconsistencies (see 
Appendix AC), while the other half read and listened to the trial transcript version 
featuring the eight testimonial inconsistencies (see Appendix N) selected during Studies 
One and Two, all of which concern testimony proffered by witnesses that favor the 
plaintiff.  Since the burden of proof in civil negligence cases is that a preponderance of 
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the evidence must support the verdict, noticing inconsistencies within the plaintiff’s case 
was expected to diminish the strength of the case against the defendant.  In other words, 
to find in favor of the plaintiff and therefore hold the defendant liable, meeting the 
standard of proof would require the trier of fact (in this case, the mock juror participants) 
to conclude that the evidence presented by the plaintiff is true and accurate to a 
probability greater than 50%.  Thus, I reasoned that the more inconsistencies the 
participants noticed, the more likely these inconsistencies would weaken (or at the very 
least reflect poorly on) the plaintiff’s case, and as such, the less likely they would find 
that the plaintiff met the burden of proof.  I expected there would be a direct positive 
correlation between the number of inconsistencies a participant noticed and their verdict 
in favor of the defendant.    
Dependent measures. 
Upon finishing the trial transcript, participants completed a verdict form, and, if 
applicable, awarded punitive and/or compensatory damages (see Appendices AD and 
AE).  They then rated the credibility and persuasiveness of each witness on a seven-point 
scale ranging from Completely Lacks Credibility to Completely Credible (see Appendix 
H, Witness Credibility Ratings), followed by another page with a similar seven-point 
scale rating the persuasiveness of each witness from Not Persuasive at All to Very 
Persuasive (see Appendix H, Witness Persuasiveness Ratings). 
After completing all of the measures based on their feelings about the case, 
participants answered the array of open ended, short answer, multiple choice, true/false, 
and point blank inconsistency detection questions used in Study Two (see Appendix Q), 
followed by the 61-item version of the PANAS-X to gauge their emotional state at this 
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point, then the post-film questionnaire used by Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007) to 
confirm that the film clip had been effective.  Following these measures, they were 
thanked, debriefed of the purpose of the study and informed that the video clip was 
responsible for any changes in their emotional state, and told to log off and close their 
browser. 
Subjective Scoring 
 The open ended and short answer questions were scored by the same two research 
assistants who scored the subjective responses in Studies One and Two (see Appendix 
AF for how I scored inconsistency detection rates differently according to the narrower 
basis of Study Four).  Once again, they each completed the open ended scoring 
individually, submitted their initial, individual scorings to me, and then met with each 
other to discuss any discrepancies, and to try to resolve any divergences through 
dialogue.  After they met and made any changes to their data file based on their 
discussion, they each provided me with their final scorings for the open ended questions. 
Next, the research assistants followed the same routine of scoring all the short answer 
data individually, submitting it to me, discussed discrepancies and changed scores as they 
saw fit, and then returned each of their post-discussion score sets to me for analysis. 
Hypotheses 
Processing style through detection of inconsistencies. 
Among participants in conditions featuring inconsistencies, uncertain emotional 
induction (i.e. fear) will lead to effects similar to systematic processing wherein the 
complexities, inconsistencies, and various nuances contained within the testimony will be 
more perceptible.  Those participants in an uncertain emotional state will therefore have 
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higher rates of inconsistencies detected, while induction of certain emotions (i.e. anger) 
will lead to effects similar to heuristic processing, which will be demonstrated through 
comparably lower rates of inconsistency detection for those participants in a certain 
emotional state.  
Processing style through witness credibility and persuasiveness ratings. 
Based on the same logic which suggests that a greater rate of inconsistency 
detection should occur among those participants in the uncertain (fearful) emotional state 
than in the neutral or certain (angry) emotional state, which will serve as a proxy for 
information processing style, it follows that those participants who detect the 
inconsistencies at a greater rate will also evaluate the credibility and persuasiveness of 
those inaccurate witnesses accordingly, and that credibility and persuasiveness ratings for 
the witnesses who made inconsistent statements will be inversely related to the extent 
that their inconsistent statements are detected. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Past research has found that individual traits such as one’s need for affect (Maio 
& Esses, 2001) and need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) influence the way 
information is processed, whether cognitively oriented or emotionally-oriented arguments 
are found to be more persuasive, and what types of information will be recalled with 
greater accuracy (Haddock, Maio, Arnold, & Huskinson, 2008).  However, the interplay 
between these findings has rarely been applied to the triers of fact in our legal system.  
Due to this relative dearth of empirical research on the impact of emotional certainty on 
juror processing style and the corresponding effects on decision-making, the current 
study examined several additional areas of interest which will provide a foundation for 
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future exploration.  Because of their novelty, I can only offer loose predictions about 
what sort of outcomes may result along with possible explanatory mechanisms for each 
prospect. 
 Verdict as a result of processing style. 
Participants induced to feel fear (an uncertain emotion) and who read the 
inconsistent testimony will exhibit the most systematic style of processing demonstrated 
through the highest rates of verdicts in favor of the defendant.  Given the fact that the 
inconsistencies raise doubt as to the validity of the plaintiff’s case, more awareness of 
these inconsistencies should weaken the plaintiff’s case (and result in findings that the 
defendant is not liable.)  I anticipate that uncertain participants, by virtue of more 
systematic processing, will be more aware of the inconsistencies and thus be more likely 
to find the defendant not liable compared to their certain counterparts.   
On the other hand, participants induced to feel anger (a certain emotion) and who 
read the inconsistent testimony will exhibit the most heuristically-based processing, 
evidenced through verdicts finding the defendant liable.  Because all inconsistent 
statements are made by plaintiff’s witnesses called to testify for the purpose of assisting 
the plaintiff in meeting the burden of proof, the detection of the inconsistencies weakens 
the plaintiff’s case.  However, if participants experiencing a certain emotion are 
processing heuristically, the inconsistent statements should be less likely to be detected, 
making the plaintiff’s case appear much stronger, which in turn should result in a greater 
incidence of verdicts finding liability.  These certain (angry) heuristic processors will 
show less comprehension of trial information and less awareness of inconsistencies than 
those participants induced to experience uncertain emotion (fear). 
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Verdict confidence as a result of processing style. 
Since all inconsistencies are from plaintiff’s witnesses, and since jurors tend to 
view inconsistency as a proxy for inaccuracy (although most research on the testimonial 
inconsistency/inaccuracy relationship has revolved around eyewitness identifications 
[Berman & Cutler, 1996; Berman, et al., 1995; Brewer & Burke, 2002; Wells, Olson, & 
Charman, 2002]), the plaintiff’s case against the defendant should be viewed as being 
weaker by those participants in uncertain emotional states.  Because they will have an 
affirmative, demonstrable basis for verdicts in favor of the defendant, it is predicted that 
participants in uncertain emotional states who read the inconsistent transcripts will have 
the highest degree of confidence in their verdict.  Among participants who read the 
consistent transcripts, regardless of verdict, the uncertain participants will have higher 
confidence ratings than the certain or no emotion participants simply due to having been 
in the most cognitively engaged mindset during the trial transcript (Honess & Charman, 
2002).   
However, other research (Kuhn, Weinstock, & Flaton, 1994; Weinstock & Flaton, 
2004) has found that those jurors who express the greatest degree of certainty in their 
verdicts typically consider less evidence when making their decision than do jurors who 
report greater uncertainty.  If I find that relationship to emerge in the current study, then I 
should expect to find that angry participants who detect fewer inconsistencies should 
report the greatest degree of confidence in their verdict decisions.    
Another possible finding may be that participants in uncertain emotional states 
may process information more deeply, render a verdict consistent with having noticed 
many inconsistencies in testimony, but due to emotional congruence effects, may actually 
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feel less certain about their final decision than participants in certain emotional states 
(DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener, & Braverman, 2004; DeSteno et al., 2000; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983).  Additionally, it is also possible that participants in certain emotional states 
will be most confident in their verdicts because they view their verdict as a means to 
personally alleviate their anger (Winterich, 2011).  
To further complicate the range of possibilities in this dimension, recent research 
(Mikels, Maglio, Reed, & Kaplowitz, 2011) has found that under some circumstances, 
affect-based decision-making strategies yield greater confidence in decisions than more 
deliberative strategies, a factor which may be mediated by overall preferred style of 
processing according to the Rational-Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
 Rational/experiential processing preference moderating verdict and detection 
of inconsistencies. 
Participants who prefer to process information in a more rational manner will 
detect a greater number of inconsistencies and will return verdicts for the defense to a 
greater degree than participants who prefer to process information in an experiential 
manner.  Participants who process experientially will demonstrate a stronger effect from 
the emotional induction than those participants who process rationally. 
Results 
Inter-rater Reliability for Subjectively Scored Questions 
 To confirm that the research assistants were each coding the data according to the 
same rules of interpretation, and because I knew the distribution to be non-normally 
distributed (see Appendix AF), I conducted a Kendall’s tau-b test to measure the 
correlation coefficient between the two scorers.  For the open ended questions, the 
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average correlation of their “Yes” codings before discussion was very high (τΒ = .93, p < 
.001), as was the average correlation of their “Yes” codings following discussion (τΒ 
=.97, p < .001).  However, for the short answer questions, the average correlation of their 
“Yes” codings before discussion was moderate at best (τΒ = .43, p < .003, excluding one 
nonsignificant pairing), which did not dramatically improve even after discussion, as the 
average correlation of their “Yes” codings following discussion for all eight pairs was 
still only (τΒ =.47, p < .001).  Accordingly, I retained the open ended data but excluded 
the short answer responses from consideration for Study Four3. 
Verification of Unequal Rates of Inconsistency Detection Based on Transcript 
Version 
 In order to confirm that there was a difference in overall detection rate of 
inconsistencies based on the transcript version (essentially, to serve as a manipulation 
check that participants were in fact noticing the inconsistencies in the inconsistent trial 
transcript), I conducted an independent samples t-test for equality of mean detection 
rates.  I compared the mean detection rates according to all eight individual 
inconsistencies, as well as collapsing the inconsistencies themselves into measures for 
specific question types (open ended according to both the loose and the strict criteria, 
multiple choice, true/false, and point blank) and then also collapsing the specific question 
                                                 
3 Casual spot inspection of the data suggested to me that there was some confusion concerning the 
minimum standards for what degree of detail and accuracy was required to constitute a “Yes” answer 
versus a “Partial” credit for detection, indicating an overzealous criterion threshold in many cases.  
Unfortunately, at this point in time (again, over a year had passed since the first open ended data set they 
coded), one of the assistants had moved out of state to begin graduate school, and the other was taking time 
off from school and working full time, so rather than imposing on them to rescore the short answer data 
after what would have been a logistically difficult meeting in order to review the scoring criteria (which 
may also have caused artificially high agreement due to demand characteristics), or taking the time to train 
two new research associates for this one small element and in light of whatever potential confounds that 
may have introduced, I elected to simply drop the short answer questions from consideration, a decision 
which, in light of subsequent analysis, seemed unlikely to have made much possible difference either way. 
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types into a single total detection rate (see Table AF1), consisting of the sum of 
detections from the strict open ended, multiple choice, true/false, and point blank 
question types.  With eight inconsistencies and four question types, these Total Detection 
scores could range from 0 detections to a maximum of 32.  Mean inconsistency detection 
rates were higher on this global index for participants who were exposed to the trial 
transcript featuring inconsistent testimony (M = 13.06, SD = 7.91) than for participants 
who were exposed to the trial transcript without any inconsistent testimony (M = 1.76, 
SD = 1.83), t(108) = 13.86, p < .001, d = 2.32.  Levene’s test indicated unequal variances 
(F = 164.42, p < .001), so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 196 to 108.  This 
confirms that there is in fact a statistically significant effect stemming from the trial 
transcript version itself.  That is, participants in the inconsistent conditions believed there 
were more inconsistencies than participants in the consistent conditions. 
Effect of Emotion on Rate of Inconsistency Detection 
 The main goal of this research was to determine whether the level of certainty 
appraisals associated with an emotion (specifically, highly uncertain appraisals 
accompanying the emotion of fear, and highly certain appraisals accompanying the 
emotion of anger) would influence a mock juror’s style of cognitive processing in a 
manner that could be illustrated by the overall rate of detection for minor, non-
inculpatory, peripheral details that are nevertheless clearly contrary to the testimony of 
multiple other witnesses.  To address this overarching research question, I conducted a 2 
(trial transcript version: with or without the eight inconsistencies) x 3 (emotion induction: 
fear, anger, or neutral) factorial analysis of variance with inconsistency detection rates 
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(for all eight individual inconsistencies as well as collapsed across question types and 
total overall detections) as the dependent variable. 
 Despite thoroughly vetting the emotion manipulation through the course of Study 
Three, there was no emotion-based main effect in terms of the overall inconsistency 
detection rates (that is, across all eight inconsistencies and four question types), F(2, 192) 
= 0.43, p = .650.  However, in order to avoid revealing the underlying purpose of the 
research, emotional induction was not measured and verified immediately after the film 
clips as in Study Three, but rather following the trial transcript, verdict, witness 
credibility and persuasiveness ratings, and inconsistency detection questions.  While this 
manipulation check of emotions at such a late stage showed no significant differences, 
the duration of the film clips’ effectiveness was further explored in Study Five.  There 
was a main effect for the trial transcript version, F(1, 192) = 188.43, p < .001, η2 = .495 
on inconsistency detection, with those participants who were exposed to the trial 
transcript featuring inconsistent testimony reporting a greater total number of 
inconsistencies (M = 13.06, SD = 7.91) than those participants who were exposed to the 
trial transcript featuring no inconsistent testimony (M = 1.76, SD = 1.83).  The interaction 
between the induced emotion and trial transcript version on inconsistency detection rates 
was also not significant F(2, 192) = 0.35, p = .705. 
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Table 14 
Study Four: Detection Rate Percentages for all Eight Inconsistencies by Film 
Clip/Induced Emotion and Question Type for Participants Exposed to Inconsistent 
Transcript Only 
Inconsistency 
Open 
Ended 
CombiMed
Open Ended 
CombiHighYes
Multiple 
Choice  True/False 
Point 
Blank
Mean 
Score
PI 4-Oil Co.       
Fear/Uncertaina 32.4 29.4 44.1 47.1 50.0 40.6 
Anger/Certainb 34.4 34.4 37.5 43.8 46.9 39.4 
Neutral/Controlc 24.2 24.2 42.4 45.5 36.4 34.5 
PI 5-Model       
Fear/Uncertaina 44.1 41.2 32.4 58.8 52.9 45.9 
Anger/Certainb 34.4 34.4 18.8 59.4 56.3 40.7 
Neutral/Controlc 45.5 42.4 27.3 69.7 66.7 50.3 
PI 7-Hair       
Fear/Uncertaina 55.9 55.9 50.0 55.9 47.1 53.0 
Anger/Certainb 50.0 50.0 50.0 59.4 62.5 54.4 
Neutral/Controlc 57.6 54.5 48.5 75.8 60.6 59.4 
PI 9-Year       
Fear/Uncertaina 5.9 5.9 23.5 58.8 47.1 28.2 
Anger/Certainb 12.5 12.5 21.9 40.6 56.3 28.8 
Neutral/Controlc 18.2 18.2 36.4 57.6 39.4 34.0 
PI 10-Color       
Fear/Uncertaina 35.3 32.4 44.1 55.9 47.1 43.0 
Anger/Certainb 28.1 21.9 34.4 37.5 40.6 32.5 
Neutral/Controlc 21.2 18.2 39.4 57.6 45.5 36.4 
PI 11-Jared       
Fear/Uncertaina 29.4 26.5 38.2 50.0 35.3 35.9 
Anger/Certainb 9.4 9.4 15.6 31.3 43.8 21.9 
Neutral/Controlc 24.2 24.2 30.3 45.5 39.4 32.7 
PI 12-Tree       
Fear/Uncertaina 23.5 23.5 41.2* 41.2 55.9 37.1 
Anger/Certainb 25.0 25.0 31.3* 37.5 62.5 36.3 
Neutral/Controlc 12.1 12.1 12.1* 33.3 57.6 25.4 
PI 13-Dog       
Fear/Uncertaina 26.5 26.5 47.1 58.8 58.8 43.5 
Anger/Certainb 9.4 9.4 31.3 40.6 53.1 28.8 
Neutral/Controlc 12.1 12.1 39.4 60.6 48.5 34.5 
Mean Rate       
Fear/Uncertaina 31.6 30.2 40.1 53.3 49.3 40.9 
Anger/Certainb 25.4 24.6 30.1 43.8 52.8 35.3 
Neutral/Controlc 26.9 25.7 34.5 55.7 49.3 38.4 
Note.  an = 34.  bn = 32.  cn = 33. *χ2(2, N = 99) = 7.16, p = .028. All other relationships 
ns (p > .05). 
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 Effects of emotion on inconsistency detection according to question type. 
 After finding no interaction effects or main effects for emotion on inconsistency 
detection rates by collapsing both inconsistencies and question types, I looked to the five 
different question types to see if there were any significant results at that level (see Table 
14 for complete detection rates by question type and inconsistency according to induced 
emotion). 
 First, I considered the effects of scoring the open ended questions with the most 
accommodating scheme (“OECombiMed”: counting the response as a detection if both 
research assistants each gave some form of credit for the answer, whether a full “Yes” 
score or merely a “Partial” score).  There was no effect of emotion on inconsistency 
detection rates for the open ended questions when scored with the looser of the two 
criteria, F(2, 192) = 0.76, p = .472, though there was a main effect for the trial transcript 
version, F(1, 192) = 233.96, p < .001, η2 = .400 on inconsistency detection rates, such 
that the participants who were exposed to the trial transcript featuring the inconsistent 
testimony reported noticing a greater number of the eight inconsistencies (M = 2.24, SD = 
1.88) than did the participants who were exposed to the trial transcript without any 
inconsistencies (M = 0.06, SD = 0.31).  The interaction between the induced emotion and 
trial transcript version on inconsistency detection rates was also not significant F(2, 192) 
= 0.53, p = .588.  Adjusting the scoring scheme used to define a detection to a more 
stringent criterion level (“OECombiHighYes”: counting the response as a detection only 
if both research assistants each credited a full “Yes” score for each participants’ 
responses) also showed no effect of emotion F(2, 192) = 0.47, p = .625, though again, 
there was a main effect for the trial transcript version, F(1, 192) = 117.75, p < .001, η2 = 
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.380 on inconsistency detection rates, such that the participants who were exposed to the 
trial transcript featuring the inconsistent testimony reported noticing a greater number of 
the eight inconsistencies (M = 2.15, SD = 1.90) than did the participants who were 
exposed to the trial transcript without any inconsistencies (M = 0.04, SD = 0.24).  The 
interaction between the induced emotion and trial transcript version on inconsistency 
detection rates was also not significant F(2, 192) = 0.53, p = .588. 
 The multiple choice questions followed the same pattern.  There was no 
significant effect of emotion on detection rates, F(2, 192) = 0.89, p = .414, though there 
was a main effect for the trial transcript version, F(1, 192) = 125.28, p < .001, η2 = .395 
on inconsistency detection rates, such that the participants who were exposed to the trial 
transcript featuring the inconsistent testimony reported noticing a greater number of the 
eight inconsistencies (M = 2.80, SD = 2.46) than did the participants who were exposed 
to the trial transcript without any inconsistencies (M = 0.01, SD = 0.10).  The interaction 
between the induced emotion and trial transcript version on inconsistency detection rates 
was also not significant F(2, 192) = 0.90, p = .408.  True or false question styles did not 
have an effect of emotion on detection rates either, F(2, 192) = 0.96, p = .384, though 
again, there was a significant main effect for the trial transcript version, F(1, 192) = 
207.25, p < .001, η2 = .519 on inconsistency detection rates, such that the participants 
who were exposed to the trial transcript featuring the inconsistent testimony reported 
noticing a greater number of the eight inconsistencies (M = 4.08, SD = 2.35) than did the 
participants who were exposed to the trial transcript without any inconsistencies (M = 
0.48, SD = 0.83).  The interaction between the induced emotion and trial transcript 
version on inconsistency detection rates remained non-significant F(2, 192) = 1.854, p = 
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.159.  Finally, the point blank questions also yielded no significant effect of emotion on 
detection rates, F(2, 192) = 0.002, p = .998, though there was a main effect for the trial 
transcript version, F(1, 192) = 108.55, p < .001, η2 = .36 on inconsistency detection rates, 
such that the participants who were exposed to the trial transcript featuring the 
inconsistent testimony reported noticing a greater number of the eight inconsistencies (M 
= 4.03, SD = 2.21) than did the participants who were exposed to the trial transcript 
without any inconsistencies (M = 1.22, SD = 1.48), and again, the interaction between the 
induced emotion and trial transcript version on inconsistency detection rates was also not 
significant F(2, 192) = 0.43, p = .654. 
 This pattern buttresses the fact that the lack of significant effects for an interaction 
between emotion/certainty and transcript version on inconsistency detection rates is not 
due to any kind of ceiling or floor effects similar to what may have obscured Semmler 
and Brewer’s (2002) findings, as it is clear that the trial transcript version featuring the 
inconsistent testimony is leading to greater rates of inconsistency detection, just as it 
should if the inconsistencies are being noticed.  This is exactly what I had expected 
would happen in terms of the transcript version (based on my validation of the transcript 
and the inconsistency detection rates established in Studies One and Two), but the fact 
that there seems to be no difference emerging between detection rates for 
fearful/uncertain participants in comparison to the angry/certain participants is not what I 
had expected. 
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 Effects of emotion on inconsistency detection according to each specific 
inconsistency. 
 Since the broader measures collapsing across question types did not elicit any 
significant effects on inconsistency detection rate other than the logical outcome hinging 
upon whether the transcript featured inconsistencies, I conducted a 2 x 3 (transcript 
version x induced emotion) ANOVA testing the effects as they related to the rates of 
detection for all eight specific inconsistencies.  There was nothing slippery about the PI 
4-Oil Co. inconsistency, with no significant effect of emotion on detection rates, F(2, 
192) = 0.02, p = .978, yet again, there was a main effect for the trial transcript version, 
F(1, 192) = 75.00, p < .001, η2 = .281 on inconsistency detection rates, with participants 
who were exposed to the trial transcript featuring the inconsistent testimony reporting 
having noticed the PI 4-Oil Co. inconsistency at a greater total frequency across all four 
question types (M = 1.61, SD = 1.60) than those participants who were exposed to the 
version of the trial transcript without any inconsistent testimony (M = 0.16, SD = 0.37).  
The interaction between the induced emotion and trial transcript version on inconsistency 
detection rates was also not significant F(2, 192) = 0.46, p = .635.  For PI 5-Model, 
predictably, there was no significant effect of emotion either, F(2, 192) = 0.24, p = .787, 
though the same main effect for the trial transcript version emerged, F(1, 192) = 126.39, 
p < .001, η2 = .397 with respect to inconsistency detection rates, with participants who 
were exposed to the trial transcript featuring the inconsistent testimony reporting having 
noticed the PI 5-Model inconsistency at a greater total frequency across all four question 
types (M = 1.87, SD = 1.41) than those participants who were exposed to the version of 
the trial transcript without any inconsistent testimony (M = 0.18, SD = 0.46).  The 
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interaction between the induced emotion and trial transcript version on inconsistency 
detection rates was also not significant F(2, 192) = 0.93, p = .396 for PI 5-Model.  For PI 
7-Hair, the arrangement held firm with no effect of emotion on detection rates, F(2, 192) 
= 0.22, p = .806, though there was the same main effect for trial transcript version, F(1, 
192) = 127.80, p < .001, η2 = .400 on inconsistency detection rates, with participants who 
were exposed to the trial transcript featuring the inconsistent testimony reporting having 
noticed the PI 7-Hair inconsistency at a greater total frequency across all four question 
types (M = 2.23, SD = 1.65) than those participants who were exposed to the version of 
the trial transcript without any inconsistent testimony (M = 0.24, SD = 0.54).  The 
interaction between the induced emotion and trial transcript version on inconsistency 
detection rates was also not significant F(2, 192) = 0.29, p = .748.  PI 9-Year followed 
the same measured pace, with no main effect for emotion on detection rates, F(2, 192) = 
0.06, p = .935, with a main effect for the trial transcript version, F(1, 192) = 62.84, p < 
.001, η2 = .247 on inconsistency detection rates, with participants who were exposed to 
the trial transcript featuring the inconsistent testimony reporting having noticed the PI 9-
Year inconsistency at a greater total frequency across all four question types (M = 1.39, 
SD = 1.39) than those participants who were exposed to the version of the trial transcript 
without any inconsistent testimony (M = 0.22, SD = 0.44).  The interaction between the 
induced emotion and trial transcript version on inconsistency detection rates was once 
again not significant F(2, 192) = 0.34, p = .712. 
 PI 10-Color fell right within the very same spectrum, with no effect for emotion 
on detection rates, F(2, 192) = 0.87, p = .421, with a main effect for the trial transcript 
version, F(1, 192) = 62.84, p < .001, η2 = .247 on inconsistency detection rates, with 
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participants who were exposed to the trial transcript featuring the inconsistent testimony 
reporting having noticed the PI 10-Color inconsistency at a greater total frequency across 
all four question types (M = 1.59, SD = 1.53) than those participants who were exposed to 
the version of the trial transcript without any inconsistent testimony (M = 0.29, SD = 
0.50).  The interaction between the induced emotion and trial transcript version on 
inconsistency detection rates did not meet levels of significance F(2, 192) = 0.66, p = 
.519.  PI 11-Jared rang true, showing no effect of emotion on rate of detection, F(2, 192) 
= 1.70, p = .185, a main effect for the trial transcript version, F(1, 192) = 57.50, p < .001, 
η2 = .230 on inconsistency detection rates, with participants who were exposed to the trial 
transcript featuring the inconsistent testimony reporting having noticed the PI 11-Jared 
inconsistency at a greater total frequency across all four question types (M = 1.30, SD = 
1.51) than those participants who were exposed to the version of the trial transcript 
without any inconsistent testimony (M = 0.12, SD = 0.33).  The interaction between the 
induced emotion and trial transcript version on inconsistency detection rates was also not 
significant F(2, 192) = 0.45, p = .638.  PI 12-Tree stood firmly rooted in line with the 
other inconsistencies, such that there was no effect of emotion on detection rate, F(2, 
192) = 0.81, p = .446, though there was a main effect for the trial transcript version, F(1, 
192) = 53.45, p < .001, η2 = .218 on inconsistency detection rates, with participants who 
were exposed to the trial transcript featuring the inconsistent testimony reporting having 
noticed the PI 12-Tree inconsistency at a greater total frequency across all four question 
types (M = 1.44, SD = 1.41) than those participants who were exposed to the version of 
the trial transcript without any inconsistent testimony (M = 0.34, SD = 0.50).  The 
interaction between the induced emotion and trial transcript version on inconsistency 
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detection rates was also not significant F(2, 192) = 1.08, p = .343.  Finally, PI 13-Dog 
remained faithful to the trend as well, with no significant effect for emotion on detection 
rates either, F(2, 192) = 1.09, p = .339, though there was a main effect for the trial 
transcript version, F(1, 192) = 100.31, p < .001, η2 = .343 on inconsistency detection 
rates, with participants who were exposed to the trial transcript featuring the inconsistent 
testimony reporting having noticed the PI 13-Dog inconsistency at a greater total 
frequency across all four question types (M = 1.63, SD = 1.35) than those participants 
who were exposed to the version of the trial transcript without any inconsistent testimony 
(M = 0.19, SD = 0.44).  The interaction between emotion and trial transcript version on 
inconsistency detection rates was not significant F(2, 192) = 1.67, p = .190. 
 Clearly, the only factor which significantly predicts the rate of inconsistency 
detection is the mere presence of the inconsistencies themselves.  There is no significant 
effect of emotion according to any possible means of characterizing detections, nor is the 
interaction between emotion and transcript version significant under any arrangement or 
dependent measure. 
Credibility and Persuasiveness Ratings of Witnesses 
 The final group of dependent measures which bore noteworthy results was that of 
participants ratings of the credibility and persuasiveness of each witness.  It was my 
expectation that credibility and persuasiveness ratings for each witness would decrease in 
relation to the number of inconsistent statements participants noticed in their testimony, 
but similar to my other predictions, this yielded no significant effects other than those 
directly attributable to the exposure to the trial transcript version featuring the 
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inconsistent statements.  However, some unusual trends did emerge within the witness 
ratings. 
 There were two witnesses who each made two inconsistent statements, the other 
four inconsistent witnesses only made one inconsistent statement each (see Appendix R).  
The first of these two is Marc Zollinger, the translation company worker who incorrectly 
stated that Brock Collins drove a Corvette and not a Camry (PI 5-Model; see Appendix 
R), and who also described Lesley Jobin’s dog as being a Dachshund when in fact it was 
a German Shepherd (PI 13-Dog).  Credibility ratings for this witness showed a significant 
effect from the trial transcript version, F(1, 192) = 7.32, p = .007, η2 = .037, such that 
those participants who were exposed to the trial transcript featuring inconsistencies rated 
Marc Zollinger lower (M = 4.59, SD = 1.50) on a seven-point scale of credibility (1-
Completely Lacks Credibility to 7-Completely Credible) than did those participants who 
were exposed to the trial transcript without inconsistencies (M = 5.12, SD = 1.26).  
However, participants perception of Marc Zollinger did not show a significant effect of 
the emotion induced on the ratings of his credibility, F(2, 192) = 0.74, p = .479, nor was 
the interaction between the induced emotion and trial transcript version on credibility 
ratings significant, F(2, 192) = 1.14, p = .323.  The second witness who made two 
inconsistent statements is Lesley Jobin, the tour company worker who referred to the 
jewelry store as a Jared when in fact it was a Zales (PI 11-Jared), and who also said that 
Brock Collins’s car crashed into a tree, while all the other witnesses say that it crashed 
into a light pole (PI 12-Tree).  Lesley’s credibility ratings showed a significant main 
effect for the trial transcript version, F(1, 192) = 11.55, p = .001, η2 = .057, such that 
those participants who were exposed to the transcript featuring inconsistencies rated 
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Lesley’s credibility lower (M = 4.26, SD = 1.43) than did those who were exposed to the 
transcript without any inconsistent testimony (M = 4.90, SD = 1.17).  Like Marc, 
participants’ perceptions of Lesley did not show a significant effect of the induced 
emotion on the ratings of her credibility, F(2, 192) = 0.19, p = .829, nor was the 
interaction between the induced emotion and trial transcript version on her credibility 
ratings significant, F(2, 192) = 0.09, p = .911. 
 This next pair of witnesses also showed a main effect of transcript version on their 
credibility ratings, but in addition to that, they are also the only two witnesses who also 
showed a main effect of transcript version (or any other effect, for that matter) on the 
ratings of their persuasiveness as well.  Barbara Feldman, the librarian who says that 
Michael McGraw drives a tan van when everyone else says it is white (PI 10-Color), 
showed a significant effect of transcript version on credibility ratings, F(1, 192) = 9.79, p 
= .002, η2 = .049, with participants who were exposed to the inconsistent testimony rating 
her less credible (M = 4.32, SD = 1.48) than those participants exposed to the consistent 
transcript (M = 4.92, SD = 1.28) but no significant effect for emotion induced, F(2, 192) 
= 1.08, p = .342, or for the interaction between emotion and transcript version on her 
credibility ratings, F(2, 192) = 0.23, p = .798.  Barbara’s persuasiveness rating also 
showed a significant main effect for the transcript version, F(1, 192) = 4.52, p = .035, η2 
= .023, with those participants who were exposed to the inconsistent transcript rating her 
as less persuasive (M = 4.26, SD = 1.31) than those participants exposed to the consistent 
transcript (M = 4.64, SD = 1.17), but there was no main effect of emotion, F(2, 192) = 
0.79, p = .454, or for the interaction between emotion and trial transcript, F(2, 192) = 
0.49, p = .616, on the ratings of her persuasiveness.  Jill Randall, the mother on her way 
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home from dropping off her child, and the person who said that Michael McGraw had red 
hair (everyone else states that he has black hair; PI 7-Hair) is the other witness whose 
credibility (F[1, 192] = 11.59, p = .001, η2 = .057) and persuasiveness (F[1, 192] = 6.00, 
p = .015, η2 = .030) ratings show a significant main effect from transcript version, with 
the participants who were exposed to the transcript featuring inconsistencies rating Jill’s 
credibility lower (M = 4.16, SD = 1.48) and persuasiveness lower (M = 4.18, SD = 1.40) 
than those participants who were exposed to the consistent version of the trial transcript 
(credibility: M = 4.82, SD = 1.25; persuasiveness: M = 4.62, SD = 1.15).  Jill does not 
display a significant main effect for emotion on her credibility rating, F(2, 192) = 0.25, p 
= .781, or for the interaction between emotion and transcript version on her credibility 
rating, F(2, 192) = 0.54, p = .586.  Similarly, Jill also does not display a significant main 
effect for emotion on her persuasiveness rating, F(2, 192) = 1.39, p = .251, or for the 
interaction between emotion and transcript version on her persuasiveness rating, F(2, 
192) = 0.18, p = .838.   
 The next witness with an unusual expression of significance is Steve Powell, the 
real estate agent who was at the post office at the time of the accident.  Steve Powell 
displays a main effect for transcript version on his credibility ratings, F(1, 192) = 2.24, p 
= .041, η2 = .022, such that those participants who were exposed to the inconsistent 
transcript rated Steve’s credibility lower (M = 4.32, SD = 1.37) than did those participants 
exposed to the consistent transcript (M = 4.70, SD = 1.22), but what makes Steve Powell 
so interesting is the fact that he doesn’t make any inconsistent statements, and yet his 
credibility ratings shift as though he had.  Though approaching significance, Steve shows 
no main effect for the emotion on credibility ratings, F(2, 192) = 2.69, p = .071, or for the 
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interaction between emotion and transcript version on his credibility rating, F(2, 192) = 
1.41, p = .246.   
 The last two witnesses whose credibility ratings merit discussion are noteworthy 
for the fact that they do not show any significant effects at all, and yet in the inconsistent 
version of the trial transcript, they gave inconsistent testimony—inconsistencies which 
did not go unnoticed.  The first of these is Dr. Matthew Freeman, the plaintiff’s accident 
reconstruction expert witness, who testified that Brock Collins drove a 1986 Toyota 
Camry (PI 9-Year) when in fact he drove a 2006 Toyota Camry.  The emotion induced 
has no significant main effect on his credibility rating, F(2, 192) = 0.59, p = .556, nor 
does the trial transcript version, F(2, 192) = 0.50, p = .479, or the interaction between the 
two, F(2, 192) = 0.80, p = .450.  While this particular inconsistency was detected at one 
of the lower overall rates collapsing across all three experimental conditions which were 
exposed to the inconsistent transcript, the overall average rate of detection for all three 
film/emotion conditions was 30.33%, so this lack of significance is not simply due to a 
floor effect, but rather it seems as though some kind of conscious decision to disregard or 
devalue this inconsistency when judging Dr. Freeman’s credibility. 
 The second witness who lacks significant effects regarding credibility ratings is 
the plaintiff, Amanda Johnson, who described having seen the Exxon tanker trailer prior 
to the accident (PI 4-Oil Co.), when in fact everyone else agrees that it was a Shell tanker.  
Amanda’s nonsignificant effects for emotion induction on credibility are F(2, 192) = 
1.09, p = .338; for the trial transcript version on credibility, F(2, 192) = 0.97, p = .327; 
and for the interaction between the two, the effect was F(2, 192) = 0.26, p = .774.  The 
average rate of detection for all three emotional induction conditions that were exposed to 
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the inconsistent transcript was 38.16%, so the potential for a floor effect here is even 
lower than for Dr. Freeman’s non-significant effects.  There are a number of possible 
explanations that come to mind—the plaintiff could have been given additional leeway in 
terms of inconsistent statements out of consideration for the fact that she was grievously 
injured moments after the time she saw the tanker which she misidentified, or a general 
pro-plaintiff bias, or the perception of a functional equivalence between two of the largest 
oil companies in the world, or simply a dismissal of the conflation because it is not an 
issue which should reasonably impact any findings of fact.  It is unlikely that any 
reasonable person might conclude that because Amanda misidentified the oil company, 
that there may therefore be any doubt as to whether the accident actually occurred, or 
whether it occurred in accordance with whichever testimonial account the participant 
might have found most compelling at the time of the inaccurate statement. 
Assorted Other Dependent Measures 
 Every other dependent measure collected, including the Need for Cognition and 
Rational-Experiential Inventory scales from Part One, categorical and continuous 
verdict/liability determinations, verdict confidence, damage awards (if applicable), 
ratings of the emotions experienced while watching the film clip, the PANAS-X 
measures, and any additional witness credibility and persuasiveness ratings I have not 
mentioned were all statistically non-significant. 
Discussion 
 My overall view of these unexpectedly non-significant main effects and 
interactions for emotion/level of certainty, inconsistency detection rates, and liability 
determinations is that perhaps rather than a floor or ceiling effect obscuring differences in 
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cognitive processing style, that the null results could be due to any number of factors 
individually or collectively, both theoretical and methodological—the very nature of the 
inconsistencies themselves; the characteristics and motivation of the participants; 
unfounded theoretical conclusions, assumptions, expectations, and presumptions; 
methodological missteps, miscalculations, over- and/or under-corrections, etc.  I remain 
confident in the theoretical basis for this research, but am now of the impression that the 
exact circumstances and experimental conditions necessary to effectively capture this 
elusive and ephemeral effect of certainty appraisals shaping information processing styles 
may be much, much more practically challenging to study than I had initially believed.  
After all, I have conclusively established that the inconsistencies were in fact detected at 
the rates I had hoped for from the outset, and which I had predicted based upon Studies 
One and Two, with Study Four detection rates generally averaging approximately 40%.  
Furthermore, I was confident that although overall effect sizes were on the low side (but 
as high as could reasonably be expected for experimental inductions), the many iterations 
and analyses of Study Three confirmed that the three film clips I selected would in fact 
induce the three intended emotional states among my research sample.  However, as the 
results of Study Five suggest, each emotion induction was likely not intense and/or 
durable enough to effectively influence cognitive processing style throughout the entire 
trial transcript. 
Theoretical Explanations 
 It is possible that my participants took their jobs as mock jurors (ostensibly to 
help a local attorney evaluate the merits of appealing the outcome of an actual personal 
injury case) more seriously than I had expected, and that a comparatively weak effect of 
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certainty appraisals increasing or decreasing effortful processing was simply 
overshadowed by their motivation to do a good job.  Conversely, it is possible that 
despite my best efforts to identify and exclude all participants who did not pay close 
attention or devote legitimate effort to the requirements of the study, an overwhelming 
sense of apathy and disinterest inhibited the manifestation of any opposing effects of high 
or low certainty appraisals on cognitive processing.  Each of these two extreme 
possibilities could lead to the same end result of statistically indistinguishable 
inconsistency detection rates for the participants in the fearful and uncertain condition 
compared to those in the angry and certain experimental condition.  This two-pronged 
possibility would mirror the findings of Leippe et al. (2004) who found a curvilinear 
relationship between mock jurors’ overall need for cognition (NFC) and guilt 
determinations in light of a strong case for the prosecution where mock jurors with high 
or low degrees of NFC each returned convictions at a lower rate than moderate NFC 
mock jurors but for widely divergent reasons—a lack of understanding and elaboration 
on the part of the low NFC participants, versus a more thorough consideration of 
evidence and a greater degree of skepticism and apprehension regarding the defendant’s 
overall guilt by those high in NFC. 
 The possibility of a more complex relationship between need for cognition, 
preferred processing style, juror decision-making, and the integrated role of emotional 
appraisals (particularly that of certainty) makes the task of disentangling and 
understanding the various dynamics at work a much more challenging proposition.  Even 
though I expected to find that a high degree of uncertainty appraisals would lead to more 
effortful cognitive processing (demonstrated through a greater rate of inconsistency 
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detection) of the sort typically favored by people high in NFC , and that a high degree of 
certainty appraisals would lead to a less effortful style of cognitive processing 
(demonstrated through a lower rate of inconsistency detection) of the sort typically 
favored by people low in NFC, and despite the larger body of extant research supporting 
my unfulfilled expectations, alternative accounts are not without some empirical support.  
For example, Shestowsky and Horowitz (2004) found that in a deliberation setting, mock 
jurors lower in NFC actually discriminated between strong and weak arguments more 
thoroughly than those higher in NFC.   
Methodological Explanations 
 Since this body of research is still in its infancy, I deliberately created the 
inconsistencies to be relatively easy to notice without too much cognitive exertion and 
“puzzle solving” so that I would avoid floor effects in detection rates.  While I made sure 
that all inconsistencies were made by plaintiff’s witnesses so that the detected 
inconsistencies would all (theoretically) impact liability in the same direction, I also took 
care not to make them so diagnostic or of such great probative value towards a liability 
determination that they would become central issues of the case and cease to be the types 
of small, peripheral details that only a person processing information systematically 
rather than heuristically would pick up on.  This safeguard might have had the unintended 
result of causing participants to almost perfunctorily dismiss any inconsistencies they 
detected because to them, detecting the inconsistency was so easy that they assumed it 
was such a simple, obvious mistake without any kind of “Eureka!” or “Gotcha!” 
implications that they simply disregarded it as irrelevant, an assumption which, from the 
perspective of a mock juror, could have been confirmed by the mere fact that there were 
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no efforts by the plaintiff’s attorney to clarify or correct the inconsistencies during direct 
examination, as well as the fact that the defendant’s attorney never seized upon the 
inconsistencies as a means of impeaching an inconsistent witness’s credibility.   
 In addition to the possible perceived ease of detection and the potential for the 
content of the trial transcript itself to have contributed to the lack of any effect of 
inconsistency detection on verdict, the nature of the inconsistencies themselves could 
have colored participants’ beliefs.  Prior research on the effects of inconsistent testimony 
by eyewitnesses has found that exposing mock jurors to different levels of inconsistency 
(new testimony offered during the trial which was not disclosed during any investigation, 
contradictions between pretrial assertions and in-court testimony, and inconsistent 
statements within trial testimony), no matter how diagnostic the content, any exposure to 
inconsistent eyewitness testimony reduced likelihood of conviction, degree of defendant 
guilt, and eyewitness credibility (Berman & Cutler, 1996).  Similarly, Berman, Narby, 
and Cutler (1995) found that with regard to eyewitness testimony, any inconsistent 
statements by the witness having to do with their view of the perpetrator, whether 
perceptually central (i.e., having to do with the perpetrator’s appearance) or perceptually 
peripheral (i.e., having to do with information irrelevant to the accuracy of a personal 
identification, such as nearby objects) in nature, resulted in lower ratings of defendant 
culpability and lower ratings of eyewitness credibility by mock juror participants, while 
those participants who were exposed to eyewitnesses making inconsistent statements 
regarding perceptually central details convicted the defendant at a lower rate.  However, 
these distinct effects of inconsistencies focused on central and/or peripheral details of 
perception and not central and/or peripheral details in terms of relevance to legal 
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decision-making or any probative value, so it is possible that the overall legal relevance 
of the inconsistencies themselves may explain why I did not find what I had expected to 
find.  Perhaps the inconsequential nature of each of the inconsistencies with respect to the 
ultimate decision of liability, or even with respect to the credibility of the witness who 
makes them (since for the most part, they can be characterized as a sort of “slip of the 
tongue” or an obvious but irrelevant oversight) rendered inconsistency detection rates 
impotent as my overall dependent variables representing processing style as moderated 
by emotional appraisals of certainty.   
 The heightened importance of the overall relevance of the informational cue to the 
decision-making task itself is supported by the findings of Moons and Mackie (2007).  
Their findings are at even greater odds with the theoretical basis for my research, having 
found results very nearly directly contrary to my expectations.   They not only found that 
participants experimentally induced to feel angry were inclined to undergo a more 
thorough, rigorous, and ultimately accurate evaluation of argument strength in 
comparison to neutrally-induced participants, but also that individual traits such as the 
need for cognition and associated preferences for style of cognitive processing are less 
predictive of information processing style than the emotional state of the decision-maker.  
In other words, they found that even among participants predisposed to heuristic, low-
effort cognitive processing styles, that the induction of anger was sufficient motivation to 
engage in systematic processing, irrespective of personal preferences.  They did find that 
the induction of anger prompted heuristic processing, but only for specific types of 
accessible, task-relevant heuristics, which suggests that the nature of the decision in 
concert with the informational cue itself are better predictors of cognitive processing style 
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rather than the emotional state of the decision-maker.  The non-significant differences in 
verdict (both for induced emotion as well as transcript version) would suggest that there 
were equivalent degrees of cognitive engagement across conditions, and that regardless 
of induced emotion, those participants who were exposed to the inconsistent trial 
transcript were adept at determining the overall importance of the inconsistent 
information as it pertains to the fact-finding objective of a mock juror’s liability 
determination. 
 If we assume that the emotion inductions held throughout the entire trial 
transcript, and if anger truly was influential in the way that I predicted, then angry 
participants should have largely overlooked the inconsistencies. Conversely, if fear was 
influential in the way that I predicted, then the fearful/uncertain participants should not 
have overlooked the inconsistencies.  However, both angry/certain and fearful/uncertain 
participants detected the inconsistencies at roughly the same rate (see Table 14).  
Participants in all conditions clearly noticed the inconsistencies, and since the rates of 
detection simply did not show what I thought they would, either the inconsistencies were 
being disregarded as inconsequential by everyone who noticed them, or else they were 
not the ideal dependent variable for my very narrow, specific, and delicate purpose.  
However, a more parsimonious explanation which still allows for the possibility that the 
predicted effect exists is that the emotion inductions were too weak or too fleeting to 
register under these experimental conditions (see Study Five and Study Limitations and 
Future Directions, below.)  
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Chapter IX 
Study Five:  Establishing Durability and Duration of Emotion Inductions 
Method 
Theoretical Basis 
 In anticipation of the potential utility in better understanding the overall depth and 
durability of the emotion inductions during the interpretation of Study Four’s results, I 
collected data in a separate study (running simultaneously to Study Four) endeavoring to 
ascertain whether the emotional inductions from the film clips would (and to what extent) 
endure through the presentation of the entire trial transcript.   
Participants 
 I identified and excluded inattentive participants using the all of the same methods 
and criteria used in Study Three since this was essentially a replication of Study Three 
with the exception of having exposed participants to the trial transcript between the film 
clip emotional induction stage and the full post-film measure of emotion using the 
PANAS-X.  To start, there were 560 discrete data entries, and after eliminating 141 
entries from participants who accessed the study on at least one separate occasion prior to 
actually completing it and 111 entries from participants who did not complete the entire 
study, there were 308 participants remaining. 
 I calculated the duration of the additional time each participant spent on the web 
page featuring their randomly assigned film clip by taking the total time spent on the 
page and subtracting the duration of the film clip they watched.  I summarily eliminated 
the very most egregious extreme outliers (who spent an additional 15,152; 18,365; 
32,136; and 111,325 seconds) before calculating the threshold of the merely extreme 
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outliers, defined as exceeding the 97.5th percentile in total delay, which was 263.4 
seconds delay, which resulted in 19 participants being identified as extreme outliers 
ranging from 273.9 to 2766.6 seconds spent (M = 816.05, SD = 701.64) and eliminated 
from further analysis, leaving 285 participants. 
 Next, I calculated the duration of total time each participant spent on the entire 
study.  I defined the most egregious outliers as anyone who spent over four hours (14,400 
seconds) on the study, which eliminated 13 participants ranging in total times of 14,486 
seconds to 256,604 seconds.  I then defined the extreme outliers of the remaining 
participants as those who exceeded the 97.5th percentile in total time spend, which was 
6708.0 seconds (111.8 minutes), and eliminated another 7 participants as a result, ranging 
from 6714.1 seconds to 10,644.2 seconds spent (M = 9072.3, SD = 1607.7), leaving a 
total of 265 participants. 
 After eliminating those extreme outliers which would skew the overall 
distribution of time spent, I calculated the distribution of total time spent for the 
remaining 265 participants on a condition by condition basis, resulting in the elimination 
of thirteen participants whose total time spent was in excess of two standard deviations 
above the mean for their experimental conditions.  There were no participants who 
completed the study in less time than two standard deviations below the means of their 
experimental conditions, leaving 252 participants remaining. 
 Having excluded the extreme outliers for both the duration of lag time after the 
film clip as well as for total time spent, and without those participants whose total time 
spent exceeded two standard deviations beyond the mean, I still wanted to eliminate those 
remaining participants who had an unusually long delay between the time their film clip 
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ended and the point when they clicked the “Continue” button to load the next webpage.  I 
calculated the mean latency for each film clip condition and eliminated those 21 
participants whose times were greater than two standard deviations past the mean, 
leaving me with 231 participants. 
 Just as in Study Three, I wanted to eliminate those participants who, based on 
their I-PANAS-SF pretest, were already in an elevated mood state for any emotions 
related to fear and anger—angry, nervous, afraid, mad, and the composite Negative 
Affect value (consisting of the mean score of the sum of upset, hostile, ashamed, angry, 
nervous, afraid, and mad) so I cut 41 participants whose ratings on any one or more of 
those five measures exceeded two standard deviations above the mean, which left 190 
participants remaining. 
 Finally, I eliminated 29 participants who failed the attention check question 
(“Please Select 2—A Little”) I inserted into the PANAS-X, resulting in a total of 161 
participants. 
Design 
 The design was a 3 (film clip induction emotion/level of certainty: The Shining 
[1980] for fear/low certainty vs. My Bodyguard [1980] for anger/high certainty vs. 
Alaska’s Wild Denali [1997] for neutral emotional impact/control level of certainty) x 2 
(trial transcript version: with testimonial inconsistencies vs. without testimonial 
inconsistencies) pretest-posttest control mixed factorial design.  The purpose of this 
undertaking was simply to learn whether the levels of induced emotion found 
immediately after the film clips as in Study Three would still remain even after having 
been exposed to the trial transcript. 
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Materials 
 I used the same three film clips selected based on Study Three (The Shining, My 
Bodyguard, and Alaska’s Wild Denali) as well as two versions of the trial transcript from 
Studies One and Two (and just as in Study Four), with one version featuring the eight 
testimonial inconsistencies chosen during Studies One and Two (see Appendix N), and a 
control version without any testimonial inconsistencies (see Appendix AC). 
 Emotion measures. 
 To obtain a baseline measure of emotional state without unduly emphasizing 
emotional states or introspective self-evaluation, I used the 10-item International Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule Short Form (I-PANAS-SF, Thompson, 2007; see 
Appendix O).  The I-PANAS-SF does not include any emotion ratings analogous to 
anger, so to maximize utility for my specific purposes, I appended “Angry” and “Mad” to 
the scale since one of the critical manipulations in Study Four is inducing some 
participants to feel anger.  To obtain a more thorough measurement of emotional state 
immediately after exposure to the trial transcript, participants completed the 61-item 
(adding Mad) Specific Affect Scales of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule- 
Expanded (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994; see Appendix O) following the final 
witness’s testimony. 
Procedure 
 Participants believed that they were participating in a mock juror study to assist a 
local attorney evaluate the merits of appealing a verdict, but that due to the duration of 
that study, they would also have to complete a short, unrelated study having to do with 
film clips to round out the total time necessary to merit the full amount of course credit. 
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 Participants first completed the I-PANAS-SF to measure their baseline emotions, 
then watched one of the three randomly assigned film clips, then were exposed to one of 
the two randomly selected trial transcripts (with or without testimonial inconsistencies), 
then completed the PANAS-X,  and concluded their participation by completing the 
witness credibility and persuasiveness ratings. 
Results 
 I first needed to confirm that there were no differences between groups prior to 
the emotional inductions.  Analysis of variance with a Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons showed no significant differences between the six experimental groups for 
any of the twelve emotions rated on the I-PANAS-SF pretest: upset, F(1, 5) = 0.50, p = 
.777, η2 = .02; hostile, F(1, 5) = 0.61, p = .694, η2 = .02; alert, F(1, 5) = 0.61, p = .694, η2 
= .02; ashamed, F(1, 5) = 1.05, p = .393, η2 = .03; angry, F(1, 5) = 0.26, p = .934, η2 = 
.01; nervous, F(1, 5) = 0.49, p = .783, η2 = .02; determined, F(1, 5) = 0.94, p = .456, η2 = 
.03; attentive, F(1, 5) = 1.03, p = .403, η2 = .03; afraid, F(1, 5) = 0.66, p = .653, η2 = .02; 
active, F(1, 5) = 1.55, p = .177, η2 = .05; inspired, F(1, 5) = 1.39, p = .231, η2 = .04; mad, 
F(1, 5) = 0.15, p = .980, η2 = .01.   
 To investigate my suspicion that perhaps the null results of Study Four may have 
been due to the dissipation of the emotion inductions from each film clip, my next step 
was to check whether (and if so, which) emotional ratings were significantly different 
during the post-trial ratings in comparison to their initial baseline ratings.  To accomplish 
this, I conducted a repeated measures t-test for each of the twelve emotions rated both 
before the film clip and after exposure to one of the trial transcripts (see Tables 15 
through 17 for pre- and post- film clip means on a scale from 1-very slightly or not at all 
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to 5-extremely).  I included the emotion ratings from the corresponding conditions testing 
the effectiveness of emotion induction techniques (watching The Shining with no 
perspective taking writing task and watching My Bodyguard with no perspective taking 
writing task) from Study Three to more fully illustrate the effect of including the trial 
transcript on the overall ratings of each emotion.  In essence, the only difference in 
procedure from each of the conditions in Study Three and this undertaking is that rather 
than providing their postfilm emotion ratings immediately following the film clip as in 
Study Three, they were also exposed to one of the trial transcripts between the film clip 
and giving their emotion ratings. 
Discussion 
 At first blush, these effects do not appear noteworthy in any way, especially for 
the emotions of alert, ashamed, determined, attentive, active, and inspired, in which 
virtually no significant differences between conditions emerge, and for this reason in 
combination with their general lack of similarity to either fear, anger, or appraisals of 
certainty or uncertainty, they were omitted from further analysis, though they do paint a 
potentially bleak picture with respect to how trial testimony can impact an observer’s 
overall levels of attention and engagement.   
 Next, since there were no significant interactions specifically associated with the 
film clips or their intended emotional inductions, I collapsed across conditions for film 
clip and for transcript version for the 161 participants in this phase (this does not include 
any participants from Study Three), and after making Bonferroni adjustments to the 
critical alpha levels for multiple comparisons in each set of collapsed conditions (The 
Shining: n = 67, adjusted α = .05/67 or .0007;  My Bodyguard: n = 44, adjusted α = .05/44 
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or .0011; Alaska’s Wild Denali: n = 50, adjusted α = .05/50 or .001; Inconsistent 
Transcript: n = 94, adjusted α = .05/94 or .0005; Consistent Transcript: n = 67, adjusted α 
= . 05/67 or .0007) no statistically significant relationships emerged according to these 
broader characterizations either (see Table 18).
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Table 15 
Study Five: Contrast of Mean Emotion Ratings Before and After The Shining Film Clip 
and Trial Transcript 
 
Trial 
Transcript 
Version 
Before 
Film 
After   
Film Difference*   95% CI 
 
Emotion M SD M SD M SD t p LL UL 
Cohen’s 
d 
Upset Inconsistenta 1.22 0.48 1.38 0.64 0.16 0.73 1.36 .183 -0.08 0.40 0.22 
 Consistentb 1.13 0.43 1.33 0.66 0.20 0.71 1.53 .136 -0.07 0.47 0.28 
 Study 3c 1.53 0.84 1.61 0.93 0.08 1.05 0.48 .638 -0.27 0.44 0.08 
Hostile Inconsistenta 1.05 0.23 1.19 0.52 0.14 0.48 1.71 .096 -0.03 0.30 0.28 
 Consistentb 1.07 0.25 1.13 0.35 0.07 0.37 1.00 .326 -0.07 0.20 0.18 
 Study 3c 1.19 0.58 1.50 1.00 0.31 1.01 1.82 .078 -0.04 0.65 0.30 
Alert Inconsistenta 2.89 1.24 2.73 1.17 -0.16 1.40 -0.70 .487 -0.63 0.31 -0.12 
 Consistentb 3.00 1.34 3.27 1.23 0.27 1.70 0.86 .397 -0.37 0.90 0.16 
 Study 3c 3.03 1.34 3.19 1.33 0.17 1.30 0.77 .446 -0.27 0.61 0.13 
Ashamed Inconsistenta 1.19 0.62 1.19 0.57 0.00 0.53 0.00 1.00 -0.18 0.18 0.00 
 Consistentb 1.03 0.18 1.03 0.18 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 -0.10 0.10 0.00 
 Study 3c 1.08 0.28 1.11 0.40 0.03 0.45 0.37 .711 -0.12 0.18 0.06 
Angry Inconsistenta 1.11 0.31 1.24 0.60 0.14 0.63 1.30 .201 0.35 1.30 0.21 
 Consistentb 1.10 0.31 1.13 0.35 0.03 0.41 0.44 .662 -0.12 0.19 0.08 
 Study 3c 1.25 0.65 1.22 0.48 -0.03 0.61 -0.27 .786 -0.23 0.18 -0.05 
Nervous Inconsistenta 1.38 0.59 1.38 0.76 0.00 0.67 0.00 1.00 -0.22 0.22 0.00 
 Consistentb 1.40 0.56 1.27 0.45 -0.13 0.68 -1.07 .293 -0.39 0.12 -0.20 
 Study 3c 1.33 0.68 2.42 1.36 1.08 1.30 5.02 <.001 0.64 1.52 0.84 
Determined Inconsistenta 3.49 1.07 2.16 1.19 -1.32 1.33 -6.04 <.001 -1.77 -0.88 -0.99 
 Consistentb 3.53 1.11 2.70 1.32 -0.83 1.15 -3.98 <.001 -1.26 -0.40 -0.73 
 Study 3c 3.33 1.53 2.36 1.38 -0.97 1.48 -3.93 <.001 -1.47 -0.47 -0.66 
Attentive Inconsistenta 3.49 1.04 3.14 1.13 -0.35 1.32 -1.62 .113 -0.79 0.09 -0.27 
 Consistentb 3.67 0.99 3.47 1.17 -0.20 1.19 -0.92 .363 -0.64 0.24 -0.17 
 Study 3c 3.47 1.38 3.72 1.06 0.25 1.13 1.33 .193 -0.13 0.63 0.22 
Afraid Inconsistenta 1.16 0.37 1.27 0.51 0.11 0.57 1.16 .254 -0.08 0.30 0.19 
 Consistentb 1.06 0.25 1.07 0.25 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 -0.10 0.10 0.00 
 Study 3c 1.11 0.32 2.19 1.31 1.08 1.40 4.64 <.001 0.61 1.56 0.77 
Active Inconsistenta 2.62 1.19 2.08 1.14 -0.54 0.90 -3.65 .001 -1.14 -0.48 -0.81 
 Consistentb 3.10 1.18 2.43 1.22 -0.67 0.99 -3.67 .001 -1.04 -0.30 -0.67 
 Study 3c 2.67 1.37 2.03 1.21 -0.64 1.40 -2.74 .010 -1.11 -0.17 -0.46 
Inspired Inconsistenta 2.76 1.14 1.95 1.03 -0.81 1.00 -4.95 <.001 -1.14 -0.48 -0.81 
 Consistentb 3.23 1.30 2.13 1.33 -1.10 1.21 -4.97 <.001 -1.55 -0.65 -0.91 
 Study 3c 2.94 1.55 2.00 1.20 -0.94 1.37 -4.13 <.001 -1.41 -0.48 -0.68 
Mad Inconsistenta 1.11 0.31 1.27 0.84 0.16 0.80 1.23 .225 -0.10 0.43 -0.20 
 Consistentb 1.10 0.31 1.17 0.38 0.07 0.45 0.81 .423 -0.10 0.23 0.15 
 Study 3c 1.31 0.62 1.19 0.58 -0.11 0.57 -1.16 .254 -0.31 0.08 -0.19 
Note. CI = Confidence Interval of the Difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  
*After minus Before; positive values indicate an increased rating. an = 37; df = 36. bn = 
30; df = 29. cThere was no trial transcript presented in Study Three; n = 36, df = 35. 
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Table 16 
Study Five: Contrast of Mean Emotion Ratings Before and After My Bodyguard Film 
Clip and Trial Transcript 
 
Trial 
Transcript 
Version 
Before 
Film 
After   
Film Difference*   95% CI 
 
Emotion M SD M SD M SD t p LL UL 
Cohen’s 
d 
Upset Inconsistenta 1.23 0.50 1.84 1.19 0.61 1.17 2.91 .007 1.04 2.91 0.52 
 Consistentb 1.08 0.28 1.31 0.63 0.23 0.73 1.15 .273 -0.21 0.67 0.32 
 Study 3c 1.17 0.38 2.77 1.48 1.60 1.43 6.13 <.001 1.07 2.13 1.12 
Hostile Inconsistenta 1.19 0.75 1.35 0.76 0.16 0.58 1.54 .134 -0.05 0.38 0.28 
 Consistentb 1.08 0.28 1.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 **     
 Study 3c 1.17 0.46 1.53 0.78 0.37 0.96 2.08 .046 0.01 0.73 0.38 
Alert Inconsistenta 2.61 1.56 3.00 1.51 0.39 1.54 1.40 .173 -0.18 0.95 0.25 
 Consistentb 3.23 1.64 3.23 1.24 0.00 1.78 0.00 1.00 -1.07 1.07 0.00 
 Study 3c 3.43 1.25 3.53 1.28 0.10 1.12 0.49 .630 -0.32 0.52 0.09 
Ashamed Inconsistenta 1.06 0.25 1.26 0.82 0.19 0.79 1.36 .184 -0.10 0.48 0.24 
 Consistentb 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 **     
 Study 3c 1.03 0.18 1.47 0.86 0.43 0.86 2.77 .010 0.11 0.75 0.50 
Angry Inconsistenta 1.13 0.34 1.58 1.09 0.45 1.06 2.37 .024 0.06 0.84 0.43 
 Consistentb 1.08 0.28 1.15 0.38 0.08 0.49 0.56 .584 -0.22 0.38 0.16 
 Study 3c 1.07 0.25 2.37 1.33 1.30 1.34 5.30 <.001 0.80 1.80 0.97 
Nervous Inconsistenta 1.39 0.72 1.42 0.85 0.03 0.91 0.20 .845 -0.30 0.37 0.04 
 Consistentb 1.46 0.78 1.38 0.87 -0.08 1.26 -0.22 .829 -0.84 0.68 -0.06 
 Study 3c 1.33 0.76 1.27 0.52 -0.07 0.78 -0.47 .645 -0.36 0.23 -0.08 
Determined Inconsistenta 3.10 1.60 2.45 1.55 -0.65 1.66 -2.16 .039 -1.26 -0.03 -0.39 
 Consistentb 3.69 0.85 2.69 1.38 -1.00 1.15 -3.12 .009 -1.70 -0.30 -0.87 
 Study 3c 3.40 1.30 2.80 1.45 -0.60 1.16 -2.83 .008 -1.03 -0.17 -0.52 
Attentive Inconsistenta 3.19 1.49 3.16 1.24 -0.03 1.47 -0.12 .904 -0.57 0.51 -0.02 
 Consistentb 3.77 1.09 3.69 1.25 -0.08 1.12 -0.25 .808 -0.75 0.60 -0.07 
 Study 3c 3.73 0.94 4.00 0.83 0.27 0.52 2.80 .009 0.07 0.46 0.51 
Afraid Inconsistenta 1.13 0.34 1.26 0.51 0.13 0.43 1.68 .103 -0.03 0.29 0.30 
 Consistentb 1.08 0.28 1.00 0.00 -0.08 0.28 -1.00 .337 -0.24 0.09 -0.28 
 Study 3c 1.00 0.00 1.20 0.41 0.20 0.41 2.69 .012 0.05 0.35 0.49 
Active Inconsistenta 2.74 1.63 1.87 1.06 -0.87 1.34 -3.63 .001 -1.36 -0.38 -0.65 
 Consistentb 3.00 1.53 2.08 1.19 -0.92 1.12 -2.98 .011 -1.60 -0.25 -0.83 
 Study 3c 3.00 1.34 2.37 1.50 -0.63 1.03 -3.36 .002 -1.02 -0.25 -0.61 
Inspired Inconsistenta 2.77 1.52 1.45 0.96 -1.32 1.40 -5.26 <.001 -1.84 -0.81 -0.99 
 Consistentb 2.77 1.30 1.54 0.78 -1.23 1.01 -4.38 .001 -1.84 -0.62 -1.22 
 Study 3c 2.90 1.37 1.90 1.45 -1.00 1.31 -4.17 <.001 -1.49 -0.51 -0.76 
Mad Inconsistenta 1.06 0.25 1.29 0.90 0.23 0.92 1.37 .182 -0.11 0.56 0.25 
 Consistentb 1.08 0.28 1.00 0.00 -0.08 0.28 -1.00 .337 -0.24 0.09 -0.28 
 Study 3c 1.10 0.31 2.13 1.22 1.03 1.19 4.76 <.001 0.59 1.48 0.87 
Note. CI = Confidence Interval of the Difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  
*After minus Before; positive values indicate an increased rating. **t can not be 
computed because the standard error of the difference is 0.  an = 31; df = 30. bn = 13; df = 
12. cThere was no trial transcript presented in Study Three; n = 30, df = 29. 
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Table 17 
Study Five: Contrast of Mean Emotion Ratings Before and After Alaska’s Wild Denali 
Film Clip and Trial Transcript 
 
Trial 
Transcript 
Version 
Before 
Film 
After   
Film Difference*   95% CI 
 
Emotion M SD M SD M SD t p LL UL 
Cohen’s 
d 
Upset Inconsistenta 1.19 0.40 1.42 0.76 0.23 0.71 1.66 .110 -0.06 0.52 0.32 
 Consistentb 1.29 0.62 1.21 0.42 -0.08 0.41 -1.00 .328 -0.26 0.09 -0.20 
Hostile Inconsistenta 1.15 0.46 1.31 0.62 0.15 0.54 1.44 .161 -0.07 0.37 0.28 
 Consistentb 1.04 0.20 1.17 0.38 0.13 0.34 1.81 .083 -0.02 0.27 0.37 
Alert Inconsistenta 2.77 1.24 2.88 1.03 0.12 1.48 0.40 .694 -0.48 0.71 0.08 
 Consistentb 3.08 1.14 2.92 1.10 -0.17 1.61 -0.51 .616 -0.84 0.51 -0.10 
Ashamed Inconsistenta 1.08 0.27 1.19 0.49 0.12 0.52 1.14 .265 -0.09 0.32 0.22 
 Consistentb 1.21 0.59 1.04 0.20 -0.17 0.48 -1.70 .103 -0.37 0.04 -0.35 
Angry Inconsistenta 1.08 0.27 1.23 0.51 0.15 0.54 1.44 .161 -0.07 0.37 0.28 
 Consistentb 1.17 0.38 1.17 0.48 0.00 0.51 0.00 1.00 -0.22 0.22 0.00 
Nervous Inconsistenta 1.19 0.57 1.35 0.75 0.15 0.78 1.00 .327 -0.16 0.47 0.20 
 Consistentb 1.42 0.72 1.33 0.57 -0.08 0.65 -0.62 .539 -0.36 0.19 -0.13 
Determined Inconsistenta 3.27 1.19 2.23 1.07 -1.04 1.40 -3.78 .001 -1.60 -0.47 -0.74 
 Consistentb 3.08 1.25 2.21 1.10 -0.88 1.03 -4.14 <.001 -1.31 -0.44 -0.85 
Attentive Inconsistenta 3.69 1.12 3.58 1.10 -0.12 1.66 -0.36 .726 -0.78 0.55 -0.07 
 Consistentb 3.29 0.95 2.92 1.14 -0.38 0.88 -2.10 .047 -0.74 -0.01 -0.43 
Afraid Inconsistenta 1.04 0.20 1.12 0.43 0.08 0.48 0.81 .425 -0.12 0.27 0.16 
 Consistentb 1.13 0.34 1.00 0.00 -0.13 0.34 -1.81 .083 -0.27 0.02 -0.37 
Active Inconsistenta 3.04 1.15 2.00 1.06 -1.04 1.28 -4.14 <.001 -1.56 -0.52 -0.81 
 Consistentb 2.25 1.15 1.88 1.12 -0.38 0.92 -1.99 .059 -0.77 0.02 -0.41 
Inspired Inconsistenta 3.00 1.17 1.85 0.97 -1.15 1.29 -4.57 <.001 -1.67 -0.63 -0.90 
 Consistentb 2.33 1.40 1.67 0.92 -0.67 1.13 -2.89 .008 -1.14 -0.19 -0.59 
Mad Inconsistenta 1.12 0.33 1.19 0.63 0.08 0.48 0.81 .425 -0.12 0.27 0.16 
 Consistentb 1.13 0.34 1.13 0.45 0.00 0.51 0.00 1.00 -0.22 0.22 0.00 
Note. CI = Confidence Interval of the Difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  
*After minus Before; positive values indicate an increased rating. **The neutral/no 
emotion film clip was confirmed under separate procedures; see Appendix W. an = 26; df 
= 25. bn = 24; df = 23.  
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Table 18 
Study Five: Contrast of Mean Emotion Ratings Before and After Film and Trial 
Transcript, Collapsing Across Conditions 
 
Collapsed 
Condition 
Before 
Film 
After   
Film Difference*   95% CI 
 
Emotion M SD M SD M SD t p LL UL 
Cohen’s 
d 
Upset The Shininga 1.18 0.46 1.36 0.64 0.18 0.72 2.05 .045 0.00 0.35 0.25 
 My 
Bodyguardb 1.18 0.45 1.68 1.07 0.50 1.07 3.11 .003 0.18 0.82 0.47 
 Alaska’s Wild 
Denalic 1.24 0.52 1.32 0.62 0.08 0.60 0.94 .351 -0.09 0.25 0.13 
 Inconsistent 
Transcriptd 1.21 0.46 1.54 0.90 0.33 0.91 3.52 .001 0.14 0.52 0.36 
 Consistent 
Transcripte 1.18 0.49 1.28 0.57 0.10 0.63 1.36 .180 -0.05 0.26 0.17 
Hostile The Shininga 1.06 0.24 1.16 0.45 0.10 0.43 1.98 .051 -0.00 0.21 0.24 
 My 
Bodyguardb 1.16 0.64 1.27 0.66 0.11 0.49 1.53 .133 -0.04 0.26 0.23 
 Alaska’s Wild 
Denalic 1.10 0.36 1.24 0.52 0.14 0.45 2.12 .033 0.01 0.27 0.31 
 Inconsistent 
Transcriptd 1.13 0.51 1.28 0.63 0.15 0.53 2.74 .007 0.04 0.26 0.28 
 Consistent 
Transcripte 1.06 0.24 1.13 0.34 0.07 0.32 1.93 .058 -0.00 0.15 0.24 
Angry The Shininga 1.10 0.31 1.19 0.50 0.09 0.54 1.35 .182 -0.04 0.22 0.17 
 My 
Bodyguardb 1.11 0.32 1.45 0.95 0.34 0.94 2.41 .020 0.06 0.63 0.36 
 Alaska’s Wild 
Denalic 1.12 0.33 1.20 0.50 0.08 0.53 1.07 .290 -0.07 0.23 0.15 
 Inconsistent 
Transcriptd 1.11 0.31 1.35 0.79 0.24 0.79 3.02 .003 0.08 0.41 0.29 
 Consistent 
Transcripte 1.12 0.33 1.15 0.40 0.03 0.46 0.53 .597 -0.08 0.14 0.07 
Afraid The Shininga 1.12 0.33 1.18 0.42 0.06 0.46 1.07 .288 -0.05 0.17 0.13 
 My 
Bodyguardb 1.11 0.32 1.18 0.45 0.07 0.40 1.14 .262 -0.05 0.19 0.17 
 Alaska’s Wild 
Denalic 1.08 0.27 1.06 0.31 -0.02 0.43 -0.33 .743 -0.14 0.10 -0.05 
 Inconsistent 
Transcriptd 1.12 0.32 1.22 0.49 0.11 0.50 2.08 .041 0.00 0.21 0.21 
 Consistent 
Transcripte 1.09 0.29 1.03 0.17 -0.06 0.30 -1.65 .103 -0.13 0.01 -0.20 
Mad The Shininga 1.10 0.31 1.22 0.67 0.12 0.66 1.47 .145 -0.04 0.28 0.18 
 My 1.07 0.25 1.20 0.77 0.14 0.80 1.14 .262 -0.11 0.38 0.17 
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Bodyguardb 
 Alaska’s Wild 
Denalic 1.12 0.33 1.16 0.55 0.04 0.49 0.57 .569 -0.10 0.18 0.08 
 Inconsistent 
Transcriptd 1.10 0.30 1.26 0.80 0.16 0.77 2.02 .046 0.00 0.32 0.21 
 Consistent 
Transcripte 1.10 0.31 1.12 0.37 0.01 0.44 0.28 .784 -0.09 0.12 0.03 
Note. CI = Confidence Interval of the Difference; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  
*After minus Before; positive values indicate an increased rating. an = 67; df = 66; 
adjusted α = .0007. bn = 44; df = 43; adjusted α = .0011. cn = 50; df = 49; adjusted α = 
.001. dn = 94; df = 93; adjusted α = .0005. en = 67; df = 66; adjusted α = .0007. 
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Chapter X 
Overall Discussion 
 Despite the null results, this collection of studies has yielded fruitful dividends 
and helped clear the way for future research.  Studies One and Two finalized and 
streamlined a trial transcript fact pattern that is ready for use in continued efforts to 
isolate the relationship between information processing style and emotional appraisals, 
and it can be easily adapted to suit many other research applications.  The detection rates 
of the eight inconsistencies can be used as the primary dependent variables of processing 
style in other, less exploratory research domains than the present undertaking turned out 
to be.  Additionally, through the course of several unexpected challenges, Study Three 
rejected several unfit methods while also validating several other verifiably effective 
means of emotion induction—at least among the relatively unique population of Florida 
International University undergraduates. 
 The legal system of the United States is designed to be uniform and consistent, 
adhering to principles of common law and precedent.  This leaves little room for the 
volatile, unpredictable influence of emotions in the law, despite the fact that we know 
emotions inevitably creep into jury decision-making in ways we do not yet fully 
understand.  Inconclusive and unexpected results preclude the contribution towards a 
better understanding of juror decision-making I had hoped to make, so practical or 
policy-oriented recommendations are impossible until additional exploration is 
conducted.  I have several suggestions that should be addressed before moving too far 
forward, and contingent upon eventually settling the procedural hindrances, there are 
several promising avenues of research that will unfold. 
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Study Limitations and Future Directions 
 Weaknesses in the current research include the usual sorts of validity-based 
concerns often associated with psychological research in general, as well as limitations 
unique to conducting research online and difficulties associated with studying juror 
decision-making in particular.  Using an exclusively undergraduate participant pool may 
have yielded results which are not perfectly generalizeable to the overall jury-eligible 
population since it is possible that the preferences for different types of cognitive 
processing and legal decision-making criteria favored by college students may not be 
perfectly representative of groups varying in education level.  While not an unreasonable 
consideration, this concern has been addressed and largely withdrawn after several 
investigations into its merit.  Bornstein (1999) considered 20 years worth of extant 
literature on jury simulation studies to address the general concerns of ecological validity 
(including concerns regarding sample populations, research paradigms, deliberation 
requirements, outcome variables of interest and how they were defined, and manipulation 
of real-world consequences) and found that much of the skepticism is unfounded.  He 
examined twenty-six studies where sample selection (undergraduates versus community 
members) was a manipulated variable, and found that of those twenty-six, only five 
studies showed a main effect on verdict.  Furthermore, only two of those twenty-six 
studies showed a main effect for demographic characteristics, which suggests that student 
and nonstudent samples are similarly affected by information at trial.  
 Due to the acknowledged lack of experimental control inherent in an online 
format, in order to best reduce the threat of participants paying less attention than they 
otherwise would in a more structured setting, I included multiple manipulation checks 
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having to do with case familiarity and overall attention levels and excluded those 
participants who failed them.  Objections having to do with research settings can be 
assuaged (though certainly not dismissed outright) as online research paradigms have 
been found to be largely comparable to traditional “in person” methods (Gosling, Vazire, 
Srivastava, & John, 2004) and more specific to the current study, emotion has been 
successfully induced in past online research (Wiener et al., 2007).   
 Given the null results, perhaps the most noteworthy limitation to my studies can 
be seen as a combination of all of the aforementioned concerns—a global objection 
incorporating the overall induction of emotion as well as the overall emotional 
involvement and motivation of online mock juror participants.  Breau and Brook (2007) 
conducted a small jury simulation experiment using law students focusing on the impact 
of the perceived consequences of participating in what was purported to be an honor code 
violation for one half of the participants, while the other half of participants were 
informed that they were participating in a mock jury exercise.  After deliberating, each 
participant answered open ended questions related to their opinions on the deliberations 
and verdict and a multiple-choice survey addressing their perceptions of the experimental 
design and the degree to which they believed they were participating in a real honor code 
hearing.  While the sample size was too small to draw any meaningful statistical 
conclusions, the “real” juries deliberated for a longer duration (40 and 85-90 minutes) 
than the known mock juries (20-25 minutes and 30 minutes), and the “real” juries either 
found the accused to be not guilty or had a hung jury, whereas the mock juries each 
delivered guilty verdicts.  Furthermore, the post-deliberation questionnaires among “real” 
participants yielded very strong agreement with the statement “I put my heart and soul 
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into resolving this issue”, whereas the known mock jurors disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with that same statement.  These findings suggest that there is a differential level of 
emotional and personal investment in jury simulations when the participants are unaware 
that they are participating in a simulation, and that to reveal the hypothetical nature of 
such experiments serves to dilute the motivation to reach the correct and most fair 
verdict, which itself indicates that the perceived level of task importance by experimental 
participants can influence verdict as well.   
 In accordance with Bornstein and McCabe’s (2005) recommendation to maximize 
perceived real-live consequences in jury research, I expected that my cover story for the 
study (that participants were sought to assist a local attorney in determining the viability 
of appealing a past verdict) would allay this concern of participants’ motivation for the 
most part, but the possibility remains that my results are not fully generalizeable to a real 
jury, since even if participants fully believed the cover story for the study, they may not 
have had the requisite degree of perceived task importance since the trial itself had 
ostensibly concluded, and their role was simply to help decide whether further action 
might be worthwhile.  
 My expectation that the detection of inconsistencies made by plaintiff’s witnesses 
(and the plaintiff herself) should have swayed participants to find verdicts in favor of the 
defendant at a greater rate than those who did not notice (or were not exposed to) the 
inconsistent testimony is betrayed by the fact that in Study Four, 170 of 198 participants 
in all conditions (85.9%) found the defendant not liable, and one would logically expect 
more than 28 (14.1%) of participants to find liability when 98 participants (50%) were 
exposed to the trial transcript featuring inconsistencies and 98 participants (50%) were 
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exposed to the transcript without inconsistencies--an outcome illustrating the irrelevance 
of trial transcript version with respect to verdict.  Furthermore, the detection of 
inconsistent testimony showed little relation to the credibility or persuasiveness ratings 
for those witnesses, which also obfuscates the interpretation of the relationship between 
inconsistent testimony and increased durability of emotional inductions. 
 One way to avoid this ambiguity in undertaking future research would be to create 
a trial transcript that is pre-tested and confirmed to elicit a more even split of verdicts, 
either in the version featuring inconsistencies favoring the defendant (in which case, we 
would expect the transcript version without inconsistencies to lead to a greater rate of 
finding the defendant liable) or in the version without inconsistencies (in which case we 
would expect the version with the inconsistencies to find the defendant less liable).  Upon 
determining baseline rates of liability determinations for both transcripts, this 
“inconsistencies lead to greater certainty, which in turn bolsters emotional induction 
duration” theory could be more directly tested and evaluated in relation to the more 
diagnostic corroborative evidence of verdict disparities for each transcript version.   
 In creating the trial transcript, I had intended to come up with case facts that, in 
the absence of testimonial inconsistencies, would lead to a roughly even percentage of 
verdicts in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant.  It was my expectation that in so doing, 
the effect of inconsistency detection would translate into a greater rate of verdicts in favor 
of the defendant for those participants who processed information systematically due to 
the uncertainty appraisals inherent in their fearful emotional state, which would be 
evident in comparison to the higher rate of verdicts in favor of the plaintiff for those 
participants who detected fewer inconsistencies as a result of their more heuristic 
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processing resulting from their certainty appraisals associated with their angry emotional 
state.  However, it was beyond the scope of the current research to calibrate the trial 
transcript to reach a specific distribution of verdicts.  Nevertheless, future investigatory 
efforts would be well served to at least have a baseline measure of verdict distribution, 
even if fine-tuning the two transcripts to reach a specific distribution of verdicts is 
logistically prohibitive.  Future efforts might even focus on testing the overall hypothesis 
of certainty appraisals mediating cognitive processing styles in a much shorter trial 
setting, or even a less procedurally complex context than that of a jury trial in order to 
first find preliminary support for the underlying expectations in a more simple, direct 
format.  Cognitive consequences of certainty appraisals could (theoretically) just as easily 
be demonstrated through divergences in performance on the Stroop test, brain teasers, 
logic puzzles and games, or simply general knowledge questions of the sort found on 
traditional college entrance and placement exams.  These types of studies have been done 
in the past (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al. 1994; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens, 2001), 
but they have focused more on the effect of anger and its associated certainty appraisals 
leading to an increased reliance on heuristic processing rather than the alternative (yet 
complementary) effect of increased uncertainty appraisals on an increased reliance on 
systematic processing as the current research attempted. 
 Another, more straightforward methodological explanation for my findings is that 
the effect of the emotional inductions dissipated too quickly to drive the mechanisms of 
processing style more powerfully and profoundly throughout the duration of the entire 
trial transcript, as Study Five suggests.  Instead of measuring residual emotional 
induction only after the conclusion of the 45 minute trial transcript (and after full 
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exposure to all elements of all eight inconsistencies), if more experimental conditions 
were incorporated which varied in terms of the timing of administering emotion ratings 
and inconsistency detection measures, then we would have a more complete picture of 
any sort of dynamic shift in emotion inductions in relation to exposure to (and detection 
of) inconsistencies, which we could compare to control conditions with identical emotion 
inductions measured at identical intervals but without any testimonial inconsistencies in 
the transcript. 
 Another consideration is that the experimental inductions of fear and anger might 
simply not have been personally relevant enough for divergent processing styles to fully 
manifest as a result.  Working within the ethical guidelines of responsible research likely 
precludes the induction of fear (and perhaps even anger) through more personally 
relevant induction techniques, but by using more reliable physiological measures of fear 
such as a heart rate monitor or similar instead of less robust self-report measures, future 
researchers could arrive at more substantive conclusions based on physiological 
confirmation of emotion inductions (and give greater precision to drawing distinctions 
when faced with relatively small effects) which might very well shed light on the current 
ambiguity. 
 The present collection of studies has left the door open to investigate whether it is 
necessary to use detection rates of more cognitively complex and/or legally dispositive 
inconsistencies within a mock trial context in order to tease out a significant results 
illustrating how the overall level of certainty associated with a given emotion can 
influence cognitive processing style of mock jurors.  Given contradictions in prior 
findings and the unexpected nature of the current results, this research has also raised the 
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issue of whether a more prudent investigatory roadmap would instead focus on finding 
evidence of the “certainty appraisals on cognitive processing style” effect in more simple, 
straightforward, non-legal experimental formats first before rushing to apply the 
principles to the intricacies of legal decision-making.  The current research also raises the 
question of whether stronger emotional inductions might be necessary in order to elicit 
the effects I expected to find, as well as the possibility that the detection of 
inconsistencies may have more control over emotional state instead of the other way 
around as originally expected.   
 Once the two overlapping foundations of determining the optimal type of 
inconsistency to use as the dependent measure, as well as identifying the most effective 
induction methods of un/certainty appraisals are each firmly established, the avenues for 
future research building on those core principles are manifest.  For example, it would be a 
tremendously valuable—arguably unethically so—skill for trial attorneys, or anyone else 
for that matter, to be able to deliberately induce elevated or reduced levels of cognitive 
engagement through the activation of certain emotions.  Such a discovery would in turn 
bring to mind the importance of studying emotion regulation efforts and how those too 
may have unanticipated or unchartered cognitive consequences. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 Film Clip Stimulus Materials 
 
Rottenberg, J., & Ray, R. D., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Emotion elicitation using films. In J. 
A. Coan & J. J. B. Allen (Eds.), The handbook of emotion elicitation and 
assessment. London: Oxford University Press. 
 
ANGER FILMS 
BODYGUARD  
Film: “My Bodyguard”  
Target emotion: Anger  
Clip length: 4’06”  
Instructions: Advance to the first frame in which a growing circular form has the words 
“Magnetic Video” written under it in full. Reset the timer to 00:00:00:00 
(hours:minutes:seconds:frames). Begin the clip at 01:12:23:05 (01:12:15:01). At this 
point, two men are visible, one wearing a red tank top and the other wearing an army 
jacket. A fight is about to begin. Several people are in the background, including a blond-
haired boy in the lower right hand corner of the screen. Begin the clip at the first frame in 
which the blond-haired boy’s hand covers both his mouth and nose. End the clip at 
01:16:29:27 (01:16:20:20). At this point, a man dressed in a gray muscle shirt and black 
pants is exiting the scene, with trees, a wall, and a fence in the background. This is two 
frames before a shot of a man with a bloody nose on all fours.  
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CRY FREEDOM  
Film: “Cry Freedom”  
Target emotion: Anger  
Clip length: 2’36”  
Instructions: Advance to the point at which “Cry Freedom” is typed across the screen. At 
the first frame in which the “m” is visible, reset the timer to 00:00:00:00 
(hours:minutes:seconds:frames). Begin the clip at 2:24:56:11 (02:25:56:07). At this point, 
there is a shift from a view of protesters in the distance to a close-up of a bald girl with a 
pink skirt and a boy crossing just in front of her. Begin the clip with the first frame of this 
close up. Stop recording at 2:25:16:07 (02:26:15:05). At this point, a boy in a dark gray 
sweater is jumping up and down. Stop recording at the last frame in which he is visible 
before the camera shifts to the two groups of protesters joining into one group. Begin 
recording at 2:25:32:06 (02:26:32:06). This is the point at which the camera switches to a 
view of the three groups of protesters who have just joined into one big group which is 
advancing straight toward the camera. End the clip at 2:27:49:10 (02:28:49:10). At this 
point, a man in a car has just shot a boy who was running away. Stop recording after the 
boy falls, at the first frame in which he is completely still. 
 
FEAR FILMS  
SHINING  
Film: “The Shining”  
Target emotion: Fear  
Clip length: 1’22”  
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Instructions: Advance to the first frame of the film, which shows a body of water 
surrounded by mountains. Reset the timer to 00:00:00:00 
(hours:minutes:seconds:frames). Begin the clip at 00:56:51:15 (00:57:03:08). At this 
point, a boy’s hands are visible (one flat on the floor and the other in a fist). There are toy 
trucks and cars on a red, brown, and orange carpet. End the clip at 00:58:12:18 
(00:58:24:01). At this point, an open door with a key in the lock is visible, and one full 
second has passed since the boy has said “Mom, are you in there?”  
 
LAMBS  
Film: “Silence of the Lambs”  
Target emotion: Fear  
Clip length: 3’29”  
Instructions: Advance to the first frame of the film in which the words “A STRONG 
HEART DEMME PRODUCTION” appear. Reset the timer to 00:00:00:00 
(hours:minutes:seconds:frames). Begin the clip at 01:40:16:29 (01:40:56:01). At this 
point, a dirt road and trees are in the forefront and a mint green trailer is in the 
background. Stop recording at 01:43:44:23 (01:44:24:10). At this point, the profile of a 
dark-haired woman is visible. There is a metal wire hanging from the ceiling that appears 
to almost (but not quite) touch her nose and chin. Begin recording at 01:46:36:24 
(01:47:16:01). At this point, hands holding a gun are moving rapidly into the scene from 
the right of the screen. In the background, there is dirty yellow wallpaper. End the clip at 
01:46:38:19 (01:47:18:01). At this point, the dark-haired woman has her back to the 
yellow wallpaper, and has pointed her gun between the upper-middle and the upper-right 
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hand portions of the screen. Her right hand obscures most of the left half of her face and 
we hear her exclaim as the lights go out.  
 
NEUTRAL FILMS  
STICKS  
Film:“Noncommercial Screen Saver”  
Target emotion: Neutral  
Clip Length 3’26”  
Instructions: Film available for download at 
http://www.cas.usf.edu/psychology/fac_rottenbergJ.htm  
 
DENALI  
Film: “Alaska’s Wild Denali”  
Target emotion: Neutral  
Clip Length: 5’02”  
Instructions: Reset the timer to 00.00.00:00 when the credits for the Alaskan production 
company come up. Begin the clip at 00:33:28:00 (00:33:15:00), right after a person plays 
a guitar, start as the music is still playing and fading, but the visual is a silhouette of a 
mountain and the midnight sky; the narrator talks about the Alaskan midnight sky. End 
the clip at 00:38:30:00 (00:38:17:00). At this point, a buck is eating little grasses and 
there is a shot of a mountain stream. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Semmler and Brewer’s (2002) Trial Transcript Materials 
 
INCONSISTENT NEUTRAL 
Judge: Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen, my name is Judge Stevenson. Today we 
are to hear in the Supreme Court the case of the Crown versus Mark Alexander 
Fitzpatrick. Mr Fitzpatrick is charged with causing death by dangerous driving. Mr 
Spence, you are now invited to open the case for the prosecution. 
Prosecution : Thank you Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, my name is 
Henry Spence, I am the prosecuting attorney in the case of the Crown vs Mark 
Alexander Fitzpatrick. You will hear eyewitness evidence today that proves beyond 
reasonable doubt that Mr Fitzpatrick is solely responsible for the death of Celia White. 
The accident took place at approximately 10am on the 14th of April 1998 on Mount 
Barker Road near Eagle on the Hill. Driving home from a visit with relatives, the 
family in their Corolla sedan rounded a left hand bend and were confronted with a 
large fuel tanker on the wrong side of the road. The driver panicked, swerved causing 
the trailer to jack-knife across the path of the oncoming car. The car hit the trailer on 
the driver’s side. Unfortunately, Celia White and her daughter were trapped in the 
twisted wreckage. They were trapped for 20 minutes. The mother sustained only a 
broken and gashed leg. Celia White’s husband and son were looking on. They could 
not help her. They had to stand back because there was fuel all over the road. The 
daughter was eventually rescued by the ‘jaws of life’. 
You will hear eyewitness evidence that proves that Mr Fitzpatrick drove his semitrailer 
in a manner that created potential danger to other people using the highway. 
This was solely and act of carelessness and inattention and an act that directly caused 
the death of Celia White. You, the jury, can deliver justice which by finding the 
defendant guilty of causing death by dangerous driving. Thank you Your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Warwick, you may now open the case for the defence. 
Defence; Thankyou Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, My name is 
Melvin Warwick, I am the attorney defending my client Mr Fitzpatrick in this case. 
The prosecution will allege on the basis of eyewitness testimony that my client was 
solely responsible for the injury which occurred when his truck collided with the 
eyewitness’ car on the morning of April 14th. Ladies and Gentlemen, I want you to 
first remember while listening to the eyewitness evidence that the eyewitness was 
actually in the car at the time of the accident which means that he may not have seen 
the things he alleges to have seen. Second, he and his young son had to watch his wife 
and daughter trapped in the wreckage of a car that was in imminent danger of bursting 
into flames. This is bound to cause feelings of helplessness and perhaps a strong need 
to blame someone. While not in any way meaning to deny the adverse nature of the 
events that occurred on that day, I have to emphasise that Mr White is not an impartial 
witness who has the benefit of objectivity. Finally, at the time of the accident he must 
have been under a great deal of stress and this most likely affected his ability to recall 
the details of an event. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is our case that it was the witness’s 
car which crossed over the double white lines that morning causing Mr Fitzpatrick to 
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swerve and his trailer to jack-knife across the road and into the witness’ car. Finally, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask you to consider the suffering of the truck’s driver Mr 
Fitzpatrick. He walked away physically unarmed from the accident. However, 
psychologically he is distraught. He knows that he could not have avoided the 
accident, but he still blames himself despite the physical evidence which proves his 
innocence. Ladies and Gentlemen, in considering the evidence, remember that the 
Crown bears the burden of proof. They must prove beyond reasonable doubt that my 
client drove in a manner dangerous to the public, that this was the result of 
carelessness and further that this action was the sole cause of the death which resulted 
from the collision. You can deliver justice and ease Mr Fitzpatrick’s suffering by 
delivering a not guilty verdict in accordance with the truth. Thank you Your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Spence, please call your first witness. 
Prosecution: Thankyou Your Honour. The Crown calls Police Constable Roger 
McNally to the stand. {Pause} Mr McNally, My name is Henry Spence, I am the 
prosecuting Attorney. I would like to ask you some questions about the accident 
which took place on Mount Barker Road, near Eagle on the Hill, on the morning of 
April 14th 1998. We are keen to establish the truth so please answer where appropriate 
with either, I don’t know, I ‘m not sure or I am sure. 
Police Constable: Yes, I will. 
Prosecution: You were the investigating officer when this accident occurred ? 
Police Constable: Yes, that is correct. 
Prosecution: Can you describe for the jury the position of the vehicles when you 
arrived at the scene of the accident that morning. 
Police Constable: Certainly. The semi-trailer was blocking the whole road. The cabin 
was in the middle of the down track with its trailer perpendicular to the cabin 
obstructing the rest of the down track and extending all the way across the up track. 
The truck had been travelling down Mount Barker Road away from Eagle on the Hill 
and the car had been travelling up. (1)The car had impacted the trailer about half way 
along its right side. There wasn’t much left of the car, the motor had been pushed back 
to the center console. The car had hit mostly on the driver’s side. The car was 
completely caved in on the driver’s side. I arrived on the scene before the ambulance. 
The woman was pinned in the driver’s seat. She was bleeding profusely. The father 
and son who had managed to get out of the vehicle were yelling at me to get them out 
of the wreckage. I couldn’t do anything because of the risk of the fuel around the car 
igniting and causing an explosion …I tried to move them away from the car, they 
wouldn’t leave the rest of their family trapped….we just had to wait…Mr Spence, I 
was so surprised that they all managed to make it out alive. When I got there and saw 
the damage to the car I was amazed that they hadn’t all been killed. 
Prosecution: Mr McNally……Was there any evidence that either of the vehicles had 
taken evasive action, such as breaking or swerving before impact ? 
Police Constable: (2) Yes, there were wide skid marks from the truck trailer skewing 
sideways which were 28 meters in length and from the truck going in a direction 
perpendicular to those of the truck which were a 2 meters longer. There were no skid 
marks from the car. 
Prosecution: From the length of the skid marks, the damage caused upon impact and 
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the position of the vehicles, can any estimates about the speed of the truck and car be 
made. 
Police Constable: It is difficult to determine. However, it appears that the car may 
have been travelling at about 32 km/hour and the truck at about 50. 
Prosecution: Mr McNally, what causes a trailer to jack-knife or begin to push the 
cabin of a truck along ? 
Police Constable; There are several different causes for a trailer to jack-knife. It can be 
caused by incorrect tyre pressure, insufficient or too heavy loads, under gear out of 
alignment or worn steering or other faults in old vehicles. 
Prosecution: In your opinion was the jack-knife of the truck trailer caused by any of 
the problems that you just mentioned ? 
Police Constable; No. We checked the vehicle thoroughly. It was in good condition 
mechanically. 
Prosecution: What in your opinion, was the cause of the collision? 
Police Constable: The truck obviously swerved to it’s left and braked heavily. This 
caused the trailer to jack-knife and the car ran into the trailer. I can not speculate on 
the reason why the driver of the truck had to brake. 
Prosecution: Is it possible Mr McNally, that the driver swerved and braked because he 
suddenly realised he was on the wrong side of the road ? 
Police Constable: Yes it is possible. 
Prosecution: Thankyou Mr McNally. No further questions Your honour. 
Judge: Mr Warwick, you may now cross examine the witness. 
Defence: Good morning Mr McNally. My name is Melvin Warwick, I am defending 
my client Mr Fitzpatrick the driver of the semi-trailer. Mr McNally, you stated to my 
learned friend Mr Spence, that there are several reasons for a trailer to jack-knife in 
the manner you described. 
Police Constable: Yes. 
Defence: Is it not equally possible that the driver of the truck, my client, may have 
braked and swerved to avoid a collision when he saw the car driven by Celia White 
on the wrong side of the road ? 
Police Constable: Yes it is possible. As I said before, the trailer jack-knifed because 
the truck braked heavily and swerved to it’s left. I can only speculate on the reasons 
why the truck braked in the first place. I can only tell you that the trailer moved to the 
other side of the road because of the braking and swerving. 
Def: Thankyou Mr McNally. No further questions Your Honour. 
* 
Judge: Mr Spence, you may now call your second witness to the stand. 
Prosecution: Thankyou Your Honour. The Crown calls James White to the stand. 
Goodmorning Mr White, my name is Henry Spence, I am the prosecuting attorney, I 
would like to ask you some questions about the accident which took place on Mount 
Barker Road at Eagle on the Hill, Monday the 14th of April 1998. Mr White it is 
essential for the carriage of justice that the jury have a good understanding of the 
events leading up to the accident. We are keen to establish the truth so please answer 
where appropriate with either, I don’t know, I’m not sure or I am sure. 
Witness: Yes I will. 
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Prosecution: Would you state your full name please. 
Witness: James Phillip White. 
Prosecution: What is your full home address. 
Witness: 20 Druids Avenue, Mount Barker, South Australia. 
Prosecution: At approximately 10am on Monday the 14th of April 1998 were you a 
passenger in the vehicle travelling along Mount Barker road , which was 
subsequently involved in the accident in question? 
Witness: Yes, I was. 
Prosecution: Why was the vehicle in which you were a passenger travelling along 
Mount Barker Road on the morning of the accident ? 
Witness: My family and I were returning from a visit with my parents at Clarence 
Gardens in Adelaide. 
Prosecution: Who was in the car with you ? 
Witness: My wife Celia, who was driving, and our children Kayla and Jarrod. 
Prosecution: Had Celia, your wife, had any accidents prior to the one that occurred 
that morning ? 
Witness: No. Celia had an impeccable driving record. 
Prosecution: Did Celia have any impairments or disabilities which may have reduced 
her ability to drive ? 
Witness: No, she did not. 
Prosecution: Was Celia tired, stressed or distracted on the day while she was driving 
the vehicle ? 
Witness: No she was not. 
Prosecution: Were the children distracting her at any point during the trip ? 
Witness: No. 
Prosecution: Are you sure Mr White, children can sometimes find it difficult to 
behave on long trips ? 
Witness: The children were being well behaved, talking to each other in the back. 
Celia’s attention was on the road the whole time. 
Prosecution: Do you have any problems with your eyes Mr White ? 
Witness: No 
Prosecution: When was the last time you had your eyes checked ? 
Witness: About 3 months ago. We get them checked regularly because of the type of 
work I do. 
Prosecution: Mr White, can you tell the court in detail, what you were doing 5 minutes 
prior to the accident. 
Witness: Well, as I said before, we were returning home from a visit to my parent’s 
place in Adelaide. We were driving up Mount Barker Road… 
Prosecution: Mr White, what exactly was going on in the car at this point ? 
Witness: We were talking to the kids about what they had been doing at Grandma’s 
place. 
Prosecution: When did you first notice the truck ? 
Witness: (4)When we rounded the left hand bend just before where the accident 
happened. You couldn’t see around the corner because at that point the road is actually 
bending around the steep hill on the left. 
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Prosecution: When you first saw the truck, where in relation to your car, was it located 
? 
Witness: It was directly in front of us, a little to the left of the center of our car. 
Prosecution: Was the truck over the double white lines on the road? 
Witness: Yes. 
Prosecution: In your estimation, how far over the white lines ? 
Witness: At least 3 meters. About from here to the jury away. (3) It was ¾ the way 
over on our side of the road. So far over that we couldn’t have swerved around it, 
there simply wasn’t room. 
Prosecution: Did the truck appear to swerve or deviate from it’s course at any time 
prior to impact, Mr White ? 
Witness: Yes, it did. I remember that Celia had time to flash the lights a couple of 
times… (5)it swerved to our left (3). 
Prosecution: At what speed were you travelling ? 
Witness: I reckon it was only about 40km/h. We had slowed down to take the corner. 
Prosecution: At what speed in your estimation was the truck travelling ? 
Witness: It must have been over 60km/h. We had slowed down, it came towards us 
very quickly. (5)Celia didn’t have time to do anything. 
Prosecution: Did the truck appear to slow down or brake at any point ? 
Witness: (2) No it didn’t brake at all. As I said it happened very quickly. There was 
this petrol truck, or Ampol truck and the trailer across the road coming straight for us 
and…. It was very quick. There was no way Celia could have avoided it. 
Prosecution: Which side of the trailer did your car hit ? 
Witness: (1) We hit on the trailer’s left side. 
Prosecution: Is there anything else that you think is important to tell the court Mr 
White ? 
Witness: Yes, I’d just like the jury to know that Celia was always a good driver. 
Prosecution: No further questions Your Honour. 
* 
Judge: Thankyou Mr Spence. Mr Warwick, you may now cross-examine the witness. 
Defence: Thankyou Your Honour. Good morning Mr White. My name is Melvin 
Warwick and I am the attorney for the defence in this case. I have some questions to 
ask you about the accident which took place on Mount Barker Road in which you 
were involved. The justice system demands that the jury have a clear picture of these 
events, so please answer the questions as accurately as possible. {Pause} At what 
point did you think you saw the truck on the wrong side of the road ? 
Witness: (4)I’d say at least 15 meters before we rounded the bend. Before the accident 
scene, I could see that it was on the wrong side of the road. I could see the (6) paint of 
the Mobil symbol and the chrome trailer shining through the trees. 
Defence: And you are sure you could tell that the truck was on the wrong side of the 
road ? 
Witness: Yes. I am sure. 
Defence: You were rounding the bend and travelling at a reasonable speed and yet 
you are sure were able to discern that the truck was on the wrong side of the road ? 
Witness: Yes, that’s what I’m telling you. 
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Defence: Mr White, if you saw the truck was on the wrong side of the road before you 
reached the bend, why didn’t you warn your wife ? 
Witness: I don’t know. It happened very quickly. I wasn’t 100% sure that it was on the 
wrong side before we rounded the bend. But I could see it definitely was once we got 
further the way around. (3)It was almost half way over onto our side of the road. 
Defence: Between the time that you saw the truck through the trees and the time that 
you saw it coming toward you, did your eyes remain on the road ? 
Witness: No. 
Defence: Exactly what were you doing in between the time that you saw the truck 
through the trees and the time that you rounded the bend? 
Witness:(7) I was getting a tissue for Kayla. She’d spilt her drink. 
Defence: Mr White, your wife maintained her attention on the road the whole time 
while you were trying to clean up the mess on the back seat ? 
Witness: Yes. 
Defence: Is it not possible that she too was distracted by your daughter’s mishap, and 
that her attention left the road for a few moments also ? 
W: No. 
Def: Mr White, I think that perhaps she was distracted and that you needed to blame 
someone for your misfortune and that happens to be my client Mr Fitzpatrick. 
W: No that’s not true ! He caused the accident, his truck was on the wrong side of the 
road ! 
Def: No further questions Your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Spence, you may now address the jury with your closing statement. 
Pro: Thankyou Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, you have heard 
evidence today from two witnesses to the accident which occurred on April 14th 1999 
on Mount Barker Road. Mr Fitzpatrick may well have suffered as the result of these 
events, however, the White family has suffered much more. The testimony of both 
Constable McNally and Mr White prove beyond reasonable doubt that, Mr Fitzpatrick 
drove in a manner that was dangerous to the public, that this was the result of 
carelessness due to inattention and the sum result of these actions was the death of 
Celia White. Celia was trapped in the wreckage for 20 minutes and could see her 
husband and son were out of the car and that they could not help her. Ladies and 
Gentlemen of the jury, Mr Fitzpatrick’s suffering is insignificant by comparison to 
that of the White family. You have a duty to the Whites and to the public to find the 
defendant guilty of causing death by dangerous driving. The Whites must be given the 
understanding that our justice system is fair and the public must be given the 
understanding of how important careful attention on the road at all time really is. 
Thankyou for your attention Ladies and Gentlemen. 
Judge: Mr Warwick you may now address the jury with your closing statement. 
Def: Thank you Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury. The prosecution has 
alleged that it was Mr Fitzpatrick’s truck on the wrong side of the road which caused 
the accident in question. We contend that the only reason the trailer ended up there 
was because of the driver’s need to swerve sharply and to brake to avoid the White’s 
car which had strayed on to the wrong side of the road. Ladies and Gentlemen I ask 
you to consider the eyewitness evidence upon which the Prosecution’s allegation is 
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based. Mr White had to watch his wife’s life in danger right in front of him and could 
not do anything as they waited for help to arrive. A situation like this can be 
emotionally upsetting. Can you place your faith in the memory of a man who has 
experienced such events ? Can you believe that he is able to clearly remember what he 
saw prior to these events ? No, you cannot. The amount of stress that Mr White would 
have experienced is substantial, and yet the prosecution asserts that Mr White’s 
memory would have been unaffected by this. Secondly, Ladies and Gentlemen, realise 
that when people see those whom they know die they often need to blame someone. 
Mr White cannot face the possibility that his wife’s driving caused her own death. 
This is easy to understand. However, as the guardians of justice, you the jury have the 
duty to up hold the law, no matter how much people have suffered and may continue 
to suffer. That is why you must find my client Mr Fitzpatrick not guilty of causing 
grievous bodily harm by dangerous driving. That is all Your Honour. 
INCONSISTENT SAD 
Judge: Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen, my name is Judge Stevenson. Today we 
are to hear in the Supreme Court the case of the Crown versus Mark Alexander 
Fitzpatrick. Mr Fitzpatrick is charged with causing death by dangerous driving. Mr 
Spence, you are now invited to open the case for the prosecution. 
Prosecution : Thank you Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, my name is 
Henry Spence, I am the prosecuting attorney in the case of the Crown vs Mark 
Alexander Fitzpatrick. You will hear eyewitness evidence today that proves beyond 
reasonable doubt that Mr Fitzpatrick is solely responsible for the death of Celia White. 
The tragic events took place at approximately 10am on the 14th of April 1998 on 
Mount Barker Road near Eagle on the Hill. Driving home from a visit with relatives, 
the family in their Corolla sedan rounded a left hand bend and were confronted with a 
large fuel tanker on the wrong side of the road. The driver panicked, swerved causing 
the trailer to jack-knife across the path of the oncoming car. The car hit the trailer on 
the driver’s side. Unfortunately, Celia White was crushed and trapped in the twisted 
wreckage with her little girl Kayla. She was trapped for 20 minutes, in agony from the 
steering column of the car which had crushed her chest. Her legs were crushed and she 
could hear her little girl trapped in the back seat crying out for her mum. But sadly she 
could do nothing. Celia White died that morning with her husband and son looking 
on, and her daughter calling for her. They could not help her. There was fuel all over 
the road. They had to stand back and watch two people that they dearly loved suffer. 
Kayla was rescued by the ‘jaws of life’, even more saddening was the fact that her 
face was severely lacerated by the glass from the passenger’s side window. She also 
bears the psychological scars of the ordeal and these Ladies and Gentlemen will take 
much longer to heal. 
In sum it is a very gloomy picture. You will hear eyewitness evidence that proves that 
Mr Fitzpatrick drove his semi-trailer in a manner that created potential danger to other 
people using the highway. This was solely and act of carelessness and inattention and 
an act that directly caused the death of Celia White, and the serious and tragic injury 
of her young child. Mr Fitzpatrick has destroyed the lives and happiness of many 
individuals who loved Celia White. Most particularly James White and his children 
who must live with the sad memory of the accident and face the prospect of life 
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without a wife and mother. You, the jury, can deliver justice which will appease their 
loss by finding the defendant guilty the charge of causing death by dangerous driving. 
Thankyou Your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Warwick, you may now open the case for the defence. 
Defence; Thankyou Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, My name is 
Melvin Warwick, I am the attorney defending my client Mr Fitzpatrick in this case. 
The prosecution will allege on the basis of eyewitness testimony that my client was 
solely responsible for the death and injury which occurred when his truck collided 
with the eyewitness’ car on the morning of April 14th. Ladies and Gentlemen, I want 
you to first remember while listening to the eyewitness evidence that the eyewitness 
was actually in the car at the time of the accident which means that he may not have 
seen the things he alleges to have seen. Second, he and his young son had to watch his 
wife bleed to death while his child was trapped in the wreckage of a car that was in 
imminent danger of bursting into flames. This is bound to cause feelings of 
helplessness and perhaps a strong need to blame someone for this tragic outcome. 
While not in any way meaning to deny the ad and tragic nature of the events that 
occurred on that day, I have to emphasise that Mr White is not an impartial witness 
who has the benefit of objectivity. Finally, at the time of the accident he must have 
been under a great deal of stress and this most likely affected his ability to recall the 
details of an event. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is our case that it was the witness’s car 
which crossed over the double white lines that morning causing Mr Fitzpatrick to 
swerve and his trailer to jack-knife across the road and into the witness’ car. Finally, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask you to consider the suffering of the truck’s driver Mr 
Fitzpatrick. He walked away physically unarmed from the accident. However, 
psychologically he is distraught. He knows that he could not have avoided the 
accident, but he still blames himself despite the physical evidence which proves his 
innocence. Ladies and Gentlemen, in considering the evidence, the tragedy, 
understand that all of those involved are victims, and sadly all will bare emotional and 
physical scars. Also remember that the Crown bears the burden of proof. They must 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that my client drove in a manner dangerous to the 
public, that this was the result of carelessness and further that this action was the sole 
cause of the death and injury which result from the collision. You can deliver justice 
and ease Mr Fitzpatrick’s suffering by delivering a not guilty verdict in accordance 
with the truth. Thankyou Your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Spence, please call your first witness. 
Prosecution: Thankyou Your Honour. The Crown calls Police Constable Roger 
McNally to the stand. {Pause} Mr McNally, My name is Henry Spence, I am the 
prosecuting Attorney. I would like to ask you some questions about the accident 
which took place on Mount Barker Road, near Eagle on the Hill, on the morning of 
April 14th 1998. We are keen to establish the truth so please answer where appropriate 
with either, I don’t know, I ‘m not sure or I am sure. 
Police Constable: Yes, I will. 
Prosecution: You were the investigating officer when this accident occurred ? 
Police Constable: Yes, that is correct. 
Prosecution: Can you describe for the jury the position of the vehicles when you 
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arrived at the scene of the accident that morning. 
Police Constable: Certainly. The semi-trailer was blocking the whole road. The cabin 
was in the middle of the down track with its trailer perpendicular to the cabin 
obstructing the rest of the down track and extending all the way across the up track. 
The truck had been travelling down Mount Barker Road away from Eagle on the Hill 
and the car had been travelling up. (1)The car had impacted the trailer about half way 
along its right side. There wasn’t much left of the car, the motor had been pushed back 
to the center console. The car had hit mostly on the driver’s side. This had caused the 
steering column to be pushed through the chest of the driver. The car was completely 
caved in on the driver’s side. I arrived on the scene before the ambulance. The woman 
was pinned in the driver’s seat by the steering column and the girl in the driver’s side 
passenger seat was trapped also. The mother was still alive when I arrived but she was 
in obvious pain. She was bleeding profusely. The daughter was sobbing; it was as if 
she could tell that her Mum wasn’t going to make it. The father and son who had 
managed to get out of the vehicle were distraught, they were yelling at me to get the 
others out of the wreckage. I couldn’t do anything because of the risk of the fuel 
around the car igniting and causing an explosion which would have killed all of us…I 
tried to move them away from the car, they wouldn’t leave the rest of their family 
trapped….we just had to wait…sit there and watch her die… Mr Spence, this would 
have to be one of the most horrific and disturbing accidents I had ever had the 
misfortune to attend. 
Prosecution: Mr McNally, take a moment to compose yourself. We can understand the 
great deal of emotional strain that recounting the accident will cause you……Was 
there any evidence that either of the vehicles had taken evasive action, such as 
breaking or swerving before impact ? 
Police Constable: (2) Yes, there were wide skid marks from the truck trailer skewing 
sideways which were 28 meters in length and from the truck going in a direction 
perpendicular to those of the truck which were a 2 meters longer. There were no skid 
marks from the car. 
Prosecution: From the length of the skid marks, the damage caused upon impact and 
the position of the vehicles, can any estimates about the speed of the truck and car be 
made. 
Police Constable: It is difficult to determine. However, it appears that the car may 
have been travelling at about 32 km/hour and the truck at about 50. 
Prosecution: Mr McNally, what causes a trailer to jack-knife or begin to push the 
cabin of a truck along ? 
Police Constable; There are several different causes for a trailer to jack-knife. It can be 
caused by incorrect tyre pressure, insufficient or too heavy loads, under gear out of 
alignment or worn steering or other faults in old vehicles. 
Prosecution: In your opinion was the jack-knife of the truck trailer caused by any of 
the problems that you just mentioned ? 
Police Constable; No. We checked the vehicle thoroughly. It was in good condition 
mechanically. 
Prosecution: What in your opinion, was the cause of the collision? 
Police Constable: The truck obviously swerved to it’s left and braked heavily. This 
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caused the trailer to jack-knife and the car ran into the trailer. I can not speculate on 
the reason why the driver of the truck had to brake. 
Prosecution: Is it possible Mr McNally, that the driver swerved and braked because he 
suddenly realised he was on the wrong side of the road ? 
Police Constable: Yes it is possible. 
Prosecution: Thankyou Mr McNally. No further questions Your honour. 
Judge: Mr Warwick, you may now cross examine the witness. 
Defence: Good morning Mr McNally. My name is Melvin Warwick, I am defending 
my client Mr Fitzpatrick the driver of the semi-trailer. Mr McNally, you stated to my 
learned friend Mr Spence, that there are several reasons for a trailer to jack-knife in 
the manner you described. 
Police Constable: Yes. 
Defence: Is it not equally possible that the driver of the truck, my client, may have 
braked and swerved to avoid a collision when he saw the car driven by Celia White 
on the wrong side of the road ? 
Police Constable: Yes it is possible. As I said before, the trailer jack-knifed because 
the truck braked heavily and swerved to it’s left. I can only speculate on the reasons 
why the truck braked in the first place. I can only tell you that the trailer moved to the 
other side of the road because of the braking and swerving. 
Def: Thankyou Mr McNally. No further questions Your Honour. 
* 
Judge: Mr Spence, you may now call your second witness to the stand. 
Prosecution: Thankyou Your Honour. The Crown calls James White to the stand. 
Goodmorning Mr White, my name is Henry Spence, I am the prosecuting attorney, I 
would like to ask you some questions about the accident which took place on Mount 
Barker Road at Eagle on the Hill, Monday the 14th of April 1998. I realise that the 
events that occurred on that day are heart rending for you. We all appreciate that you 
and your children had to watch as someone you loved was dying and yet you were 
unable to do anything to ease the pain. Mr White it is essential for the carriage of 
justice that the jury have a good understanding of the events leading up to the 
accident, and so unfortunately some very sad and difficult memories will have to be 
experienced. Take your time with your answers and try to remain composed. We are 
keen to establish the truth so please answer where appropriate with either, I don’t 
know, I’m not sure or I am sure. 
Witness: Yes I will. 
Prosecution: Would you state your full name please. 
Witness: James Phillip White. 
Prosecution: What is your full home address. 
Witness: 20 Druids Avenue, Mount Barker, South Australia. 
Prosecution: At approximately 10am on Monday the 14th of April 1998 were you a 
passenger in the vehicle travelling along Mount Barker road , which was 
subsequently involved in the accident in question? 
Witness: Yes, I was. 
Prosecution: Why was the vehicle in which you were a passenger travelling along 
Mount Barker Road on the morning of the accident ? 
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Witness: My family and I were returning from a visit with my parents at Clarence 
Gardens in Adelaide. 
Prosecution: Who was in the car with you ? 
Witness: My wife Celia, who was driving, and our children Kayla and Jarrod. 
Prosecution: Had Celia, your wife, had any accidents prior to the one that occurred 
that morning ? 
Witness: No. Celia had an impeccable driving record. 
Prosecution: Did Celia have any impairments or disabilities which may have reduced 
her ability to drive ? 
Witness: No, she did not. 
Prosecution: Was Celia tired, stressed or distracted on the day while she was driving 
the vehicle ? 
Witness: No she was not. 
Prosecution: Were the children distracting her at any point during the trip ? 
Witness: No. 
Prosecution: Are you sure Mr White, children can sometimes find it difficult to 
behave on long trips ? 
Witness: The children were being well behaved, talking to each other in the back. 
Celia’s attention was on the road the whole time. 
Prosecution: Do you have any problems with your eyes Mr White ? 
Witness: No 
Prosecution: When was the last time you had your eyes checked ? 
Witness: About 3 months ago. We get them checked regularly because of the type of 
work I do. 
Prosecution: Mr White, can you tell the court in detail, what you were doing 5 minutes 
prior to the accident. 
Witness: Well, as I said before, we were returning home from a visit to my parent’s 
place in Adelaide. We were driving up Mount Barker Road… 
Prosecution: Mr White, what exactly was going on in the car at this point ? 
Witness: We were talking to the kids about the baby rabbits Grandma had shown 
them. They wanted a rabbit….Celia was telling them that if they wanted a rabbit they 
would both have to take care of it, look after it and feed it regularly…..they promised 
her they would…. 
Judge: Take a moment, if you wish, Mr White, to compose yourself. 
Witness: Thankyou…..Sorry……it’s just really hard…..without her…. 
{Pause} 
Prosecution: Can we continue Mr White ? 
Witness: Yes. 
Prosecution: When did you first notice the truck ? 
Witness: (4)When we rounded the left hand bend just before where the accident 
happened. You couldn’t see around the corner because at that point the road is actually 
bending around the steep hill on the left. 
Prosecution: When you first saw the truck, where in relation to your car, was it located 
? 
Witness: It was directly in front of us, a little to the left of the center of our car. 
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Prosecution: Was the truck over the double white lines on the road? 
Witness: Yes. 
Prosecution: In your estimation, how far over the white lines ? 
Witness: At least 3 meters. About from here to the jury away. (3) It was ¾ the way 
over on our side of the road. So far over that we couldn’t have swerved around it, 
there simply wasn’t room. 
Prosecution: Did the truck appear to swerve or deviate from it’s course at any time 
prior to impact, Mr White ? 
Witness: Yes, it did. I remember that Celia had time to flash the lights a couple of 
times… (5)it swerved to our left (3). 
Prosecution: At what speed were you travelling ? 
Witness: I reckon it was only about 40km/h. We had slowed down to take the corner. 
Prosecution: At what speed in your estimation was the truck travelling ? 
Witness: It must have been over 60km/h. We had slowed down, it came towards us 
very quickly. (5)Celia didn’t have time to do anything. 
Prosecution: Did the truck appear to slow down or brake at any point ? 
Witness: (2) No it didn’t brake at all. As I said it happened very quickly. There was 
this petrol truck, or Ampol truck and the trailer across the road coming straight for us 
and…. It was very quick. There was no way Celia could have avoided it. 
Prosecution: Which side of the trailer did your car hit ? 
Witness: (1) We hit on the trailer’s left side. 
Prosecution: Is there anything else that you think is important to tell the court Mr 
White ? 
Witness: Yes, I’d just like the jury to know that Celia was always a good driver. She 
was a great mother and she was my best friend. I miss her so much and our children 
miss her…..they keep asking when she’s coming home….. 
Judge: Mr White, please try to compose yourself. We understand how difficult this is 
for you, but please try to answer the questions. 
Prosecution: No further questions Your Honour. 
* 
Judge: Thankyou Mr Spence. Mr Warwick, you may now cross-examine the witness. 
Defence: Thankyou Your Honour. Good morning Mr White. My name is Melvin 
Warwick and I am the attorney for the defence in this case. I have some questions to 
ask you about the accident which took place on Mount Barker Road in which you 
were involved. Mr White, I know that this is difficult for you , I know that you will 
abhor the implications of the questions that I will ask you and I too find myself feeling 
very sad about what took place that day. At times such as these I find it very difficult 
to do my job. You and your children have been through a lot. But the justice system 
demands that the jury have a clear picture of these events, so please answer the 
questions as accurately as possible. {Pause} At what point did you think you saw the 
truck on the wrong side of the road ? 
Witness: (4)I’d say at least 15 meters before we rounded the bend. Before the accident 
scene, I could see that it was on the wrong side of the road. I could see the (6) paint of 
the Mobil symbol and the chrome trailer shining through the trees. 
Defence: And you are sure you could tell that the truck was on the wrong side of the 
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road ? 
Witness: Yes. I am sure. 
Defence: You were rounding the bend and travelling at a reasonable speed and yet 
you were able to discern that the truck was on the wrong side of the road. 
Witness: Yes, that’s what I’m telling you. 
Defence: Mr White, if you saw the truck was on the wrong side of the road before you 
reached the bend, why didn’t you warn your wife ? 
Witness: I don’t know. It happened very quickly. I wasn’t 100% sure that it was on the 
wrong side before we rounded the bend. But I could see it definitely was once we got 
further the way around. (3)It was almost half way over onto our side of the road. 
Defence: Between the time that you saw the truck through the trees and the time that 
you saw it coming toward you, did your eyes remain on the road ? 
Witness: No. 
Defence: Exactly what were you doing in between the time that you saw the truck 
through the trees and the time that you rounded the bend? 
Witness:(7) I was getting a tissue for Kayla. She’d spilt her drink. 
Defence: Mr White, your wife maintained her attention on the road the whole time 
while you were trying to clean up the mess on the back seat ? 
Witness: Yes. 
Defence: Is it not possible that she too was distracted by your daughter’s mishap, and 
that her attention left the road for a few moments also ? 
W: No. 
Def: Mr White, I think that perhaps she was distracted and that out of your grief and 
loss, you needed to blame someone for your misfortune and that happens to be my 
client Mr Fitzpatrick. 
W: No that’s not true ! He caused the accident, his truck was on the wrong side of the 
road ! 
Def: No further questions Your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Spence, you may now address the jury with your closing statement. 
Pro: Thankyou Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, you have heard 
evidence today from two witnesses to the tragic event which occurred on April 14th 
1999 on Mount Barker Road. Mr Fitzpatrick may well have suffered as the result of 
these events, however, the White family has suffered much more. The testimony of 
both Constable McNally and Mr White prove beyond reasonable doubt that, Mr 
Fitzpatrick drove in a manner that was dangerous to the public, that this was the result 
of carelessness due to inattention and the sum result of these actions was the death of 
Celia White. Both of these children will have to face a life without their mother, and a 
life of the memories of pain and suffering as a result of the accident. Little Kayla was 
trapped in the wreckage with her dying mother for half an hour. She could see her 
father and brother were out of the car and that they could not help her or her mother. 
This little girl has to bear these memories for the rest of her life. Mr White and his son 
will never forget watching Celia die. They will never forget the monumental 
helplessness, the frustration, the terrible loss. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, Mr 
Fitzpatrick’s suffering is insignificant by comparison to that of the White family. You 
have a duty to the Whites and to the public to find the defendant guilty of causing 
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death by dangerous driving. The Whites must be given the understanding that our 
justice system is fair and the public must be given the understanding of how important 
careful attention on the road at all time really is. Thankyou for your attention Ladies 
and Gentlemen. 
Judge: Mr Warwick you may now address the jury with your closing statement. 
Def: Thankyou Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury. The prosecution has 
alleged that it was Mr Fitzpatrick’s truck on the wrong side of the road which caused 
the accident in question. We contend that the only reason the trailer ended up there 
was because of the driver’s need to swerve sharply and to brake to avoid the White’s 
car which had strayed on to the wrong side of the road. Ladies and Gentlemen I ask 
you to consider the eyewitness evidence upon which the Prosecution’s allegation is 
based. Mr White had to watch his wife die right in front of him and could not do 
anything to prevent this occurrence. Similarly, he had to watch his daughter in pain 
and bleeding as they waited for help to arrive. A situation cannot be more emotionally 
upsetting than this. Can you place your faith in the memory of a man who has 
experienced such events ? Can you believe that he is able to clearly remember what he 
saw prior to these events ? No, you cannot. The amount of stress that Mr White would 
have experienced is barely conceivable, and yet the prosecution asserts that Mr 
White’s memory would have been unaffected by this. Secondly, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, realise that when people lose those whom they love they often go through 
a period of grief that involves the need to blame someone for their lose. Mr White 
cannot face the possibility that his wife’s driving caused her own death and the injury 
of their children. This is easy to understand. However, as the guardians of justice, you 
the jury have the duty to up hold the law, no matter how much people have suffered 
and may continue to suffer. That is why you must find my client Mr Fitzpatrick not 
guilty of causing death by dangerous driving. That is all Your Honour. 
CONSISTENT SAD 
Judge: Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen, my name is Judge Stevenson. Today we 
are to hear in the Supreme Court the case of the Crown versus Mark Alexander 
Fitzpatrick. Mr Fitzpatrick is charged with causing death by dangerous driving. Mr 
Spence, you are now invited to open the case for the prosecution. 
Prosecution : Thank you Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, my name is 
Henry Spence, I am the prosecuting attorney in the case of the Crown vs Mark 
Alexander Fitzpatrick. You will hear eyewitness evidence today that proves beyond 
reasonable doubt that Mr Fitzpatrick is solely responsible for the death of Celia White. 
The tragic events took place at approximately 10am on the 14th of April 1998 on 
Mount Barker Road near Eagle on the Hill. Driving home from a visit with relatives, 
the family in their Corolla sedan rounded a left hand bend and were confronted with a 
large fuel tanker on the wrong side of the road. The driver panicked, swerved causing 
the trailer to jack-knife across the path of the oncoming car. The car hit the trailer on 
the driver’s side. Unfortunately, Celia White was crushed and trapped in the twisted 
wreckage with her little girl Kayla. She was trapped for 20 minutes, in agony from the 
steering column of the car which had crushed her chest. Her legs were crushed and she 
could hear her little girl trapped in the back seat crying out for her mum. But sadly she 
could do nothing. Celia White died that morning with her husband and son looking 
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on, and her daughter calling for her. They could not help her. There was fuel all over 
the road. They had to stand back and watch two people that they dearly loved suffer. 
Kayla was rescued by the ‘jaws of life’, even more saddening was the fact that her 
face was severely lacerated by the glass from the passenger’s side window. She also 
bears the psychological scars of the ordeal and these Ladies and Gentlemen will take 
much longer to heal. 
In sum it is a very gloomy picture. You will hear eyewitness evidence that proves that 
Mr Fitzpatrick drove his semi-trailer in a manner that created potential danger to other 
people using the highway. This was solely and act of carelessness and inattention and 
an act that directly caused the death of Celia White, and the serious and tragic injury 
of her young child. Mr Fitzpatrick has destroyed the lives and happiness of many 
individuals who loved Celia White. Most particularly James White and his children 
who must live with the sad memory of the accident and face the prospect of life 
without a wife and mother. You, the jury, can deliver justice which will appease their 
loss by finding the defendant guilty the charge of causing death by dangerous driving. 
Thankyou Your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Warwick, you may now open the case for the defence. 
Defence; Thankyou Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, My name is 
Melvin Warwick, I am the attorney defending my client Mr Fitzpatrick in this case. 
The prosecution will allege on the basis of eyewitness testimony that my client was 
solely responsible for the death and injury which occurred when his truck collided 
with the eyewitness’ car on the morning of April 14th. Ladies and Gentlemen, I want 
you to first remember while listening to the eyewitness evidence that the eyewitness 
was actually in the car at the time of the accident which means that he may not have 
seen the things he alleges to have seen. Second, he and his young son had to watch his 
wife bleed to death while his child was trapped in the wreckage of a car that was in 
imminent danger of bursting into flames. This is bound to cause feelings of 
helplessness and perhaps a strong need to blame someone for this tragic outcome. 
While not in any way meaning to deny the ad and tragic nature of the events that 
occurred on that day, I have to emphasise that Mr White is not an impartial witness 
who has the benefit of objectivity. Finally, at the time of the accident he must have 
been under a great deal of stress and this most likely affected his ability to recall the 
details of an event. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is our case that it was the witness’s car 
which crossed over the double white lines that morning causing Mr Fitzpatrick to 
swerve and his trailer to jack-knife across the road and into the witness’ car. Finally, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask you to consider the suffering of the truck’s driver Mr 
Fitzpatrick. He walked away physically unarmed from the accident. However, 
psychologically he is distraught. He knows that he could not have avoided the 
accident, but he still blames himself despite the physical evidence which proves his 
innocence. Ladies and Gentlemen, in considering the evidence, the tragedy, 
understand that all of those involved are victims, and sadly all will bare emotional and 
physical scars. Also remember that the Crown bears the burden of proof. They must 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that my client drove in a manner dangerous to the 
public, that this was the result of carelessness and further that this action was the sole 
cause of the death and injury which result from the collision. You can deliver justice 
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and ease Mr Fitzpatrick’s suffering by delivering a not guilty verdict in accordance 
with the truth. Thankyou Your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Spence, please call your first witness. 
Prosecution: Thankyou Your Honour. The Crown calls Police Constable Roger 
McNally to the stand. {Pause} Mr McNally, My name is Henry Spence, I am the 
prosecuting Attorney. I would like to ask you some questions about the accident 
which took place on Mount Barker Road, near Eagle on the Hill, on the morning of 
April 14th 1998. We are keen to establish the truth so please answer where appropriate 
with either, I don’t know, I ‘m not sure or I am sure. 
Police Constable: Yes, I will. 
Prosecution: You were the investigating officer when this accident occurred ? 
Police Constable: Yes, that is correct. 
Prosecution: Can you describe for the jury the position of the vehicles when you 
arrived at the scene of the accident that morning. 
Police Constable: Certainly. The semi-trailer was blocking the whole road. The cabin 
was in the middle of the down track with its trailer perpendicular to the cabin 
obstructing the rest of the down track and extending all the way across the up track. 
The truck had been travelling down Mount Barker Road away from Eagle on the Hill 
and the car had been travelling up. (1)The car had impacted the trailer about half way 
along its right side. There wasn’t much left of the car, the motor had been pushed back 
to the center console. The car had hit mostly on the driver’s side. This had caused the 
steering column to be pushed through the chest of the driver. The car was completely 
caved in on the driver’s side. I arrived on the scene before the ambulance. The woman 
was pinned in the driver’s seat by the steering column and the girl in the driver’s side 
passenger seat was trapped also. The mother was still alive when I arrived but she was 
in obvious pain. She was bleeding profusely. The daughter was sobbing; it was as if 
she could tell that her Mum wasn’t going to make it. The father and son who had 
managed to get out of the vehicle were distraught, they were yelling at me to get the 
others out of the wreckage. I couldn’t do anything because of the risk of the fuel 
around the car igniting and causing an explosion which would have killed all of us…I 
tried to move them away from the car, they wouldn’t leave the rest of their family 
trapped….we just had to wait…sit there and watch her die… Mr Spence, this would 
have to be one of the most horrific and disturbing accidents I had ever had the 
misfortune to attend. 
Prosecution: Mr McNally, take a moment to compose yourself. We can understand the 
great deal of emotional strain that recounting the accident will cause you……Was 
there any evidence that either of the vehicles had taken evasive action, such as 
breaking or swerving before impact ? 
Police Constable: (2) Yes, there were wide skid marks from the truck trailer skewing 
sideways which were 28 meters in length and from the truck going in a direction 
perpendicular to those of the truck which were a 2 meters longer. There were no skid 
marks from the car. 
Prosecution: From the length of the skid marks, the damage caused upon impact and 
the position of the vehicles, can any estimates about the speed of the truck and car be 
made. 
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Police Constable: It is difficult to determine. However, it appears that the car may 
have been travelling at about 32 km/hour and the truck at about 50. 
Prosecution: Mr McNally, what causes a trailer to jack-knife or begin to push the 
cabin of a truck along ? 
Police Constable; There are several different causes for a trailer to jack-knife. It can be 
caused by incorrect tyre pressure, insufficient or too heavy loads, under gear out of 
alignment or worn steering or other faults in old vehicles. 
Prosecution: In your opinion was the jack-knife of the truck trailer caused by any of 
the problems that you just mentioned ? 
Police Constable; No. We checked the vehicle thoroughly. It was in good condition 
mechanically. 
Prosecution: What in your opinion, was the cause of the collision? 
Police Constable: The truck obviously swerved to it’s left and braked heavily. This 
caused the trailer to jack-knife and the car ran into the trailer. I can not speculate on 
the reason why the driver of the truck had to brake. 
Prosecution: Is it possible Mr McNally, that the driver swerved and braked because he 
suddenly realised he was on the wrong side of the road ? 
Police Constable: Yes it is possible. 
Prosecution: Thankyou Mr McNally. No further questions Your honour. 
Judge: Mr Warwick, you may now cross examine the witness. 
Defence: Good morning Mr McNally. My name is Melvin Warwick, I am defending 
my client Mr Fitzpatrick the driver of the semi-trailer. Mr McNally, you stated to my 
learned friend Mr Spence, that there are several reasons for a trailer to jack-knife in 
the manner you described. 
Police Constable: Yes. 
Defence: Is it not equally possible that the driver of the truck, my client, may have 
braked and swerved to avoid a collision when he saw the car driven by Celia White 
on the wrong side of the road ? 
Police Constable: Yes it is possible. As I said before, the trailer jack-knifed because 
the truck braked heavily and swerved to it’s left. I can only speculate on the reasons 
why the truck braked in the first place. I can only tell you that the trailer moved to the 
other side of the road because of the braking and swerving. 
Def: Thankyou Mr McNally. No further questions Your Honour. 
* 
Judge: Mr Spence, you may now call your second witness to the stand. 
Prosecution: Thankyou Your Honour. The Crown calls James White to the stand. 
Good morning Mr White, my name is Henry Spence, I am the prosecuting attorney, I 
would like to ask you some questions about the accident which took place on Mount 
Barker Road at Eagle on the Hill, Monday the 14th of April 1998. I realise that the 
events that occurred on that day are heart rending for you. We all appreciate that you 
and your children had to watch as someone you loved was dying and yet you were 
unable to do anything to ease the pain. Mr White it is essential for the carriage of 
justice that the jury have a good understanding of the events leading up to the 
accident, and so unfortunately some very sad and difficult memories will have to be 
experienced. Take your time with your answers and try to remain composed. We are 
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keen to establish the truth so please answer where appropriate with either, I don’t 
know, I’m not sure or I am sure. 
Witness: Yes I will. 
Prosecution: Would you state your full name please. 
Witness: James Phillip White. 
Prosecution: What is your full home address. 
Witness: 20 Druids Avenue, Mount Barker, South Australia. 
Prosecution: At approximately 10am on Monday the 14th of April 1998 were you a 
passenger in the vehicle travelling along Mount Barker road , which was 
subsequently involved in the accident in question? 
Witness: Yes, I was. 
Prosecution: Why was the vehicle in which you were a passenger travelling along 
Mount Barker Road on the morning of the accident ? 
Witness: My family and I were returning from a visit with my parents at Clarence 
Gardens in Adelaide. 
Prosecution: Who was in the car with you ? 
Witness: My wife Celia, who was driving, and our children Kayla and Jarrod. 
Prosecution: Had Celia, your wife, had any accidents prior to the one that occurred 
that morning ? 
Witness: No. Celia had an impeccable driving record. 
Prosecution: Did Celia have any impairments or disabilities which may have reduced 
her ability to drive ? 
Witness: No, she did not. 
Prosecution: Was Celia tired, stressed or distracted on the day while she was driving 
the vehicle ? 
Witness: No she was not. 
Prosecution: Were the children distracting her at any point during the trip ? 
Witness: No. 
Prosecution: Are you sure Mr White, children can sometimes find it difficult to 
behave on long trips ? 
Witness: The children were being well behaved, talking to each other in the back. 
Celia’s attention was on the road the whole time. 
Prosecution: Do you have any problems with your eyes Mr White ? 
Witness: No 
Prosecution: When was the last time you had your eyes checked ? 
Witness: About 3 months ago. We get them checked regularly because of the type of 
work I do. 
Prosecution: Mr White, can you tell the court in detail, what you were doing 5 minutes 
prior to the accident. 
Witness: Well, as I said before, we were returning home from a visit to my parent’s 
place in Adelaide. We were driving up Mount Barker Road… 
Prosecution: Mr White, what exactly was going on in the car at this point ? 
Witness: We were talking to the kids about the baby rabbits Grandma had shown 
them. They wanted a rabbit….Celia was telling them that if they wanted a rabbit they 
would both have to take care of it, look after it and feed it regularly…..they promised 
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her they would…. 
Judge: Take a moment, if you wish, Mr White, to compose yourself. 
Witness: Thankyou…..Sorry……it’s just really hard…..without her…. 
{Pause} 
Prosecution: Can we continue Mr White ? 
Witness: Yes. 
Prosecution: When did you first notice the truck ? 
Witness: (4)When we rounded the left hand bend just before where the accident 
happened. You couldn’t see around the corner because at that point the road is actually 
bending around the steep hill on the left. 
Prosecution: When you first saw the truck, where in relation to your car, was it located 
? 
Witness: It was directly in front of us, a little to the left of the center of our car. 
Prosecution: Was the truck over the double white lines on the road? 
Witness: Yes. 
Prosecution: In your estimation, how far over the white lines ? 
Witness: At least 3 meters. About from here to the jury away. (3) It was almost half 
the way over on our side of the road. So far over that we couldn’t have swerved 
around it, there simply wasn’t room. 
Prosecution: Did the truck appear to swerve or deviate from it’s course at any time 
prior to impact, Mr White ? 
Witness: Yes, it did. I remember that Celia had time to flash the lights a couple of 
times… (5)it swerved to our right (3). 
Prosecution: At what speed were you travelling ? 
Witness: I reckon it was only about 40km/h. We had slowed down to take the corner. 
Prosecution: At what speed in your estimation was the truck travelling ? 
Witness: It must have been over 60km/h. We had slowed down, it came towards us 
very quickly. (5). 
Prosecution: Did the truck appear to slow down or brake at any point ? 
Witness: (2) It did brake. As I said it happened very quickly. There was this petrol 
truck, or Ampol truck and the trailer across the road coming straight for us and…. It 
was very quick. There was no way Celia could have avoided it. 
Prosecution: Which side of the trailer did your car hit ? 
Witness: (1) We hit on the trailer’s right side. 
Prosecution: Is there anything else that you think is important to tell the court Mr 
White ? 
Witness: Yes, I’d just like the jury to know that Celia was always a good driver. She 
was a great mother and she was my best friend. I miss her so much and our children 
miss her…..they keep asking when she’s coming home….. 
Judge: Mr White, please try to compose yourself. We understand how difficult this is 
for you, but please try to answer the questions. 
Prosecution: No further questions Your Honour. 
* 
Judge: Thankyou Mr Spence. Mr Warwick, you may now cross-examine the witness. 
Defence: Thankyou Your Honour. Good morning Mr White. My name is Melvin 
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Warwick and I am the attorney for the defence in this case. I have some questions to 
ask you about the accident which took place on Mount Barker Road in which you 
were involved. Mr White, I know that this is difficult for you , I know that you will 
abhor the implications of the questions that I will ask you and I too find myself feeling 
very sad about what took place that day. At times such as these I find it very difficult 
to do my job. You and your children have been through a lot. But the justice system 
demands that the jury have a clear picture of these events, so please answer the 
questions as accurately as possible. {Pause} At what point did you think you saw the 
truck on the wrong side of the road ? 
Witness: (4)When we rounded the bend just before the accident happened, as I said 
before, it was a blind corner which you couldn’t see around because of the hill. When 
we rounded the bend I could see that it was on the wrong side of the road. I could see 
the (6) paint of the Ampol symbol. 
Defence: And you are sure you could tell that the truck was on the wrong side of the 
road ? 
Witness: Yes. I am sure. 
Defence: You were rounding the bend and travelling at a reasonable speed and yet 
you were able to discern that the truck was on the wrong side of the road. 
Witness: Yes, that’s what I’m telling you. 
Defence: Mr White, if you saw the truck was on the wrong side of the road, why 
didn’t you warn your wife ? 
Witness: I don’t know. It happened very quickly. But I could see it definitely was on 
the wrong side of the road. (3)It was almost half way over onto our side of the road. 
Defence: Did your eyes remain on the road the whole time you were rounding the 
corner? 
Witness: Yes. 
Defence: Exactly what were you doing in between the time that you rounded the bend 
and the time that you first saw the truck? 
Witness:(7) I was watching the road. 
Defence: Mr White, your wife maintained her attention on the road the whole time 
while you were going around the corner ? 
Witness: Yes. 
Defence: Is it not possible that she was distracted by your children, and that her 
attention left the road for a few moments? 
W: No. 
Def: Mr White, I think that perhaps she was distracted and that out of your grief and 
loss, you needed to blame someone for your misfortune and that happens to be my 
client Mr Fitzpatrick. 
W: No that’s not true ! He caused the accident, his truck was on the wrong side of the 
road ! 
Def: No further questions Your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Spence, you may now address the jury with your closing statement. 
Pro: Thankyou Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, you have heard 
evidence today from two witnesses to the tragic event which occurred on April 14th 
1999 on Mount Barker Road. Mr Fitzpatrick may well have suffered as the result of 
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these events, however, the White family has suffered much more. The testimony of 
both Constable McNally and Mr White prove beyond reasonable doubt that, Mr 
Fitzpatrick drove in a manner that was dangerous to the public, that this was the result 
of carelessness due to inattention and the sum result of these actions was the death of 
Celia White. Both of these children will have to face a life without their mother, and a 
life of the memories of pain and suffering as a result of the accident. Little Kayla was 
trapped in the wreckage with her dying mother for half an hour. She could see her 
father and brother were out of the car and that they could not help her or her mother. 
This little girl has to bear these memories for the rest of her life. Mr White and his son 
will never forget watching Celia die. They will never forget the monumental 
helplessness, the frustration, the terrible loss. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, Mr 
Fitzpatrick’s suffering is insignificant by comparison to that of the White family. You 
have a duty to the Whites and to the public to find the defendant guilty of causing 
death by dangerous driving. The Whites must be given the understanding that our 
justice system is fair and the public must be given the understanding of how important 
careful attention on the road at all time really is. Thankyou for your attention Ladies 
and Gentlemen. 
Judge: Mr Warwick you may now address the jury with your closing statement. 
Def: Thankyou Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury. The prosecution has 
alleged that it was Mr Fitzpatrick’s truck on the wrong side of the road which caused 
the accident in question. We contend that the only reason the trailer ended up there 
was because of the driver’s need to swerve sharply and to brake to avoid the White’s 
car which had strayed on to the wrong side of the road. Ladies and Gentlemen I ask 
you to consider the eyewitness evidence upon which the Prosecution’s allegation is 
based. Mr White had to watch his wife die right in front of him and could not do 
anything to prevent this occurrence. Similarly, he had to watch his daughter in pain 
and bleeding as they waited for help to arrive. A situation cannot be more emotionally 
upsetting than this. Can you place your faith in the memory of a man who has 
experienced such events ? Can you believe that he is able to clearly remember what he 
saw prior to these events ? No, you cannot. The amount of stress that Mr White would 
have experienced is barely conceivable, and yet the prosecution asserts that Mr 
White’s memory would have been unaffected by this. Secondly, Ladies and 
Gentlemen, realise that when people lose those whom they love they often go through 
a period of grief that involves the need to blame someone for their lose. Mr White 
cannot face the possibility that his wife’s driving caused her own death and the injury 
of their children. This is easy to understand. However, as the guardians of justice, you 
the jury have the duty to up hold the law, no matter how much people have suffered 
and may continue to suffer. That is why you must find my client Mr Fitzpatrick not 
guilty of causing death by dangerous driving. That is all Your Honour. 
CONSISTENT NEUTRAL 
Judge: Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen, my name is Judge Stevenson. Today we 
are to hear in the Supreme Court the case of the Crown versus Mark Alexander 
Fitzpatrick. Mr Fitzpatrick is charged with causing grievous bodily harm by dangerous 
driving. Mr Spence, you are now invited to open the case for the prosecution. 
Prosecution : Thank you Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, my name is 
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Henry Spence, I am the prosecuting attorney in the case of the Crown vs Mark 
Alexander Fitzpatrick. You will hear eyewitness evidence today that proves beyond 
reasonable doubt that Mr Fitzpatrick is solely responsible for the injury caused to 
Celia White. The accident took place at approximately 10am on the 14th of April 1998 
on Mount Barker Road near Eagle on the Hill. Driving home from a visit with 
relatives, the family in their Corolla sedan rounded a left hand bend and were 
confronted with a large fuel tanker on the wrong side of the road. The driver panicked, 
swerved causing the trailer to jack-knife across the path of the oncoming car. The car 
hit the trailer on the driver’s side. Unfortunately, Celia White and her daughter were 
trapped in the twisted wreckage. They were trapped for 20 minutes. The mother 
sustained only a broken and gashed leg. Celia White’s husband and son were looking 
on. They could not help her. They had to stand back because there was fuel all over 
the road. The daughter was eventually rescued by the ‘jaws of life’. 
You will hear eyewitness evidence that proves that Mr Fitzpatrick drove his semitrailer 
in a manner that created potential danger to other people using the highway. 
This was solely and act of carelessness and inattention and an act that directly caused 
the death of Celia White. You, the jury, can deliver justice which by finding the 
defendant guilty of causing death by dangerous driving. Thank you Your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Warwick, you may now open the case for the defence. 
Defence; Thankyou Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, My name is 
Melvin Warwick, I am the attorney defending my client Mr Fitzpatrick in this case. 
The prosecution will allege on the basis of eyewitness testimony that my client was 
solely responsible for the injury which occurred when his truck collided with the 
eyewitness’ car on the morning of April 14th. Ladies and Gentlemen, I want you to 
first remember while listening to the eyewitness evidence that the eyewitness was 
actually in the car at the time of the accident which means that he may not have seen 
the things he alleges to have seen. Second, he and his young son had to watch his wife 
trapped in the wreckage of a car that was in imminent danger of bursting into flames. 
This is bound to cause feelings of helplessness and perhaps a strong need to blame 
someone. While not in any way meaning to deny the adverse nature of the events that 
occurred on that day, I have to emphasise that Mr White is not an impartial witness 
who has the benefit of objectivity. Finally, at the time of the accident he must have 
been under a great deal of stress and this most likely affected his ability to recall the 
details of an event. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is our case that it was the witness’s car 
which crossed over the double white lines that morning causing Mr Fitzpatrick to 
swerve and his trailer to jack-knife across the road and into the witness’ car. Finally, 
Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask you to consider the suffering of the truck’s driver Mr 
Fitzpatrick. He walked away physically unarmed from the accident. However, 
psychologically he is distraught. He knows that he could not have avoided the 
accident, but he still blames himself despite the physical evidence which proves his 
innocence. Ladies and Gentlemen, in considering the evidence remember that the 
Crown bears the burden of proof. They must prove beyond reasonable doubt that my 
client drove in a manner dangerous to the public, that this was the result of 
carelessness and further that this action was the sole cause of the death that resulted 
from the collision. You can deliver justice and ease Mr Fitzpatrick’s suffering by 
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delivering a not guilty verdict in accordance with the truth. Thankyou Your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Spence, please call your first witness. 
Prosecution: Thankyou Your Honour. The Crown calls Police Constable Roger 
McNally to the stand. {Pause} Mr McNally, My name is Henry Spence, I am the 
prosecuting Attorney. I would like to ask you some questions about the accident 
which took place on Mount Barker Road, near Eagle on the Hill, on the morning of 
April 14th 1998. We are keen to establish the truth so please answer where appropriate 
with either, I don’t know, I ‘m not sure or I am sure. 
Police Constable: Yes, I will. 
Prosecution: You were the investigating officer when this accident occurred ? 
Police Constable: Yes, that is correct. 
Prosecution: Can you describe for the jury the position of the vehicles when you 
arrived at the scene of the accident that morning. 
Police Constable: Certainly. The semi-trailer was blocking the whole road. The cabin 
was in the middle of the down track with its trailer perpendicular to the cabin 
obstructing the rest of the down track and extending all the way across the up track. 
The truck had been travelling down Mount Barker Road away from Eagle on the Hill 
and the car had been travelling up. (1)The car had impacted the trailer about half way 
along its right side. There wasn’t much left of the car, the motor had been pushed back 
to the center console. The car had hit mostly on the driver’s side. The car was 
completely caved in on the driver’s side. I arrived on the scene before the ambulance. 
The woman was pinned in the driver’s seat. The mother was in obvious pain. She was 
bleeding profusely. The father and son who had managed to get out of the vehicle 
were yelling at me to get them out of the wreckage. I couldn’t do anything because of 
the risk of the fuel around the car igniting and causing an explosion …I tried to move 
them away from the car, they wouldn’t leave the rest of their family trapped….we just 
had to wait…Mr Spence, I was so surprised that they all managed to make it out alive. 
When I got there and saw the damage to the car I was amazed that they hadn’t all been 
killed. 
Prosecution: Mr McNally……Was there any evidence that either of the vehicles had 
taken evasive action, such as breaking or swerving before impact ? 
Police Constable: (2) Yes, there were wide skid marks from the truck trailer skewing 
sideways which were 28 meters in length and from the truck going in a direction 
perpendicular to those of the truck which were a 2 meters longer. There were no skid 
marks from the car. 
Prosecution: From the length of the skid marks, the damage caused upon impact and 
the position of the vehicles, can any estimates about the speed of the truck and car be 
made. 
Police Constable: It is difficult to determine. However, it appears that the car may 
have been travelling at about 32 km/hour and the truck at about 50. 
Prosecution: Mr McNally, what causes a trailer to jack-knife or begin to push the 
cabin of a truck along ? 
Police Constable; There are several different causes for a trailer to jack-knife. It can be 
caused by incorrect tyre pressure, insufficient or too heavy loads, under gear out of 
alignment or worn steering or other faults in old vehicles. 
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Prosecution: In your opinion was the jack-knife of the truck trailer caused by any of 
the problems that you just mentioned ? 
Police Constable; No. We checked the vehicle thoroughly. It was in good condition 
mechanically. 
Prosecution: What in your opinion, was the cause of the collision? 
Police Constable: The truck obviously swerved to it’s left and braked heavily. This 
caused the trailer to jack-knife and the car ran into the trailer. I can not speculate on 
the reason why the driver of the truck had to brake. 
Prosecution: Is it possible Mr McNally, that the driver swerved and braked because he 
suddenly realised he was on the wrong side of the road ? 
Police Constable: Yes it is possible. 
Prosecution: Thankyou Mr McNally. No further questions Your honour. 
Judge: Mr Warwick, you may now cross examine the witness. 
Defence: Good morning Mr McNally. My name is Melvin Warwick, I am defending 
my client Mr Fitzpatrick the driver of the semi-trailer. Mr McNally, you stated to my 
learned friend Mr Spence, that there are several reasons for a trailer to jack-knife in 
the manner you described. 
Police Constable: Yes. 
Defence: Is it not equally possible that the driver of the truck, my client, may have 
braked and swerved to avoid a collision when he saw the car driven by Celia White 
on the wrong side of the road ? 
Police Constable: Yes it is possible. As I said before, the trailer jack-knifed because 
the truck braked heavily and swerved to it’s left. I can only speculate on the reasons 
why the truck braked in the first place. I can only tell you that the trailer moved to the 
other side of the road because of the braking and swerving. 
Def: Thankyou Mr McNally. No further questions Your Honour. 
* 
Judge: Mr Spence, you may now call your second witness to the stand. 
Prosecution: Thankyou Your Honour. The Crown calls James White to the stand. 
Goodmorning Mr White, my name is Henry Spence, I am the prosecuting attorney, I 
would like to ask you some questions about the accident which took place on Mount 
Barker Road at Eagle on the Hill, Monday the 14th of April 1998. Mr White it is 
essential for the carriage of justice that the jury have a good understanding of the 
events leading up to the accident. We are keen to establish the truth so please answer 
where appropriate with either, I don’t know, I’m not sure or I am sure. 
Witness: Yes I will. 
Prosecution: Would you state your full name please. 
Witness: James Phillip White. 
Prosecution: What is your full home address. 
Witness: 20 Druids Avenue, Mount Barker, South Australia. 
Prosecution: At approximately 10am on Monday the 14th of April 1998 were you a 
passenger in the vehicle travelling along Mount Barker road , which was 
subsequently involved in the accident in question? 
Witness: Yes, I was. 
Prosecution: Why was the vehicle in which you were a passenger travelling along 
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Mount Barker Road on the morning of the accident ? 
Witness: My family and I were returning from a visit with my parents at Clarence 
Gardens in Adelaide. 
Prosecution: Who was in the car with you ? 
Witness: My wife Celia, who was driving, and our children Kayla and Jarrod. 
Prosecution: Had Celia, your wife, had any accidents prior to the one that occurred 
that morning ? 
Witness: No. Celia had an impeccable driving record. 
Prosecution: Did Celia have any impairments or disabilities which may have reduced 
her ability to drive ? 
Witness: No, she did not. 
Prosecution: Was Celia tired, stressed or distracted on the day while she was driving 
the vehicle ? 
Witness: No she was not. 
Prosecution: Were the children distracting her at any point during the trip ? 
Witness: No. 
Prosecution: Are you sure Mr White, children can sometimes find it difficult to 
behave on long trips ? 
Witness: The children were being well behaved, talking to each other in the back. 
Celia’s attention was on the road the whole time. 
Prosecution: Do you have any problems with your eyes Mr White ? 
Witness: No 
Prosecution: When was the last time you had your eyes checked ? 
Witness: About 3 months ago. We get them checked regularly because of the type of 
work I do. 
Prosecution: Mr White, can you tell the court in detail, what you were doing 5 minutes 
prior to the accident. 
Witness: Well, as I said before, we were returning home from a visit to my parent’s 
place in Adelaide. We were driving up Mount Barker Road… 
Prosecution: Mr White, what exactly was going on in the car at this point ? 
Witness: We were talking to the kids about what they had been doing at Grandma’s 
place. 
Prosecution: When did you first notice the truck ? 
Witness: (4)When we rounded the left hand bend just before where the accident 
happened. You couldn’t see around the corner because at that point the road is actually 
bending around the steep hill on the left. 
Prosecution: When you first saw the truck, where in relation to your car, was it located 
? 
Witness: It was directly in front of us, a little to the left of the center of our car. 
Prosecution: Was the truck over the double white lines on the road? 
Witness: Yes. 
Prosecution: In your estimation, how far over the white lines ? 
Witness: At least 3 meters. About from here to the jury away. (3) It was almost half 
the way over on our side of the road. So far over that we couldn’t have swerved 
around it, there simply wasn’t room. 
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Prosecution: Did the truck appear to swerve or deviate from it’s course at any time 
prior to impact, Mr White ? 
Witness: Yes, it did. I remember that Celia had time to flash the lights a couple of 
times… (5)it swerved to our right (3). 
Prosecution: At what speed were you travelling ? 
Witness: I reckon it was only about 40km/h. We had slowed down to take the corner. 
Prosecution: At what speed in your estimation was the truck travelling ? 
Witness: It must have been over 60km/h. We had slowed down, it came towards us 
very quickly. (5) 
Prosecution: Did the truck appear to slow down or brake at any point ? 
Witness: (2) It did brake. As I said it happened very quickly. There was this petrol 
truck, or Ampol truck and the trailer across the road coming straight for us and…. It 
was very quick. There was no way Celia could have avoided it. 
Prosecution: Which side of the trailer did your car hit ? 
Witness: (1) We hit on the trailer’s right side. 
Prosecution: Is there anything else that you think is important to tell the court Mr 
White ? 
Witness: Yes, I’d just like the jury to know that Celia was always a good driver. 
Prosecution: No further questions Your Honour. 
* 
Judge: Thankyou Mr Spence. Mr Warwick, you may now cross-examine the witness. 
Defence: Thankyou Your Honour. Good morning Mr White. My name is Melvin 
Warwick and I am the attorney for the defence in this case. I have some questions to 
ask you about the accident which took place on Mount Barker Road in which you 
were involved. The justice system demands that the jury have a clear picture of these 
events, so please answer the questions as accurately as possible. {Pause} At what 
point did you think you saw the truck on the wrong side of the road ? 
Witness: (4)When we rounded the bend, just before the accident happened. As I said 
before, it was a blind corner which you couldn’t see around because of the hill. When 
we rounded the bend I could see that it was on the wrong side of the road. I could see 
the (6) paint of the Ampol symbol. 
Defence: And you are sure you could tell that the truck was on the wrong side of the 
road ? 
Witness: Yes. I am sure. 
Defence: You were rounding the bend and travelling at a reasonable speed and yet 
you are sure were able to discern that the truck was on the wrong side of the road ? 
Witness: Yes, that’s what I’m telling you. 
Defence: Mr White, if you saw the truck was on the wrong side of the road why didn’t 
you warn your wife ? 
Witness: I don’t know. It happened very quickly. But I could see it definitely was on 
the wrong side of the road. (3)It was almost half way over onto our side of the road. 
Defence: Did your eyes remain on the road the whole time you were rounding the 
corner? 
Witness: Yes. 
Defence: Exactly what were you doing in between time that you rounded the bend and 
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the time that you saw the truck? 
Witness:(7) I was watching the road. 
Defence: Mr White, your wife maintained her attention on the road the whole time 
while you were going around the corner? 
Witness: Yes. 
Defence: Is it not possible that she was distracted by your children, and that her 
attention left the road for a few moments ? 
W: No. 
Def: Mr White, I think that perhaps she was distracted and that out of your anger, you 
needed to blame someone for your misfortune and that happens to be my client Mr 
Fitzpatrick. 
W: No that’s not true ! He caused the accident, his truck was on the wrong side of the 
road ! 
Def: No further questions Your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Spence, you may now address the jury with your closing statement. 
Pro: Thankyou Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, you have heard 
evidence today from two witnesses to the accident which occurred on April 14th 1999 
on Mount Barker Road. Mr Fitzpatrick may well have suffered as the result of these 
events, however, the White family has suffered much more. The testimony of both 
Constable McNally and Mr White prove beyond reasonable doubt that, Mr Fitzpatrick 
drove in a manner that was dangerous to the public, that this was the result of 
carelessness due to inattention and the sum result of these actions was the death of 
Celia White. Celia was trapped in the wreckage for 20 minutes and could see her 
husband and son were out of the car and that they could not help her. Ladies and 
Gentlemen of the jury, Mr Fitzpatrick’s suffering is insignificant by comparison to 
that of the White family. You have a duty to the Whites and to the public to find the 
defendant guilty of causing death by dangerous driving. The Whites must be given the 
understanding that our justice system is fair and the public must be given the 
understanding of how important careful attention on the road at all time really is. 
Thankyou for your attention Ladies and Gentlemen. 
Judge: Mr Warwick you may now address the jury with your closing statement. 
Def: Thankyou Your Honour. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury. The prosecution has 
alleged that it was Mr Fitzpatrick’s truck on the wrong side of the road which caused 
the accident in question. We contend that the only reason the trailer ended up there 
was because of the driver’s need to swerve sharply and to brake to avoid the White’s 
car which had strayed on to the wrong side of the road. Ladies and Gentlemen I ask 
you to consider the eyewitness evidence upon which the Prosecution’s allegation is 
based. Mr White had to watch his wife’s life in danger right in front of him and could 
not do anything as they waited for help to arrive. A situation like this can be 
emotionally upsetting. Can you place your faith in the memory of a man who has 
experienced such events ? Can you believe that he is able to clearly remember what he 
saw prior to these events ? No, you cannot. The amount of stress that Mr White would 
have experienced is substantial, and yet the prosecution asserts that Mr White’s 
memory would have been unaffected by this. Secondly, Ladies and Gentlemen, realise 
that when people see those whom they know killed they often need to blame someone. 
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Mr White cannot face the possibility that his wife’s driving caused her own death. 
This is easy to understand. However, as the guardians of justice, you the jury have the 
duty to up hold the law, no matter how much people have suffered and may continue 
to suffer. That is why you must find my client Mr Fitzpatrick not guilty of causing 
death by dangerous driving. That is all Your Honour. 
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APPENDIX C 
Study One Data Reduction Procedures 
Step One: Raw Data 
 At the conclusion of data collection, the final data file included 264 total entries, 
or one separate entry for each discrete time Study One was accessed and begun.    Of 
these 264 entries, 147 were complete, having accessed every page of the study website.  
To be clear, these are not total numbers of distinct participants, but rather all separate 
instances of data recordings initiated each time the study was started.   
Step Two: Eliminating Repeat Starters 
 Despite repeated admonitions and stern warnings to the contrary, some 
participants in online studies nevertheless begin the study and then quit partway through 
completion, only to return at a later time to complete the study in full.  Because the 
objective of Study One is to determine the relative ease or rate of detecting each 
testimonial inconsistency in comparison to the other inconsistencies present in the trial 
transcript, I eliminated those participants who were exposed to the trial transcript to any 
extent prior to the session in which they completed the study.  For example, a participant 
who read along through the end of all plaintiff’s witnesses but quit the study before the 
defense presented its case, only to return two days later to restart the study (the website 
required participants to start over if their browser window closed at any point) and 
completed it during that second session would have been exposed to the inconsistent 
information two full times.  This obviously gives that repeat participant a greater 
opportunity to detect the inconsistencies compared to a participant who was only exposed 
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to the critical information once, so I eliminated all data associated with those participants 
who accessed the study on more than one occasion.  However, for any participants who 
completed the study the first time they accessed it, but who may have started it again, I 
simply eliminated all data associated with any subsequent attempts since their first 
exposure was untainted. 
 After eliminating the data associated with any participants who had been pre-
exposed to the trial transcript, 161 separate data entries remained. 
Step Three: Eliminating Inattentive Participants 
 Because online data collection allows participants to complete the study at the 
time and place of their choosing, it tends to be more popular with the FIU participant 
pool than in-person studies which require participants to be in a specific time and place to 
participate.  While this flexibility benefits participants and the concomitant popularity 
benefits researchers with faster data collection (as well as requiring less time to input and 
code data), the tradeoff for researchers is the lack of control over the environment in 
which participants complete the study.  Without the presence of a supervising researcher, 
some participants may choose to complete online studies without actually paying 
attention or engaging in anything resembling legitimate, earnest effort.   To combat this 
problem (or at least prevent it from tainting my data), I included two questions intended 
to confirm that the participant was in fact paying at least some minimum degree of 
attention to the questions they were answering.  The first, presented in random order 
among the Multiple Choice questions, was 
There are lots of witnesses and lots of evidence in trials.  Sometimes testimony is consistent, sometimes it’s 
contradictory, sometimes different witnesses disagree, and sometimes accounts vary. 
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Please mark all possible answers for the following question, even those which are contradictory to each 
other. 
  
These questions are designed to test your memory for the information in the trial testimony, not your 
personal opinion on what actually happened or what is correct.  How you answer these questions should not 
depend on which witnesses you believe to have been accurate or those you believe to have been 
inaccurate—just the content of the testimony itself. 
  
Again, you may choose more than one answer. 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
Thank you for participating in this study.  To ensure that you are paying attention to the questions, please 
mark A for this question.   
 A. He put the car into reverse 
 B. He stopped the car 
 C. He turned sharply to his right 
 D. He pulled the emergency brake 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
The second, presented in random order among the True/False questions, was 
There are lots of witnesses and lots of evidence in trials.  Sometimes testimony is consistent, sometimes it’s 
contradictory, sometimes different witnesses disagree, and sometimes accounts vary. 
  
These True or False questions are designed to test your memory for the information in the trial testimony, 
not your personal opinion on what actually happened or what is correct.  
  
How you answer these questions should not depend on which witnesses you believe to have been accurate 
or those you believe to have been inaccurate—just the content of the testimony itself. 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
  
Thank you for your continued attention and hard work.  The study is almost over, so please mark this 
answer true so that we will know that you’re still paying attention. 
 True 
 False 
 I don't know 
 
I eliminated all nine participants who failed to answer one or both of these questions as 
directed, leaving 152 remaining sets of data. 
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Step Four: Eliminating Partial Participants 
 Steps Three and Four could have been performed in interchangeable order with no 
consequence, but I expressly refrained from eliminating the participants who did not 
complete the study at the start of the data reduction process because doing so would have 
prevented me from having the ability to identify those participants who began the study 
and were exposed to some or all of the trial transcript and quit partway through, only to 
restart and complete the study at a later time—and with an improper degree of exposure 
to the trial transcript and inconsistent testimony.  It is only after this step that the 
remaining data entries can properly be called “participants.”  Of the 152 data entries 
remaining before this step, only 114 participants completed the entire study.   
Step Five: Eliminating Extreme Outliers of Total Time Spent 
 Due to the fact that individual differences in reading speed, attention to detail, and 
overall thoughtfulness and thoroughness of answering the battery of questions designed 
to measure inconsistency detections (including 36 Open Ended and Short Answer 
questions with no restriction on response length), and I had estimated that most 
participants should be able to complete the entire study in approximately 90 to 120 
minutes, I defined an extreme outlier as any participant who required greater than twice 
that duration to complete the study.  Because some participants would load the first page 
of the study (the Informed Consent page) and then wait (sometimes minutes, hours, or 
even days) before actually indicating their consent and beginning the study, to prevent 
this practice from skewing the calculations of total time spent, I calculated the total 
duration by subtracting the time participants loaded the second page (immediately after 
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submitting the Informed Consent page) from the time the last page of the study was 
submitted. 
 Eight participants were identified as extreme outliers ranging from 242.21 
minutes spent to 1060.01 minutes spent (M = 577.04, SD = 306.90) and eliminated from 
further analysis, leaving a total of 106 participants. 
Step Six: Eliminating Outliers of Total Time Spent 
 After eliminating those extreme outliers which would skew the overall 
distribution, I calculated the distribution for the remaining 106 participants, resulting in 
the elimination of those six participants whose total time spent was in excess of two 
standard deviations above the mean, or greater than 179.30 minutes (M = 113.17, SD = 
33.06).  There were no participants who completed the study in less time than two 
standard deviations below the mean. 
 The resulting data set (n = 100) to be used in Study One included participants who 
spent between 72.11 and 176.91 minutes (M = 107.36, SD = 23.53). 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Study One Trial Transcript (15 Inconsistencies) 
 
NOTE: Highlighted phrases (e.g. PI-Plain Inconsistency, S&B-Inconsistency used in 
Semmler & Brewer [2002], etc.) denote details of testimony relevant to the 15 
inconsistencies, and are only marked here for ease of identification.  This emphasis was 
not included in the actual materials used. 
 
 
Johnson v. McGraw   
 
The following trial transcript is an abridged version of a real trial from here in the state of 
Florida.  The trial, which has already taken place, and for which the jury has already 
rendered a verdict, involved a traffic accident which resulted in injury to the plaintiff, 
Amanda Johnson, an injury she alleged was the result of negligence on behalf of the 
defendant, Michael McGraw.  Although the circumstances of the accident involved 
multiple parties, Michael McGraw was the only defendant in this case. 
 
While the names of all parties have been changed, one of the attorneys has asked FIU 
researchers to conduct this study to see how real people like you perceive the case so that 
they can determine whether to appeal the outcome of the trial.  We will be using the data 
from this study to help the attorney, so please pay close attention as it will impact the 
final resolution of an actual civil case. 
 
Please listen to the trial transcript and read along as if you had been chosen to serve as a 
juror in this case. 
 
~~~~~ 
Judge Robert C. Underwood: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are about to hear 
testimony concerning an automobile accident that occurred in the late afternoon of 
Tuesday, July 8th, 2008 in the city of Clermont, located in Lake County, Florida.  The 
plaintiff is Amanda Johnson, and the defendant is Michael McGraw.  There are no other 
plaintiffs or defendants in this suit, and all other disputes between these and any other 
parties related to the events in question have been resolved separately prior to this 
proceeding.   
 
~~~~~  
Opening Statement by Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff:  Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, what we have 
before us today is an unfortunate story of a young lady who was simply going about her 
business one day, on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008, up in Clermont, which is in 
central Florida to the west of Orlando.  This young lady, Amanda Johnson, was at the 
time a 26 year old waitress at a family restaurant.  She was riding in the car with her 
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boyfriend, Brock Collins, a 28 year old middle school teacher.  They were in his blue 
Toyota Camry (PI 5-Model true)on their way to catch a movie before meeting up with 
Amanda’s parents for dinner later that night.  Unfortunately, their plans were dashed by 
the negligence of another driver on the road that evening, Michael McGraw. 
 
Throughout this case, you are going to hear overwhelming evidence from a variety of 
witnesses—Amanda Johnson, Brock Collins, a host of different eyewitnesses to the 
accident, the emergency first responders on the scene, medical professionals, as well as 
professional scientists who specialize in the analysis of vehicles and crash scenes which 
they use to reconstruct accidents.  The testimony of all these witnesses will show you, 
with no uncertainty whatsoever, that Mr. McGraw, and only Mr. McGraw—not Mr. 
Collins, not the driver of the semi truck, not anybody else and not anything else other 
than Mr. McGraw’s negligent operation of his big, white (PI 10 color true) van—was the 
direct cause of Amanda Johnson’s serious injury. I hope that you find him liable for all 
damages suffered by Ms. Johnson at his hand.  Thank you very much for your time, 
service, and attention today. 
 
~~~~~ 
Opening Statement by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant:  Esteemed members of the jury—like my 
colleague, I thank you in advance for your attention, effort, and diligent fulfillment of 
your civic duty.  What we can all agree on is that you are here today to hear about a 
traffic accident that injured a nice young lady and her boyfriend.  Everybody wishes that 
this accident hadn’t happened, but not everybody agrees about how it happened or how 
Ms. Johnson ended up being hurt. 
 
Ms. Johnson and her attorney would like for you to believe that her broken hip and other 
injuries are the result of negligence on the part of Mr. McGraw.  Now it’s certainly true 
that Mr. McGraw, while trying to avoid the out of control semi tractor trailer coming 
towards him, ended up hitting Mr. Collins’s car.  What we’re less certain about is how 
Ms. Johnson was injured.  You see, Ms. Johnson wasn’t wearing her seat belt, and we’ll 
be presenting evidence to you that will show that Ms. Johnson wasn’t injured because 
Mr. McGraw hit their car, but that she was injured when the car ran into the street lamp, 
and that if she had been wearing a seat belt, she wouldn’t have broken her hip. 
 
Ms. Johnson and her attorney would like for you to believe that her injuries are the fault 
of Mr. McGraw, but through the course of this trial, you will soon see that they don’t 
have any real evidence to support this allegation. Because they can’t show that the 
majority of the evidence undoubtedly proves that Mr. McGraw was the cause of Ms. 
Johnson’s injuries, you will come to the conclusion that Michael McGraw was not 
negligent, was not the direct cause of Amanda’s broken hip, and that he should not be 
held liable for her injuries and you should render a verdict in favor of the defendant. 
~~~~~ 
 
 248 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Marc Zollinger, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Can you please state your name and 
occupation for the court? 
 
Marc Zollinger (Answerer):  My name is Marc Zollinger, and I’m an administrative 
assistant for Universal Translation Corporation. 
 
Q:  And where is your office located? 
 
A:  It’s on Foothill Drive, pretty close to the intersection of Foothill and Windsor, a little 
south of there, on the east side, or I guess northeast side of the road at that point, down by 
the bend. 
 
Q:  Tell me, Mr. Zollinger, what were you doing on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 
2008?  
 
A:  I needed some fresh air, so I went to the little walk-up coffee window a few doors 
down from our office, the one on the north side of the Cuban restaurant there. 
 
Q:  Okay.  And while you were there, did anything unusual happen? 
 
A:  As a matter of fact, yes.  While I was waiting in line, I was just standing around 
watching the cars go by when there was a big traffic accident behind me up the way a 
little bit at the corner. 
 
Q:  Up the way a little bit?  How far do you mean?  Help the jury to understand how 
close you were. 
 
A:  Oh, not that far really.  Probably a few hundred feet away, but I had a pretty clear 
view since it’s just the parking lot for the restaurant there to the north of the coffee 
window up to the corner. 
 
Q:  And can you tell us what you saw? 
 
A:  I saw a car, a van, and a tanker truck get into a wreck.  The tanker truck was kind of 
sideways, coming southbound towards the intersection and kind of weaving back and 
forth a little bit in the middle of the road.  I saw Mr. Collins’s car, a blue  Corvette (PI 5-
model false)make a left turn to go west on Windsor to get out of the way of the truck, but 
then Mr. McGraw’s white (PI 10 color true)Ford work van came screeching around, and 
then the semi locked up its brakes and the tires started squealing but the tanker trailer 
swung around and kind of batted Mr. McGraw’s van on the passenger side (PI 1/S&B 1 
true)which then bounced into the back of Mr. Collins’s car which then crashed into the 
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street light (PI 12 true) on the northwest corner of the intersection.  It was like one big 
chain reaction.  They almost hit some lady walking a Dachshund. (PI 13 false) 
 
Q:  And what happened next? 
 
A:  I saw the guy with the black hair (PI 7 true), Mr. McGraw, get out of his van to make 
sure everyone in Mr. Collins’s car was okay or something.  I couldn’t hear what they 
were saying or anything, but right away Mr. McGraw got on his phone, I guess to call 
911.  After a minute or two, Mr. Collins, the bald one, got out of the car and went around 
to the passenger side and was talking to someone in the passenger seat.  He looked pretty 
worried based on all his movements and body language. 
 
Q:  And then what? 
 
A:  I placed my order, and by the time I got my coffee I could see that a police car was 
already on the scene (PI 8 true)so I grabbed my coffee and went over to tell him what I 
saw.  I told him exactly how it happened, and he wrote it all down.  The officer’s name 
was Christopher Eaton. (PI 14 true)  He was a really big guy. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Zollinger.  No further questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Marc Zollinger, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for 
the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Could you describe for us in 
just a little more detail exactly what happened after all the vehicles came to a stop? 
 
Marc Zollinger (Answerer):  Sure.  Mr. McGraw got out of the white (PI 10 color 
true)van pretty quickly and immediately ran over to Mr. Collins’s blue  Corvette, (PI 5-
model false) over to the driver’s side.  I couldn’t hear them, of course, but it looked to me 
like he was making sure everyone was okay, and then shortly after talking to Mr. Collins, 
McGraw got his cell phone out of his pocket and made a call.  A minute or two later, the 
police officer arrived, then I went over and told him (PI 14 true)what I saw, and then I 
went back to work. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Zollinger.  I have nothing further. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Barbara Feldman, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Hello there.  Could you please state 
your name and occupation for the record? 
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Barbara Feldman (Answerer):  My name is Barbara Feldman, and I am a librarian. 
 
Q:  Thank you Ms. Feldman.  Now you’re familiar with the day in question here in this 
trial, right? 
 
A:  Yes I am.   
 
Q:  And did you witness the accident at issue here? 
 
A:  Yes I did.  I remember it all quite vividly.  I was driving southbound on Foothill 
Drive, north of the intersection with Windsor. 
 
Q:  And could you please describe for us what you saw? 
 
A:  Sure.  As I was driving, up ahead I noticed a Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) oil tanker trailer 
crossing over the line separating the two directions of traffic, kind of skidding its tires 
and fishtailing around.  The stop light (PI 15 true) ahead of us was green, so I’m not sure 
what the deal was.  It’s not like he was slamming on his brakes to keep from running the 
light (PI 15 true) or anything.  It was also driving southbound like I was, so I slowed 
down to stay away from the situation.  It was all over the place in the left turn lane in the 
middle, going back and forth into the oncoming lanes of traffic and stuff. 
 
Q:  And what happened next? 
 
A:  Well, the truck’s trailer sort of swung out into the intersection, where it hit Mr. 
McGraw’s tan van, (PI 10 color False)  kind of side swiping it and kind of just smacking 
it on the passenger side, which forced the van into the back side of Mr. Collins’s 
blueToyota Camry (PI 5-model true), which then crashed into a light pole (PI 12 true)on 
the northeast corner of the intersection. 
 
Q:  Okay, and what about after the accident? 
 
A:  I just stayed around until the police officer arrived, and once she (PI 14 false) got 
there, I gave her (PI 14 false) my statement and my contact information, and then I left to 
go home. 
 
Q:  Thank you Ms. Feldman.  I have no more questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Barbara Feldman, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for 
the Defendant 
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Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant:  I have no questions for this witness, your 
Honor. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Jill Randall, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Could you please give us your name 
and occupation? 
 
Jill Randall (Answerer):  My name is Jill Randall, and I sell Amway products from my 
home here in Clermont. 
 
Q:  Now could you please tell us about what you saw on Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  I was waiting for my turn at the four-way stop (PI 15 false) at the intersection in order 
to to cross Foothill heading west, and there was a semi truck that came out of nowhere 
from the north, skidding and screeching and swerving all over the place out of control. 
 
Q:  That must have been pretty scary.  Can you tell us more about the truck and what 
happened? 
 
A:  Well, I saw the truck blow the stop sign (PI 15 false) going through the intersection 
kind of in the middle of the southbound and northbound lanes, and he was fishtailing a 
little bit, you know, the cab of the truck going in one direction while the trailer was 
slipping and sliding around behind him in another direction.  The truck swerved towards 
me, to the east, to the driver’s left, past me as it came through the intersection.  (PI 
3/S&B 3 true) As the truck was getting itself under control, I could tell that there was 
some sort of additional accident on the opposite side of the trailer involving some other 
vehicles, but since I was on the east side of the trailer and that was all happening on the 
west side, I really couldn’t see too much about what exactly happened. 
 
Q:  Okay, so you weren’t able to see much of the actual contact between the vehicles? 
 
A:  Well, no, not of the actual contact when it was happening, but after everything came 
to a stop, I was able to see that the white (PI 10 color true)van driven by Mr. McGraw 
had crashed into the back of the other car, the one driven by Mr. Collins, the blue Toyota 
Camry, (PI 5-model true) and Mr. Collins’s car was up against the street lamp(PI 12 
true).  It looked like it had pretty much hit the lamppost (PI 12 true)head on, and Mr. 
McGraw’s van was stopped behind it, and it was all banged up on the passenger side. (PI 
1/S&B 1 true) 
 
Q:  Well it sounds like you got a good look at the aftermath of the accident.  What 
happened after everything came to rest? 
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A:  The red-haired man (PI 7 false), Mr. McGraw got out of his van pretty quickly and 
went to go check on the people in Mr. Collins’s car.  He was talking to Mr. Collins for a 
minute, and then he got out his phone and made a call, I assume to 911.  Mr. Collins got 
out of his car eventually, and when the police officer arrived a minute or two later, he (PI 
14 true) was a real hunk, so I hung around and gave him my statement once the 
paramedics got there to take over (PI 8 true) making sure everyone got the medical 
attention they needed. 
 
Q:  We appreciate your testimony here today, Ms. Randall.  No further questions. 
 
Judge Robert C. Underwood:  Your witness, Mr. Kurtz. 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Jill Randall, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  So Ms. Randall, you weren’t 
able to describe exactly what happened during the wreck itself because the trailer from 
the tanker truck was blocking your view, is that right? 
 
Jill Randall (Answerer):  That’s right.  I saw the beginning and I saw the aftermath, but I 
didn’t see the actual accident between Mr. McGraw and Mr. Collins, no. 
 
Q:  I see.  Thank you very much, Ms. Randall.  I don’t have any more questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Steve Powell, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Could you please give your name and 
occupation for the record? 
 
Steve Powell (Answerer):  My name is Steve Powell, and I’m a real estate agent here in 
Clermont. 
 
Q:  And where were you on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  I was at the post office located there on the east side of Foothill Drive, a little ways up 
from, I mean north of, the intersection with Windsor Road. 
   
Q:  Okay.  And did you see anything unusual at the post office? 
 
A:  Well, just as I was leaving, I was looking out the window and I saw a Shell (PI 
4/S&B 6 true) tanker truck go skidding down the street past the post office. 
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Q:  Down Foothill you say? 
 
A:  Yeah, it was traveling south but kind of screeching and sliding out of control. 
 
Q:  And what did you see after that? 
 
A:  Well, I didn’t really see exactly what happened next.  I was walking out of the 
building and didn’t have a constant, uninterrupted view so I missed the actual crash, but 
after I got outside, I saw the whole accident scene with the tanker truck stopped at a 
funny angle over on the east side of Foothill on Windsor, and the van and the car over on 
the corner by the Zales(PI 11 true) jewelry store.  The guy with the black hair (PI 7 true), 
Mr. McGraw, was standing outside the vehicles.  There were a couple of people in the 
car, the blue Camry, (PI 5-model true) and they looked kind of hurt.   
 
Q: How so? 
 
A: The bald guy, Mr. Collins, had some cuts and stuff on his forehead and he was 
bleeding a little bit, but the lady in the passenger seat was much worse.  It was kind of 
hard to see exactly how she was hurt, but it was clear she was pretty banged up. 
 
Q: And can you tell us what happened next? 
 
A: I had an important meeting I had to get to a little later on that afternoon so I didn’t 
have time to stick around, and I don’t know how I could have helped anyway, but as I 
was starting to walk back to my car, the bald guy, Mr. Collins, was out of his car and the 
ambulance showed up (PI 8 false) so I figured it would be okay now that there was an 
official emergency responder on the scene.  Right as I got to my car, which was parked 
over in the lot north of the coffee shop on the southeast corner of the intersection, I saw a 
police officer arrive next (PI 8 false), so I figured I might as well go over to him (PI 14 
true) and tell him what I had seen before I left to go to my meeting.  As I was giving 
Officer Eaton my statement, I could see the paramedics getting Ms. Johnson out of the 
car and loading her into the ambulance.  It was at that time that I could see that her left 
leg (PI 6 false) was all mangled and busted up. 
 
Q:  Thank you for your time, Mr. Powell.  I don’t have any more questions for you. 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Steve Powell, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Mr. Powell, you were inside the 
post office when the actual accident occurred, and were unable to see exactly what 
happened at the intersection, is that right? 
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Steve Powell (Answerer):  Yeah, I just saw the Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) truck go past the 
window out of control, but no, I couldn’t see the intersection or anything that far down 
from where I was. 
 
Q:  So you don’t have any idea exactly how any of the different vehicles crashed into 
each other, or the exact moment in which Ms. Johnson might have been hurt, or how she 
was hurt, or anything specific like that, correct? 
 
A:  That’s correct.  I just saw the truck go by and then by the time I was outside, I saw the 
wreckage and stuff where it had all come to rest. 
 
Q:  So basically everything at issue here happened when you couldn’t see it? 
 
A:  Well I did see two men, Mr. Collins and Mr. McGraw outside talking to each other 
when the ambulance arrived at the time I was walking across Windsor, and then by the 
time I got to my car, I saw the police had just arrived too. (PI 8 false) 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Powell.  No further questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Lesley Jobin, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Hello there, could you please tell us 
your name, occupation, and city of residence for the record? 
 
Lesley Jobin (Answerer):  My name is Lesley Jobin, I’m a tour group coordinator, and I 
live here in Clermont. 
 
Q:  And what were you doing on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  Well, since there’s really no slow days at my company because of all the visitors to 
the area and different tourist attractions and stuff in and around Orlando, we’re open 
seven days a week, and I’m off on Mondays and Tuesdays each week.  That was a 
Tuesday, and I was out walking Finnegan, my German Shepherd. (PI 13 true) 
 
Q:  And can you tell us a little more about your walk with Finnegan that day? 
 
A:  Sure.  I was walking west along Windsor Road, having just crossed Foothill. I was 
passing in front of the Jared jewelry store (PI 11 false) there at the corner, when the crash 
happened. 
 
Q:  So can you tell us what you saw? 
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A:  Well, I saw the Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) truck fishtailing out of control, well, I guess 
there isn’t any way for a truck to fishtail but still be under control, but anyway, it was sort 
of sliding out toward its right side, and then it kind of smacked the side of the white (PI 
10 color true)van, and that’s when the van crashed into the back of the blue Toyota 
Camry, (PI 5-model true) which then ran straight into a tree (PI 12 false) on the corner in 
front of Jared(PI 11 false). 
 
Q:  Were you able to see anything that happened inside of either of the vehicles? 
 
A:  Yeah, when Mr. McGraw first hit Mr. Collins’s car, I could see that both Mr. Collins 
and Ms. Johnson’s heads went flying forward into the windshield.  
 
Q:  Thank you Ms. Jobin.  I don’t have any more questions for you. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Lesley Jobin, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  So Ms. Jobin, you were out 
walking your German Shepherd, (PI 13 true) Finnegan, that afternoon, is that correct? 
 
Lesley Jobin (Answerer):  That’s right. 
 
Q:  And were you talking on the phone, or listening to music, or anything like that on 
your walk? 
 
A:  Well, I was listening to my iPod. 
 
Q:  Hmm.  Okay.  And you were walking west, passing the Zales(PI 11 true) store when 
you heard a crash and turned around to look, is that right? 
 
A:  Yeah, Finnegan and I were both really startled, and we ran backwards a little bit just 
as Mr. Collins’s car hit the tree. (PI 12 false) 
 
Q:  I see.  Thank you very much, Ms. Jobin. 
 
~~~~~ 
  
Plaintiff’s Witness Brock Collins, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner): Hello there, could you please state 
your name, occupation, and city of residence for the record? 
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Brock Collins (Answerer):  My name is Brock Collins, I’m a teacher at Windy Hill 
Middle School here in Clermont where I live. 
 
Q:  And just so we’re clear, what is your relationship with the plaintiff in this case, 
Amanda Johnson? 
 
A:  She’s my girlfriend.  We’ve been dating for a couple of years. 
 
Q:  And could you tell us a little bit about what happened on the afternoon of Tuesday, 
July 8th, 2008? 
  
A:  Well, Amanda and I were on our way to see a matinee before going out to dinner with 
her folks later on, when we got into a big wreck at the corner of Windsor and Foothill. 
 
Q:  Can you tell us about what you remember happening before the accident and how it 
all unfolded? 
 
A:  Well, I was driving my car, a blue 2006 (PI 9-year true)Toyota Camry (PI 5-model 
true)four door, northbound on Foothill Drive, and Amanda was in the passenger seat.  We 
were coming around the bend, right where Foothill goes from kind of east/west to 
north/south, and once I got around the bend approaching the intersection, we had the 
green light, (PI 15 true)and I saw a semi truck skidding out of control towards us.  
  
Q:  Sounds pretty scary.  Can you describe how you reacted to the situation and what 
happened next? 
 
A:  Yeah, it was really crazy to see a big truck barreling down on us like that.  It took me 
a second to figure out what to do because I couldn’t tell which way the truck was going to 
go or what was going to happen next.  I kind of slowly turned to my left, to go west on 
Windsor because I was pretty sure that the truck was going to end up going to my right, 
east on Windsor.  Once I could tell for sure that that’s where he was headed, I was able to 
pull out of his way just barely fast enough to miss the end of his tanker trailer whipping 
around the corner behind him.  It was a real relief to miss it, but the relief was very short 
lived. 
 
Q:  How so? 
 
A:  Well, the guy behind me in the white (PI 10 color true)Ford panel van wasn’t as 
lucky.  I guess he tried to get out of the way of the swinging trailer much the same way as 
I did, but he just ended up rear-ending us pretty much straight on, and our heads hit the 
windshield, and we then crashed into the street lamp (PI 12 true) on the northwest corner 
of the intersection, all pretty much at the same time as his van was getting hit by the 
trailer. I got dinged on the head pretty good but wasn’t that messed up, no permanent 
scars or damage or anything, but Amanda was really hurt badly. 
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Q:  She certainly was.  I’m really sorry you guys had to go through all of that.  Thank 
you, Mr. Collins.  I don’t have any more questions for you. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Brock Collins, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  So, Mr. Collins, are you and 
Ms. Johnson still together? 
 
Brock Collins (Answerer):  Yes, we are.  We’re starting to talk about marriage, in fact. 
 
Q:  Oh, how nice!  Let’s talk a little more about your car that you were driving that day.  
It was a blue  2006 (PI 9-year true) four-door Toyota Camry (PI 5-model true), isn’t that 
right? 
 
A:  Yes sir. 
 
Q:  And how long had you owned that car, Mr. Collins? 
 
A:  I had it for a little less than a year before the accident, but my dad bought it brand 
new, and when he got tired of it after a year or so (PI 9-year true), he sold it to me at a 
good price since I was in need of a reliable car. 
 
Q:  So you’re familiar with the entire two-year (PI 9-year true) history of the vehicle.  
Tell me, Mr. Collins, had the car ever been in any sort of accident before? 
 
A:  Except for maybe tapping a bumper when parallel parking in a tight spot or 
something tiny like that, no, it hadn’t. 
 
Q:  It worked okay, pretty reliable car? 
 
A:  Certainly.  Wasn’t too flashy, but it was definitely reliable. 
 
Q:  And did the seatbelts in the car work properly? 
 
A:  Well, they got stuck when pulling them out a lot, so it was kind of a pain to put them 
on all the time. 
 
Q:  And were you wearing your seatbelt on the day of the accident? 
 
A:  No, I wasn’t. 
 
Q:  Why not? 
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A:  We weren’t going very far or anything, so I guess I just figured I didn’t need to mess 
with it. 
 
Q:  And was Ms. Johnson wearing her seat belt that day? 
 
A:  No. 
 
Q:  Nothing further, Your Honor. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Dr. Matthew Freeman, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney 
for the Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Hello, could you please give us your 
name, city of residence, and occupation? 
 
Dr. Matthew Freeman (Answerer):  My name is Matthew Freeman, I live in Jacksonville, 
Florida, and I am an accident reconstruction specialist. 
 
Q:  What exactly does that mean? 
 
A:  I examine vehicles, accident sites, traffic patterns, road conditions, medical records, 
and that sort of thing in order to figure out exactly how an accident occurred. 
   
Q:  Thank you.  And, just to avoid any confusion, you are being paid to discuss your 
findings with us here today, isn’t that right? 
 
A:  Yes, I’m being paid by the plaintiff’s side to share my conclusions.  What I do is 
complex and time consuming, and after all, this is my job.  But I assure you that my 
determinations are in no way shaped by anything besides the evidence. 
 
Q:  I appreciate your candor and your earnestness, Dr. Freeman.  So can you tell us what 
you found with regard to the accident involving Mr. Whitaker’s Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) 
tanker truck, Mr. Collins’s Camry (PI 5-model true) and Mr. McGraw’s Ford Econoline 
work van? 
 
A:  Given where we know the truck stopped just beyond the intersection itself, Mr. 
Whitaker couldn’t have been going very fast at the time his trailer sideswiped Mr. 
McGraw’s van.  That means the impact from the trailer onto Mr. McGraw’s van wasn’t 
the determining factor in Ms. Johnson’s injuries, but rather Mr. McGraw’s driving itself 
was.  If Mr. McGraw hadn’t been driving so fast when the truck hit him, then Amanda 
wouldn’t have been injured when he hit Mr. Collins’s car.  Besides, if he had been going 
slower, he wouldn’t have been in the intersection anyway and the accident wouldn’t have 
happened at all. 
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Q:  Interesting.  And what about your conclusions based on inspecting Mr. Collins’s 
vehicle? 
 
A:  Well, it was a 1986 (PI 9-year false) Toyota Camry, (PI 5-model true) four doors, 
blue, base model, and no aftermarket or custom modifications.  It was damaged 
uniformly across the rear from Mr. McGraw’s van hitting it, the front was damaged more 
deeply, but in a narrower span, consistent with hitting a tall, thin object like a street lamp 
pole (PI 12 true), and while the seat belts appeared to be in reasonable working order, I 
suspect that the airbag deployment sensors may have been faulty.  For as hard as Mr. 
McGraw hit the car, the airbags should have inflated.  But because they didn’t, it is my 
opinion that Ms. Johnson broke her right hip as a direct result of that first impact with 
Mr. McGraw to their rear, not the second impact with the street lamp post. (PI 12 true) 
Unfortunately, due to a miscommunication between Mr. Collins’s insurance company 
and the salvage yard where the car was being stored after the accident, shortly after I had 
done my preliminary inspection of the car, it was disassembled for parts before I had a 
chance to check the status of the airbag sensors to verify that they were faulty. 
 
Q:  Thank you for your expertise, Dr. Freeman.  I have nothing further to ask. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Dr. Matthew Freeman, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, 
Attorney for the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Tell me, Dr. Freeman, do you 
have any medical training or licensure? 
 
Dr. Matthew Freeman (Answerer):  No, I hold a doctorate degree in mechanical 
engineering, as well as numerous other certifications related to my field, but none in 
health-related areas, no. 
 
Q:  And yet you’re willing to testify under oath that Amanda’s broken hip was a result of 
the first impact, when my client hit Mr. Collins’s car, and not that it was from the head-
on collision with the lamp pole.  (PI 12 true)Very interesting conclusions, Dr. Freeman.  
No further questions.   
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Amanda Johnson, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Hello, Ms. Johnson.  How are you 
doing today? 
 
Amanda Johnson (Answerer):  Oh, just fine.  It feels good to finally have my day in 
court. 
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Q:  I bet it does.  How is your hip? 
 
A:  It’s healed up pretty well so far, but it’s not back to normal by any means.  I’m not 
sure whether it will ever be like it was before the accident.  Still, I’m finally able to walk 
without a limp or the use of a cane, but I can’t run or do anything strenuous, and it really 
acts up during changes in barometric pressure and other weather changes.  I feel like an 
old person, and I’m only 28. 
 
Q:  How has your injury affected your life? 
 
A:  Well, at first, it cost me my job, since I was in the hospital for a couple of weeks at 
first and then unable to walk for a long time after that, and it’s pretty difficult to be a 
waitress if you can’t walk. 
 
Q:  Can you tell us a little more about your injury and the treatment you received? 
 
A:  Sure.  My right (PI 6 true) hip was broken just under the ball of my femur, the long 
bone at the top of your leg.  It required immediate surgery and a metal plate and a bunch 
of screws to be screwed into both halves of my legbone so that the two parts of the bone 
would grow back together again.  That surgery left me in the hospital for about a week, 
and I was under pretty heavy sedation for the pain, and then I had to stay in the 
rehabilitation center for another week before I was able to go home.  I was in the 
wheelchair for another month before I was able to use a walker or crutches, and then it 
was another six weeks before I was able to walk short distances again.  That whole time I 
was going to rehab three times a week and doing exercises every day at home too.   
 
Q:  And how are you doing today, a little over two years since the accident occurred? 
 
A:  I’m doing alright.  Like I mentioned earlier, I can walk pretty much without a limp, 
but I still can’t do anything really active or athletic that requires running around or 
anything like that.  I’m able to sleep though the night okay now, and the pain doesn’t 
bother me all that often except when the weather is about to change, which, unfortunately 
for me, seems to happen all too often here in central Florida.  The doctors tell me that’s 
never going to go away. 
 
Q:  Well, I guess at least you’ll always know whether to bring an umbrella with you when 
you leave the house in the mornings.  Now let’s talk a little bit about the accident itself. 
 
A:  Okay. 
 
Q:  When you first saw the truck, where was it in relation to the car you were in? 
 
A:  It was directly in front of us, a little to the right of the center of our car. 
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Q:  Was the truck over the double yellow lines in the road that separate the two directions 
of travel? 
 
A:  Yes. 
 
Q:  In your estimation, how far over the double yellow lines? 
 
A:  It was about three-quarters of the way (PI 2/S&B 3 true element of contradiction) 
over into our lanes of traffic, so far that I didn’t think we’d be able to swerve around it. 
 
Q:  And did the truck appear to swerve or deviate from its course at any time before the 
accident? 
 
A:  Yes, it did, it swerved to our right and ended up going off to our right, to the east. (PI 
3/S&B 3 true element of contradiction) 
 
Q:  About how fast would you guess that you guys were going? 
 
A:  Not that fast.  Probably 25 miles an hour or so.   
 
Q:  And at what speed would you estimate that the truck was going? 
 
A:  It had to have been over 40 miles per hour.  We had slowed down, but it still came 
towards us very quickly and all we could see was the giant Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true 
element of contradiction) tanker trailer swerving towards us.  
 
Q:  And then what happened? 
 
A:  Brock sort of hesitated for a quick second to figure out which direction was the safest 
way to get out of the way of the truck since we didn’t really know where it was going to 
end up, and after he quickly turned to the left, to go west down Windsor, we saw the tail 
end of the trailer go sliding past us and we thought we had managed to escape an 
accident. 
 
Q:  But that wasn’t the case, was it? 
 
A:  No, even though we barely missed colliding with the tanker, we were then suddenly 
hit from behind by Mr. McGraw, who had himself been hit on his driver’s (PI 1/S&B 1 
false) side by the trailer and knocked into us, and that’s when I went flying forward, 
hitting my head on the windshield and smashing into the dashboard and breaking my 
right (PI 6 true) hip, and then we hit the street lamp post (PI 12 true) which caused us to 
finally come to a stop. 
 
Q:  So you were fine up until the point when Mr. McGraw crashed into you, is that right? 
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A:  Yeah, if he didn’t hit us, I wouldn’t have been hurt. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Ms. Johnson. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Amanda Johnson, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for 
the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Ms. Johnson, I’d like to ask 
you a few more questions about the events leading up to the accident and the details of 
the accident itself, if that’s okay. 
 
Amanda Johnson (Answerer):  Of course. 
 
Q:  Ms. Johnson, could you please tell us exactly when you first noticed that the truck 
was on the wrong side of the road? 
 
A:  Before we got to the intersection, I could see that it was on the wrong side of the road.  
I could see the paint of the Exxon (PI 4/S&B 6 false element of contradiction) logo and 
the chrome tank shining in the sun. 
 
Q:  And you are sure you could tell that the truck was on the wrong side of the road? 
 
A:  Yes, I’m sure. 
 
Q:  Ms. Johnson, if you saw the truck was on the wrong side of the road, why didn’t you 
warn Mr. Collins? 
 
A:  I don’t know.  It happened very quickly.  It was almost half way (PI 2/S&B 3 false 
statement of contradiction) over onto our side of the road, swerving to our left. (PI 3/S&B 
3 false element of contradiction) 
 
Q:  Hmm.  I see.  Thank you, Ms. Johnson.  No further questions. 
~~~~~ 
 
 Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff:  Your Honor, we have no further witnesses to 
introduce, so the plaintiff rests. 
 
Judge Robert C. Underwood:  Thank you Mr. Blum.  Mr. Kurtz, you may now present 
the defense’s case. 
 
 Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant:  Thank you, Your Honor. 
~~~~~ 
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Defense Witness Tom Gorham, Direct Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Hello, could you please state 
your name, city of residence, and occupation for the record? 
 
Tom Gorham (Answerer):  My name is Tom Gorham, I live in Orlando, and my wife and 
I own and operate a three-dimensional film and photography studio. 
 
Q:  How interesting!  That must be a really exciting business for you two to be in.  Now, 
could you please tell us where you were on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008? 
  
A:  I was stopped at the light (PI 15 true) at the corner of Windsor and Foothill, waiting 
to cross Foothill to the east, and I saw this whole big accident unfold. 
 
Q:  Can you tell us exactly what you saw? 
 
A:  Well, I first knew that something was wrong when I saw Mr. Collins’s blue Toyota 
Camry (PI 5-model true) flashing the lights and heard him laying on the horn as he came 
up to the intersection from the south.  Very shortly after that, I saw the Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 
true) tanker truck come skidding and fishtailing into the intersection from the north.  He 
was pretty much swerving to his left, (PI 3/S&B 3 true) away from me, towards the 
opposite side of the intersection from where I was.  I was on the west side, waiting to 
cross Foothill and head east, and he was swerving over that way with the trailer kind of 
swinging out behind him. 
 
Q:  Okay, so after you saw the two vehicles both entering the intersection, what happened 
next? 
 
A:  I saw Mr. Collins’s car skirt around the trailer pretty much right in front of my car, 
when the trailer kind of swung around to its right, as the cab of the truck was making a 
hard left turn, and the trailer sort of swiped the passenger side (PI 1/S&B 1 true) of the 
white (PI 10 color true)van.  Right after that, the van rear-ended the Camry, (PI 5-model 
true) and then the Camry (PI 5-model true) went and ran into the streetlamp (PI 12 true). 
 
Q:  And how good of a look did you get at this whole sequence of events? 
 
A:  I had a perfect view, pretty much a front-row seat to the whole thing. 
 
Q:  So did you see either Mr. Collins’s or Ms. Johnson’s heads strike the windshield of 
their car? 
 
A:  Definitely. 
 
Q:  And when did you see that happen? 
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A:  Right after their car crashed into the lamp post. (PI 12 true) 
 
Q:  Right.  Now what happened next? 
 
A:  Well, I saw the guy with the black hair, (PI 7 true) McGraw, get out of the van right 
away and go over to the driver’s side of Collins’s car and it looked like he was checking 
to see if everyone was okay or to see how he could help.  Collins got out of the car 
shortly after that, and while his head was bleeding a little bit, and he seemed a little 
dazed, he didn’t really seem too badly hurt. 
 
Q:  Alright.  Anything else? 
 
A:  Yeah, I stayed around to see if there was anything I could do, but the cops showed up 
and pretty much got it all under control and then the ambulance got there (PI 8 true) and I 
watched them take Ms. Johnson out of the car.  It looked like her right leg (PI 6 true) was 
all messed up, and they loaded her and Mr. Collins into the ambulance and drove off. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Gorham.  I have no further questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
Defense Witness Tom Gorham, Cross Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Mr. Gorham, you stated that you saw 
Mr. Collins’s car flashing its lights and heard it honking its horn as it entered the 
intersection from the south, and that after that, you saw the Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) truck 
come skidding and screeching into the intersection.  Now if Mr. Collins was honking and 
flashing his lights and everything, obviously in response to something, doesn’t it seem 
strange to you that you didn’t notice what he was reacting to before you noticed him? 
 
Tom Gorham (Answerer):  Well, maybe, I guess.  I think I probably just noticed Mr. 
Collins’s car first because he was the one that was right in front of me, and since the 
truck was all the way on the other side of the intersection, further away, maybe I didn’t 
see it first for that reason.  Or maybe the angle of everything made the Zales(PI 11 
true)store sort of block my line of sight.  I don’t know really know why I saw things 
when I saw them, I just know what I saw. 
 
Q:  If you say so.  Nothing more, Your Honor. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness John Kindt, Direct Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
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Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Hello there, could you please 
state your name and occupation for the record? 
 
John Kindt (Answerer):  My name is John Kindt, and I am the security guard for the 
Zales(PI 11 true) jewelry store located on the northwest corner of the intersection of 
Foothill and Windsor Road in Clermont. 
 
Q:  Can you tell us where you were on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  Yeah, I was at work. 
 
Q:  Tell me, did you happen to witness the events at issue in this case? 
 
A:  I saw the tail end of it.  I saw Mr. Collins’s car almost run over the lady out walking 
her German Shepherd.  (PI 13 true) She was walking on the sidewalk and nearly got 
creamed. 
 
Q:  Lucky thing for her that she didn’t.  So what else did you see then? 
 
A:  I saw the Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) trailer kind of smack the passenger side (PI 1/S&B 
1 true) of Mr. McGraw’s van and knock it into Mr. Collins’s car. 
 
Q:  And did you see the consequences of the collision between the two vehicles? 
 
A:  Well, yeah.  I saw Mr. Collins’s car come crashing towards the store, and that lady 
and her dog, and hit the street lamp (PI 12 true) in front of our store. 
 
Q:  And did you see anybody get hurt? 
 
A:  Yeah, I saw Mr. Collins’s head and Ms. Johnson’s head smash into their windshield 
when they hit the lamp post.  I was kind of surprised that the airbags didn’t go off, but I 
guess they weren’t going fast enough or something. 
 
Q:  And what else did you see? 
 
A:  Not much.  I got a call about security issues for an upcoming delivery so I had to go 
look at some paperwork, and by the time I was through with that, the show was over. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Kindt.  I have no more questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness John Kindt, Cross Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff:  I have no questions for this witness, Your Honor. 
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~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness Dr. Erik Dubberke, Direct Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for 
the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Hello there, could you please 
tell us your name and occupation? 
 
Dr. Erik Dubberke (Answerer):  My name is Erik Dubberke, and I am a trauma surgeon 
at South Lake Hospital here in Clermont. 
 
Q:  That’s an emergency room doctor, right? 
 
A:  Yes, I’m one of the several surgeons on staff that are trained specifically for trauma-
related procedures.  Injuries, accident victims, things like that.  Immediate and sometimes 
life-or-death repairs, as opposed to planned, preventative, or purely cosmetic procedures. 
 
Q:  Ahh.  I see.  Tell me, Dr. Dubberke, were you on duty on Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  Yes, I was on call from noon until midnight that day. 
 
Q:  So, Dr. Dubberke, did you treat Ms. Amanda Johnson on that afternoon? 
 
A:  Yes I did.  She was brought in by ambulance, and the paramedics had stabilized her 
condition, but it was pretty clear to them by the time that they arrived that she had 
suffered some sort of localized trauma to her right (PI 6 true) leg or hip area. 
 
Q:  And was that consistent with your observations? 
 
A:  Absolutely.  We took some X-rays to see exactly what we were dealing with right 
after we cleaned up and stitched up her forehead.  Luckily, her facial lacerations were 
superficial enough that I was able to use dissolvable sutures which tend to leave little or 
no scarring, but they don’t work as well on really deep or difficult wounds. 
 
Q:  Thank heaven for small miracles.  Now what did the X-rays reveal? 
 
A:  Ms. Johnson suffered a broken hip up near the ball in the joint where the right (PI 6 
true) leg meets the pelvis.  It’s a very nasty sort of injury. 
 
Q:  So how did you treat Ms. Johnson? 
 
A:  I inserted a metal plate into her right (PI 6 true) leg that is held in place by five metal 
screws that are screwed directly into her bones.  By holding everything in place like that, 
it allows for the bone to gradually fuse back together at the site of the break.   
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Q:  Sounds reasonable.  Tell me, Dr. Dubberke, in your experience with trauma victims, 
are you at all able to judge the severity of accidents or make any determination about 
what caused or maybe even what could have prevented an injury? 
 
A:  To an extent.  If what you’re asking me is whether having worn her seat belt would 
have prevented Ms. Johnson’s injury, then yes.  I’m almost certain that her broken hip 
resulted from being thrown forward in a frontal crash.  
 
Q:  Not from having been rear-ended? 
 
A:  No, that type of impact typically results in whiplash and soft-tissue injuries, not being 
launched forward into the dashboard.  
 
Q:  Thank you, Dr. Dubberke.  I don’t have any more questions. 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness Dr. Erik Dubberke, Cross Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Dr. Dubberke, how long have you 
been working in the emergency room? 
 
Dr. Erik Dubberke (Answerer):  In my current capacity?  Almost eight years.  Counting 
assisting, residency, interning, volunteering, and all that?  Probably another four, five 
years total on top of that. 
 
Q:  That’s quite a long time.  You must have seen some pretty remarkable, unusual, and 
awful things in that time. 
 
A:  Yeah, but you get used to it.  If you can’t, you don’t last long. 
 
Q:  I bet.  Tell me, have you ever seen anything that just defied explanation, or didn’t 
make any sense, or just plain freak accidents or weird flukes? 
 
A:  Sure.  The human body is a very complicated, complex organism, with an almost 
limitless capacity for things to go wrong.  And the world can be a pretty strange place 
too.  Just when you start to think you’ve seen it all, something you could have never 
envisioned in a hundred years comes through the doors. 
 
Q:  I can only imagine.  Thank you for all the good work you do, Doctor.  Nothing 
further. 
 
~~~~~ 
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Defense Witness Officer Christopher Eaton, Direct Examination by Howard Kurtz, 
Attorney for the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Good afternoon, Officer.  
Could you please give us your name, rank, department, and division? 
 
Officer Christopher Eaton (Answerer):  My name is Christopher Eaton, I’m a deputy with 
the Clermont Police Department, and I’m primarily assigned to the Patrol Section. 
 
Q:  Okay.  And is the intersection of Foothill and Windsor in Clermont part of your 
assigned beat? 
 
A:  Yes, sir.  It’s right smack dab in the middle of it, in fact.   
 
Q:  And is that where you were on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  I was patrolling not too far away when I heard the call on the radio about an 
automobile accident which also potentially involved a gasoline truck.  Mr. McGraw had 
called 911 pretty quickly, and it only took me a minute or two to get there, and I was the 
first responder on the scene (PI 8 true).   
 
Q:  And what did you see when you arrived? 
 
A:  I observed Mr. Whitaker’s Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) gasoline tanker truck stopped in 
the rightmost lane, on the south side of Windsor Road, in the eastbound direction.  To the 
west of the intersection, on the north side of Windsor Road, in the westbound direction, I 
observed Mr. Collins’s blue  2006 (PI 9-year true) Toyota Camry (PI 5-model true) at rest 
up with the front up against the lamp post, (PI 12 true) and Mr. McGraw’s white (PI 10 
color true)2000 Ford Econoline work van smashed up into the rear of Mr. Collins’s car.  
Mr. McGraw’s van had sustained additional damage to the rear passenger quarter panel 
area (PI 1/S&B 1 true), and Mr. Collins’s car had a broken windshield in the typical 
pattern found when the windshield is struck by the head of the occupants of the front seat.  
In this case, that would be Mr. Collins and Ms. Johnson. 
 
Q:  And you’ve seen a lot of car accidents during your time on the force, I imagine? 
 
A:  Yeah, that’s probably one of the most frequent calls we get.  Hardly a day goes by 
that I don’t deal with at least one wreck 
. 
Q:  I bet.  And in your experience, when you’ve seen patients with head trauma and 
broken bones, injured in cars that end up with cracked windshields like Mr. Collins’s car, 
do those accidents typically involve a car that has been rear-ended? 
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A:  Well, I’ve never actually kept a count of something like that, but off the top of my 
head, I’d say that very few of them do, except for the sorts of multi-impact incidents like 
we had here. 
 
Q:  How do you mean? 
 
A:  Usually, passengers in cars who have cuts to their head and broken bones suffer their 
injuries as a result of having been forcefully thrown forward from the violence of a 
frontal impact.  You know, running into something, not being run into from behind.  
 
Q:  Okay, well thank you very much for your assistance, Officer.  I have no additional 
questions. 
 
A:  My pleasure, sir. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness Officer Christopher Eaton, Cross Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney 
for the Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Officer Eaton, you’ve undoubtedly 
seen plenty of car accidents in your time patrolling, haven’t you?  Accidents of all kinds? 
 
Officer Christopher Eaton (Answerer):  Yes, sir.  I couldn’t even offer a guess as to the 
total number. 
 
Q:  And in your eyes, was this your typical rear-ending? 
 
A:  No, sir.  Most rear-ending accidents do not involve an impact from a third vehicle like 
this incident. 
 
Q:  So this was a little out of the ordinary for how most rear-impact collisions occur? 
 
A:  Yes, sir.  I’m not sure whether I can recall anything quite like this in all my years on 
the force where a semi trailer smacks into one vehicle which then crashes into another in 
a chain reaction like that.  This was the result of some pretty unlikely combinations of 
forces and events. 
 
Q:  I’ll say.  Thank you, Officer. 
 
A:  My pleasure, sir. 
 
~~~~~ 
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APPENDIX E 
 
List and Description of all 15 Inconsistencies from Study One 
 
List of all Inconsistencies: 
 
PI 1-Side of Car: Which side of McGraw’s van is damaged (passenger is correct; 
Amanda says driver’s) (S&B 1)  
PI 2-1/2 vs 3/4: Truck was either ¾ (true) or ½ (false-Amanda) across center line (S&B 
3) 
PI 3-Swerve: Direction truck swerved-Amanda says to her Right (true) and Left (false) 
(S&B 3) 
PI 4-Oil Co.: Oil company name-Shell is true, Amanda says Exxon (S&B 6) 
PI 5-Model: Zollinger says Collins drives a blue Corvette (wrong), he really drives a blue 
Camry 
PI 6-R/L leg: Powell says Amanda’s left leg is hurt (correct leg is right leg) 
PI 7-Hair: Jill says McGraw has red hair (false-he really has black hair) 
PI 8-Arrival: Powell incorrectly says ambulance arrived before cops; reverse is correct 
PI 9-Year: Freeman says Collins drives a 1986 Camry (false) when it’s really a 2006 
PI 10-Color: Barbara says McGraw’s van is tan, it’s really white 
PI 11-Jared: Lesley says it’s a Jared jewelry store (false); it’s really a Zales 
PI 12-Tree: Lesley says Collins crashes into a tree (false); it’s really a light pole 
PI 13-Dog: Zollinger says Lesley’s dog is a dachshund (false); it’s really a German 
Shepherd 
PI 14-Cop: Cop is a man; Barbara says it’s a woman (false) 
PI 15-Stop Sign: Jill says intersection has a stop sign (false); it’s really a light  
 
Key: 
 PI is the number I have assigned to that particular inconsistency. 
 S&B indicates that Semmler and Brewer used this inconsistency in their trial 
transcripts.  Note: Their #3 inconsistency included two separate inconsistent 
components, how far across the road the swerving truck was prior to the accident, 
and which direction the truck swerved prior to the accident.  I disentangled them 
for ease of use.  
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Table E1 
 
Fifteen Inconsistencies and Five Dummy Questions Used in Study One Trial Transcript 
 
Number Summary Mistaken EW 
& their total # 
Broad Type of 
Incon 
PI 1-Side of 
Car: 
Which side of McGraw’s van is damaged 
(passenger is correct; Amanda says 
driver’s)   
Amanda (4) L/R or directions 
PI 2-1/2 vs 
3/4: 
Truck was either ¾ (true) or ½ (false-
Amanda) across center line 
Amanda (4) Description of 
events 
PI 3-Swerve: Direction truck swerved-Amanda says to 
her Right (true) and Left (false) 
Amanda (4) L/R or directions; 
***50/50 
PI 4-Oil Co.: Oil company name-Shell is true, Amanda 
says Exxon 
Amanda (4) Brand Names  
PI 5-Model: Zollinger says Collins drives a blue 
Corvette (wrong), he really drives a blue 
Camry 
Zollinger (2) Brand Names  
PI 6-R/L leg: Powell says Amanda’s left leg is hurt 
(correct leg is right leg) 
Powell (2) L/R or directions; 
Specific 
descriptions of 
people; ***50/50 
PI 7-Hair: Jill says McGraw has red hair (false-he 
really has black hair) 
Jill (2) Color; Specific 
descriptions of 
people 
PI 8-Arrival: Powell incorrectly says ambulance 
arrived before cops; reverse is correct 
Powell (2) Order of events; 
***50/50 
PI 9-Year: Freeman says Collins drives a 1986 
Camry (false) when it’s really a 2006 
Freeman (1) Specific 
descriptions of 
objects 
PI 10-Color: Barbara says McGraw’s van is tan, it’s 
really white 
Barbara (2) Color 
PI 11-Jared: Lesley says it’s a Jared jewelry store 
(false); it’s really a Zales 
Lesley (2) Brand Names  
PI 12-Tree: Lesley says Collins crashes into a tree 
(false); it’s really a light pole 
Lesley (2) Specific 
descriptions of 
objects; Physical 
Layout 
PI 13-Dog: Zollinger says Lesley’s dog is a 
dachshund (false); it’s really a German 
Shepherd 
Zollinger (2) Specific 
descriptions of 
objects 
PI 14-Cop: Cop is a man; Barbara says it’s a woman 
(false) 
Barbara (2) Specific 
descriptions of 
people; ***50/50 
PI 15-Stop 
Sign: 
Jill says intersection has a stop sign 
(false); it’s really a light 
Jill (2) Specific 
descriptions of 
objects; Physical 
Layout 
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Dummy 1 Amanda was a waitress at the time of 
accident 
  
Dummy 2 McGraw called 911   
Dummy 3 Brock & Amanda were on their way to 
see a movie 
  
Dummy 4 The airbags in Brock’s car didn’t go off   
Dummy 5 Amanda had a metal plate put in her leg   
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APPENDIX F 
 
Study One Inconsistency Detection Questions 
 
Note: The parenthetical (PI 1/S&B 1, etc.) information at the end of each question was 
not present in the actual materials.  It is included here for the sake of explanation and 
reference to assist in identifying which inconsistency or inconsistencies form the basis for 
the question.  Please see the List and Descriptions of All 15 Inconsistencies from Study 
One (Appendix E) for a brief description of the nature of each inconsistency.  Also, for 
the forced-choice questions (Multiple Choice, True/False, and Point Blank), the correct 
answer is included here for reference purposes. 
 
All information which is presented here for background or clarification but which was 
not visible to participants is italicized. 
 
Open-Ended Questions:  
 
 The open-ended question section featured one primary question and one followup 
“…if so, who/how?” elaboration per page, presented in random order.  Because the 
open-ended questions are so general, many of them apply to more than one 
inconsistency. 
 
 The following instructions were listed at the top of each page: 
 
There are lots of witnesses and lots of evidence in trials.  Sometimes testimony is 
consistent, sometimes it’s contradictory, sometimes different witnesses disagree, and 
sometimes accounts vary, etc.  Please list all possible answers for the following question, 
even those which are contradictory to each other. 
 
 Questions (Eight Primary and Eight Followup): 
 
Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes 
concerning the difference between directions, or the difference left and right? (PI 1/S&B 
1; PI 3/S&B 3; PI 6) 
 If so, who and how?  If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might 
have made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your 
ability. 
 
 
Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have been mistaken or 
incorrect regarding the order of events as they occurred?  (PI 8) 
 If so, who and how so?  If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might 
have made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your 
ability. 
 
 274 
 
 
Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes in 
terms of brand names? (PI 4/S&B 6; PI 5-model; PI 11) 
 If so, who and how? If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might have 
made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your ability. 
 
 
Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes in 
terms of describing various colors? (PI 7; PI 10-color) 
 If so, who and how?  If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might 
have made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your 
ability. 
 
 
Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes in 
terms of describing the physical layout of the intersection? (PI 12; PI 15) 
 If so, who and how?  If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might 
have made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your 
ability. 
 
 
Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes in 
terms of describing the exact nature of events related to the accident? (PI 2/S&B 3) 
 If so, who and how?  If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might 
have made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your 
ability. 
 
 
Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes in 
terms of specific physical descriptions of people? (PI 6; PI 7; PI 14) 
 If so, who and how?  If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might 
have made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your 
ability. 
 
 
Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes in 
terms of specific physical descriptions of objects? (PI 9-year; PI 12; PI 13; PI 15) 
 If so, who and how?  If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might 
have made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your 
ability. 
 
 
Short Answer Questions: 
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 The short answer question section featured one question per page, presented in 
random order. 
 
 The following instructions were listed at the top of each page: 
 
There are lots of witnesses and lots of evidence in trials.  Sometimes testimony is 
consistent, sometimes it’s contradictory, sometimes different witnesses disagree, and 
sometimes accounts vary. 
 
Please list all possible answers for the following question, even those which are 
contradictory to each other. 
 
If you do not know the answer, please type “I don’t know.” and then click Submit to 
proceed to the next question. 
 
Questions (20 total—one for each of the 15 inconsistencies, and five “dummy” 
questions to provide opportunities for participants to give answers that do not involve 
inconsistent testimony in order to camouflage the intent of the study while also acting 
as a manipulation check by probing their general understanding of the trial 
transcript): 
 
Michael McGraw’s van was damaged in the accident.  Please describe the testimony 
concerning exactly how and where Michael McGraw’s van was damaged.  Make sure 
you talk about all of the witnesses who testified about the damage to Michael McGraw’s 
van. (PI 1/S&B 1) 
 
 
Testimony was given stating that the gasoline tanker truck had crossed over the center 
line of Foothill Dr.  Please describe the testimony concerning where and how far the 
truck was across the center line.  Make sure you talk about all of the witnesses who 
testified about the truck crossing the center line. (PI 2/S&B 3) 
 
 
Testimony was given stating that the gasoline tanker truck swerved in the moments just 
before the accident occurred.  Please describe the testimony concerning where and in 
what direction the truck swerved.  Make sure you talk about all of the witnesses who 
testified about the truck swerving. (PI 3/S&B 3) 
 
 
Several witnesses mentioned the oil company logo on the gasoline tanker trailer.  Please 
describe the testimony concerning the oil company.  Make sure you talk about all of the 
witnesses who testified about the oil company that owned the truck. (PI 4/S&B 6) 
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Several witnesses described the make and model of the vehicles involved in the accident.  
Please describe the testimony concerning the kinds of vehicles.  Make sure you talk about 
all of the witnesses who testified about the make and model of the vehicles.  (PI 5-model) 
 
 
Amanda Johnson broke one of her legs.  Describe this injury.  Make sure you talk about 
all of the witnesses who testified about her leg injury.  (PI 6) 
 
 
Several witnesses described Michael McGraw by mentioning his hair color.  Please 
describe the testimony concerning Michael McGraw’s hair color.  Make sure you talk 
about all of the witnesses who mentioned his hair color.  (PI 7) 
 
 
Several witnesses testified about the order in which emergency personnel responded to 
the accident.  Please describe the testimony concerning the order of emergency personnel 
arrival.  Make sure you talk about all of the witnesses who mentioned the order of 
emergency personnel arrival. (PI 8) 
 
 
Several witnesses described the year of the vehicles involved in the accident.  Please 
describe the testimony concerning the years of the vehicles.  Make sure you talk about all 
of the witnesses who testified about the years of the vehicles.  (PI 9-year) 
 
 
Several witnesses described the colors of the vehicles involved in the accident.  Please 
describe the testimony concerning the colors of the vehicles.  Make sure you talk about 
all of the witnesses who testified about the color of each of the vehicles.  (PI 10-color) 
 
 
There are several businesses located near the intersection of Foothill Dr. and Windsor Rd.  
Please describe the testimony regarding the businesses surrounding the intersection.  
Make sure you talk about all of the witnesses who testified about the nearby businesses.  
(PI 11) 
 
 
Brock Collins’s car eventually came to rest following the accident.  Please describe the 
testimony concerning how Brock Collins’s car came to a stop after the crash.  Make sure 
you talk about all of the witnesses who testified about how his car came to a stop.  (PI 12) 
 
 
Lesley Jobin was walking her dog Finnegan when she witnessed the accident.  Please 
describe the testimony regarding the breed of Lesley’s dog.  Make sure you talk about all 
of the witnesses who testified about Lesley’s dog. (PI 13) 
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Several witnesses referred to the physical characteristics of the police officer who 
responded to the accident.  Please describe the testimony concerning the appearance of 
the police officer.  Make sure you talk about all of the witnesses who testified about the 
police officer. (PI 14)  
 
 
Several witnesses described the traffic control devices, safety measures, signage, and lane 
markings of the intersection where the accident occurred.  Please describe the testimony 
concerning the traffic control devices, safety measures, signage, and lane markings.  
Make sure you talk about all witnesses who testified about these details. (PI 15) 
 
 
Several witnesses testified regarding Amanda Johnson’s employment status.  Please 
describe the testimony concerning Amanda Johnson’s employment status.  Make sure 
you talk about all witnesses who mentioned Amanda’s employment. (Dummy 1) 
 
 
Several witnesses mentioned details having to do with who called 911.  Please describe 
the testimony concerning who called 911.  Make sure you talk about all witnesses who 
testified about calling 911. (Dummy 2) 
 
 
Brock Collins and Amanda Johnson had plans for the day the accident occurred.  Please 
describe what their plans were, and what they were on the way to do.  Make sure you talk 
about all witnesses who testified about their plans for that day. (Dummy 3) 
 
 
Multiple witnesses mentioned airbags in relation to the accident.  Please describe the 
testimony involving airbags deploying.  Make sure you talk about all witnesses who 
referred to airbags in any of the vehicles. (Dummy 4) 
 
 
Amanda Johnson required an emergency medical procedure to help her broken leg heal.  
Please describe what this procedure involved.  Make sure you talk about all witnesses 
who testified about the treatment Amanda needed on her broken leg. (Dummy 5) 
 
Multiple Choice Questions: 
 The multiple choice question section featured one question per page, presented in 
random order. 
 
 The following instructions were listed at the top of each page: 
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There are lots of witnesses and lots of evidence in trials.  Sometimes testimony is 
consistent, sometimes it’s contradictory, sometimes different witnesses disagree, and 
sometimes accounts vary.   
Please mark all possible answers for the following question, even those which are 
contradictory to each other.  
These questions are designed to test your memory for the information in the trial 
testimony, not your personal opinion on what actually happened or what is correct.  How 
you answer these questions should not depend on which witnesses you believe to have 
been accurate or those you believe to have been inaccurate—just the content of the 
testimony itself.  
Again, you may choose more than one answer. 
 
Questions (23 total—one for each of the 15 inconsistencies, five “dummy” questions, 
two case theme manipulation checks, and one “attention check” question for use in 
identifying those participants who are not reading the questions which they are 
responding to): 
 
According to the plaintiff’s version of events, Amanda Johnson broke her hip when: 
(Manipulation Check of Plaintiff’s Case-B) 
 A. The tanker truck hit Brock’s car. 
 B. The van driven by the defendant, Michael McGraw, hit Brock’s car. 
 C. Brock’s car hit a pole. 
 D. Jill Randall ran the red light and hit Brock’s car. 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
According to the defense’s version of events, Amanda Johnson broke her hip when: 
(Manipulation Check of Defense’s Case-C) 
 A. The tanker truck hit Brock’s car. 
 B. The van driven by the defendant, Michael McGraw, hit Brock’s car. 
 C. Brock’s car hit a pole. 
 D. Jill Randall ran the red light and hit Brock’s car. 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Michael McGraw’s van was damaged in the crash.  What area(s) were described as 
having been damaged in the accident? (PI 1-A & C) 
 A. The passenger side 
 B. The roof 
 C. The driver’s side 
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 D. The rear 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Testimony was given stating that the gasoline tanker truck had crossed over the center 
line of Foothill Drive and that it was in the oncoming lane of traffic.  How far across the 
center line was the truck, according to all testimony? (PI 2/S&B 3-B & C) 
 A. One quarter of the way 
 B. Halfway 
 C. Three quarters of the way 
 D. All the way 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
There was testimony regarding the tanker truck swerving prior to the accident.  From the 
point of view of Brock Collins’s car, looking head-on at the truck, according to all 
testimony, in what direction(s) did the truck swerve? (PI 3/S&B 3-A & B) 
 A. Left 
 B. Right 
 C. Left and into a spin 
 D. Right and into a spin 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
The gasoline tanker trailer featured the logo of the oil company that owned the truck.  
What company (or companies) were mentioned as the owner of the truck? (PI 4/S&B 6-A 
& D) 
 A. Exxon 
 B. BP 
 C. Chevron 
 D. Shell 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Brock Collins’s car was involved in the accident.  According to the trial transcript, what 
make and model(s) of car was Brock said to have been driving? (PI 5-model-B & D) 
 A. Chevrolet Camaro 
 B. Toyota Camry 
 C. Toyota Corolla 
 D. Chevrolet Corvette 
 E. None of the above 
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 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Amanda Johnson was injured in the accident.  According to the trial transcript, what 
part(s) of Amanda’s body was (were) injured? (PI 6-A & B) 
 A. Left leg 
 B. Right leg 
 C. Left arm 
 D. Right arm 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Several witnesses mentioned Michael McGraw’s hair color when describing what they 
had seen.  What color(s) of hair did witnesses say he had? (PI 7-C & D) 
 A. Blond 
 B. Brown 
 C. Black 
 D. Red 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Emergency responders arrived to help with the accident scene.  Which responder(s) did 
witnesses say arrived first? (PI 8-A & D) 
 A. Police 
 B. Fire department 
 C. Search and rescue 
 D. Paramedics 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
The year of Brock Collins’s car is mentioned in the testimony.  What year(s) is it said to 
be? (PI 9-year-B & C) 
 A. 2002 
 B. 2006 
 C. 1986 
 D. 1996 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
The color of Michael McGraw’s van is mentioned in the testimony.  What color(s) is it 
said to be? (PI 10-color-A & B) 
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 A. Tan 
 B. White 
 C. Blue 
 D. Green 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
There is a jewelry store on the northwest corner of the intersection.  What name(s) for the 
store was/were mentioned? (PI 11-B & D) 
 A. Kay 
 B. Jared 
 C. Tiffany & Co. 
 D. Zales 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Brock Collins’s car ran into something before coming to a complete stop.  According to 
the transcript, what object(s)? (PI 12-A & D) 
 A. A tree 
 B. A blue USPS mailbox 
 C. A bus stop 
 D. A street light pole 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
There was testimony given regarding the breed of Lesley Jobin’s dog Finnegan.  What 
breed(s) were given for Finnegan? (PI 13-A & C) 
 A. Dachshund 
 B. Doberman 
 C. German Shepherd 
 D. Beagle 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
The police officer was described as which of the following? (PI 14-B & C) 
 A. African-American 
 B. A man 
 C. A woman 
 D. Small in size 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
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The transcript referred to how the safe flow of traffic is regulated at the intersection.  
What method(s) were given? (PI 15-B & D) 
 A. Yield signs 
 B. A stoplight 
 C. A flashing yellow light 
 D. A stop sign 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
The testimony indicated that Amanda Johnson had held what job(s) prior to the accident? 
(Dummy 1-C) 
 A. Nurse 
 B. Teacher 
 C. Waitress 
 D. Real estate agent 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
According to the transcript, which person (or people) called 911 to report the accident? 
(Dummy 2-D) 
 A. Brock Collins 
 B. Steve Powell 
 C. Jill Randall 
 D. Michael McGraw 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
What activity or activities did Brock and Amanda have planned for the day of the 
accident? (Dummy 3-A & B) 
 A. Going to a movie 
 B. Going out to dinner 
 C. Going to a concert 
 D. Going to a party 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
The transcript included testimony concerning airbags in Brock Collins’s car.  Which of 
the following was included? (Dummy 4-B & C) 
 A. The airbags inflated 
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 B. The airbags did not inflate 
 C. The airbags may have been defective 
 D. The car did not have airbags 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Amanda Johnson required serious medical treatment for her broken leg when she arrived 
at the emergency room.  What procedure(s) did she need? (Dummy 5-A & D) 
 A. A metal plate to be inserted 
 B. The bone had to be broken further in order to heal properly 
 C. A bone graft 
 D. Metal screws to be inserted 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this study.  To ensure that you are paying attention to the 
questions, please mark A for this question.   (Attention check-A) 
 A. He put the car into reverse 
 B. He stopped the car 
 C. He turned sharply to his right 
 D. He pulled the emergency brake 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
True/False Questions: 
  
 The true/false question section featured one question per page, presented in 
random order. 
 
 The following instructions were listed at the top of each page: 
 
There are lots of witnesses and lots of evidence in trials.  Sometimes testimony is 
consistent, sometimes it’s contradictory, sometimes different witnesses disagree, and 
sometimes accounts vary. 
Please answer the following True or False questions regarding the trial transcript. 
These questions are designed to test your memory for the information in the trial 
testimony, not your personal opinion on what actually happened or what is correct.   
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How you answer these questions should not depend on which witnesses you believe to 
have been accurate or those you believe to have been inaccurate—just the content of the 
testimony itself.  
Questions (21 total—one for each of the 15 inconsistencies, five dummy questions, and 
one attention check; True, False, and I don’t know were answer choices): 
 
There was a discrepancy in the testimony about which side of Michael McGraw’s van 
was hit by the tanker trailer. (T; PI 1/S&B 1) 
 
 
There were different estimates given for how far across the center line of the road the 
truck was before the accident. (T; PI 2/S&B 3) 
 
 
One witness testified that the semi truck swerved both to the right and to the left prior to 
the accident. (T; PI 3/S&B 3) 
 
 
Only one oil company logo was identified on the tanker trailer according to the transcript. 
(F; PI 4/S&B 6) 
 
 
Out of all descriptions of Brock Collins’s car within the trial testimony, there was no 
discrepancy concerning the make and model of the car. (F; PI 5-model) 
 
 
There was no testimony claiming that Amanda Johnson had hurt her left leg. (F; PI 6) 
 
 
Not all witnesses agreed in their testimony about what color hair Michael McGraw had. 
(T; PI 7) 
 
 
All witnesses who described the aftermath of the accident agreed with each other about 
the order in which the police and ambulance arrived on the scene. (F; PI 8) 
 
 
There was conflicting testimony given regarding the year of Brock Collins’s car. (T; PI 
9-year) 
 
 
There was no conflict in testimony given regarding the color of Michael McGraw’s van. 
(F; PI 10-color) 
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There were multiple store names given for the jewelry store in the trial transcript. (T; PI 
11) 
 
 
Brock Collins’s car hit an object before finally coming to rest, and all testimony 
concerning that object agreed about exactly what that object was. (F; PI 12) 
 
 
Different witnesses named different breeds when describing Lesley Jobin’s dog. (T; PI 
13) 
 
 
There were no conflicting descriptions of the police officer’s gender. (F; PI 14) 
 
 
There were conflicting accounts of how traffic is controlled at the intersection. (T; PI 15) 
 
 
There was conflicting testimony concerning Amanda Johnson’s job before the accident. 
(F; Dummy 1) 
 
 
There was no discrepancy in the transcript concerning who called 911 about the accident. 
(T; Dummy 2) 
 
 
There was conflicting testimony concerning where Brock and Amanda were going when 
the accident occurred. (F; Dummy 3) 
 
 
There was no testimony saying that the airbags deployed in Brock Collins’s car. (T; 
Dummy 4) 
 
 
There was conflicting testimony given regarding the medical procedures performed on 
Amanda Johnson to help heal her broken bones. (F; Dummy 5) 
 
 
Thank you for your continued attention and hard work.  The study is almost over, so 
please mark this answer true so that we will know that you’re still paying attention. (T; 
Attention Check) 
 
Point Blank Questions: 
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 These questions were designed to be as direct as possible without creating 
demand characteristics.  There was only one set of questions per page (that is, two 
consecutive pages per witness—done to prevent any confusion over whether the two 
hypotheticals were the same, whether they should be evaluated in conjunction with each 
other, whether the same Juror 1 and Juror 2 are the focus each question, etc.)  Order of 
presentation was randomized by witness, with all witnesses except Amanda Johnson 
featuring two consecutive pages, each page with one question apiece.  Because Amanda 
Johnson’s testimony is associated with four testimonial inconsistencies, the four pages 
featuring questions concerning her testimony were always presented last. 
 
The following instructions appeared at the top of each page: 
 
For this final section of questions, you will be asked to evaluate the way two different 
jurors each viewed a particular witness’s testimony. 
 
Each question should be answered independently of all others.  The way you answer one 
question should not have any bearing on how you answer any other question. 
 
Questions (16 total—one for each of the 15 inconsistencies and one manipulation 
check): 
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Marc Zollinger to be inaccurate but their 
opinions were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree with? 
 
 The juror who found Marc Zollinger’s testimony to be inaccurate because he said 
that Brock Collins was driving a Corvette while another witness said he was driving a 
Camry. 
 The juror who found Marc Zollinger’s testimony to be inaccurate because he said 
that Brock Collins was driving a Camaro while another witness said he was driving a 
Camry. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 1; PI 5-model) 
 
 The juror who found Marc Zollinger’s testimony to be inaccurate because he said 
that Lesley Jobin’s dog was a Doberman while another witness said it was a German 
Shepherd. 
 The juror who found Marc Zollinger’s testimony to be inaccurate because he said 
that Lesley Jobin’s dog was a Dachshund while another witness said it was a German 
Shepherd. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 2; PI 13) 
 
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Barbara Feldman to be inaccurate but their 
opinions were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree with?  
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 The juror who found Barbara Feldman’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
said that Michael McGraw’s van was green while another witness said it was white. 
 The juror who found Barbara Feldman’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
said that Michael McGraw’s van was tan while another witness said it was white. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 2; PI 10-color) 
  
 The juror who found Barbara Feldman’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
said that the police officer who responded to the scene was a woman while another 
witness said it was a man. 
 The juror who found Barbara Feldman’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
said that the police officer who responded to the scene was small in size while another 
witness said he’s large. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors.  
 (Juror 1; PI 14) 
 
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Jill Randall to be inaccurate but their opinions 
were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree with?  
 
The juror who found Jill Randall’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that the intersection of Foothill and Windsor has a stop sign while another witness said it 
has a stop light to control traffic. 
 The juror who found Jill Randall’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that the intersection of Foothill and Windsor has a yield sign while another witness said it 
has a stop light to control traffic. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 1; PI 15)  
 
The juror who found Jill Randall’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that Michael McGraw has red hair while another witness said he has black hair. 
 The juror who found Jill Randall’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that Michael McGraw has blond hair while another witness said he has black hair. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 1; PI 7) 
 
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Steve Powell to be inaccurate but their 
opinions were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree with?  
 
The juror who found Steve Powell’s testimony to be inaccurate because he said 
that the fire department arrived at the accident scene first while another witness said the 
police arrived first. 
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The juror who found Steve Powell’s testimony to be inaccurate because he said 
that the ambulance arrived at the accident scene first while another witness said the police 
arrived first. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 2; PI 8) 
 
The juror who found Steve Powell’s testimony to be inaccurate because he said 
that Amanda Johnson’s right arm was injured while another witness said her right leg was 
injured. 
The juror who found Steve Powell’s testimony to be inaccurate because he said 
that Amanda Johnson’s left leg was injured while another witness said her right leg was 
injured. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 2; PI 6) 
 
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Lesley Jobin to be inaccurate but their 
opinions were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree with?  
 
The juror who found Lesley Jobin’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that she was in front of the Kay jewelry store when she saw the accident while another 
witness said it was a Zales jewelry store. 
 The juror who found Lesley Jobin’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that she was in front of the Jared jewelry store when she saw the accident while another 
witness said it was a Zales jewelry store. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 2; PI 11) 
 
The juror who found Lesley Jobin’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that Brock Collins’s car came to a stop when it crashed into a tree while another witness 
said it crashed into a street light pole. 
 The juror who found Lesley Jobin’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that Brock Collins’s car came to a stop when it crashed into a tree while another witness 
said it crashed into a bus stop. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 1; PI 12) 
 
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Dr. Matthew Freeman to be inaccurate but 
their opinions were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree 
with?  
 
 The juror who found Dr. Matthew Freeman’s testimony to be inaccurate because 
he said that Brock Collins’s car was a 1986 Toyota Camry while another witness said it 
was a 2006 Toyota Camry. 
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 The juror who found Dr. Matthew Freeman’s testimony to be inaccurate because 
he said that Brock Collins’s car was a 2002 Toyota Camry while another witness said it 
was a 2006 Toyota Camry. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 1; PI 9-year) 
 
 The juror who found Dr. Matthew Freeman’s testimony to be inaccurate because 
he said that Brock and Amanda were on their way to a concert when the accident 
occurred while another witness said they were on their way to a movie and dinner. 
 The juror who found Dr. Matthew Freeman’s testimony to be inaccurate because 
he said that Brock and Amanda were on their way to a party when the accident occurred 
while another witness said they were on their way to a movie and dinner. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Neither; Dummy/Manipulation check/camouflage) 
  
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Amanda Johnson to be inaccurate but their 
opinions were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree with?  
 
 The juror who found Amanda Johnson’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
said that the rear of Michael McGraw’s van was damaged by the truck while another 
witness said it was damaged on the passenger side. 
 The juror who found Amanda Johnson’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
said that the driver’s side of Michael McGraw’s van was damaged by the truck while 
another witness said it was damaged on the passenger side. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 2; PI 1/S&B 1) 
 
 The juror who found Amanda Johnson’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
first said that prior to the accident, the semi truck was three-quarters of the way across the 
center of the road and then later said that it was only halfway across the center of the 
road. 
 The juror who found Amanda Johnson’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
first said that prior to the accident, the semi truck was three-quarters of the way across the 
center of the road and then later said that it was only a quarter of the way across the 
center of the road. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 1; PI 2/S&B 3) 
 
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Amanda Johnson to be inaccurate but their 
opinions were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree with?  
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 The juror who found Amanda Johnson’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
first said that prior to the accident, the semi truck swerved to her right and then later said 
that it swerved to her right and went into a spin. 
 The juror who found Amanda Johnson’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
first said that prior to the accident, the semi truck swerved to her right and then later said 
that it swerved to her left. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 2; PI 3/S&B 3) 
 
 The juror who found Amanda Johnson’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
first said that she saw the Shell company logo on the tanker trailer and then later said that 
she saw the Exxon company logo on the tanker trailer. 
 The juror who found Amanda Johnson’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
first said that she saw the Shell company logo on the tanker trailer and then later said that 
she saw the BP company logo on the tanker trailer. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 1; PI 4/S&B 6) 
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APPENDIX G 
Study One Informed Consent 
 
  
  
ADULT ONLINE CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
  
Civil Juror Decision-Making 
  
IRB Approval # 100411-01 
  
Thank you for looking into our study. Over the next few webpages you will read a description of a civil trial 
and some jury instructions, and then answer some questions about the case. Before participating, please 
read the information in the official consent document below.  
  
**IMPORTANT: You may use any of the following web browsers AS LONG AS JAVASCRIPT IS 
ENABLED: Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Apple Safari, and Internet Explorer.  If you have 
JavaScript turned off, or use any add-ons, extensions, or shortcuts which block JavaScript, please 
either disable them, add qualtrics.com to the list of approved sites, enable JavaScript, or run your 
browser in Safe Mode** 
  
Please complete this study at one time.  If for any reason you are not able to complete the study in one 
sitting, you will have to start over.  The experiment takes roughly 60 to 90 minutes to complete.  
  
Please note, you must have cookies and JavaScript enabled on your browser in order to participate.  If you 
click the button below but do not leave this page, your browser is not supporting cookies.  Cookies are used 
only so that you can have a unique identification number for this study; no personal information will be 
stored in cookies. 
  
As a student in the FIU Psychology Participant Pool (enrolled in PSY 2012 or other class), you are invited to 
participate in a research study conducted over the Web. The following information is provided to help you 
make an informed decision whether or not to participate. Your participation is completely voluntary, and not 
participating will not affect your class grade in any way. You must be at least 18 years old to participate. 
  
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
You are being asked to be in a research study.  The purpose of this study is to investigate how jurors make 
decisions.  Completion of this study will take approximately one hour. 
  
NUMBER OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
If you decide to be in this study, you will be one of approximately 100 people in this research study. 
  
DURATION OF THE STUDY 
Your participation will require approximately 60 to 90 minutes.  
  
PROCEDURES 
If you agree to be in the study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
1.      You will be asked to read along with and listen to a case scenario involving a civil lawsuit in which a 
plaintiff is suing a defendant for negligence. You will be asked to answer questions about the events 
described on a Web page. You will be asked to imagine you are a juror in the case and to decide whether 
the defendant is liable and whether the plaintiff is entitled to any money-based damages. We will also ask 
how you feel and your opinion on various aspects of the case. You can refuse to answer any question and 
cease participation at any time. 
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RISKS AND/OR DISCOMFORTS 
The following risks may be associated with your participation in this study: You might become upset when 
you read or render a verdict about the case involving an automobile accident, especially if you or someone 
you know has been involved in a similar accident. This event is unlikely, but if you are concerned about it 
you may withdraw from the study at any time 
  
BENEFITS 
The following benefits may be associated with your participation in this study: you may find the learning 
experience enjoyable, you may learn a little bit about how psychological research is conducted, and the 
process may help you better understand the legal process. The information gained from this study will help 
us better understand the factors that influence juror decision-making processes and to improve trial 
procedures. 
  
ALTERNATIVES 
You do not need to participate in this research. Your instructor may have alternative means for you to earn 
class credit, though your participation here may satisfy your instructor’s research requirements.    
  
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The records of this study will be kept private and will be protected to the fullest extent provided by law. In 
any sort of report we might publish, we will not include any information that will make it possible to identify a 
subject.  Research records will be stored securely and only the researcher team will have access to the 
records.  
  
Any information obtained during this study that could identify you will be kept strictly confidential. The study 
will collect information about your IP address and the browser you are using. No personal information will be 
placed on your browser by the use of cookies. So that participation credit may be given, you will be required 
to enter your Panther ID number and your name. The personal information collected will be deleted from the 
database once data collection is completed and credit has been given. The information gained from this 
study may be published in scientific journals or presented at scientific meetings, but your identity will be kept 
strictly confidential. 
  
COMPENSATION & COSTS 
There is no financial compensation to you as a result of participating in this study. Completion of this study 
earns partial credit toward the FIU Psychology Participant Pool requirements as outlined by your professor 
and on http://fiu.sona-systems.com/. For participating in this study you will receive one and a half research 
credits. You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without adversely 
affecting your relationship with the investigators or Florida International University. There will be no negative 
consequences for deciding not to participate or for withdrawing. If you choose to not participate in this study, 
you may satisfy your course requirements through other studies registered with the FIU Psychology 
Participant Pool at http://fiu.sona-systems.com/, or you may contact your course instructor to arrange an 
alternative method of obtaining credit. Participation in human subjects research is not required to earn credit 
in any class, and your professor is required to offer an alternative method of obtaining credit. You will not be 
responsible for any costs to participate in this study. 
  
RIGHT TO DECLINE OR WITHDRAW 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You are free to participate in the study or withdraw your consent 
at any time during the study.  Your withdrawal or lack of participation will not affect any benefits to which you 
are otherwise entitled.  
  
RESEARCHER CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you have any questions about the purpose, procedures, or any other issues relating to this research study 
you may contact Stephen Joy at [PHONE NUMBER REDACTED], or at [EMAIL ADDRESS REDACTED].  
  
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you would like to talk with someone about your rights of being a subject in this research study or about 
ethical issues with this research study, you may contact the FIU Office of Research Integrity by phone at 
[PHONE NUMBER REDACTED] or by [EMAIL ADDRESS REDACTED]. 
 
PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT 
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I have read the information in this consent form and agree to participate in this study.  I have had a chance 
to ask any questions I have about this study, and they have been answered for me.  By clicking on the 
“consent to participate” button below I am providing my informed consent. 
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APPENDIX H 
Witness-Specific Likert Scales 
Witness Credibility Ratings 
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Witness Persuasiveness Ratings 
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APPENDIX I 
Demographic Questions 
 1.   In what year were you born (yyyy)?      ____________________ 
 
2. What is your gender?     Check one:            Male              Female   
 
3. What is your ethnic origin/race? 
____  White/Caucasian  ____  American Indian 
____  Hispanic  ____  Asian    
  ___  African American  ____  Other _______________________   
 
4.  Indicate your highest educational training as of this date.  (check one) 
____  Freshman  ____  Junior 
____  Sophomore  ____  Senior  
____  Professional or graduate school ____  Other _______________________ 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 5.  What is your current work status? Check one: 
 
           Employed full time            Employed part time            Unemployed 
 
 6.  What is your occupation? ______________________________________________                            
 
 7.  What is your place of employment? ______________________________________                           
 
8.  Is English your primary language?      Yes _____                  No _____ 
 
 How many years have you spoken English?   ______ Years 
 
If English is not your primary language, what is your primary language? 
 
 _______________________________ 
 
 If English is not your primary language, how fluent are you in English? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
         
Not at all Fluent  Somewhat  
Fluent 
 Very  
Fluent 
 
 
9. Do you speak Spanish?  Yes ____ No ____ 
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 If you speak Spanish, how many years have you spoken Spanish?   ______ Years 
 
 If you speak Spanish, how fluent are you in Spanish?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
         
Not at all Fluent  Somewhat  
Fluent 
 Very  
Fluent 
 
10. Have you ever served as a juror before?  Yes ____  No ____ 
 
 If yes, was it a civil case or a criminal case?   Civil ____ Criminal ____ 
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APPENDIX J 
Participant Debriefing Information 
 
Thank you for your participation in our study.  Please read the debriefing material 
below. 
 
Debriefing Material 
 
This study is investigating the impact that emotional state and emotion regulation efforts 
have on the way people perceive and process information in a legal context.  While jurors 
are usually instructed by the judge to make decisions based on the law rather than 
emotional responses or “gut feeling” reasoning, sometimes it can be difficult to set aside 
emotional reactions when trying to make a decision.  These experiments will allow us to 
gain a better understanding of how to facilitate attentive, effortful, and thorough juror 
decision-making. 
 
This study exposed some participants to film clips intended to artificially manipulate their 
emotions.  Some clips were shown in order to put participants into a more angry 
emotional state, some clips were show to put participants into a more fearful emotional 
state, and some film clips were shown for the purpose of not changing emotional state at 
all.  This study exposed some participants to testimonial inconsistencies (witnesses 
confusing facts or giving testimony outside their sphere of experience) while other 
participants received a consistent trial transcript. 
 
We expect to find that participants in certain moods (like anger) will process the trial 
transcript differently than those participants in uncertain moods (like fear). That is, prior 
research indicates that anger (a certain emotion) can decrease participants’ ability to 
process information (and detect inconsistencies) while fear (an uncertain emotion) can 
compel deeper information processing (and may increase detection of inconsistencies). 
This research will further test this possibility as well as lay groundwork for future 
research aimed at reducing the impact of emotions on how people perceive and process 
information.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the experiment, please contact the main 
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researcher, Stephen Joy at [PHONE NUMBER REDACTED] or [EMAIL ADDRESS 
REDACTED].  You may also contact Patricia Price, the Institutional Review Board 
Chairperson at [PHONE NUMBER REDACTED] or [EMAIL ADDRESS 
REDACTED]. 
 
Again, thank you very much for your participation in this study. 
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APPENDIX K 
 
Open Ended Question Coding Instructions 
 
Note: These are the exact scoring instructions furnished to the two research assistants. 
 
Purpose of the Coding: 
In a nutshell, I’m trying to determine the detection rates for each of the 15 different Plain 
Inconsistencies (abbreviated PIs throughout) that are present in a trial transcript. 
 
Ultimately, I’m interested in which PIs are reported as well as how often and to what 
extent they’re reported. 
 
What I need from you guys is to go through the responses to determine which PIs the 
participants picked up on.  It will be tricky, especially at the beginning, so we’re going to 
take things slow and kind of go over everything together at first, then you’ll practice a 
little bit on your own, and then we’ll meet again to go over everything again before I give 
you the real data. 
 
Materials/Files: 
Johnson v McGraw (Word doc)—this is the trial transcript, complete with each PI-
relevant statement marked and highlighted 
List of All Incons (Excel file)—this is a list of all PIs and the individual details of each PI 
Open Ended Coding Instructions (Word doc)—that’s this... 
Open Ended Incon Detection Questions (Word doc)—this is a list of all of the Open 
Ended  questions 
Study One OE Practice Data (Excel file; one for each of you)—this is for training 
purposes concerning the Open Ended questions 
Study One OE Practice Answer Key (Excel file)—I’ll give this to you guys after we’re 
finished with the OE Practice Data exercise, just to be used as a reference/example later 
on 
Study One OE Data (Excel file; one for each of you)—I’ll give this to you guys after 
we’re finished with the OE Practice Data exercise 
 
Order of Steps/Plan of Attack: 
1.  First, you’ll each need to familiarize yourselves with the trial transcript itself.  The 
version you’ll have to use (Johnson v McGraw 15 PIs ALL Incons Marked Word 
document) has each element of each PI noted and highlighted, with the number of each 
inconsistency given, as well as whether that element is the true/consistent portion, or 
whether it’s the inconsistent/false portion of the testimony.  Only witnesses for the 
plaintiff’s side make any inconsistent statements, but you should still be familiar with the 
defense witnesses’ testimony too, since noticing some of the inconsistencies depends (in 
whole or in part) on their testimony as well. 
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While you’re reading over the transcript, you can follow along with all 15 of the PIs 
(both the consistent and inconsistent portions) by using the List of All Incons Excel file. 
 
2.  After you’ve each had time to read over the trial transcript, we can meet to go over 
everything and I can answer any questions you might have at that point. 
 
3.  After we have a chance to go over everything in person (don’t dive in on this until we 
have a chance to meet), you can try coding the rest of the practice data (Study One 
Practice OEs Only Excel file—the two files are identical except for the fact that I’ve 
made a separate one for each of you with your name on it, just to keep potential 
confusion to a minimum).  I’ve done the first few participants myself so you can sort of 
use that as guidance.  More detail on this is below… 
 
4.  Once you’ve worked out the practice coding and made note of any questions you have 
along the way and any responses you’re not sure how to code, we can all meet again to 
go over everything together so that we’re all on the same page. 
 
5.  At that point, I’ll have the real data files ready for you to code.  We can meet again 
after you’ve each had time to get started but before you get too far along just to make 
sure we’re all using the same sort of criteria. 
 
6.  After confirming that we’re all coding the same way, you can finish your files 
independently, making note of any responses that you’re unsure about.  After you’re both 
finished, you two can meet without me to talk through those issues, and if there’s still 
something you two can’t figure out, or if you can’t come to an agreement (which is 
perfectly okay—don’t feel like you must agree with each other 100%--it’s far better for 
you both to be confident in your reasoning than to persuade the other…), then Dr. Winter 
and/or I can weigh in. 
 
7.  When we have all the Open Ended questions finished, we’ll move on to much the 
same procedure for the other batch of questions but with a few minor differences that 
we’ll worry about later on… 
 
Background Details: 
 
The question abbreviations are organized according to which Plain Inconsistency (PI) the 
question involves.  See the List of All Incons Excel file for a complete description of all 
15 of them. 
 
However, the survey software only allows a certain number of characters in naming 
variables, which is why there are no spaces or commas between some of the numbers.  
They are listed in numerical order though, which should clear up some of the confusion.  
Also, “OEPI” stands for “Open Ended Plain Inconsistency” meaning that the broad 
question is intended to elicit answers including each of the inconsistencies according to 
the numbers listed, but they’re structured to mainly elicit yes/no/I don’t know sorts of 
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responses.  However, “OEH” stands for “Open Ended How”, which is basically an 
elaboration on the preceding question—“If so, who and how so?”  See the Open Ended 
Incon Detection Questions Word document for the full list of the questions. 
 
General Interpretation of Content as a Yes or a Partial Response: 
 
For the OE (Open Ended) questions, to count as a “Yes” response, it should be clear that 
they were aware of that particular inconsistency to some extent.  They don’t need to 
provide every single detail—the names of all people who testified consistently, the 
person who made the inconsistency, both the consistent and the inconsistent elements, 
etc.—just enough information that there isn’t any doubt or uncertainty whether they 
noticed the inconsistency.  Even if they get some of the details wrong, if it’s undeniable 
that they noticed the inconsistency to some degree, it should count as a “Yes”. 
 
For the OE (Open Ended) questions, to count as a “Partial” response, there should be 
enough information that you’re pretty sure that they noticed the inconsistency to some 
extent, even if they’re vague and don’t give you much detail.  All you need to find is that 
the response seems to support the notion that they detected the inconsistency to some 
degree.  A “Partial” doesn’t depend on the overall percentage of accuracy or detail within 
their answer, but rather your certainty that they spotted it at all.  If you think they 
probably spotted the inconsistency based on their answer but there isn’t anything absolute 
or definite mentioned that makes it beyond a doubt that they spotted the inconsistency, 
that’s still enough.  Basically, if based on their answer you think they probably spotted 
something about the inconsistency, it counts as a “Partial”.  Even something as vague and 
unclear as “there was something iffy about the cop” would be enough to count as a PI 14 
Partial.  Since this is the most broadly open ended type of question the participants 
answered, we’ll want to code everything with the most accommodating and flexible 
standards we’ll be using throughout the coding process. 
 
This kind of flexibility could be tricky if someone were to say “there’s something iffy 
about the cars” because we wouldn’t know for sure whether they’re talking about PI 5 
(Camry/Corvette), PI 9 (1986/2006 Camry), or even PI 10 (tan/white van).  This sort of 
response would be perfect for you to make a note to discuss with each other later on, after 
you’ve gone through everything the first time by yourself.  If you can’t come to an 
agreement with each other, or you simply don’t know how to make a ruling, then you can 
bring me in to help decide how to code it. 
 
If a participant says that they noticed something inconsistent but they don’t give enough 
information for you to tell in any way whatsoever which inconsistency they’re referring 
to (i.e., “something didn’t seem right”), or that they definitely noticed anything at all 
(they might just be guessing because they think they’re supposed to notice something, or 
they might not have actually paid any attention to the trial transcript and they’re just 
trying to BS their way through an answer because they’ve figured out what we’re 
probably looking for, or if they’re one of those argumentative participants who thinks it’s 
their duty to act like the slightest degree of ambiguity—real or perceived—gives them 
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license to explain why they can’t possibly answer the question, etc.) or if they’re just 
making very vague, unclear, indirect, general statements, then that shouldn’t count as a 
detection. 
 
Specific Coding Instructions: 
 
 For the OEPI questions, only grade if they include actual details and content—don’t 
bother with the “yes/no/I don’t know” types of answers that most will give for these 
questions. 
 
 I found it easiest to just mark an xxx under each cell so that I would know that I had 
already looked at it and didn’t need to revisit it when working on the Practice Excel 
file, but you don’t have to do that if you don’t think it helps you keep track of what 
you’ve already done or to keep all the different lines straight—it’s totally up to you. 
 
 For the Practice File, for the responses of any real substance (not the Yes/No/I Don’t 
Know/Etc. sorts of things), make a little note underneath each answer explaining why 
you did or didn’t code something as a Yes or a Partial.  It will probably be helpful for 
you to put the actual scoring you decide to assign into bold so that you can do the 
final tally for each participant more easily without having to fully re-read everything 
you wrote. 
 
However, when you’re through with the Practice and actually coding the real data, 
you can put as much or as little notes or explanation in the line underneath the actual 
answers as you want.  It’s probably easiest to just put the PI # Yes or PI # Partial 
underneath unless you have questions about how to code an answer.  In that case, 
enter whatever notes you need to make so that you’ll be able to talk it over with each 
other once you’re both done with the bulk of the coding.  Otherwise, you don’t need 
to explain the reason—I only included that in my Practice Excel file to help you to 
see how and why I coded things the way that I did, and I’m only asking that you do 
that for the Practice File so that we’ll be able to discuss things when we meet again 
prior to working on the actual data. 
 
 Mark the total number of times that the participant mentions each PI # Yes and PI # 
Partial, just so we can keep a tally of which inconsistencies are mentioned the most 
often.  There is no need to tally or code any “no” or “I don’t know” responses, or any 
“yes” answers that don’t give any other information.   
 
 The “OEPI_###” questions are phrased in a sort of yes/no format (though obviously 
some participants choose to elaborate on their answers), with the following 
“OEH_###” question being “If so, how?”, which is set up for more detailed answers 
(again, see the Open Ended Incon Detection Questions Word document).  If a 
participant gives a Yes or a Partial answer in the “OEPI_###” question, and then 
again gives the same information or better in the followup “OEH_###” question, only 
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give them the credit for the strongest mention, not two credits for essentially saying 
the same thing twice in the two parts of the same question. 
 
In other words, because the OEPI/OEH questions are paired up with each other, if 
they mention the same PI more than once within the same pairing, (basically, if they 
include the details in both the OEPI and the OEH answer, rather than just answering 
the OEPI with a “yes” and then including the details in the OEH followup question) 
they should only get credit for the same PI once. 
 
 For example: 
OEPI 7 10: Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think 
might have made mistakes in terms of describing various colors? (PI 7; PI 10-
color) 
OEH 7 10: If so, who and how?  If you don’t remember exactly which 
witness(es) might have made this type of mistake, please just describe the 
mistake(s) to the best of your ability. 
 
If they answer OEPI 7 10 with “Yes, someone messed up McGraw’s hair 
color-Jill said it was red but everyone else said black.” And they answer OEH 
7 10 with “McGraw’s hair color was described as red by one witness and 
black by the others.” Then they will only receive one PI 7 Yes scoring 
between both of those since the OEPI and OEH questions are essentially two 
parts of the same question. 
 
 However, if they refer to the same PI more than once across different sets of 
questions, then count each mention (still with only a maximum of one credit per 
question pairing) individually.   
 
For example, if they mention Jill says McGraw has red hair in OEPI_710 and 
OEH_710 as in the illustration above which counts as one PI 7 Yes, and then they 
also mention it in OEPI_6714, and OEH_6714 like so: 
 
OEPI 6 7 14: Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might 
have made mistakes in terms of specific physical descriptions of people? (PI 6; PI 7; 
PI 14) 
OEH 6 7 14: If so, who and how?  If you don’t remember exactly which 
witness(es) might have made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) 
to the best of your ability. 
 
by answering OEPI 6 7 14 with “Yes, McGraw’s hair color was said to be both red 
and black, and one person said the cop was a woman.” And they answer OEH 6 7 14 
with “McGraw’s hair color and the cop’s gender.” Then they would receive one PI 7 
Yes and one PI 14 Yes total for both 6 7 14 questions to go along with the other PI 7 
Yes from the 710 questions. 
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Assuming they didn’t mention hair color or the gender of the cop in any other 
responses, they’d get a total score of two PI 7 Yes responses and one PI 14 Yes 
response.  They wouldn’t get a total of four PI 7-Yes credits because they mentioned 
it four times total, just two, since the two mentions in both 710 questions and the two 
mentions in both 6714 questions are just counted as one each.  I hope this makes 
sense—it’s a pretty straightforward idea that’s uncommonly difficult to succinctly 
describe… 
 
 If you don’t know how to code a response, make a note underneath it and you can 
discuss it with each other after going through the rest of the data. 
 
 If you both are unable to come up with an agreement for how to code something 
tricky after discussing it with each other, then you can bring it to Dr. Winter’s or my 
attention and we’ll make a decision. 
 
 If you have any questions about general rules or practices, please feel free to contact 
me via email or phone/text.  If you have a more specific question like how to interpret 
a particular response (that doesn’t have any broader, general questions associated 
with it), then just make a note of it and you each can discuss these with one another 
after you’ve completed the initial stage of coding. 
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APPENDIX L 
 
Short Answer Question Coding Instructions 
 
Note: These are the exact scoring instructions furnished to the two research assistants. 
 
Purpose of the Coding: 
In a nutshell, I’m trying to determine the detection rates for each of the 15 different Plain 
Inconsistencies (abbreviated PIs throughout) that are present in a trial transcript. 
 
Ultimately, I’m interested in which PIs are reported as well as how often and to what 
extent they’re reported. 
 
What I need from you guys is to go through the responses to determine which PIs the 
participants picked up on.  It will be tricky, especially at the beginning, so we’re going to 
take things slow and kind of go over everything together at first, then you’ll practice a 
little bit on your own, and then we’ll meet again to go over everything again before I give 
you the real data. 
 
Materials/Files: 
Johnson v McGraw (Word doc)—this is the trial transcript, complete with each PI-
relevant statement marked and highlighted 
List of All Incons (Excel file)—this is a list of all PIs and the individual details of each PI 
Short Answer Coding Instructions (Word doc)—that’s this... 
Short Answer Incon Detection Questions (Word doc)—this is a list of all of the Short 
Answer questions 
Study One SA Practice Data (Excel file; one for each of you)—this is for training 
purposes concerning the Short Answer questions 
Study One SA Practice Answer Key (Excel file)—I’ll give this to you guys after we’re 
finished with the SA Practice Data exercise, just to be used as a reference/example later 
on 
Study One SA Data (Excel file; one for each of you)—I’ll give this to you guys after 
we’re finished with the SA Practice Data exercise 
 
Order of Steps/Plan of Attack: 
1.  You’re already familiar with the trial transcript and the 15 different PIs, so really the 
only thing we need to do first is to meet to go over everything and I can explain the 
differences in how the Short Answer questions should be coded in comparison to how we 
coded the Open Ended questions.  I’ll be able to answer any questions you might have at 
that point. 
 
2.  After we have a chance to go over everything in person (don’t dive in on this until we 
have a chance to meet), you can try coding the rest of the practice data (Study One 
Practice SAs Only Excel file—the two files are identical except for the fact that I’ve 
made a separate one for each of you with your name on it, just to keep potential 
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confusion to a minimum).  I’ve done the first few participants myself so you can sort of 
use that as guidance.  More detail on this is below… 
 
3.  Once you’ve worked out the practice coding and made note of any questions you have 
along the way and any responses you’re not sure how to code, we can all meet again to 
go over everything together so that we’re all on the same page. 
 
4.  At that point, I’ll have the real data files ready for you to code.  We can meet again 
after you’ve each had time to get started but before you get too far along just to make 
sure we’re all using the same sort of criteria. 
 
5.  After confirming that we’re all coding the same way, you can finish your files 
independently, making note of any responses that you’re unsure about.  After you’re both 
finished, you two can meet without me to talk through those issues, and if there’s still 
something you two can’t figure out, or if you can’t come to an agreement (which is 
perfectly okay—don’t feel like you must agree with each other 100%--it’s far better for 
you both to be confident in your reasoning than to persuade the other…), then Dr. Winter 
and/or I can weigh in. 
 
6.  When we have all the Short Answer questions finished, we’ll use that data to help 
finalize the trial transcript to only include 5 or so of the original 15 PIs, and then I’ll need 
to test that version again to make sure that people are noticing the 5 remaining PIs at the 
correct rate, so I’ll need you both to help with another batch of OEs and SAs again 
soon… 
 
Background Details: 
 
The question abbreviations are organized according to which Plain Inconsistency (PI) the 
question involves.  See the List of All Incons Excel file for a complete description of all 
15 of them. 
 
“SA” stands for Short Answer, and since the SA questions are less vague and more direct 
in scope, there’s less room for overlap among the questions, so each PI has its own SA PI 
# question, so there’s no need to squeeze a bunch of numbers into the question/variable 
name. 
 
Also, there are five Dummy questions (abbreviated SA D #) which deal with other, fully 
consistent details of the transcript that are included just so that participants don’t realize 
that each question involves a different PI.  You don’t need to worry about these, except to 
look to see if by any chance they mentioned any of the 15 PIs in their responses to the 
five SA D questions. 
 
See the Short Answer Incon Detection Questions Word document for the full list of the 
questions. 
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General Interpretation of Content as a Yes or a Partial Response: 
 
For the SA (Short Answer) questions, to count as a “Yes” response, it should be clear that 
they were aware of that particular inconsistency and whatever level of detail they provide 
should be correct.  This is different than the more forgiving way we coded “Yes” 
responses for the OE (Open Ended) questions.  Here, they still don’t have to give every 
single aspect and detail (such as listing every person who made the consistent statements, 
etc.), but what they do list must be accurate. 
 
For the SA (Short Answer) questions, to count as a “Partial” response, it should be clear 
that they noticed the inconsistency, but they can have some of the details incorrect, 
vague, or missing.  However, it should be clear that they noticed the inconsistency, not 
just the consistent elements (or not just the inconsistent elements).   
 
For example, 
SA PI 7: Several witnesses described Michael McGraw by mentioning his hair 
color.  Please describe the testimony concerning Michael McGraw’s hair color.  Make 
sure you talk about all of the witnesses who mentioned his hair color.  (PI 7) 
 
If they only mention McGraw having black hair, that doesn’t count as a partial detection, 
because even though it’s true, and it’s obviously related to PI 7, that’s only the consistent 
portion of the testimony—it doesn’t give any indication that they noticed the inconsistent 
part, so we wouldn’t score that as a PI 7 Partial.  If they said “McGraw’s hair was 
described as different colors” that would be enough to count as a PI 7 Partial. 
 
Also, since some of the PIs are basically a 50/50 tossup--PI 3 (direction the truck 
swerved), PI 6 (which leg Amanda hurt), PI 8 (order of emergency responders arrival), 
and PI 14 (whether the cop is a man or a woman) more or less only have two conceivable 
answers that can be given, and PI 2 (whether the truck was ½ or ¾ across the center lines) 
is based on a contradiction by Amanda (nobody else says anything about the exact 
degree/extent the truck is on the wrong side of the road), simply listing one of the two 
possibilities is NOT enough for a Partial answer to be scored.  I’ve marked those 
columns in the Practice Excel file with asterisks, and I’ve also bolded the columns as a 
reminder.  I’ve also included **50/50 for these few PIs in the “Broad Type of Incon” 
column on the List of All Incons Excel file. 
 
This is different from how we coded the “Partial” responses for the OE (Open Ended) 
questions, where we were just looking for the very bare minimum standard of “I’m pretty 
sure they noticed something but I’m not absolutely positive that they did.”  Here, we 
want to know for sure that they noticed something, and the degree of flexibility only has 
to do with overall accuracy and correctness. 
 
For the SA_D (Short Answer-Dummy) questions 1 thru 5, there is no inconsistency 
associated with these questions, they’re included in order to provide a number of 
additional questions regarding details of the testimony but which do not feature anything 
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related to inconsistent testimony.  That way, participants do not think that every single 
question must obviously have some sort of inconsistent statement associated with it, and 
we won’t have people guessing or trying to deduce the answers we’re looking for without 
actually noticing the details and information themselves.  Still, you should read through 
each of them in case there might be some additional information volunteered that has to 
do with one of the 15 inconsistencies, in which case you can code it accordingly. 
 
If a participant says that they noticed something inconsistent but they don’t give enough 
information for you to tell in any way whatsoever which inconsistency they’re referring 
to (i.e., “something didn’t seem right”), or that they definitely noticed anything at all 
(they might just be guessing because they think they’re supposed to notice something, or 
they might not have actually paid any attention to the trial transcript and they’re just 
trying to BS their way through an answer because they’ve figured out what we’re 
probably looking for, or if they’re one of those argumentative participants who thinks it’s 
their duty to act like the slightest degree of ambiguity—real or perceived—gives them 
license to explain why they can’t possibly answer the question, etc.) or if they’re just 
making very vague, unclear, indirect, general statements, then that shouldn’t count as a 
detection. 
 
Specific Coding Instructions: 
 
 I found it easiest to just mark an xxx under each cell so that I would know that I had 
already looked at it and didn’t need to revisit it when working on the Practice Excel 
file, but you don’t have to do that if you don’t think it helps you keep track of what 
you’ve already done or to keep all the different lines straight—it’s totally up to you. 
 
 For the Practice File, for the responses of any real substance (not the Yes/No/I Don’t 
Know/Etc. sorts of things), make a little note underneath each answer explaining why 
you did or didn’t code something as a Yes or a Partial.  It will probably be helpful for 
you to put the actual scoring you decide to assign into bold so that you can do the 
final tally for each participant more easily without having to fully re-read everything 
you wrote. 
 
However, when you’re through with the Practice and actually coding the real data, 
you can put as much or as little notes or explanation in the line underneath the actual 
answers as you want.  It’s probably easiest to just put the PI # Yes or PI # Partial 
underneath unless you have questions about how to code an answer.  In that case, 
enter whatever notes you need to make so that you’ll be able to talk it over with each 
other once you’re both done with the bulk of the coding.  Otherwise, you don’t need 
to explain the reason—I only included that in my Practice Excel file to help you to 
see how and why I coded things the way that I did, and I’m only asking that you do 
that for the Practice File so that we’ll be able to discuss things when we meet again 
prior to working on the actual data. 
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 Mark the total number of times that the participant mentions each PI # Yes and PI # 
Partial, just so we can keep a tally of which inconsistencies are mentioned the most 
often.  There is no need to tally or code any “no” or “I don’t know” responses, or any 
“yes” answers that don’t give any other information.   
 
 The Short Answer questions are pretty direct in their wording, so there shouldn’t be 
too many cases of participants mentioning a PI other than the specific one from the 
question itself, but I’m sure there will be cases where someone might misunderstand 
the intention of the question, or where they might think that another PI is equally 
applicable to the way the question is phrased, so just keep your eyes open for that and 
make sure to record the tally accurately. 
 
 If you don’t know how to code a response, make a note underneath it and you can 
discuss it with each other after going through the rest of the data. 
 
 If you both are unable to come up with an agreement for how to code something 
tricky after discussing it with each other, then you can bring it to Dr. Winter’s or my 
attention and we’ll make a decision. 
 
 If you have any questions about general rules or practices, please feel free to contact 
me via email or phone/text.  If you have a more specific question like how to interpret 
a particular response (that doesn’t have any broader, general questions associated 
with it), then just make a note of it and you each can discuss these with one another 
after you’ve completed the initial stage of coding. 
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APPENDIX M 
Study One Scoring, Scale Creation, and Evaluation of Inconsistencies 
Verification of Inter-rater Reliability 
 Skewness and kurtosis values for the distribution of “Yes” and “Partial” detection 
scores on the open ended questions exceeded twice the absolute value of their standard 
errors for all 15 inconsistencies calculated for two research assistants individually using 
their data sets from their individual ratings done before discussion with each other, after 
discussion with each other, and collapsing the “Yes” and “Partial” scores into a single 
total of scored detections for both research assistants individually before discussion and 
again after discussion.  The short answer questions were similarly non-normally 
distributed based on skewness and kurtosis values predominantly exceeding twice the 
absolute value of their standard errors for the same treatments and tests of data.  
Furthermore, because n = 100, I used Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality to confirm, 
which showed that for all non-constant scores (conducted on the same array of individual 
before and after ratings and collapses of data), inconsistency detection was not normally 
distributed (p < .001).  Because of this non-normal distribution, I relied on Kendall’s tau-
b correlation to verify inter-rater reliability rather than Pearson’s or Spearman’s 
correlations. 
Construction of Scales to Compare Relative Ease of Detection for Each 
Inconsistency 
 I used a wide range of measures to thoroughly compare the detection rates of each 
inconsistency to all others (see Appendix F for all questions used).  Those measures 
included open ended questions wherein detections were coded as either a “Yes” or a 
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“Partial” detection (see Appendix K for open ended scoring rubric) by two individual 
research assistants, short answer questions in which detections were also coded as either a 
“Yes” or a “Partial” detection (see Appendix L for short answer scoring rubric) by two 
individual research assistants, multiple choice questions which each required multiple 
correct answers to unequivocally count as a detection, true or false questions (which were 
not a typical, true 50/50 proposition because an “I don’t know” option was included to 
deter guessing), and “point blank” questions which forced participants to identify which 
inconsistency was included in the testimony when presented with the details of the actual 
inconsistency and another similar inconsistency which was not in the transcript, as well 
as a third “I don’t know” option to discourage guessing. 
 The variety of different ways to interpret and synergize the multiple disparate 
formats of data into a single metric for the purpose of evaluating the worthiness of each 
inconsistency for use in the later studies required me to come up with an overall scale to 
integrate the detection rate data.  I was able to create several such scales, but before 
detailing their creation and components, I must explain how I interpreted each type of 
question. 
 Open Ended and Short Answer Questions 
 Although the research assistants used different thresholds of scoring for the open 
ended and short answer codings, the nature of the data set and the logistics of 
interpretation was common to both, so they will be discussed jointly for the purposes of 
this description. 
 The way I quantified the open ended data is based on the way both research 
assistants scored the set of data, and it takes into account the fact that they were recording 
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the total number of mentions of a detection for each inconsistency (this turned out to be 
something I later recoded into a binary “present/absent” variable, since certain 
inconsistencies lended themselves to being described in response to more than one 
question—especially among the open ended questions—while others would only be a 
natural response to one question) so the number of mentions, which is reflected in all Yes 
and Partial values, is not a reliable means of distinguishing detection rates.  However, 
they remained useful as an index of agreement between research assistants, particularly 
when comparing the Before values (each assistant coded the data independently) to the 
After values (after meeting to compare the way they coded everything and to discuss and 
justify why they coded a particular response in a particular way with the goal of coming 
to a consensus if/when possible.) 
 For a full description of coding procedures and instructions, see Appendices K 
and L, but the primary difference between open ended and short answer coding 
instructions related to the degree of flexibility allowed in defining a “Yes” or a “Partial” 
detection.  Since open-ended questions lack specificity by nature, the degree of flexibility 
was greater for the open ended responses.  However, since the short answer questions 
were far more specific in their wording, the research assistants were instructed to be 
much more exclusive and strict in their scoring and interpretations.   
 In creating my final scales to rank and evaluate the detection rates of all 15 
inconsistencies in relation to each other for the open ended and short answer questions, I 
focused only on the data sets each research assistant submitted after their discussion.  I 
came up with four different ways to recode or “finalize” the open ended and short answer 
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data into a value corresponding to an overall detection rate for each inconsistency. In 
order of “loosest” level to “strictest” level, the resulting categories include: 
 CombiLoose: If at least one research assistant gave any credit whatsoever (Yes or 
Partial) to that participant for that particular inconsistency. 
 CombiMed: Both research assistants must give some sort of credit (Yes or 
Partial) to that participant for that particular inconsistency. 
 CombiHighBoth: Both research assistants must give that participant the exact 
same credit (with both giving Yes or both giving Partial) for that particular 
inconsistency. 
 CombiHighYes: Both research assistants must give that participant the exact same 
credit (counting only Yes scores) for that particular inconsistency. 
 
I will return to discussion of these four scoring schemes below when outlining the 
process I used to aggregate all question types into metrics to assist in selecting those 
inconsistencies to retain for use in the remainder of the research. 
 Multiple Choice Questions 
 Out of all participants who were not excluded from analysis at the outset (N = 
100), 19 of them did not report a single inconsistency by selecting the two different 
choices corresponding to the correct consistent and correct inconsistent information 
presented in the trial transcript.  While it is unclear whether these participants truly did 
not notice any of the inconsistencies, or they did notice but simply did not understand the 
instructions—particularly that they were told it was okay to select more than one answer, 
or if perhaps they were not truly engaged, paying attention, and earnestly participating, 
they did not meet any of the pre-established criteria for exclusion.  Nevertheless, the 
possibility remains that they may not have been fully engaged participants (though they 
each did indicate having noticed inconsistencies through other question formats), so I 
elected to consider detection rate data for the multiple choice questions both with them (N 
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= 100), and without them (N = 81) to provide an upper and lower boundary to the 
detection rates among the multiple choice questions. 
 True or False Questions 
 Interpreting the true or false inconsistency detection rates was straightforward.  
Eight of the 15 non-dummy questions were phrased in a manner such that an 
inconsistency detection corresponded with a “True” response, and seven of 15 were 
phrased in a manner where a “False” response indicated an inconsistency detection.  
Detection rates for each inconsistency were simply the percentage of participants who 
answered the non-dummy questions in a manner indicating a detection. 
 Point Blank Questions 
 The point blank questions presented participants with two jurors, both of whom 
found one of the witness’s (whichever witness makes the inconsistent statement of 
interest) to be inaccurate but for two different reasons.  Participants were asked which of 
the two hypothetical jurors they most agreed with, both of whom said there was an 
inconsistency. However, one provided a reason based on the exact details of the 
manipulated inconsistency while the other provided a reason based on details similar to 
but not present in the manipulated inconsistency. For example, for the point blank 
question associated with PI 5-Model, the choices are whether Marc Zollinger’s testimony 
is inaccurate because he said that Brock Collins drove a Corvette (which is how the 
inconsistency is presented in the testimony) or because he said that Brock Collins drove a 
Camaro (which is not the basis of the inconsistent testimony).  There is also an “I don’t 
agree with either of these jurors.” option. 
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 The point blank questions can actually provide two different “levels” of 
diagnostic information.  First, those participants who correctly identify the basis of the 
incorrect testimony are credited with having detected the inconsistency.  Second, those 
participants who selected the incorrect basis (essentially, those who did not get the 
question right, but who nevertheless indicated some belief in an inconsistency concerning 
the topic at issue, or who may have noticed an inconsistency but could not recalled the 
exact details correctly—basically, everyone but those participants who chose “I don’t 
agree with either of these jurors.”) are able to provide a very liberal definition of 
detection.  Of course, these participants may have simply guessed or deduced the nature 
of the inconsistency based on exposure to prior questions, and for that reason this would 
make a terrible metric if it were the sole measure of inconsistency detection rate, but as 
the final set of questions, and as the most liberal interpretation of the most direct and 
“easiest” of the inconsistency detection measures, it is useful enough to simply consider 
these participants who did not answer the question distinctly incorrectly within the more 
lenient of the two detection rate scoring composites.  
Scales to Compare Relative Ease of Detection for Each Inconsistency 
 For the open ended and short answer questions, I came up with four different 
schemes of standardization (in rough order of ascending criteria, CombiLoose, 
CombiMed, CombiHighBoth, and CombiHighYes).  CombiLoose, CombiMed, and 
CombiHighBoth did not yield drastically different aggregate rates of detection with 
CombiLoose generally resulting in 1-3% more detections of each inconsistency than 
CombiMed, which generally resulted in 1-3% more detections of each inconsistency than 
CombiHighBoth. To arrive at the upper range of detection rates, I elected to use the 
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CombiMed standard because CombiLoose seemed too permissive—I did not care for the 
idea of counting anything as a detection where only one of the research assistants found 
reason to give credit.  CombiHighBoth seemed like it may have been the best overall 
technique to use if I were constrained to only using one, but since my objective in 
creating these two loose and strict composite measures is to establish the most reasonable 
upper and lower boundaries of detection rates, the compromising, inclusive nature of the 
CombiHighBoth definition was not as definitive and rigorous as I wanted the components 
of the strict standard composite to be, while the CombiHighYes standard was exactly 
that.   
 The two criteria levels for the multiple choice questions (loose: counting only 
those 81 participants who got at least one multiple choice question correct by providing 
both the consistent and the inconsistent answers vs. strict: counting all 100 participants) 
are so named for their effect on overall detection rates (with loose leading to higher 
overall percentage of detections, and strict leading to a lower overall percentage), not the 
overall “standard for inclusion as an inconsistency detection”, which would have resulted 
in the opposite naming scheme.  Similarly, it is important to keep this distinction in mind 
for the point blank criteria naming convention (loose: counting both those participants 
who got the question correct as well as those who chose the incorrect option as a reason 
for finding the witness’s testimony unconvincing—essentially everyone who did not 
select “I don’t agree with either of these jurors” vs. strict: counting only those 
participants who got the question correct).   
 I applied the same reasoning to the names of the two composite scoring schemes, 
such that the Strict scheme will provide the lowest overall percentage of detections, but 
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the detection rates it yields for each inconsistency will be the unequivocal minimum 
levels of  detection.  The Strict criteria level averages Open Ended CombiHighYes, Short 
Answer CombiHighYes, all 100 Multiple Choice responses, True/False, and Point Blank.  
On the other end of the spectrum, the Loose scheme will provide the highest overall 
percentage of detections according to the most forgiving definitions of inconsistency 
detection.  The Loose criteria level averages Open Ended CombiMed, Short Answer 
CombiMed, Multiple Choice only 81 (using the Multiple Choice responses from only 
those 81 participants who got at least one multiple choice question correct, in percentage 
equivalent), True/False, and Point Blank Combined (counting detections for all 
participants who did not choose “I don’t know.”) 
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Table M1 
 
Study One: Loose Scoring Scheme Detection Rate Percentages for all 15 Inconsistencies 
by Question Type 
Inconsistency 
Open 
Ended 
CombiMed 
Short 
Answer 
CombiMed 
Multiple 
Choice 81 
non-0’s 
True 
False 
Point 
Blank 
Combined 
Loose 
Score 
PI 7-Hair 43.0 38.0 54.3 62.0 65.0 52.5* 
PI 4-Oil Co. 27.0 33.0 56.8 54.0 60.0 46.1* 
PI 5-Model 38.0 25.0 39.5 55.0 61.0 43.7* 
PI 12-Tree 29.0 13.0 42.0 42.0 77.0 40.6* 
PI 13-Dog 6.0 25.0 49.4 52.0 65.0 39.5* 
PI 11-Jared 32.0 7.0 42.0 46.0 65.0 38.4* 
PI 9-Year 16.0 30.0 30.9 48.0 67.0 38.4* 
PI 10-Color 23.0 20.0 37.0 47.0 63.0 38.0* 
Mean Rate 16.5 15.0 31.4 45.7 62.9 34.3 
PI 3-Swerve 17.0 3.0 7.4 64.0 64.0 31.1 
PI 2-1/2 vs 3/4 0.0 2.0 12.3 64.0 53.0 26.3 
PI 15-Stop Sign 8.0 4.0 24.7 33.0 57.0 25.3 
PI 6-R/L leg 2.0 3.0 7.4 46.0 65.0 24.7 
PI 8-Arrival 1.0 10.0 23.5 25.0 62.0 24.3 
PI 1-Side of Car 3.0 3.0 27.2 25.0 60.0 23.6 
PI 14-Cop 3.0 9.0 17.3 23.0 60.0 22.5 
Note.  *Inconsistencies 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 will be retained and used in Studies 
Two, Four, and Five.  Inconsistencies 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 14, and 15 will be redacted from the 
Johnson v. McGraw trial transcript to be used in Studies Two, Four, and Five. 
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Table M2 
Study One: Strict Scoring Scheme Detection Rate Percentages for all 15 Inconsistencies 
by Question Type 
Inconsistency 
Open Ended 
CombiHighYes 
Short Answer 
CombiHighYes 
Multiple 
Choice 
True 
False 
Point 
Blank 
Strict 
Score 
PI 7-Hair 43.0 32.0 44.0 62.0 55.0 47.2* 
PI 5-Model 36.0 22.0 32.0 55.0 55.0 40.0* 
PI 4-Oil Co. 26.0 23.0 46.0 54.0 50.0 39.8* 
PI 12-Tree 26.0 12.0 34.0 42.0 68.0 36.4* 
PI 13-Dog 6.0 19.0 40.0 52.0 51.0 33.6* 
PI 11-Jared 31.0 5.0 34.0 46.0 46.0 32.4* 
PI 10-Color 22.0 17.0 30.0 47.0 46.0 32.4* 
PI 9-Year 13.0 20.0 25.0 48.0 48.0 30.8* 
Mean Rate 14.9 10.8 25.5 45.7 46.0 28.6 
PI 3-Swerve 10.0 1.0 6.0 64.0 39.0 24.0 
PI 6-R/L leg 2.0 1.0 6.0 46.0 48.0 20.6 
PI 15-Stop Sign 3.0 3.0 20.0 33.0 42.0 20.2 
PI 2-1/2 vs 3/4 0.0 1.0 10.0 64.0 24.0 19.8 
PI 8-Arrival 0.0 3.0 19.0 25.0 48.0 19.0 
PI 1-Side of Car 3.0 2.0 22.0 25.0 37.0 17.8 
PI 14-Cop 3.0 1.0 14.0 23.0 33.0 14.8 
Note.  *Inconsistencies 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 will be retained and used in Studies 
Two, Four, and Five.  Inconsistencies 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 14, and 15 will be redacted from the 
Johnson v. McGraw trial transcript to be used in Studies Two, Four, and Five. 
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APPENDIX N 
 
Studies Two and Four Trial Transcript (8 Inconsistencies) 
 
NOTE: Highlighted phrases (e.g. PI-Plain Inconsistency, S&B-Inconsistency used in 
Semmler & Brewer [2002], etc.) denote details of testimony relevant to the eight 
inconsistencies, and are only marked here for ease of identification.  This emphasis was 
not included in the actual materials used. 
 
 
Johnson v. McGraw   
 
The following trial transcript is an abridged version of a real trial from here in the state of 
Florida.  The trial, which has already taken place, and for which the jury has already 
rendered a verdict, involved a traffic accident which resulted in injury to the plaintiff, 
Amanda Johnson, an injury she alleged was the result of negligence on behalf of the 
defendant, Michael McGraw.  Although the circumstances of the accident involved 
multiple parties, Michael McGraw was the only defendant in this case. 
 
While the names of all parties have been changed, one of the attorneys has asked FIU 
researchers to conduct this study to see how real people like you perceive the case so that 
they can determine whether to appeal the outcome of the trial.  We will be using the data 
from this study to help the attorney, so please pay close attention as it will impact the 
final resolution of an actual civil case. 
 
Please listen to the trial transcript and read along as if you had been chosen to serve as a 
juror in this case. 
 
~~~~~ 
Judge Robert C. Underwood: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are about to hear 
testimony concerning an automobile accident that occurred in the late afternoon of 
Tuesday, July 8th, 2008 in the city of Clermont, located in Lake County, Florida.  The 
plaintiff is Amanda Johnson, and the defendant is Michael McGraw.  There are no other 
plaintiffs or defendants in this suit, and all other disputes between these and any other 
parties related to the events in question have been resolved separately prior to this 
proceeding.   
 
~~~~~  
Opening Statement by Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff:  Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, what we have 
before us today is an unfortunate story of a young lady who was simply going about her 
business one day, on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008, up in Clermont, which is in 
central Florida to the west of Orlando.  This young lady, Amanda Johnson, was at the 
time a 26 year old waitress at a family restaurant.  She was riding in the car with her 
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boyfriend, Brock Collins, a 28 year old middle school teacher.  They were in his blue 
Toyota Camry (PI 5-Model true)on their way to catch a movie before meeting up with 
Amanda’s parents for dinner later that night.  Unfortunately, their plans were dashed by 
the negligence of another driver on the road that evening, Michael McGraw. 
 
Throughout this case, you are going to hear overwhelming evidence from a variety of 
witnesses—Amanda Johnson, Brock Collins, a host of different eyewitnesses to the 
accident, the emergency first responders on the scene, medical professionals, as well as 
professional scientists who specialize in the analysis of vehicles and crash scenes which 
they use to reconstruct accidents.  The testimony of all these witnesses will show you, 
with no uncertainty whatsoever, that Mr. McGraw, and only Mr. McGraw—not Mr. 
Collins, not the driver of the semi truck, not anybody else and not anything else other 
than Mr. McGraw’s negligent operation of his big, white (PI 10 color true) van—was the 
direct cause of Amanda Johnson’s serious injury. I hope that you find him liable for all 
damages suffered by Ms. Johnson at his hand.  Thank you very much for your time, 
service, and attention today. 
 
~~~~~ 
Opening Statement by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant:  Esteemed members of the jury—like my 
colleague, I thank you in advance for your attention, effort, and diligent fulfillment of 
your civic duty.  What we can all agree on is that you are here today to hear about a 
traffic accident that injured a nice young lady and her boyfriend.  Everybody wishes that 
this accident hadn’t happened, but not everybody agrees about how it happened or how 
Ms. Johnson ended up being hurt. 
 
Ms. Johnson and her attorney would like for you to believe that her broken hip and other 
injuries are the result of negligence on the part of Mr. McGraw.  Now it’s certainly true 
that Mr. McGraw, while trying to avoid the out of control semi tractor trailer coming 
towards him, ended up hitting Mr. Collins’s car.  What we’re less certain about is how 
Ms. Johnson was injured.  You see, Ms. Johnson wasn’t wearing her seat belt, and we’ll 
be presenting evidence to you that will show that Ms. Johnson wasn’t injured because 
Mr. McGraw hit their car, but that she was injured when the car ran into the street lamp, 
and that if she had been wearing a seat belt, she wouldn’t have broken her hip. 
 
Ms. Johnson and her attorney would like for you to believe that her injuries are the fault 
of Mr. McGraw, but through the course of this trial, you will soon see that they don’t 
have any real evidence to support this allegation. Because they can’t show that the 
majority of the evidence undoubtedly proves that Mr. McGraw was the cause of Ms. 
Johnson’s injuries, you will come to the conclusion that Michael McGraw was not 
negligent, was not the direct cause of Amanda’s broken hip, and that he should not be 
held liable for her injuries and you should render a verdict in favor of the defendant. 
~~~~~ 
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Plaintiff’s Witness Marc Zollinger, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Can you please state your name and 
occupation for the court? 
 
Marc Zollinger (Answerer):  My name is Marc Zollinger, and I’m an administrative 
assistant for Universal Translation Corporation. 
 
Q:  And where is your office located? 
 
A:  It’s on Foothill Drive, pretty close to the intersection of Foothill and Windsor, a little 
south of there, on the east side, or I guess northeast side of the road at that point, down by 
the bend. 
 
Q:  Tell me, Mr. Zollinger, what were you doing on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 
2008?  
 
A:  I needed some fresh air, so I went to the little walk-up coffee window a few doors 
down from our office, the one on the north side of the Cuban restaurant there. 
 
Q:  Okay.  And while you were there, did anything unusual happen? 
 
A:  As a matter of fact, yes.  While I was waiting in line, I was just standing around 
watching the cars go by when there was a big traffic accident behind me up the way a 
little bit at the corner. 
 
Q:  Up the way a little bit?  How far do you mean?  Help the jury to understand how 
close you were. 
 
A:  Oh, not that far really.  Probably a few hundred feet away, but I had a pretty clear 
view since it’s just the parking lot for the restaurant there to the north of the coffee 
window up to the corner. 
 
Q:  And can you tell us what you saw? 
 
A:  I saw a car, a van, and a tanker truck get into a wreck.  The tanker truck was kind of 
sideways, coming southbound towards the intersection and kind of weaving back and 
forth a little bit in the middle of the road.  I saw Mr. Collins’s car, a blue  Corvette (PI 5-
model false)make a left turn to go west on Windsor to get out of the way of the truck, but 
then Mr. McGraw’s white (PI 10 color true)Ford work van came screeching around, and 
then the semi locked up its brakes and the tires started squealing but the tanker trailer 
swung around and kind of batted Mr. McGraw’s van on the passenger side which then 
bounced into the back of Mr. Collins’s car which then crashed into the street light (PI 12 
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true) on the northwest corner of the intersection.  It was like one big chain reaction.  They 
almost hit some lady walking a Dachshund. (PI 13 false) 
 
Q:  And what happened next? 
 
A:  I saw the guy with the black hair (PI 7 true), Mr. McGraw, get out of his van to make 
sure everyone in Mr. Collins’s car was okay or something.  I couldn’t hear what they 
were saying or anything, but right away Mr. McGraw got on his phone, I guess to call 
911.  After a minute or two, Mr. Collins, the bald one, got out of the car and went around 
to the passenger side and was talking to someone in the passenger seat.  He looked pretty 
worried based on all his movements and body language. 
 
Q:  And then what? 
 
A:  I placed my order, and by the time I got my coffee I could see that a police car was 
already on the scene so I grabbed my coffee and went over to tell him what I saw.  I told 
him exactly how it happened, and he wrote it all down.  The officer’s name was 
Christopher Eaton.  He was a really big guy. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Zollinger.  No further questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Marc Zollinger, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for 
the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Could you describe for us in 
just a little more detail exactly what happened after all the vehicles came to a stop? 
 
Marc Zollinger (Answerer):  Sure.  Mr. McGraw got out of the white (PI 10 color 
true)van pretty quickly and immediately ran over to Mr. Collins’s blue  Corvette, (PI 5-
model false) over to the driver’s side.  I couldn’t hear them, of course, but it looked to me 
like he was making sure everyone was okay, and then shortly after talking to Mr. Collins, 
McGraw got his cell phone out of his pocket and made a call.  A minute or two later, the 
police officer arrived, then I went over and told him what I saw, and then I went back to 
work. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Zollinger.  I have nothing further. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Barbara Feldman, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Hello there.  Could you please state 
your name and occupation for the record? 
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Barbara Feldman (Answerer):  My name is Barbara Feldman, and I am a librarian. 
 
Q:  Thank you Ms. Feldman.  Now you’re familiar with the day in question here in this 
trial, right? 
 
A:  Yes I am.   
 
Q:  And did you witness the accident at issue here? 
 
A:  Yes I did.  I remember it all quite vividly.  I was driving southbound on Foothill 
Drive, north of the intersection with Windsor. 
 
Q:  And could you please describe for us what you saw? 
 
A:  Sure.  As I was driving, up ahead I noticed a Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) oil tanker trailer 
crossing over the line separating the two directions of traffic, kind of skidding its tires 
and fishtailing around.  The stop light ahead of us was green, so I’m not sure what the 
deal was.  It’s not like he was slamming on his brakes to keep from running the light or 
anything.  It was also driving southbound like I was, so I slowed down to stay away from 
the situation.  It was all over the place in the left turn lane in the middle, going back and 
forth into the oncoming lanes of traffic and stuff. 
 
Q:  And what happened next? 
 
A:  Well, the truck’s trailer sort of swung out into the intersection, where it hit Mr. 
McGraw’s tan van, (PI 10 color False) kind of side swiping it and kind of just smacking it 
on the passenger side, which forced the van into the back side of Mr. Collins’s 
blueToyota Camry (PI 5-model true), which then crashed into a light pole (PI 12 true)on 
the northeast corner of the intersection. 
 
Q:  Okay, and what about after the accident? 
 
A:  I just stayed around until the police officer arrived, and once he got there, I gave him 
my statement and my contact information, and then I left to go home. 
 
Q:  Thank you Ms. Feldman.  I have no more questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Barbara Feldman, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for 
the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant:  I have no questions for this witness, your 
Honor. 
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~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Jill Randall, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Could you please give us your name 
and occupation? 
 
Jill Randall (Answerer):  My name is Jill Randall, and I sell Amway products from my 
home here in Clermont. 
 
Q:  Now could you please tell us about what you saw on Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  I was at the intersection waiting for the light to change so that I could cross Foothill 
heading west, and there was a semi truck that came out of nowhere from the north, 
skidding and screeching and swerving all over the place out of control. 
 
Q:  That must have been pretty scary.  Can you tell us more about the truck and what 
happened? 
 
A:  Well, I saw the truck blow the light going through the intersection kind of in the 
middle of the southbound and northbound lanes, and he was fishtailing a little bit, you 
know, the cab of the truck going in one direction while the trailer was slipping and 
sliding around behind him in another direction.  The truck swerved towards me, to the 
east, to the driver’s left, past me as it came through the intersection.  As the truck was 
getting itself under control, I could tell that there was some sort of additional accident on 
the opposite side of the trailer involving some other vehicles, but since I was on the east 
side of the trailer and that was all happening on the west side, I really couldn’t see too 
much about what exactly happened. 
 
Q:  Okay, so you weren’t able to see much of the actual contact between the vehicles? 
 
A:  Well, no, not of the actual contact when it was happening, but after everything came 
to a stop, I was able to see that the white (PI 10 color true)van driven by Mr. McGraw 
had crashed into the back of the other car, the one driven by Mr. Collins, the blue Toyota 
Camry, (PI 5-model true) and Mr. Collins’s car was up against the street lamp(PI 12 
true).  It looked like it had pretty much hit the lamppost (PI 12 true)head on, and Mr. 
McGraw’s van was stopped behind it, and it was all banged up on the passenger side.  
 
Q:  Well it sounds like you got a good look at the aftermath of the accident.  What 
happened after everything came to rest? 
 
A:  The red-haired man (PI 7 false), Mr. McGraw got out of his van pretty quickly and 
went to go check on the people in Mr. Collins’s car.  He was talking to Mr. Collins for a 
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minute, and then he got out his phone and made a call, I assume to 911.  Mr. Collins got 
out of his car eventually, and when the police officer arrived a minute or two later, he 
was a real hunk, so I hung around and gave him my statement once the paramedics got 
there to take over making sure everyone got the medical attention they needed. 
 
Q:  We appreciate your testimony here today, Ms. Randall.  No further questions. 
 
Judge Robert C. Underwood:  Your witness, Mr. Kurtz. 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Jill Randall, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  So Ms. Randall, you weren’t 
able to describe exactly what happened during the wreck itself because the trailer from 
the tanker truck was blocking your view, is that right? 
 
Jill Randall (Answerer):  That’s right.  I saw the beginning and I saw the aftermath, but I 
didn’t see the actual accident between Mr. McGraw and Mr. Collins, no. 
 
Q:  I see.  Thank you very much, Ms. Randall.  I don’t have any more questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Steve Powell, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Could you please give your name and 
occupation for the record? 
 
Steve Powell (Answerer):  My name is Steve Powell, and I’m a real estate agent here in 
Clermont. 
 
Q:  And where were you on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  I was at the post office located there on the east side of Foothill Drive, a little ways up 
from, I mean north of, the intersection with Windsor Road. 
   
Q:  Okay.  And did you see anything unusual at the post office? 
 
A:  Well, just as I was leaving, I was looking out the window and I saw a Shell (PI 4 
true/S&B 6 true) tanker truck go skidding down the street past the post office. 
 
Q:  Down Foothill you say? 
 
A:  Yeah, it was traveling south but kind of screeching and sliding out of control. 
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Q:  And what did you see after that? 
 
A:  Well, I didn’t really see exactly what happened next.  I was walking out of the 
building and didn’t have a constant, uninterrupted view so I missed the actual crash, but 
after I got outside, I saw the whole accident scene with the tanker truck stopped at a 
funny angle over on the east side of Foothill on Windsor, and the van and the car over on 
the corner by the Zales(PI 11 true) jewelry store.  The guy with the black hair (PI 7 true), 
Mr. McGraw, was standing outside the vehicles.  There were a couple of people in the 
car, the blue Camry, (PI 5-model true) and they looked kind of hurt.   
 
Q: How so? 
 
A: The bald guy, Mr. Collins, had some cuts and stuff on his forehead and he was 
bleeding a little bit, but the lady in the passenger seat was much worse.  It was kind of 
hard to see exactly how she was hurt, but it was clear she was pretty banged up. 
 
Q: And can you tell us what happened next? 
 
A: I had an important meeting I had to get to a little later on that afternoon so I didn’t 
have time to stick around, and I don’t know how I could have helped anyway, but as I 
was starting to walk back to my car, the bald guy, Mr. Collins, was out of his car and the 
police officer had showed up so I figured it would be okay now that there was an official 
emergency responder on the scene.  Right as I got to my car, which was parked over in 
the lot north of the coffee shop on the southeast corner of the intersection, I saw the 
ambulance arrive next, so I figured I might as well go over to the police officer and tell 
him what I had seen now that medical personnel were there before I left to go to my 
meeting.  As I was giving Officer Eaton my statement, I could see the paramedics getting 
Ms. Johnson out of the car and loading her into the ambulance.  It was at that time that I 
could see that her right leg was all mangled and busted up. 
 
Q:  Thank you for your time, Mr. Powell.  I don’t have any more questions for you. 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Steve Powell, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Mr. Powell, you were inside the 
post office when the actual accident occurred, and were unable to see exactly what 
happened at the intersection, is that right? 
 
Steve Powell (Answerer):  Yeah, I just saw the Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) truck go past the 
window out of control, but no, I couldn’t see the intersection or anything that far down 
from where I was. 
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Q:  So you don’t have any idea exactly how any of the different vehicles crashed into 
each other, or the exact moment in which Ms. Johnson might have been hurt, or how she 
was hurt, or anything specific like that, correct? 
 
A:  That’s correct.  I just saw the truck go by and then by the time I was outside, I saw the 
wreckage and stuff where it had all come to rest. 
 
Q:  So basically everything at issue here happened when you couldn’t see it? 
 
A:  Well I did see two men, Mr. Collins and Mr. McGraw outside talking to each other 
when the police officer arrived at the time I was walking across Windsor, and then by the 
time I got to my car, I saw the ambulance had just arrived too. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Powell.  No further questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Lesley Jobin, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Hello there, could you please tell us 
your name, occupation, and city of residence for the record? 
 
Lesley Jobin (Answerer):  My name is Lesley Jobin, I’m a tour group coordinator, and I 
live here in Clermont. 
 
Q:  And what were you doing on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  Well, since there’s really no slow days at my company because of all the visitors to 
the area and different tourist attractions and stuff in and around Orlando, we’re open 
seven days a week, and I’m off on Mondays and Tuesdays each week.  That was a 
Tuesday, and I was out walking Finnegan, my German Shepherd. (PI 13 true) 
 
Q:  And can you tell us a little more about your walk with Finnegan that day? 
 
A:  Sure.  I was walking west along Windsor Road, having just crossed Foothill. I was 
passing in front of the Jared jewelry store (PI 11 false) there at the corner, when the crash 
happened. 
 
Q:  So can you tell us what you saw? 
 
A:  Well, I saw the Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) truck fishtailing out of control, well, I guess 
there isn’t any way for a truck to fishtail but still be under control, but anyway, it was sort 
of sliding out toward its right side, and then it kind of smacked the side of the white (PI 
10 color true)van, and that’s when the van crashed into the back of the blue Toyota 
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Camry, (PI 5-model true) which then ran straight into a tree (PI 12 false) on the corner in 
front of Jared(PI 11 false). 
 
Q:  Were you able to see anything that happened inside of either of the vehicles? 
 
A:  Yeah, when Mr. McGraw first hit Mr. Collins’s car, I could see that both Mr. Collins 
and Ms. Johnson’s heads went flying forward into the windshield.  
 
Q:  Thank you Ms. Jobin.  I don’t have any more questions for you. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Lesley Jobin, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  So Ms. Jobin, you were out 
walking your German Shepherd, (PI 13 true) Finnegan, that afternoon, is that correct? 
 
Lesley Jobin (Answerer):  That’s right. 
 
Q:  And were you talking on the phone, or listening to music, or anything like that on 
your walk? 
 
A:  Well, I was listening to my iPod. 
 
Q:  Hmm.  Okay.  And you were walking west, passing the Zales(PI 11 true) store when 
you heard a crash and turned around to look, is that right? 
 
A:  Yeah, Finnegan and I were both really startled, and we ran backwards a little bit just 
as Mr. Collins’s car hit the tree. (PI 12 false) 
 
Q:  I see.  Thank you very much, Ms. Jobin. 
 
~~~~~ 
  
Plaintiff’s Witness Brock Collins, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner): Hello there, could you please state 
your name, occupation, and city of residence for the record? 
 
Brock Collins (Answerer):  My name is Brock Collins, I’m a teacher at Windy Hill 
Middle School here in Clermont where I live. 
 
Q:  And just so we’re clear, what is your relationship with the plaintiff in this case, 
Amanda Johnson? 
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A:  She’s my girlfriend.  We’ve been dating for a couple of years. 
 
Q:  And could you tell us a little bit about what happened on the afternoon of Tuesday, 
July 8th, 2008? 
  
A:  Well, Amanda and I were on our way to see a matinee before going out to dinner with 
her folks later on, when we got into a big wreck at the corner of Windsor and Foothill. 
 
Q:  Can you tell us about what you remember happening before the accident and how it 
all unfolded? 
 
A:  Well, I was driving my car, a blue 2006 (PI 9-year true)Toyota Camry (PI 5-model 
true)four door, northbound on Foothill Drive, and Amanda was in the passenger seat.  We 
were coming around the bend, right where Foothill goes from kind of east/west to 
north/south, and once I got around the bend approaching the intersection, we had the 
green light, and I saw a semi truck skidding out of control towards us.  
  
Q:  Sounds pretty scary.  Can you describe how you reacted to the situation and what 
happened next? 
 
A:  Yeah, it was really crazy to see a big truck barreling down on us like that.  It took me 
a second to figure out what to do because I couldn’t tell which way the truck was going to 
go or what was going to happen next.  I kind of slowly turned to my left, to go west on 
Windsor because I was pretty sure that the truck was going to end up going to my right, 
east on Windsor.  Once I could tell for sure that that’s where he was headed, I was able to 
pull out of his way just barely fast enough to miss the end of his tanker trailer whipping 
around the corner behind him.  It was a real relief to miss it, but the relief was very short 
lived. 
 
Q:  How so? 
 
A:  Well, the guy behind me in the white (PI 10 color true)Ford panel van wasn’t as 
lucky.  I guess he tried to get out of the way of the swinging trailer much the same way as 
I did, but he just ended up rear-ending us pretty much straight on, and our heads hit the 
windshield, and we then crashed into the street lamp (PI 12 true) on the northwest corner 
of the intersection, all pretty much at the same time as his van was getting hit by the 
trailer. I got dinged on the head pretty good but wasn’t that messed up, no permanent 
scars or damage or anything, but Amanda was really hurt badly. 
 
Q:  She certainly was.  I’m really sorry you guys had to go through all of that.  Thank 
you, Mr. Collins.  I don’t have any more questions for you. 
 
~~~~~ 
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Plaintiff’s Witness Brock Collins, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  So, Mr. Collins, are you and 
Ms. Johnson still together? 
 
Brock Collins (Answerer):  Yes, we are.  We’re starting to talk about marriage, in fact. 
 
Q:  Oh, how nice!  Let’s talk a little more about your car that you were driving that day.  
It was a blue  2006 (PI 9-year true) four-door Toyota Camry (PI 5-model true), isn’t that 
right? 
 
A:  Yes sir. 
 
Q:  And how long had you owned that car, Mr. Collins? 
 
A:  I had it for a little less than a year before the accident, but my dad bought it brand 
new, and when he got tired of it after a year or so (PI 9-year true), he sold it to me at a 
good price since I was in need of a reliable car. 
 
Q:  So you’re familiar with the entire two-year (PI 9-year true) history of the vehicle.  
Tell me, Mr. Collins, had the car ever been in any sort of accident before? 
 
A:  Except for maybe tapping a bumper when parallel parking in a tight spot or 
something tiny like that, no, it hadn’t. 
 
Q:  It worked okay, pretty reliable car? 
 
A:  Certainly.  Wasn’t too flashy, but it was definitely reliable. 
 
Q:  And did the seatbelts in the car work properly? 
 
A:  Well, they got stuck when pulling them out a lot, so it was kind of a pain to put them 
on all the time. 
 
Q:  And were you wearing your seatbelt on the day of the accident? 
 
A:  No, I wasn’t. 
 
Q:  Why not? 
 
A:  We weren’t going very far or anything, so I guess I just figured I didn’t need to mess 
with it. 
 
Q:  And was Ms. Johnson wearing her seat belt that day? 
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A:  No. 
 
Q:  Nothing further, Your Honor. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Dr. Matthew Freeman, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney 
for the Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Hello, could you please give us your 
name, city of residence, and occupation? 
 
Dr. Matthew Freeman (Answerer):  My name is Matthew Freeman, I live in Jacksonville, 
Florida, and I am an accident reconstruction specialist. 
 
Q:  What exactly does that mean? 
 
A:  I examine vehicles, accident sites, traffic patterns, road conditions, medical records, 
and that sort of thing in order to figure out exactly how an accident occurred. 
   
Q:  Thank you.  And, just to avoid any confusion, you are being paid to discuss your 
findings with us here today, isn’t that right? 
 
A:  Yes, I’m being paid by the plaintiff’s side to share my conclusions.  What I do is 
complex and time consuming, and after all, this is my job.  But I assure you that my 
determinations are in no way shaped by anything besides the evidence. 
 
Q:  I appreciate your candor and your earnestness, Dr. Freeman.  So can you tell us what 
you found with regard to the accident involving Mr. Whitaker’s Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) 
tanker truck, Mr. Collins’s Camry (PI 5-model true) and Mr. McGraw’s Ford Econoline 
work van? 
 
A:  Given where we know the truck stopped just beyond the intersection itself, Mr. 
Whitaker couldn’t have been going very fast at the time his trailer sideswiped Mr. 
McGraw’s van.  That means the impact from the trailer onto Mr. McGraw’s van wasn’t 
the determining factor in Ms. Johnson’s injuries, but rather Mr. McGraw’s driving itself 
was.  If Mr. McGraw hadn’t been driving so fast when the truck hit him, then Amanda 
wouldn’t have been injured when he hit Mr. Collins’s car.  Besides, if he had been going 
slower, he wouldn’t have been in the intersection anyway and the accident wouldn’t have 
happened at all. 
 
Q:  Interesting.  And what about your conclusions based on inspecting Mr. Collins’s 
vehicle? 
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A:  Well, it was a 1986 (PI 9-year false) Toyota Camry, (PI 5-model true) four doors, 
blue, base model, and no aftermarket or custom modifications.  It was damaged 
uniformly across the rear from Mr. McGraw’s van hitting it, the front was damaged more 
deeply, but in a narrower span, consistent with hitting a tall, thin object like a street lamp 
pole (PI 12 true), and while the seat belts appeared to be in reasonable working order, I 
suspect that the airbag deployment sensors may have been faulty.  For as hard as Mr. 
McGraw hit the car, the airbags should have inflated.  But because they didn’t, it is my 
opinion that Ms. Johnson broke her right hip as a direct result of that first impact with 
Mr. McGraw to their rear, not the second impact with the street lamp post. (PI 12 true) 
Unfortunately, due to a miscommunication between Mr. Collins’s insurance company 
and the salvage yard where the car was being stored after the accident, shortly after I had 
done my preliminary inspection of the car, it was disassembled for parts before I had a 
chance to check the status of the airbag sensors to verify that they were faulty. 
 
Q:  Thank you for your expertise, Dr. Freeman.  I have nothing further to ask. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Dr. Matthew Freeman, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, 
Attorney for the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Tell me, Dr. Freeman, do you 
have any medical training or licensure? 
 
Dr. Matthew Freeman (Answerer):  No, I hold a doctorate degree in mechanical 
engineering, as well as numerous other certifications related to my field, but none in 
health-related areas, no. 
 
Q:  And yet you’re willing to testify under oath that Amanda’s broken hip was a result of 
the first impact, when my client hit Mr. Collins’s car, and not that it was from the head-
on collision with the lamp pole.  (PI 12 true)Very interesting conclusions, Dr. Freeman.  
No further questions.   
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Amanda Johnson, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Hello, Ms. Johnson.  How are you 
doing today? 
 
Amanda Johnson (Answerer):  Oh, just fine.  It feels good to finally have my day in 
court. 
 
Q:  I bet it does.  How is your hip? 
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A:  It’s healed up pretty well so far, but it’s not back to normal by any means.  I’m not 
sure whether it will ever be like it was before the accident.  Still, I’m finally able to walk 
without a limp or the use of a cane, but I can’t run or do anything strenuous, and it really 
acts up during changes in barometric pressure and other weather changes.  I feel like an 
old person, and I’m only 28. 
 
Q:  How has your injury affected your life? 
 
A:  Well, at first, it cost me my job, since I was in the hospital for a couple of weeks at 
first and then unable to walk for a long time after that, and it’s pretty difficult to be a 
waitress if you can’t walk. 
 
Q:  Can you tell us a little more about your injury and the treatment you received? 
 
A:  Sure.  My right hip was broken just under the ball of my femur, the long bone at the 
top of your leg.  It required immediate surgery and a metal plate and a bunch of screws to 
be screwed into both halves of my legbone so that the two parts of the bone would grow 
back together again.  That surgery left me in the hospital for about a week, and I was 
under pretty heavy sedation for the pain, and then I had to stay in the rehabilitation center 
for another week before I was able to go home.  I was in the wheelchair for another 
month before I was able to use a walker or crutches, and then it was another six weeks 
before I was able to walk short distances again.  That whole time I was going to rehab 
three times a week and doing exercises every day at home too.   
 
Q:  And how are you doing today, a little over two years since the accident occurred? 
 
A:  I’m doing alright.  Like I mentioned earlier, I can walk pretty much without a limp, 
but I still can’t do anything really active or athletic that requires running around or 
anything like that.  I’m able to sleep though the night okay now, and the pain doesn’t 
bother me all that often except when the weather is about to change, which, unfortunately 
for me, seems to happen all too often here in central Florida.  The doctors tell me that’s 
never going to go away. 
 
Q:  Well, I guess at least you’ll always know whether to bring an umbrella with you when 
you leave the house in the mornings.  Now let’s talk a little bit about the accident itself. 
 
A:  Okay. 
 
Q:  When you first saw the truck, where was it in relation to the car you were in? 
 
A:  It was directly in front of us, a little to the right of the center of our car. 
 
Q:  Was the truck over the double yellow lines in the road that separate the two directions 
of travel? 
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A:  Yes. 
 
Q:  In your estimation, how far over the double yellow lines? 
 
A:  It was about three-quarters of the way over into our lanes of traffic, so far that I didn’t 
think we’d be able to swerve around it. 
 
Q:  And did the truck appear to swerve or deviate from its course at any time before the 
accident? 
 
A:  Yes, it did, it swerved to our right and ended up going off to our right, to the east.  
 
Q:  About how fast would you guess that you guys were going? 
 
A:  Not that fast.  Probably 25 miles an hour or so.   
 
Q:  And at what speed would you estimate that the truck was going? 
 
A:  It had to have been over 40 miles per hour.  We had slowed down, but it still came 
towards us very quickly and all we could see was the giant Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true 
element of contradiction) tanker trailer swerving towards us.  
 
Q:  And then what happened? 
 
A:  Brock sort of hesitated for a quick second to figure out which direction was the safest 
way to get out of the way of the truck since we didn’t really know where it was going to 
end up, and after he quickly turned to the left, to go west down Windsor, we saw the tail 
end of the trailer go sliding past us and we thought we had managed to escape an 
accident. 
 
Q:  But that wasn’t the case, was it? 
 
A:  No, even though we barely missed colliding with the tanker, we were then suddenly 
hit from behind by Mr. McGraw, who had himself been hit on his passenger’s side by the 
trailer and knocked into us, and that’s when I went flying forward, hitting my head on the 
windshield and smashing into the dashboard and breaking my right hip, and then we hit 
the street lamp post (PI 12 true) which caused us to finally come to a stop. 
 
Q:  So you were fine up until the point when Mr. McGraw crashed into you, is that right? 
 
A:  Yeah, if he didn’t hit us, I wouldn’t have been hurt. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Ms. Johnson. 
 
~~~~~ 
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Plaintiff’s Witness Amanda Johnson, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for 
the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Ms. Johnson, I’d like to ask 
you a few more questions about the events leading up to the accident and the details of 
the accident itself, if that’s okay. 
 
Amanda Johnson (Answerer):  Of course. 
 
Q:  Ms. Johnson, could you please tell us exactly when you first noticed that the truck 
was on the wrong side of the road? 
 
A:  Before we got to the intersection, I could see that it was on the wrong side of the road.  
I could see the paint of the Exxon (PI 4/S&B 6 false element of contradiction) logo and 
the chrome tank shining in the sun. 
 
Q:  And you are sure you could tell that the truck was on the wrong side of the road? 
 
A:  Yes, I’m sure. 
 
Q:  Ms. Johnson, if you saw the truck was on the wrong side of the road, why didn’t you 
warn Mr. Collins? 
 
A:  I don’t know.  It happened very quickly.  It was almost three quarters of the way over 
onto our side of the road, swerving to our right. 
 
Q:  Hmm.  I see.  Thank you, Ms. Johnson.  No further questions. 
~~~~~ 
 
 Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff:  Your Honor, we have no further witnesses to 
introduce, so the plaintiff rests. 
 
Judge Robert C. Underwood:  Thank you Mr. Blum.  Mr. Kurtz, you may now present 
the defense’s case. 
 
 Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant:  Thank you, Your Honor. 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness Tom Gorham, Direct Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Hello, could you please state 
your name, city of residence, and occupation for the record? 
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Tom Gorham (Answerer):  My name is Tom Gorham, I live in Orlando, and my wife and 
I own and operate a three-dimensional film and photography studio. 
 
Q:  How interesting!  That must be a really exciting business for you two to be in.  Now, 
could you please tell us where you were on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008? 
  
A:  I was stopped at the light at the corner of Windsor and Foothill, waiting to cross 
Foothill to the east, and I saw this whole big accident unfold. 
 
Q:  Can you tell us exactly what you saw? 
 
A:  Well, I first knew that something was wrong when I saw Mr. Collins’s blue Toyota 
Camry (PI 5-model true) flashing the lights and heard him laying on the horn as he came 
up to the intersection from the south.  Very shortly after that, I saw the Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 
true) tanker truck come skidding and fishtailing into the intersection from the north.  He 
was pretty much swerving to his left, away from me, towards the opposite side of the 
intersection from where I was.  I was on the west side, waiting to cross Foothill and head 
east, and he was swerving over that way with the trailer kind of swinging out behind him. 
 
Q:  Okay, so after you saw the two vehicles both entering the intersection, what happened 
next? 
 
A:  I saw Mr. Collins’s car skirt around the trailer pretty much right in front of my car, 
when the trailer kind of swung around to its right, as the cab of the truck was making a 
hard left turn, and the trailer sort of swiped the passenger side of the white (PI 10 color 
true)van.  Right after that, the van rear-ended the Camry, (PI 5-model true) and then the 
Camry (PI 5-model true) went and ran into the streetlamp (PI 12 true). 
 
Q:  And how good of a look did you get at this whole sequence of events? 
 
A:  I had a perfect view, pretty much a front-row seat to the whole thing. 
 
Q:  So did you see either Mr. Collins’s or Ms. Johnson’s heads strike the windshield of 
their car? 
 
A:  Definitely. 
 
Q:  And when did you see that happen? 
 
A:  Right after their car crashed into the lamp post. (PI 12 true) 
 
Q:  Right.  Now what happened next? 
 
A:  Well, I saw the guy with the black hair, (PI 7 true) McGraw, get out of the van right 
away and go over to the driver’s side of Collins’s car and it looked like he was checking 
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to see if everyone was okay or to see how he could help.  Collins got out of the car 
shortly after that, and while his head was bleeding a little bit, and he seemed a little 
dazed, he didn’t really seem too badly hurt. 
 
Q:  Alright.  Anything else? 
 
A:  Yeah, I stayed around to see if there was anything I could do, but the cops showed up 
and pretty much got it all under control and then the ambulance got there and I watched 
them take Ms. Johnson out of the car.  It looked like her right leg was all messed up, and 
they loaded her and Mr. Collins into the ambulance and drove off. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Gorham.  I have no further questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
Defense Witness Tom Gorham, Cross Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Mr. Gorham, you stated that you saw 
Mr. Collins’s car flashing its lights and heard it honking its horn as it entered the 
intersection from the south, and that after that, you saw the Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) truck 
come skidding and screeching into the intersection.  Now if Mr. Collins was honking and 
flashing his lights and everything, obviously in response to something, doesn’t it seem 
strange to you that you didn’t notice what he was reacting to before you noticed him? 
 
Tom Gorham (Answerer):  Well, maybe, I guess.  I think I probably just noticed Mr. 
Collins’s car first because he was the one that was right in front of me, and since the 
truck was all the way on the other side of the intersection, further away, maybe I didn’t 
see it first for that reason.  Or maybe the angle of everything made the Zales store sort of 
block my line of sight.  I don’t know really know why I saw things when I saw them, I 
just know what I saw. 
 
Q:  If you say so.  Nothing more, Your Honor. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness John Kindt, Direct Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Hello there, could you please 
state your name and occupation for the record? 
 
John Kindt (Answerer):  My name is John Kindt, and I am the security guard for the 
Zales jewelry store located on the northwest corner of the intersection of Foothill and 
Windsor Road in Clermont. 
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Q:  Can you tell us where you were on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  Yeah, I was at work. 
 
Q:  Tell me, did you happen to witness the events at issue in this case? 
 
A:  I saw the tail end of it.  I saw Mr. Collins’s car almost run over the lady out walking 
her German Shepherd.  (PI 13 true) She was walking on the sidewalk and nearly got 
creamed. 
 
Q:  Lucky thing for her that she didn’t.  So what else did you see then? 
 
A:  I saw the Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) trailer kind of smack the passenger side of Mr. 
McGraw’s van and knock it into Mr. Collins’s car. 
 
Q:  And did you see the consequences of the collision between the two vehicles? 
 
A:  Well, yeah.  I saw Mr. Collins’s car come crashing towards the store, and that lady 
and her dog, and hit the street lamp (PI 12 true) in front of our store. 
 
Q:  And did you see anybody get hurt? 
 
A:  Yeah, I saw Mr. Collins’s head and Ms. Johnson’s head smash into their windshield 
when they hit the lamp post.  I was kind of surprised that the airbags didn’t go off, but I 
guess they weren’t going fast enough or something. 
 
Q:  And what else did you see? 
 
A:  Not much.  I got a call about security issues for an upcoming delivery so I had to go 
look at some paperwork, and by the time I was through with that, the show was over. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Kindt.  I have no more questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness John Kindt, Cross Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff:  I have no questions for this witness, Your Honor. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness Dr. Erik Dubberke, Direct Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for 
the Defendant 
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Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Hello there, could you please 
tell us your name and occupation? 
 
Dr. Erik Dubberke (Answerer):  My name is Erik Dubberke, and I am a trauma surgeon 
at South Lake Hospital here in Clermont. 
 
Q:  That’s an emergency room doctor, right? 
 
A:  Yes, I’m one of the several surgeons on staff that are trained specifically for trauma-
related procedures.  Injuries, accident victims, things like that.  Immediate and sometimes 
life-or-death repairs, as opposed to planned, preventative, or purely cosmetic procedures. 
 
Q:  Ahh.  I see.  Tell me, Dr. Dubberke, were you on duty on Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  Yes, I was on call from noon until midnight that day. 
 
Q:  So, Dr. Dubberke, did you treat Ms. Amanda Johnson on that afternoon? 
 
A:  Yes I did.  She was brought in by ambulance, and the paramedics had stabilized her 
condition, but it was pretty clear to them by the time that they arrived that she had 
suffered some sort of localized trauma to her right leg or hip area. 
 
Q:  And was that consistent with your observations? 
 
A:  Absolutely.  We took some X-rays to see exactly what we were dealing with right 
after we cleaned up and stitched up her forehead.  Luckily, her facial lacerations were 
superficial enough that I was able to use dissolvable sutures which tend to leave little or 
no scarring, but they don’t work as well on really deep or difficult wounds. 
 
Q:  Thank heaven for small miracles.  Now what did the X-rays reveal? 
 
A:  Ms. Johnson suffered a broken hip up near the ball in the joint where the right leg 
meets the pelvis.  It’s a very nasty sort of injury. 
 
Q:  So how did you treat Ms. Johnson? 
 
A:  I inserted a metal plate into her right leg that is held in place by five metal screws that 
are screwed directly into her bones.  By holding everything in place like that, it allows for 
the bone to gradually fuse back together at the site of the break.   
 
Q:  Sounds reasonable.  Tell me, Dr. Dubberke, in your experience with trauma victims, 
are you at all able to judge the severity of accidents or make any determination about 
what caused or maybe even what could have prevented an injury? 
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A:  To an extent.  If what you’re asking me is whether having worn her seat belt would 
have prevented Ms. Johnson’s injury, then yes.  I’m almost certain that her broken hip 
resulted from being thrown forward in a frontal crash.  
 
Q:  Not from having been rear-ended? 
 
A:  No, that type of impact typically results in whiplash and soft-tissue injuries, not being 
launched forward into the dashboard.  
 
Q:  Thank you, Dr. Dubberke.  I don’t have any more questions. 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness Dr. Erik Dubberke, Cross Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Dr. Dubberke, how long have you 
been working in the emergency room? 
 
Dr. Erik Dubberke (Answerer):  In my current capacity?  Almost eight years.  Counting 
assisting, residency, interning, volunteering, and all that?  Probably another four, five 
years total on top of that. 
 
Q:  That’s quite a long time.  You must have seen some pretty remarkable, unusual, and 
awful things in that time. 
 
A:  Yeah, but you get used to it.  If you can’t, you don’t last long. 
 
Q:  I bet.  Tell me, have you ever seen anything that just defied explanation, or didn’t 
make any sense, or just plain freak accidents or weird flukes? 
 
A:  Sure.  The human body is a very complicated, complex organism, with an almost 
limitless capacity for things to go wrong.  And the world can be a pretty strange place 
too.  Just when you start to think you’ve seen it all, something you could have never 
envisioned in a hundred years comes through the doors. 
 
Q:  I can only imagine.  Thank you for all the good work you do, Doctor.  Nothing 
further. 
 
~~~~~ 
Defense Witness Officer Christopher Eaton, Direct Examination by Howard Kurtz, 
Attorney for the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Good afternoon, Officer.  
Could you please give us your name, rank, department, and division? 
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Officer Christopher Eaton (Answerer):  My name is Christopher Eaton, I’m a deputy with 
the Clermont Police Department, and I’m primarily assigned to the Patrol Section. 
 
Q:  Okay.  And is the intersection of Foothill and Windsor in Clermont part of your 
assigned beat? 
 
A:  Yes, sir.  It’s right smack dab in the middle of it, in fact.   
 
Q:  And is that where you were on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  I was patrolling not too far away when I heard the call on the radio about an 
automobile accident which also potentially involved a gasoline truck.  Mr. McGraw had 
called 911 pretty quickly, and it only took me a minute or two to get there, and I was the 
first responder on the scene.   
 
Q:  And what did you see when you arrived? 
 
A:  I observed Mr. Whitaker’s Shell (PI 4/S&B 6 true) gasoline tanker truck stopped in 
the rightmost lane, on the south side of Windsor Road, in the eastbound direction.  To the 
west of the intersection, on the north side of Windsor Road, in the westbound direction, I 
observed Mr. Collins’s blue  2006 (PI 9-year true) Toyota Camry (PI 5-model true) at rest 
up with the front up against the lamp post, (PI 12 true) and Mr. McGraw’s white (PI 10 
color true)2000 Ford Econoline work van smashed up into the rear of Mr. Collins’s car.  
Mr. McGraw’s van had sustained additional damage to the rear passenger quarter panel 
area, and Mr. Collins’s car had a broken windshield in the typical pattern found when the 
windshield is struck by the head of the occupants of the front seat.  In this case, that 
would be Mr. Collins and Ms. Johnson. 
 
Q:  And you’ve seen a lot of car accidents during your time on the force, I imagine? 
 
A:  Yeah, that’s probably one of the most frequent calls we get.  Hardly a day goes by 
that I don’t deal with at least one wreck 
. 
Q:  I bet.  And in your experience, when you’ve seen patients with head trauma and 
broken bones, injured in cars that end up with cracked windshields like Mr. Collins’s car, 
do those accidents typically involve a car that has been rear-ended? 
 
A:  Well, I’ve never actually kept a count of something like that, but off the top of my 
head, I’d say that very few of them do, except for the sorts of multi-impact incidents like 
we had here. 
 
Q:  How do you mean? 
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A:  Usually, passengers in cars who have cuts to their head and broken bones suffer their 
injuries as a result of having been forcefully thrown forward from the violence of a 
frontal impact.  You know, running into something, not being run into from behind.  
 
Q:  Okay, well thank you very much for your assistance, Officer.  I have no additional 
questions. 
 
A:  My pleasure, sir. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness Officer Christopher Eaton, Cross Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney 
for the Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Officer Eaton, you’ve undoubtedly 
seen plenty of car accidents in your time patrolling, haven’t you?  Accidents of all kinds? 
 
Officer Christopher Eaton (Answerer):  Yes, sir.  I couldn’t even offer a guess as to the 
total number. 
 
Q:  And in your eyes, was this your typical rear-ending? 
 
A:  No, sir.  Most rear-ending accidents do not involve an impact from a third vehicle like 
this incident. 
 
Q:  So this was a little out of the ordinary for how most rear-impact collisions occur? 
 
A:  Yes, sir.  I’m not sure whether I can recall anything quite like this in all my years on 
the force where a semi trailer smacks into one vehicle which then crashes into another in 
a chain reaction like that.  This was the result of some pretty unlikely combinations of 
forces and events. 
 
Q:  I’ll say.  Thank you, Officer. 
 
A:  My pleasure, sir. 
 
~~~~~ 
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APPENDIX O 
PANAS Short and Long Form Emotion Measurement Scales 
International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule Short Form (I-PANAS-SF; 
Thompson, 2007) & Specific Affect Scales of the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule—Expanded (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994) 
 
Thompson, E. R. (2007). Development and Validation of an Internationally Reliable 
Short-Form of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 38(2), 227-242. doi:10.1177/0022022106297301 
 
 
 
Note: I added Angry and Mad because anger will be experimentally induced in Studies 
Three, Four, and Five.  
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Appendix O Continued: Specific Affect Scales of the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule—Expanded (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1994) 
 
Watson, D., & Clark, L.A. (1994). The PANAS-X: Manual for the positive and negative 
affect schedule-expanded form. Unpublished manuscript, University of Iowa, Iowa City, 
IA.
 
  
N
P
 
ote: I added
ANAS-SF. 
 Mad as item 61 to allow
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APPENDIX P 
Study Two Data Reduction Procedures 
Note: Data reduction procedures for Study Two are virtually identical to the technique 
used in Study One. 
Step One: Raw Data 
 At the conclusion of data collection, the final data file included 64 total entries, or 
one separate entry for each discrete time Study One was accessed and begun.  Of these 64 
entries, 44 were complete, having accessed every page of the study website.  To be clear, 
these are not total numbers of distinct participants, but rather all separate instances of 
data recordings initiated each time the study was started.   
Step Two: Eliminating Repeat Starters 
 Despite repeated admonitions and stern warnings to the contrary, some 
participants in online studies nevertheless begin the study and then quit partway through 
completion, only to return at a later time to complete the study in full.  Because the 
objective of Study Two is to determine the relative ease or rate of detecting each of the 
eight remaining testimonial inconsistencies in comparison to their levels of detection in 
Study One, I eliminated those participants who were exposed to the trial transcript to any 
extent prior to the session in which they completed the study.  For example, a participant 
who read along through the end of all plaintiff’s witnesses but quit the study before the 
defense presented its case, only to return two days later to restart the study (the website 
required participants to start over if their browser window closed at any point) and 
completed it during that second session would have been exposed to the inconsistent 
information two full times.  This obviously gives that repeat participant a greater 
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opportunity to detect the inconsistencies compared to a participant who was only exposed 
to the critical information once, so I eliminated all data associated with those participants 
who accessed the study on more than one occasion.  However, for any participants who 
completed the study the first time they accessed it, but who may have started it again, I 
simply eliminated all data associated with any subsequent attempts since their first 
exposure was untainted. 
 After eliminating the data associated with any participants who had been pre-
exposed to the trial transcript, 45 separate data entries remained. 
Step Three: Eliminating Partial Participants 
 Steps Three and Four could have been performed in interchangeable order with no 
consequence, but I expressly refrained from eliminating the participants who did not 
complete the study at the start of the data reduction process because doing so would have 
prevented me from having the ability to identify those participants who began the study 
and were exposed to some or all of the trial transcript and quit partway through, only to 
restart and complete the study at a later time—and with an improper degree of exposure 
to the trial transcript and inconsistent testimony.  It is only after this step that the 
remaining data entries can properly be called “participants.”  Of the 45 data entries 
remaining before this step, only 40 participants completed the entire study.   
Step Four: Eliminating Inattentive Participants 
 Because online data collection allows participants to complete the study at the 
time and place of their choosing, it tends to be more popular with the FIU participant 
pool than in-person studies which require participants to be in a specific time and place to 
participate.  While this flexibility benefits participants and the concomitant popularity 
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benefits researchers with faster data collection (as well as requiring less time to input and 
code data), the tradeoff for researchers is the lack of control over the environment in 
which participants complete the study.  Without the presence of a supervising researcher, 
some participants may choose to complete online studies without actually paying 
attention or engaging in anything resembling legitimate, earnest effort.   To combat this 
problem (or at least prevent it from tainting my data), I included two questions intended 
to confirm that the participant was in fact paying at least some minimum degree of 
attention to the questions they were answering.  The first, presented in random order 
among the Multiple Choice questions, was 
There are lots of witnesses and lots of evidence in trials.  Sometimes testimony is consistent, sometimes it’s 
contradictory, sometimes different witnesses disagree, and sometimes accounts vary. 
  
Please mark all possible answers for the following question, even those which are contradictory to each 
other. 
  
These questions are designed to test your memory for the information in the trial testimony, not your 
personal opinion on what actually happened or what is correct.  How you answer these questions should not 
depend on which witnesses you believe to have been accurate or those you believe to have been 
inaccurate—just the content of the testimony itself. 
  
Again, you may choose more than one answer. 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
Thank you for participating in this study.  To ensure that you are paying attention to the questions, please 
mark A for this question.   
 A. He put the car into reverse 
 B. He stopped the car 
 C. He turned sharply to his right 
 D. He pulled the emergency brake 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
The second, presented in random order among the True/False questions, was 
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There are lots of witnesses and lots of evidence in trials.  Sometimes testimony is consistent, sometimes it’s 
contradictory, sometimes different witnesses disagree, and sometimes accounts vary. 
  
These True or False questions are designed to test your memory for the information in the trial testimony, 
not your personal opinion on what actually happened or what is correct.  
  
How you answer these questions should not depend on which witnesses you believe to have been accurate 
or those you believe to have been inaccurate—just the content of the testimony itself. 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_______ 
  
Thank you for your continued attention and hard work.  The study is almost over, so please mark this 
answer true so that we will know that you’re still paying attention. 
 True 
 False 
 I don't know 
 
I eliminated all seven participants who failed to answer one or both of these questions as 
directed, leaving 33 remaining participants. 
Step Five: Eliminating Extreme Outliers of Total Time Spent 
 Due to the fact that individual differences in reading speed, attention to detail, and 
overall thoughtfulness and thoroughness of answering the battery of questions designed 
to measure inconsistency detections (including 23 Open Ended and Short Answer 
questions with no restriction on response length), and I had estimated that most 
participants should be able to complete the entire study in approximately 60 to 90 
minutes (in contrast to the 90 to 120 minutes I estimated Study One would require 
because Study Two featured 36 fewer questions to answer, see Appendix Q), I defined an 
extreme outlier as any participant who required greater than twice that duration to 
complete the study.  Because some participants would load the first page of the study (the 
Informed Consent page) and then wait (sometimes minutes, hours, or even days) before 
actually indicating their consent and beginning the study, to prevent this practice from 
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skewing the calculations of total time spent, I calculated the total duration by subtracting 
the time participants loaded the second page (immediately after submitting the Informed 
Consent page) from the time the last page of the study was submitted. 
 Four participants were identified as extreme outliers ranging from 194.63 minutes 
spent to 869.88 minutes spent (M = 400.67, SD = 314.73) and eliminated from further 
analysis, leaving a total of 29 participants. 
Step Six: Eliminating Outliers of Total Time Spent 
 After eliminating those extreme outliers which would skew the overall 
distribution, I calculated the distribution for the remaining 29 participants, resulting in the 
elimination of two participants whose total time spent was in excess of two standard 
deviations above the mean, or greater than 163.25 minutes (M = 102.90, SD = 30.18).  
There were no participants who completed the study in less time than two standard 
deviations below the mean. 
 The resulting data set (n = 27) to be used in Study Two included participants who 
spent between 64.90 and 155.88 minutes (M = 98.14, SD = 23.81). 
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APPENDIX Q 
 
Study Two Inconsistency Detection Questions 
 
Note: The parenthetical (PI 1/S&B 1, etc.) information at the end of each question was 
not present in the actual materials.  It is included here for the sake of explanation and 
reference to assist in identifying which inconsistency or inconsistencies form the basis for 
the question.  Please see the List and Descriptions of all Eight Inconsistencies from Study 
Two (Appendix R) for a brief description of the nature of each inconsistency.  Also, for 
the forced-choice questions (Multiple Choice, True/False, and Point Blank), the correct 
answer is included here for reference purposes.   
 
All information which is presented here for background or clarification but which was 
not visible to participants is italicized. 
 
Open-Ended Questions:  
 
 The open-ended question section featured one primary question and one followup 
“…if so, who/how?” elaboration per page, presented in random order.  Because the 
open-ended questions are so general, many of them apply to more than one 
inconsistency. 
 
 The following instructions were listed at the top of each page: 
 
There are lots of witnesses and lots of evidence in trials.  Sometimes testimony is 
consistent, sometimes it’s contradictory, sometimes different witnesses disagree, and 
sometimes accounts vary, etc.  Please list all possible answers for the following question, 
even those which are contradictory to each other. 
 
 Questions (Five Primary and Five Followup): 
 
Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes in 
terms of brand names? (PI 4/S&B 6; PI 5-model; PI 11) 
 If so, who and how? If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might have 
made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your ability. 
 
 
Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes in 
terms of describing various colors? (PI 7; PI 10-color) 
 If so, who and how?  If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might 
have made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your 
ability. 
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Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes in 
terms of describing the physical layout of the intersection? (PI 12; PI 15) 
 If so, who and how?  If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might 
have made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your 
ability. 
 
 
Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes in 
terms of specific physical descriptions of people? (PI 6; PI 7; PI 14) 
 If so, who and how?  If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might 
have made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your 
ability. 
 
 
Were there any eyewitnesses that testified who you think might have made mistakes in 
terms of specific physical descriptions of objects? (PI 9-year; PI 12; PI 13; PI 15) 
 If so, who and how?  If you don’t remember exactly which witness(es) might 
have made this type of mistake, please just describe the mistake(s) to the best of your 
ability. 
 
 
Short Answer Questions: 
 
 The short answer question section featured one question per page, presented in 
random order. 
 
 The following instructions were listed at the top of each page: 
 
There are lots of witnesses and lots of evidence in trials.  Sometimes testimony is 
consistent, sometimes it’s contradictory, sometimes different witnesses disagree, and 
sometimes accounts vary. 
 
Please list all possible answers for the following question, even those which are 
contradictory to each other. 
 
If you do not know the answer, please type “I don’t know.” and then click Submit to 
proceed to the next question. 
 
Questions (13 total—one for each of the eight inconsistencies, and five “dummy” 
questions to provide opportunities for participants to give answers that do not involve 
inconsistent testimony in order to camouflage the intent of the study while also acting 
as a manipulation check by probing their general understanding of the trial 
transcript): 
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Several witnesses mentioned the oil company logo on the gasoline tanker trailer.  Please 
describe the testimony concerning the oil company.  Make sure you talk about all of the 
witnesses who testified about the oil company that owned the truck. (PI 4/S&B 6) 
 
 
Several witnesses described the make and model of the vehicles involved in the accident.  
Please describe the testimony concerning the kinds of vehicles.  Make sure you talk about 
all of the witnesses who testified about the make and model of the vehicles.  (PI 5-model) 
 
 
Several witnesses described Michael McGraw by mentioning his hair color.  Please 
describe the testimony concerning Michael McGraw’s hair color.  Make sure you talk 
about all of the witnesses who mentioned his hair color.  (PI 7) 
 
 
Several witnesses described the year of the vehicles involved in the accident.  Please 
describe the testimony concerning the years of the vehicles.  Make sure you talk about all 
of the witnesses who testified about the years of the vehicles.  (PI 9-year) 
 
 
Several witnesses described the colors of the vehicles involved in the accident.  Please 
describe the testimony concerning the colors of the vehicles.  Make sure you talk about 
all of the witnesses who testified about the color of each of the vehicles.  (PI 10-color) 
 
 
There are several businesses located near the intersection of Foothill Dr. and Windsor Rd.  
Please describe the testimony regarding the businesses surrounding the intersection.  
Make sure you talk about all of the witnesses who testified about the nearby businesses.  
(PI 11) 
 
 
Brock Collins’s car eventually came to rest following the accident.  Please describe the 
testimony concerning how Brock Collins’s car came to a stop after the crash.  Make sure 
you talk about all of the witnesses who testified about how his car came to a stop.  (PI 12) 
 
 
Lesley Jobin was walking her dog Finnegan when she witnessed the accident.  Please 
describe the testimony regarding the breed of Lesley’s dog.  Make sure you talk about all 
of the witnesses who testified about Lesley’s dog. (PI 13) 
 
 
Several witnesses testified regarding Amanda Johnson’s employment status.  Please 
describe the testimony concerning Amanda Johnson’s employment status.  Make sure 
you talk about all witnesses who mentioned Amanda’s employment. (Dummy 1) 
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Several witnesses mentioned details having to do with who called 911.  Please describe 
the testimony concerning who called 911.  Make sure you talk about all witnesses who 
testified about calling 911. (Dummy 2) 
 
 
Brock Collins and Amanda Johnson had plans for the day the accident occurred.  Please 
describe what their plans were, and what they were on the way to do.  Make sure you talk 
about all witnesses who testified about their plans for that day. (Dummy 3) 
 
 
Multiple witnesses mentioned airbags in relation to the accident.  Please describe the 
testimony involving airbags deploying.  Make sure you talk about all witnesses who 
referred to airbags in any of the vehicles. (Dummy 4) 
 
 
Amanda Johnson required an emergency medical procedure to help her broken leg heal.  
Please describe what this procedure involved.  Make sure you talk about all witnesses 
who testified about the treatment Amanda needed on her broken leg. (Dummy 5) 
 
Multiple Choice Questions: 
 The multiple choice question section featured one question per page, presented in 
random order. 
 
 The following instructions were listed at the top of each page: 
There are lots of witnesses and lots of evidence in trials.  Sometimes testimony is 
consistent, sometimes it’s contradictory, sometimes different witnesses disagree, and 
sometimes accounts vary.   
Please mark all possible answers for the following question, even those which are 
contradictory to each other.  
These questions are designed to test your memory for the information in the trial 
testimony, not your personal opinion on what actually happened or what is correct.  How 
you answer these questions should not depend on which witnesses you believe to have 
been accurate or those you believe to have been inaccurate—just the content of the 
testimony itself.  
Again, you may choose more than one answer. 
 
Questions (16 total—one for each of the eight inconsistencies, five “dummy” 
questions, two case theme manipulation checks, and one “attention check” question 
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for use in identifying those participants who are not reading the questions which they 
are responding to): 
 
According to the plaintiff’s version of events, Amanda Johnson broke her hip when: 
(Manipulation Check of Plaintiff’s Case-B) 
 A. The tanker truck hit Brock’s car. 
 B. The van driven by the defendant, Michael McGraw, hit Brock’s car. 
 C. Brock’s car hit a pole. 
 D. Jill Randall ran the red light and hit Brock’s car. 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
According to the defense’s version of events, Amanda Johnson broke her hip when: 
(Manipulation Check of Defense’s Case-C) 
 A. The tanker truck hit Brock’s car. 
 B. The van driven by the defendant, Michael McGraw, hit Brock’s car. 
 C. Brock’s car hit a pole. 
 D. Jill Randall ran the red light and hit Brock’s car. 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
The gasoline tanker trailer featured the logo of the oil company that owned the truck.  
What company (or companies) were mentioned as the owner of the truck? (PI 4/S&B 6-A 
& D) 
 A. Exxon 
 B. BP 
 C. Chevron 
 D. Shell 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Brock Collins’s car was involved in the accident.  According to the trial transcript, what 
make and model(s) of car was Brock said to have been driving? (PI 5-model-B & D) 
 A. Chevrolet Camaro 
 B. Toyota Camry 
 C. Toyota Corolla 
 D. Chevrolet Corvette 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
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Several witnesses mentioned Michael McGraw’s hair color when describing what they 
had seen.  What color(s) of hair did witnesses say he had? (PI 7-C & D) 
 A. Blond 
 B. Brown 
 C. Black 
 D. Red 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
The year of Brock Collins’s car is mentioned in the testimony.  What year(s) is it said to 
be? (PI 9-year-B & C) 
 A. 2002 
 B. 2006 
 C. 1986 
 D. 1996 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
The color of Michael McGraw’s van is mentioned in the testimony.  What color(s) is it 
said to be? (PI 10-color-A & B) 
 A. Tan 
 B. White 
 C. Blue 
 D. Green 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
There is a jewelry store on the northwest corner of the intersection.  What name(s) for the 
store was/were mentioned? (PI 11-B & D) 
 A. Kay 
 B. Jared 
 C. Tiffany & Co. 
 D. Zales 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Brock Collins’s car ran into something before coming to a complete stop.  According to 
the transcript, what object(s)? (PI 12-A & D) 
 A. A tree 
 B. A blue USPS mailbox 
 C. A bus stop 
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 D. A street light pole 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
There was testimony given regarding the breed of Lesley Jobin’s dog Finnegan.  What 
breed(s) were given for Finnegan? (PI 13-A & C) 
 A. Dachshund 
 B. Doberman 
 C. German Shepherd 
 D. Beagle 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
The testimony indicated that Amanda Johnson had held what job(s) prior to the accident? 
(Dummy 1-C) 
 A. Nurse 
 B. Teacher 
 C. Waitress 
 D. Real estate agent 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
According to the transcript, which person (or people) called 911 to report the accident? 
(Dummy 2-D) 
 A. Brock Collins 
 B. Steve Powell 
 C. Jill Randall 
 D. Michael McGraw 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
What activity or activities did Brock and Amanda have planned for the day of the 
accident? (Dummy 3-A & B) 
 A. Going to a movie 
 B. Going out to dinner 
 C. Going to a concert 
 D. Going to a party 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
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The transcript included testimony concerning airbags in Brock Collins’s car.  Which of 
the following was included? (Dummy 4-B & C) 
 A. The airbags inflated 
 B. The airbags did not inflate 
 C. The airbags may have been defective 
 D. The car did not have airbags 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Amanda Johnson required serious medical treatment for her broken leg when she arrived 
at the emergency room.  What procedure(s) did she need? (Dummy 5-A & D) 
 A. A metal plate to be inserted 
 B. The bone had to be broken further in order to heal properly 
 C. A bone graft 
 D. Metal screws to be inserted 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this study.  To ensure that you are paying attention to the 
questions, please mark A for this question.   (Attention check-A) 
 A. He put the car into reverse 
 B. He stopped the car 
 C. He turned sharply to his right 
 D. He pulled the emergency brake 
 E. None of the above 
 F. Don’t know/don’t remember 
 
 
True/False Questions: 
  
 The true/false question section featured one question per page, presented in 
random order. 
 
 The following instructions were listed at the top of each page: 
 
There are lots of witnesses and lots of evidence in trials.  Sometimes testimony is 
consistent, sometimes it’s contradictory, sometimes different witnesses disagree, and 
sometimes accounts vary. 
Please answer the following True or False questions regarding the trial transcript. 
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These questions are designed to test your memory for the information in the trial 
testimony, not your personal opinion on what actually happened or what is correct.   
How you answer these questions should not depend on which witnesses you believe to 
have been accurate or those you believe to have been inaccurate—just the content of the 
testimony itself.  
Questions (14 total—one for each of the eight inconsistencies, five dummy questions, 
and one attention check; True, False, and I don’t know were answer choices): 
 
Only one oil company logo was identified on the tanker trailer according to the transcript. 
(F; PI 4/S&B 6) 
 
 
Out of all descriptions of Brock Collins’s car within the trial testimony, there was no 
discrepancy concerning the make and model of the car. (F; PI 5-model) 
 
 
Not all witnesses agreed in their testimony about what color hair Michael McGraw had. 
(T; PI 7) 
 
 
There was conflicting testimony given regarding the year of Brock Collins’s car. (T; PI 
9-year) 
 
 
There was no conflict in testimony given regarding the color of Michael McGraw’s van. 
(F; PI 10-color) 
 
 
There were multiple store names given for the jewelry store in the trial transcript. (T; PI 
11) 
 
 
Brock Collins’s car hit an object before finally coming to rest, and all testimony 
concerning that object agreed about exactly what that object was. (F; PI 12) 
 
 
Different witnesses named different breeds when describing Lesley Jobin’s dog. (T; PI 
13) 
 
 
There was conflicting testimony concerning Amanda Johnson’s job before the accident. 
(F; Dummy 1) 
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There was no discrepancy in the transcript concerning who called 911 about the accident. 
(T; Dummy 2) 
 
 
There was conflicting testimony concerning where Brock and Amanda were going when 
the accident occurred. (F; Dummy 3) 
 
 
There was no testimony saying that the airbags deployed in Brock Collins’s car. (T; 
Dummy 4) 
 
 
There was conflicting testimony given regarding the medical procedures performed on 
Amanda Johnson to help heal her broken bones. (F; Dummy 5) 
 
 
Thank you for your continued attention and hard work.  The study is almost over, so 
please mark this answer true so that we will know that you’re still paying attention. (T; 
Attention Check) 
 
Point Blank Questions: 
 
 These questions were designed to be as direct as possible without creating 
demand characteristics.  There was only one set of questions per page (that is, two 
consecutive pages per witness—done to prevent any confusion over whether the two 
hypotheticals were the same, whether they should be evaluated in conjunction with each 
other, whether the same Juror 1 and Juror 2 are the focus each question, etc.)  Order of 
presentation was randomized by witness, with all witnesses featuring two consecutive 
pages, each page with one question apiece.  Because Study Two features seven fewer 
inconsistencies than Study One, in order to maintain uniformity of presentation with two 
Point Blank questions for each witness, three new dummy/manipulation checks based on 
removed inconsistencies (PI 14, PI 15, and PI 1/S&B 1) have been added. 
 
The following instructions appeared at the top of each page: 
 
For this final section of questions, you will be asked to evaluate the way two different 
jurors each viewed a particular witness’s testimony. 
 
Each question should be answered independently of all others.  The way you answer one 
question should not have any bearing on how you answer any other question. 
 
Questions (12 total—one for each of the eight inconsistencies and four manipulation 
checks): 
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Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Marc Zollinger to be inaccurate but their 
opinions were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree with? 
 
 The juror who found Marc Zollinger’s testimony to be inaccurate because he said 
that Brock Collins was driving a Corvette while another witness said he was driving a 
Camry. 
 The juror who found Marc Zollinger’s testimony to be inaccurate because he said 
that Brock Collins was driving a Camaro while another witness said he was driving a 
Camry. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 1; PI 5-model) 
 
 The juror who found Marc Zollinger’s testimony to be inaccurate because he said 
that Lesley Jobin’s dog was a Doberman while another witness said it was a German 
Shepherd. 
 The juror who found Marc Zollinger’s testimony to be inaccurate because he said 
that Lesley Jobin’s dog was a Dachshund while another witness said it was a German 
Shepherd. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 2; PI 13) 
 
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Barbara Feldman to be inaccurate but their 
opinions were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree with?  
 
 The juror who found Barbara Feldman’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
said that Michael McGraw’s van was green while another witness said it was white. 
 The juror who found Barbara Feldman’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
said that Michael McGraw’s van was tan while another witness said it was white. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 2; PI 10-color) 
  
 The juror who found Barbara Feldman’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
said that the police officer who responded to the scene was a woman while another 
witness said it was a man. 
 The juror who found Barbara Feldman’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
said that the police officer who responded to the scene was small in size while another 
witness said he’s large. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors.  
 (Neither; Dummy/Manipulation check/camouflage based on prior PI 14) 
 
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Jill Randall to be inaccurate but their opinions 
were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree with?  
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The juror who found Jill Randall’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that the intersection of Foothill and Windsor has a stop sign while another witness said it 
has a stop light to control traffic. 
 The juror who found Jill Randall’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that the intersection of Foothill and Windsor has a yield sign while another witness said it 
has a stop light to control traffic. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Neither; Dummy/Manipulation check/camouflage based on prior PI 15)  
 
The juror who found Jill Randall’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that Michael McGraw has red hair while another witness said he has black hair. 
 The juror who found Jill Randall’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that Michael McGraw has blond hair while another witness said he has black hair. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 1; PI 7) 
 
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Lesley Jobin to be inaccurate but their 
opinions were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree with?  
 
The juror who found Lesley Jobin’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that she was in front of the Kay jewelry store when she saw the accident while another 
witness said it was a Zales jewelry store. 
 The juror who found Lesley Jobin’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that she was in front of the Jared jewelry store when she saw the accident while another 
witness said it was a Zales jewelry store. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 2; PI 11) 
 
The juror who found Lesley Jobin’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that Brock Collins’s car came to a stop when it crashed into a tree while another witness 
said it crashed into a street light pole. 
 The juror who found Lesley Jobin’s testimony to be inaccurate because she said 
that Brock Collins’s car came to a stop when it crashed into a tree while another witness 
said it crashed into a bus stop. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 1; PI 12) 
 
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Dr. Matthew Freeman to be inaccurate but 
their opinions were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree 
with?  
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 The juror who found Dr. Matthew Freeman’s testimony to be inaccurate because 
he said that Brock Collins’s car was a 1986 Toyota Camry while another witness said it 
was a 2006 Toyota Camry. 
 The juror who found Dr. Matthew Freeman’s testimony to be inaccurate because 
he said that Brock Collins’s car was a 2002 Toyota Camry while another witness said it 
was a 2006 Toyota Camry. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 1; PI 9-year) 
 
 The juror who found Dr. Matthew Freeman’s testimony to be inaccurate because 
he said that Brock and Amanda were on their way to a concert when the accident 
occurred while another witness said they were on their way to a movie and dinner. 
 The juror who found Dr. Matthew Freeman’s testimony to be inaccurate because 
he said that Brock and Amanda were on their way to a party when the accident occurred 
while another witness said they were on their way to a movie and dinner. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Neither; Dummy/Manipulation check/camouflage) 
  
 
Imagine two jurors found the testimony of Amanda Johnson to be inaccurate but their 
opinions were for two different reasons.  Which juror’s opinion do you most agree with?  
 
 The juror who found Amanda Johnson’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
said that the rear of Michael McGraw’s van was damaged by the truck while another 
witness said it was damaged on the passenger side. 
 The juror who found Amanda Johnson’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
said that the driver’s side of Michael McGraw’s van was damaged by the truck while 
another witness said it was damaged on the passenger side. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Neither; Dummy/Manipulation check/camouflage based on prior PI 1/S&B 1) 
 
 The juror who found Amanda Johnson’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
first said that she saw the Shell company logo on the tanker trailer and then later said that 
she saw the Exxon company logo on the tanker trailer. 
 The juror who found Amanda Johnson’s testimony to be inaccurate because she 
first said that she saw the Shell company logo on the tanker trailer and then later said that 
she saw the BP company logo on the tanker trailer. 
 I don’t agree with either of these jurors. 
 (Juror 1; PI 4/S&B 6) 
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APPENDIX R 
 
List and Description of all Eight Inconsistencies from Study Two 
 
List of all Inconsistencies: 
 
PI 4-Oil Co.: Oil company name-Shell is true, Amanda says Exxon (S&B 6) 
PI 5-Model: Zollinger says Collins drives a blue Corvette (wrong), he really drives a blue 
Camry 
PI 7-Hair: Jill says McGraw has red hair (false-he really has black hair) 
PI 9-Year: Freeman says Collins drives a 1986 Camry (false) when it’s really a 2006 
PI 10-Color: Barbara says McGraw’s van is tan, it’s really white 
PI 11-Jared: Lesley says it’s a Jared jewelry store (false); it’s really a Zales 
PI 12-Tree: Lesley says Collins crashes into a tree (false); it’s really a light pole 
PI 13-Dog: Zollinger says Lesley’s dog is a dachshund (false); it’s really a German 
Shepherd 
 
Key: 
 PI is the number I have assigned to that particular inconsistency. 
 S&B indicates that Semmler and Brewer used this inconsistency in their trial 
transcripts. 
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Table R1 
 
Eight Inconsistencies Used in Study Two Trial Transcript 
 
Number Summary Mistaken EW 
& their total # 
Broad Type of 
Incon 
PI 4-Oil 
Co.: 
Oil company name-Shell is true, 
Amanda says Exxon 
Amanda (4) Brand Names  
PI 5-
Model: 
Zollinger says Collins drives a blue 
Corvette (wrong), he really drives a 
blue Camry 
Zollinger (2) Brand Names  
PI 7-Hair: Jill says McGraw has red hair (false-he 
really has black hair) 
Jill (2) Color; Specific 
descriptions of 
people 
PI 9-
Year: 
Freeman says Collins drives a 1986 
Camry (false) when it’s really a 2006 
Freeman (1) Specific 
descriptions of 
objects 
PI 10-
Color: 
Barbara says McGraw’s van is tan, it’s 
really white 
Barbara (2) Color 
PI 11-
Jared: 
Lesley says it’s a Jared jewelry store 
(false); it’s really a Zales 
Lesley (2) Brand Names  
PI 12-
Tree: 
Lesley says Collins crashes into a tree 
(false); it’s really a light pole 
Lesley (2) Specific 
descriptions of 
objects; Physical 
Layout 
PI 13-
Dog: 
Zollinger says Lesley’s dog is a 
dachshund (false); it’s really a German 
Shepherd 
Zollinger (2) Specific 
descriptions of 
objects 
Dummy 1 Amanda was a waitress at the time of 
accident 
  
Dummy 2 McGraw called 911   
Dummy 3 Brock & Amanda were on their way to 
see a movie 
  
Dummy 4 The airbags in Brock’s car didn’t go off   
Dummy 5 Amanda had a metal plate put in her leg   
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APPENDIX S 
Study Two Informed Consent 
 
  
  
ADULT ONLINE CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
  
Civil Juror Decision-Making 
  
IRB Approval # 100411-01 
  
Thank you for looking into our study. Over the next few webpages you will read a description of a civil trial 
and some jury instructions, and then answer some questions about the case. Before participating, please 
read the information in the official consent document below.  
  
**IMPORTANT: You may use any of the following web browsers AS LONG AS JAVASCRIPT IS 
ENABLED: Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Apple Safari, and Internet Explorer.  If you have 
JavaScript turned off, or use any add-ons, extensions, or shortcuts which block JavaScript, please 
either disable them, add qualtrics.com to the list of approved sites, enable JavaScript, or run your 
browser in Safe Mode** 
  
Please complete this study at one time.  If for any reason you are not able to complete the study in one 
sitting, you will have to start over.  The experiment takes roughly between 60 and 90 minutes to complete.  
  
Please note, you must have cookies and JavaScript enabled on your browser in order to participate.  If you 
click the button below but do not leave this page, your browser is not supporting cookies.  Cookies are used 
only so that you can have a unique identification number for this study; no personal information will be 
stored in cookies. 
  
As a student in the FIU Psychology Participant Pool (enrolled in PSY 2012 or other class), you are invited to 
participate in a research study conducted over the Web. The following information is provided to help you 
make an informed decision whether or not to participate. Your participation is completely voluntary, and not 
participating will not affect your class grade in any way. You must be at least 18 years old to participate. 
  
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
You are being asked to be in a research study.  The purpose of this study is to investigate how jurors make 
decisions.  Completion of this study will take approximately one and a half hours. 
  
NUMBER OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
If you decide to be in this study, you will be one of approximately 100 people in this research study. 
  
DURATION OF THE STUDY 
Your participation will require approximately 60 to 90 minutes.  
  
PROCEDURES 
If you agree to be in the study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
1.      You will be asked to read along with and listen to a case scenario involving a civil lawsuit in which a 
plaintiff is suing a defendant for negligence. You will be asked to answer questions about the events 
described on a Web page. You will be asked to imagine you are a juror in the case and to decide whether 
the defendant is liable and whether the plaintiff is entitled to any money-based damages. We will also ask 
how you feel and your opinion on various aspects of the case. You can refuse to answer any question and 
cease participation at any time. 
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RISKS AND/OR DISCOMFORTS 
The following risks may be associated with your participation in this study: You might become upset when 
you read or render a verdict about the case involving an automobile accident, especially if you or someone 
you know has been involved in a similar accident. This event is unlikely, but if you are concerned about it 
you may withdraw from the study at any time 
  
BENEFITS 
The following benefits may be associated with your participation in this study: you may find the learning 
experience enjoyable, you may learn a little bit about how psychological research is conducted, and the 
process may help you better understand the legal process. The information gained from this study will help 
us better understand the factors that influence juror decision-making processes and to improve trial 
procedures. 
  
ALTERNATIVES 
You do not need to participate in this research. Your instructor may have alternative means for you to earn 
class credit, though your participation here may satisfy your instructor’s research requirements.    
  
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The records of this study will be kept private and will be protected to the fullest extent provided by law. In 
any sort of report we might publish, we will not include any information that will make it possible to identify a 
subject.  Research records will be stored securely and only the researcher team will have access to the 
records.  
  
Any information obtained during this study that could identify you will be kept strictly confidential. The study 
will collect information about your IP address and the browser you are using. No personal information will be 
placed on your browser by the use of cookies. So that participation credit may be given, you will be required 
to enter your Panther ID number and your name. The personal information collected will be deleted from the 
database once data collection is completed and credit has been given. The information gained from this 
study may be published in scientific journals or presented at scientific meetings, but your identity will be kept 
strictly confidential. 
  
COMPENSATION & COSTS 
There is no financial compensation to you as a result of participating in this study. Completion of this study 
earns partial credit toward the FIU Psychology Participant Pool requirements as outlined by your professor 
and on http://fiu.sona-systems.com/. For participating in this study you will receive one and a half research 
credits. You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without adversely 
affecting your relationship with the investigators or Florida International University. There will be no negative 
consequences for deciding not to participate or for withdrawing. If you choose to not participate in this study, 
you may satisfy your course requirements through other studies registered with the FIU Psychology 
Participant Pool at http://fiu.sona-systems.com/, or you may contact your course instructor to arrange an 
alternative method of obtaining credit. Participation in human subjects research is not required to earn credit 
in any class, and your professor is required to offer an alternative method of obtaining credit. You will not be 
responsible for any costs to participate in this study. 
  
RIGHT TO DECLINE OR WITHDRAW 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You are free to participate in the study or withdraw your consent 
at any time during the study.  Your withdrawal or lack of participation will not affect any benefits to which you 
are otherwise entitled.  
  
RESEARCHER CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you have any questions about the purpose, procedures, or any other issues relating to this research study 
you may contact Stephen Joy at [PHONE NUMBER REDACTED] or [EMAIL ADDRESS REDACTED].  
  
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you would like to talk with someone about your rights of being a subject in this research study or about 
ethical issues with this research study, you may contact the FIU Office of Research Integrity by phone at 
[PHONE NUMBER REDACTED] or [EMAIL ADDRESS REDACTED]. 
 
PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT 
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I have read the information in this consent form and agree to participate in this study.  I have had a chance 
to ask any questions I have about this study, and they have been answered for me.  By clicking on the 
“consent to participate” button below I am providing my informed consent. 
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APPENDIX T 
Study Two Scoring, Scale Creation, and Evaluation of Inconsistencies 
Verification of Inter-rater Reliability 
 Skewness and kurtosis values for the distribution of “Yes” and “Partial” detection 
scores on the open ended questions exceeded twice the absolute value of their standard 
errors for all eight inconsistencies calculated for two research assistants individually 
using their data sets from their individual ratings done before discussion with each other, 
after discussion with each other, and collapsing the “Yes” and “Partial” scores into a 
single total of scored detections for both research assistants individually before 
discussion and again after discussion except for four of the 15 total distributions for PI 5-
Model, all of which had skewness of .75 (SE = .45) and kurtosis of -1.56 (SE = .87).  The 
short answer questions were similarly non-normally distributed based on skewness and 
kurtosis values predominantly exceeding twice the absolute value of their standard errors 
for the same treatments and tests of data.  For the short answer distributions, three of the 
15 total distributions for PI 9-Year and one of the 15 total distributions for PI 7-Hair had 
skewness of .75 (SE = .45) and kurtosis of -1.56 (SE = .87).  However, because n = 27, I 
used Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality to confirm, which showed that for all non-constant 
scores (conducted on the same array of individual before and after ratings and collapses 
of data), inconsistency detection was not normally distributed (p < .001).  Because of this 
non-normal distribution, I relied on Kendall’s tau-b correlation to verify inter-rater 
reliability rather than Pearson’s or Spearman’s correlations. 
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Construction of Scales to Compare Relative Ease of Detection for Each 
Inconsistency 
 I employed the same wide range of measures used in Study One to confirm the 
detection rates of the remaining eight inconsistencies, retaining only those questions 
related to each of the eight remaining inconsistencies (see Appendix Q for all questions 
used).  The open ended and short answer questions were independently scored by the 
same two research assistants blind to the hypothesis of my study using the same scoring 
instructions and criteria from Study One (see Appendix K for the open ended scoring 
rubric and Appendix L for the short answer scoring rubric).  Measures also included the 
same multiple choice, true or false, and point blank questions used in Study One.  
 The variety of different ways to interpret and synergize the multiple disparate 
formats of data into a single metric for the purpose of evaluating the worthiness of each 
inconsistency for use in the later studies required me to come up with an overall scale to 
integrate the detection rate data.  I was able to create several such scales, but before 
detailing their creation and components, I must explain how I interpreted each type of 
question. 
 Open Ended and Short Answer Questions 
 Although the research assistants used different thresholds of scoring for the open 
ended and short answer codings, the nature of the data set and the logistics of 
interpretation was common to both, so they will be discussed jointly for the purposes of 
this description. 
 The way I quantified the open ended data is based on the way both research 
assistants scored the set of data, and it takes into account the fact that they were recording 
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the total number of mentions of a detection for each inconsistency (this turned out to be 
something I later recoded into a binary “present/absent” variable, since certain 
inconsistencies lended themselves to being described in response to more than one 
question—especially among the open ended questions—while others would only be a 
natural response to one question) so the number of mentions, which is reflected in all Yes 
and Partial values, is not a reliable means of distinguishing detection rates.  However, 
they remained useful as an index of agreement between research assistants, particularly 
when comparing the Before values (each assistant coded the data independently) to the 
After values (after meeting to compare the way they coded everything and to discuss and 
justify why they coded a particular response in a particular way with the goal of coming 
to a consensus if/when possible.) 
 For a full description of coding procedures and instructions, see Appendices K 
and L, but the primary difference between open ended and short answer coding 
instructions related to the degree of flexibility allowed in defining a “Yes” or a “Partial” 
detection.  Since open-ended questions lack specificity by nature, the degree of flexibility 
was greater for the open ended responses.  However, since the short answer questions 
were far more specific in their wording, the research assistants were instructed to be 
much more exclusive and strict in their scoring and interpretations.   
 In creating my final scales to confirm the detection rates of all eight 
inconsistencies in relation to each other for the open ended and short answer questions, I 
focused only on the data sets each research assistant submitted after their discussion.  In 
Study One, I came up with four different ways to recode or “finalize” the open ended and 
short answer data into a value corresponding to an overall detection rate for each 
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inconsistency, though I ultimately used only two of them, and so I relied on these same 
two scoring schemes again in Study Two.  In order of “loosest” level to “strictest” level, 
the two scoring schemes I used were: 
 CombiMed: Both research assistants must give some sort of credit (Yes or 
Partial) to that participant for that particular inconsistency. 
 CombiHighYes: Both research assistants must give that participant the exact same 
credit (counting only Yes scores) for that particular inconsistency. 
 
I will return to discussion of these scoring schemes below when outlining the process I 
used to aggregate all question types into metrics to assist in confirming whether to retain 
all eight inconsistencies for use in the remainder of the research. 
 Multiple Choice Questions 
 Out of all participants who were not excluded from analysis at the outset (N = 27), 
10 of them did not report a single inconsistency by selecting the two different choices 
corresponding to the correct consistent and correct inconsistent information presented in 
the trial transcript.  While it is unclear whether these participants truly did not notice any 
of the inconsistencies, or they did notice but simply did not understand the instructions—
particularly that they were told it was okay to select more than one answer, or if perhaps 
they were not truly engaged, paying attention, and earnestly participating, they did not 
meet any of the pre-established criteria for exclusion.  Nevertheless, the possibility 
remains that they may not have been fully engaged participants (though they each did 
indicate having noticed inconsistencies through other question formats), so I elected to 
consider detection rate data for the multiple choice questions both with them (N = 27), 
and without them (N = 17) to provide an upper and lower boundary to the detection rates 
among the multiple choice questions. 
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 True or False Questions 
 Interpreting the true or false inconsistency detection rates was straightforward.  
Four of the eight non-dummy questions were phrased in a manner such that an 
inconsistency detection corresponded with a “True” response, and four of eight were 
phrased in a manner where a “False” response indicated an inconsistency detection.  
Detection rates for each inconsistency were simply the percentage of participants who 
answered the non-dummy questions in a manner indicating a detection. 
 Point Blank Questions 
 The point blank questions presented participants with two jurors, both of whom 
found one of the witness’s (whichever witness makes the inconsistent statement of 
interest) to be inaccurate but for two different reasons.  Participants were asked which of 
the two hypothetical jurors they most agreed with, both of whom said there was an 
inconsistency. However, one provided a reason based on the exact details of the 
manipulated inconsistency while the other provided a reason based on details similar to 
but not present in the manipulated inconsistency. For example, for the point blank 
question associated with PI 5-Model, the choices are whether Marc Zollinger’s testimony 
is inaccurate because he said that Brock Collins drove a Corvette (which is how the 
inconsistency is presented in the testimony) or because he said that Brock Collins drove a 
Camaro (which is not the basis of the inconsistent testimony).  There is also an “I don’t 
agree with either of these jurors.” option. 
 The point blank questions can actually provide two different “levels” of 
diagnostic information.  First, those participants who correctly identify the basis of the 
incorrect testimony are credited with having detected the inconsistency.  Second, those 
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participants who selected the incorrect basis (essentially, those who did not get the 
question right, but who nevertheless indicated some belief in an inconsistency concerning 
the topic at issue, or who may have noticed an inconsistency but could not recalled the 
exact details correctly—basically, everyone but those participants who chose “I don’t 
agree with either of these jurors.”) are able to provide a very liberal definition of 
detection.  Of course, these participants may have simply guessed or deduced the nature 
of the inconsistency based on exposure to prior questions, and for that reason this would 
make a terrible metric if it were the sole measure of inconsistency detection rate, but as 
the final set of questions, and as the most liberal interpretation of the most direct and 
“easiest” of the inconsistency detection measures, it is useful enough to simply consider 
these participants who did not answer the question distinctly incorrectly within the more 
lenient of the two detection rate scoring composites.  
Scales to Summarize Relative Ease of Detection for Each Inconsistency 
 For the open ended and short answer questions, I employed the CombiMed as the 
“loose”  or more liberal scale and CombiHighYes as the more discriminating “strict” 
scoring schemes.  The two criteria levels for the multiple choice questions (loose: 
counting only those 17 participants who got at least one multiple choice question correct 
by providing both the consistent and the inconsistent answers vs. strict: counting all 27 
participants) are so named for their effect on overall detection rates (with loose leading to 
higher overall percentage of detections, and strict leading to a lower overall percentage), 
not the overall “standard for inclusion as an inconsistency detection”, which would have 
resulted in the opposite naming scheme.  Similarly, it is important to keep this distinction 
in mind for the point blank criteria naming convention (loose: counting both those 
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participants who got the question correct as well as those who chose the incorrect option 
as a reason for finding the witness’s testimony unconvincing—essentially everyone who 
didn’t select “I don’t agree with either of these jurors” vs. strict: counting only those 
participants who got the question correct).   
 I applied the same reasoning to the names of the two composite scoring schemes, 
such that the Strict scheme will provide the lowest overall percentage of detections, but 
the detection rates it yields for each inconsistency will be the unequivocal minimum 
levels of  detection.  The Strict criteria level averages Open Ended CombiHighYes, Short 
Answer CombiHighYes, all 27 Multiple Choice responses, True/False, and Point Blank.  
On the other end of the spectrum, the Loose scheme will provide the highest overall 
percentage of detections according to the most forgiving definitions of inconsistency 
detection.  The Loose criteria level averages Open Ended CombiMed, Short Answer 
CombiMed, Multiple Choice only 17 (using the Multiple Choice responses from only 
those 17 participants who got at least one multiple choice question correct, in percentage 
equivalent), True/False, and Point Blank Combined (counting detections for all 
participants who did not choose “I don’t know.”) 
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Table T1 
Study Two: Loose Scoring Scheme Detection Rate Percentages for all Eight 
Inconsistencies by Question Type 
Inconsistency 
Open 
Ended 
CombiMed 
Short 
Answer 
CombiMed 
Multiple 
Choice 
17 non-
0’s 
True 
False 
Point 
Blank 
Combined 
Loose 
Score 
PI 7-Hair 40.7 44.4 58.8 66.7 63.0 54.7 
PI 9-Year 25.9 29.6 58.8 63.0 70.4 49.5 
PI 4-Oil Co. 22.2 22.2 47.1 37.0 63.0 38.3 
PI 5-Model 33.3 14.8 23.5 48.1 59.3 35.8 
PI 13-Dog 0.0 18.5 41.2 37.0 70.4 33.4 
PI 12-Tree 7.4 11.1 29.4 33.3 77.8 31.8 
PI 10-Color  11.1 3.7 23.5 29.6 66.7 26.9 
PI 11-Jared 25.9 3.7 23.5 33.3 37.0 24.7 
Mean Rate 20.8 18.5 38.2 43.5 63.5 36.9 
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Table T2 
Study Two: Strict Scoring Scheme Detection Rate Percentages for all Eight 
Inconsistencies by Question Type 
Inconsistency 
Open Ended 
CombiHighYes 
Short Answer 
CombiHighYes 
Multiple 
Choice 
True 
False 
Point 
Blank 
Strict 
Score
PI 9-Year 22.2 22.2 37.0 63.0 51.9 39.3 
PI 7-Hair 25.9 11.1 37.0 66.7 51.9 38.5 
PI 4-Oil Co. 14.8 18.5 29.6 37.0 40.7 28.1 
PI 5-Model 18.5 11.1 14.8 48.1 44.4 27.4 
PI 12-Tree 7.4 7.4 18.5 33.3 66.7 26.7 
PI 13-Dog 0.0 11.1 25.9 37.0 51.9 25.1 
PI 10-Color  11.1 3.7 14.8 29.6 44.4 20.7 
PI 11-Jared 14.8 0.0 14.8 33.3 37.0 20.0 
Mean Rate 14.3 10.6 24.1 43.5 48.6 28.2 
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APPENDIX U 
Study Three Data Reduction Procedures 
Step One: Raw Data 
 At the conclusion of data collection, the final data file included 389 total entries, 
or one separate entry for each discrete time Study Three was accessed and begun.  Of 
these 389 entries, 319 were complete, having accessed every page of the study website.  
To be clear, these are not total numbers of distinct participants, but rather all separate 
instances of data recordings initiated each time the study was started.   
Step Two: Eliminating Repeat Starters 
 Despite repeated admonitions and stern warnings to the contrary, some 
participants in online studies nevertheless begin the study and then quit partway through 
completion, only to return at a later time to complete the study in full.  Because the 
objective of Study Three is to determine the effectiveness of inducing fear, anger, or no 
emotional response through the use of different film clips, I wanted to use data from only 
those participants who were exposed to the stimulus materials a single time.  Not only 
would participants with prior exposure have an advance familiarity with the study which 
could influence the way they respond to the pre-test of emotional state, but repeated 
viewings of the same film clip may alter its emotional impact, either intensifying or 
reducing its effect, neither of which I wanted distorting the results of these baseline 
confirmations, as participants in Studies Four and Five will not have repeated viewings.  
As such, I eliminated all data associated with those participants who accessed the study 
on more than one occasion.  However, for any participants who completed the study the 
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first time they accessed it, but who may have started it again, I simply eliminated all data 
associated with any subsequent attempts since their first exposure was untainted. 
 After eliminating the data associated with any participants who had been pre-
exposed to the study, 329 separate data entries remained. 
Step Three: Eliminating Non-Consenting Participants 
 Two participants did not agree to participate in the study after having read the 
Informed Consent document (see Appendix V).  I eliminated those two participants who 
did not grant consent to participate, leaving 327 separate data entries remaining. 
Step Four: Eliminating Partial Participants 
 Steps Two, Three, and Four could have been performed in interchangeable order 
with no consequence, but I expressly refrained from eliminating the participants who did 
not complete the study at the start of the data reduction process because doing so would 
have prevented me from having the ability to identify those participants who began the 
study and were exposed to some or all of the study materials and quit partway through, 
only to restart and complete the study at a later time—and with an improper degree of 
exposure to the measures and film clips.  It is only after this step that the remaining data 
entries can properly be called “participants.”  Of the 327 data entries remaining before 
this step, only 319 participants completed the entire study.   
Step Five: Eliminating Extreme Outliers of Time Spent on Film Clips 
 The goal of Study Three is to measure and confirm the effectiveness of the three 
different film clips as means to induce emotions, so I wanted to eliminate from 
consideration those participants who spent too long on the webpage featuring the film 
clip before continuing on to the post-film measures.  Regardless of the basis for any delay 
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(and a lengthy period beyond the known duration of the film clip is not necessarily an 
indicator of inattention, but it is obviously an indicator of atypical rate of completion), I 
did not want these inexplicably dilatory participants to compromise the accuracy of my 
assessments.  To identify these extreme outliers, I created a “ClipLag” variable by 
subtracting the known duration of whichever film clip each participant viewed from the 
total time spent on the webpage featuring their randomly assigned film clip.  Even though 
the different film clips vary in duration, by creating the ClipLag variable this way, I was 
able to standardize the length of time spent after each participant’s film clip had ended 
and before they clicked “Continue” to go on to the next page. 
 I defined an extreme outlier as a participant at or above the 97.5th percentile in 
terms of their ClipLag value.  The 97.5th percentile was 650.8 seconds delay, which 
resulted in six participants being identified as extreme outliers ranging from 857.1 
seconds to 3332.6 seconds spent (M = 1391.1, SD = 957.2) and eliminated from further 
analysis, leaving a total of 313 participants. 
Step Six: Eliminating Extreme Outliers of Total Time Spent on Entire Study 
 In addition to using the delay between watching the film clip and proceeding to 
the next page as a criteria for exclusion, I also used the total time spent on the study as a 
way to identify atypical participants to exclude from analysis.  To standardize the values 
for total time spent on Study Three, I subtracted the duration of each participant’s 
randomly assigned film clip from the total time they spent on the study in order to 
eliminate the natural variances due to film clips of unequal length.  Defining extreme 
outliers as those participants in the 97.5th percentile of total time spent, which was 2486.9 
seconds (or 41.4 minutes), I eliminated three participants whose total times were 2730.3 
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seconds (45.5 minutes), 3279.5 (54.7 minutes), and 8059.9 (134.3 minutes), leaving 310 
participants who were not extreme outliers according to either timing criteria. 
Step Seven: Eliminating Outliers of Total Time Spent 
 After eliminating those extreme outliers which would skew the overall 
distribution of time spent, I calculated the distribution of total time spent for the 
remaining 310 participants on a condition by condition basis, resulting in the elimination 
of nine participants whose total time spent was in excess of two standard deviations 
above the mean for their experimental conditions.  There were no participants who 
completed the study in less time than two standard deviations below the means of their 
experimental conditions, leaving 301 participants remaining. 
Step Eight: Eliminating Outliers of Duration Between Clip Conclusion and 
Continuing 
 Having excluded the extreme outliers for the ClipLag duration and total time 
spent, and without those participants whose total time spent exceeded two standard 
deviations beyond the mean, I still wanted to eliminate those remaining participants who 
had an unusually long delay between the time their film clip ended and the point when 
they clicked the “Continue” button to load the next webpage.  I calculated the mean 
latency for each film clip condition and eliminated those thirteen participants whose 
times were greater than two standard deviations past the mean, leaving me with 288 
participants. 
Step Nine: Eliminating Participants in Highly Emotional States Prior to Induction 
 In order to determine the overall effectiveness of the various film clips at inducing 
the target emotions, I administered the I-PANAS-SF (Thompson, 2007) prior to the film 
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clips and the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994, see Appendix O) afterwards.  Gauging 
the effectiveness of the emotion inductions required participants who were not already in 
an elevated emotional state prior to receiving the film clip manipulation, so I calculated 
the mean ratings for each of the eleven emotions represented on the I-PANAS-SF pretest 
(plus a total of all eleven ratings), and then calculated the exact value of two standard 
deviations above and below the mean for each emotion and the combined total.  Because 
the I-PANAS-SF uses ratings on a scale from 1 (Very Slightly or Not At All) to 5 
(Extremely), two standard deviations above or below the mean was beyond the limits of 
the scale, but responding with a score of 1 in terms of attentiveness was two standard 
deviations below the mean (M = 3.51, SD = 1.13), as was a total score of all emotion 
ratings of 11 or less (M = 24.72, SD = 6.68).  There were more emotions where it was 
possible to give a high rating greater than two standard deviations beyond the mean.  
Those emotions where a rating of 3 or more was greater than two standard deviations 
above the mean were hostile (M = 1.25, SD = 0.64), ashamed (M = 1.23, SD = 0.68), 
angry (M = 1.31, SD = 0.69), afraid (M = 1.27, SD = 0.74), and mad (M = 1.33, SD = 
0.75).  Those emotions where a rating of 4 or more was greater than two standard 
deviations above the mean were upset (M = 1.46, SD = 1.13) and nervous (M = 1.56, SD 
= 0.90), while a total of 39 or more was greater than two standard deviations above the 
mean for a combined value of all eleven ratings (M = 24.72, SD = 6.68). 
 Because I am experimentally inducing fear or anger among some participants, I 
eliminated six participants who exceeded two standard deviations above the mean on 
either afraid, angry, or mad (four of those six participants exceeded the upper limit on at 
least two of the three critical emotions).  Of the remaining participants, I eliminated eight 
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who were beyond the upper or lower boundaries on five of the nine possible ratings, two 
who were beyond the boundaries on six ratings, three who were beyond the boundaries 
on seven ratings, and one participant who was beyond the established limits on eight of 
the possible nine ratings where exclusion was possible.  This left me with 268 remaining 
participants. 
Step Ten: Eliminating Highly Emotionally Volatile Participants 
 One benefit of measuring participants’ real-time emotion using the PANAS-X 
(which specifically instructs participants to “Indicate to what extent you feel this way 
right now.” for each emotion) immediately following the film clip and then to follow 
with the Post-Film Questionnaire (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007, see Appendix A), 
which specifically instructs participants that “The following questions refer to how you 
felt while watching the film.” which, while certainly not constituting an exact replication 
of the PANAS-X, still allowed me to isolate those participants who exhibited an extreme 
variation in emotion ratings from the time of the film clip to immediately after watching 
it.  Whether these highly volatile, vacillating participants were simply clicking responses 
haphazardly without reading the actual questions on one or both emotional rating scales, 
or if they are legitimately mercurial and emotionally capricious is immaterial—either 
way, I do not want to include their responses in my analysis. 
 To contrast ratings on the PANAS-X with those from the Post-Film 
Questionnaire, which asks for a rating on a scale from 0 (Not At All/None) to 8 
(Extremely/A Great Deal), I had to convert the Post-Film Questionnaire responses into an 
equivalent scale, which I did by changing a rating of 0 to a 1, a 1 to a 1.5, a 2 remained a 
2, a 3 to a 2.5, 4 to 3, 5 to 3.5, 6 to 4, 7 to 4.5, and an 8 to a 5, which aligns perfectly with 
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the 1 to 5 scale used by the PANAS-X.  I then calculated the absolute value of the 
difference between responses on the PANAS-X and the scaled Post-Film Questionnaire 
responses for anger, disgust, guilt, happiness, interest, joy, sadness, and surprise since 
those eight emotions are listed identically on both measures.  I did not compare afraid 
(PANAS-X) to fear (Post-Film Questionnaire), proud (PANAS-X) to pride (Post-Film 
Questionnaire), or ashamed (PANAS-X) to shame (Post-Film Questionnaire) due to the 
remote possibility that these minor variations in presentation might yield unexpected 
differences. 
 I calculated the sum of the absolute values of the differences in ratings for those 
eight emotions as well as the mean difference across all eight emotions for each 
participant.  I then calculated the means for both of those values from all 268 participants.  
The average sum of the absolute values of the difference in ratings ranged from 0.00 to 
25.00 (M = 4.83, SD = 3.28) while the individual average differences in ratings ranged 
from 0.0 to 3.57 (M = 0.69, SD = 0.47).  I calculated the 97.5th percentile for each of 
these values, which was 13.00 for the individual sum of differences and 1.86 for the 
individual mean differences, and I eliminated the nine participants whose values 
exceeded both thresholds, leaving me with 259 participants. 
Step Eleven: Eliminating Internally Inconsistent Participants 
 The final step of my data reduction procedure involves identifying those 
participants who may have been “Christmas treeing” their responses (that is, 
indiscriminately choosing answers based on nothing more than achieving an aesthetically 
balanced array of responses, the way one might approach decorating a Christmas tree) or 
otherwise not carefully considering their emotions while completing the measures.  Part 
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of what makes the PANAS-X such a reliable measure is its thoroughness at probing 
highly similar, interrelated traits.  Three such examples are attentiveness, which is 
measured not only by requiring participants to rate how attentive they are, but also by 
including alert and concentrating.  Similarly, fatigue as a broader construct is measured 
by tired, sleepy, and drowsy, while serenity is measured by relaxed, calm, and at ease 
response ratings.  Because all nine of these different subcomponents are presented on the 
same webpage which instructs participants to rate the extent ‘to which they feel that way 
right now,’ it is unlikely that attentive, thoughtful, engaged participants will give highly 
disparate responses to each of these three sets of similar traits.  However, since these nine 
emotion ratings are interspersed throughout the larger PANAS-X featuring 52 other 
additional emotions to rate, a participant who is not truly engaged in the study is unlikely 
to notice relatively redundant questions or give internally consistent responses purely by 
random chance. 
 I calculated the variance within the three attentiveness-related emotions (attentive, 
alert, and concentrating) for each participant, and then I calculated the 97.5th percentile of 
variance for the remaining 259 participants, which was 3.56.  I then did the same for the 
three fatigue-related emotions (tired, sleepy, and drowsy), calculating the variance 
between the three responses given by each participant and then the 97.5th percentile 
(2.89), followed by the variance between the three serenity-related emotions (relaxed, 
calm, and at ease), for each participant, and the 97.5th percentile (2.00).  I eliminated the 
ten participants who had variances at or beyond two of the three 97.5th percentile 
calculations, leaving me with a final total of 249 participants for Study Three. 
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APPENDIX V 
Study Three Informed Consent 
 
  
  
ADULT ONLINE CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
Civil Juror Decision-Making 
  
Thank you for looking into our study. Over the next few webpages you will answer some questions and view 
a short film clip.  Before participating, please read the information in the official consent document below.  
  
**IMPORTANT: You may use any of the following web browsers AS LONG AS JAVASCRIPT AND 
ADOBE/SHOCKWAVE FLASH ARE ENABLED: Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Apple Safari, and 
Internet Explorer.  If you have JavaScript or Flash turned off, or use any add-ons, extensions, or 
shortcuts which block JavaScript or Flash, please either disable them, add qualtrics.com to the list 
of approved sites, enable JavaScript, enable Flash, or run your browser in Safe Mode** 
  
Please note, you must have cookies, JavaScript, and Flash enabled on your browser in order to 
participate.  If you click the button below but do not leave this page, your browser is not supporting 
cookies.  Cookies are used only so that you can have a unique identification number for this study; no 
personal information will be stored in cookies. 
  
You must also have the capability to view Flash video clips on your computer (the same sorts of clips which 
are used on YouTube), and you must be able to listen to the video clips, either through the use of speakers 
or headphones. 
  
Please complete this study at one time.  If for any reason you are not able to complete the study in one 
sitting, you will have to start over.  The experiment takes roughly one hour to complete.  
  
As a student in the FIU Psychology Participant Pool (enrolled in PSY 2012 or other class), you are invited to 
participate in a research study conducted over the Web. The following information is provided to help you 
make an informed decision whether or not to participate. Your participation is completely voluntary, and not 
participating will not affect your class grade in any way. You must be at least 18 years old to participate. 
  
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
You are being asked to be in a research study.  The purpose of this study is to investigate how jurors make 
decisions.  Completion of this study will take approximately 30 minutes. 
  
NUMBER OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
If you decide to be in this study, you will be one of approximately 180 people in this research study. 
  
DURATION OF THE STUDY 
Your participation will require approximately 30 minutes.  
  
PROCEDURES 
If you agree to be in the study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
You will be asked to watch a short film clip as well as answer some questions about how you feel.  You can 
refuse to answer any question and cease participation at any time. 
  
RISKS AND/OR DISCOMFORTS 
The following risks may be associated with your participation in this study: You might become upset while 
viewing the short film clip from a popular movie.  This event is unlikely, but if you are concerned about it you 
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may withdraw from the study at any time.  
  
BENEFITS 
The following benefits may be associated with your participation in this study:you may find the learning 
experience enjoyable, you may learn a little bit about how psychological research is conducted, and the 
process may help you better understand the legal process. The information gained from this study will help 
us better understand the factors that influence juror decision-making processes and to improve trial 
procedures. 
  
ALTERNATIVES 
You do not need to participate in this research. Your instructor may have alternative means for you to earn 
class credit, though your participation here may satisfy your instructor’s research requirements.    
  
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The records of this study will be kept private and will be protected to the fullest extent provided by law. In 
any sort of report we might publish, we will not include any information that will make it possible to identify a 
subject.  Research records will be stored securely and only the researcher team will have access to the 
records.  
  
Any information obtained during this study that could identify you will be kept strictly confidential. The study 
will collect information about your IP address and the browser you are using. No personal information will be 
placed on your browser by the use of cookies. So that participation credit may be given, you will be required 
to enter your Panther ID number and your name. The personal information collected will be deleted from the 
database once data collection is completed and credit has been given. The information gained from this 
study may be published in scientific journals or presented at scientific meetings, but your identity will be kept 
strictly confidential. 
  
COMPENSATION & COSTS 
There is no financial compensation to you as a result of participating in this study. Completion of this study 
earns partial credit toward the FIU Psychology Participant Pool requirements as outlined by your professor 
and on http://fiu.sona-systems.com/. For participating in this study you will receive one half research credit. 
You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without adversely affecting 
your relationship with the investigators or Florida International University. There will be no negative 
consequences for deciding not to participate or for withdrawing. If you choose to not participate in this study, 
you may satisfy your course requirements through other studies registered with the FIU Psychology 
Participant Pool at http://fiu.sona-systems.com/, or you may contact your course instructor to arrange an 
alternative method of obtaining credit. Participation in human subjects research is not required to earn credit 
in any class, and your professor is required to offer an alternative method of obtaining credit.You will not be 
responsible for any costs to participate in this study. 
  
RIGHT TO DECLINE OR WITHDRAW 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You are free to participate in the study or withdraw your consent 
at any time during the study.  Your withdrawal or lack of participation will not affect any benefits to which you 
are otherwise entitled.  
  
RESEARCHER CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you have any questions about the purpose, procedures, or any other issues relating to this research study 
you may contact Stephen Joy at [PHONE NUMBER REDACTED] or [EMAIL ADDRESS REDACTED]. 
  
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you would like to talk with someone about your rights of being a subject in this research study or about 
ethical issues with this research study, you may contact the FIU Office of Research Integrity by phone at 
[PHONE NUMBER REDACTED] or [EMAIL ADDRESS REDACTED]. 
 
PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT 
I have read the information in this consent form and agree to participate in this study.  I have had a chance 
to ask any questions I have about this study, and they have been answered for me.  By clicking on the 
“consent to participate” button below I am providing my informed consent. 
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APPENDIX W 
Study Three Preliminary Investigation 
 My original plans did not call for Study Three to be broken up into two separate 
efforts, though some unexpected results required that I re-run Study Three with a few 
adjustments.  I am appending this appendix in the interest of completeness and to provide 
the frame of reference necessary to support the purpose and design of the main Study 
Three materials featured in the body of this dissertation.  However, due to nature of my 
findings from this effort, I will simply provide a summary rather than the full degree of 
elaboration appropriate for a main chapter.   
 My first (and what was intended to be the only) attempt at Study Three was a 3 
(induction target emotion/level of certainty: fear/low certainty vs. anger/high certainty vs. 
neutral emotional impact/control level of certainty) x 2 (film clip; two for each target 
emotion—fear: boy playing in hallway from The Shining [1980] vs. basement chase 
scene from Silence of the Lambs [1991]; anger: police abusing protestors from Cry 
Freedom [1987] vs. bullying scene from My Bodyguard [1980]; neutral/no emotion: a 
screen-saver featuring abstract shapes [Gross & Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg, Ray, & 
Gross, 2007] versus a nature scene from Alaska’s Wild Denali [1997]; see Appendix A) 
pretest-posttest control mixed factorial design. 
 The purpose was to confirm that these specific six film clips, which had been 
rigorously tested and validated by prior research (Gross and Levenson, 1995; Rottenberg, 
Ray, & Gross, 2007) would each elicit their respective target emotions and no other 
emotions within my pool of participants at FIU.  It had been my intention to use all six 
film clips so that having two distinct clips to elicit each emotional response could be 
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more generalizeable.  It was not my intention at this stage to pit the two film clips for 
each emotion against one another in order to select the more effective of the two.  I had 
no reason to expect that prior results would not generalize to FIU students, I simply 
wanted to be sure in order to maintain maximum experimental control.   
 Participants completed the brief, 11-item I-PANAS-SF (Thompson, 2007; see 
Appendix O) before watching one of the six randomly assigned film clips to measure 
their baseline, pre-existing emotions.  In the interest of maximizing the effectiveness of 
the emotion inductions, I included an autobiographical writing and perspective-taking 
exercise following the film clip in which participants were instructed to “please describe 
the film clip you just watched as if you were there to experience it in person” (see Lerner 
& Keltner, 2001; Martin, 1990; and Westermann et al., 1996 for more on emotion 
induction techniques featuring autobiographical reflection and perspective taking writing 
tasks).  Immediately after participants finished writing about how they would have felt if 
they were directly involved in the film clip, they completed the 60-item PANAS-X 
(Watson & Clark, 1994; see Appendix O) to gauge their final emotional state after the 
emotion inductions. 
 This effort yielded three distinct discoveries, one having to do with each of the 
three target emotions—one troublesome, one complicated, and one straightforward.  
First, it became clear that experimentally inducing fear was very difficult.  I had known 
as much at the outset of my research, and the vast collection of resources I had consulted 
concerning the experimental induction of emotions (through film clips and otherwise) 
had made it clear that due to the unavoidable artificiality of all but the most ecologically 
valid experimental settings (and the ethical responsibilities of researchers), fear was 
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unlikely to be induced to a high degree relative to the magnitude of effectiveness found 
with other experimentally induced emotions.  Neither of the film clips intended to induce 
fear (The Shining and Silence of the Lambs) produced a statistically significant increase 
in fear ratings in comparison to the four other film clips. 
 I suspected that perhaps the autobiographical writing exercise may have been 
compromising the effectiveness of the fear induction because of what Lerner and Keltner 
(2000) dubbed the “cognitive-awareness hypothesis” which suggests that upon close, 
deliberate awareness or consideration of their effects, appraisal tendencies have less 
effect because they are more readily discounted as incidental or disregarded as a simply a 
byproduct of circumstance.  While perspective taking is not strictly analogous to being 
held accountable for one’s decision-making process, past research has demonstrated very 
broadly that awareness of an unrelated influence will reduce the scope of that influence 
on a separate task or decision-making process (see Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, for a wide-
ranging summary of these types of effects).  In the event that the lack of fear induction 
from the film clips may have been due to a sort of “disregard for emotional effects known 
to be from an incidental source” phenomena when faced with the perspective taking 
writing task, in my “second” Study Three, I added the presence or absence of the 
autobiographical writing task as an independent variable such that approximately half of 
the participants would engage in the writing task after the film clip and before the 
PANAS-X, and approximately half would not, instead going straight from watching the 
film clip to completing the PANAS-X. 
 Second, it was clear that of the two film clips intended to induce anger (Cry 
Freedom and My Bodyguard), the clip from Cry Freedom featuring white South African 
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soldiers opening fire on a crowd of peaceful black anti-apartheid protestors (including a 
soldier taking careful aim with a pistol in order to shoot a fleeing young boy in the back) 
elicited a greater degree of anger than did the clip from My Bodyguard, which featured a 
boy getting beaten up by a bully who also damaged the victim’s motorcycle before 
pushing it into a lake.  Unfortunately, the Cry Freedom clip also elicited increased ratings 
of several other emotions, including afraid, frightened, and nervous.  It was my suspicion 
that perhaps the large subset of Cuban-American students at FIU might have been more 
sensitive and viscerally reactive to a scene of violent political oppression than those 
samples selected from less atypical populations used by Gross and Levenson (1995) and 
later by Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007), though since I was going to be rerunning 
Study Three with the autobiographical writing component manipulation anyway, it made 
good sense to reexamine both anger film clips under the new design. 
 The third discovery from this initial effort was that the neutral, non-emotion-
inducing screen saver/abstract shapes clip used by Gross and Levenson (1995) and 
Rottenberg, Ray, and Gross (2007) seemed to be eliciting general confusion and even 
annoyance among some participants.  The clip was almost four minutes long, so 
confusion and annoyance are not totally unreasonable responses, especially when 
considering the relative incongruity of the autobiographical writing task.  However, the 
Alaska’s Wild Denali clip did not induce (or reduce) any emotions, so I decided to use 
that clip as my neutral, non-emotion-inducing control group film clip in Studies Four and 
Five, and to instead focus exclusively on the two fear induction and two anger induction 
clips for the “main” Study Three.  In addition to these changes, I also implemented a 
much more rigorous and multi-faceted approach to data reduction for the main Study 
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Three (see Appendix U) than I undertook during this initial phase in case these findings 
may have been due in part to some inattentive or insincere participants obscuring more 
robust effects among attentive, earnest, dedicated participants. 
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APPENDIX X 
Study Four Data Reduction Procedures 
Step One: Raw Data 
 At the conclusion of data collection, the final data file included 579 total entries, 
or one separate entry for each discrete time Study Four was accessed and begun.  Of 
these 579 entries, 357 were complete, having accessed every page of the study website.  
To be clear, these are not total numbers of distinct participants, but rather all separate 
instances of data recordings initiated each time the study was started.   
Step Two: Eliminating Repeat Starters 
 Just as in the prior three studies, despite repeated reminders and unequivocal 
directions to the contrary, some participants in online studies nevertheless begin the study 
and then quit partway through completion, only to return at a later time to complete the 
study in full.  Because Study Four requires the effective induction of fear, anger, or no 
emotional response through the use of different film clips, I wanted to use data from only 
those participants who were exposed to the stimulus materials a single time.  Repeated 
viewings of the same film clip may alter its emotional impact, either intensifying or 
reducing its effect, and viewing multiple film clips would signal the nature of one of my 
independent variables, while multiple exposures to the trial transcript could artificially 
boost inconsistency detection rates.  As such, I eliminated all data associated with those 
participants who accessed the study on more than one occasion.  However, for any 
participants who completed the study the first time they accessed it, but who may have 
started it again, I simply eliminated all data associated with any subsequent attempts 
since their first exposure was untainted. 
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 After eliminating the data associated with any participants who had been pre-
exposed to the study, 363 separate data entries remained. 
Step Three: Eliminating Partial Participants 
 Steps Two, Three, and Four could have been performed in interchangeable order 
with no consequence, but I expressly refrained from eliminating the participants who did 
not complete the study at the start of the data reduction process because doing so would 
have prevented me from having the ability to identify those participants who began the 
study and were exposed to some or all of the study materials and quit partway through, 
only to restart and complete the study at a later time—and with an improper degree of 
exposure to the measures and film clips.  It is only after this step that the remaining data 
entries can properly be called “participants.”  Of the 363 data entries remaining before 
this step, only 294 participants completed the entire study.   
Step Four: Eliminating Non-Consenting Participants 
 Two participants did not agree to participate in the study after having read the 
Informed Consent document for Part Two of Study Four (see Appendix Y).  I eliminated 
those participants who did not grant consent to participate, leaving 292 separate data 
entries remaining. 
Step Five: Eliminating Extreme Outliers of Time Spent on Film Clips 
 Study Four depends on the effective and consistent induction of emotion through 
the use of film clips, so I wanted to eliminate from consideration those participants who 
spent too long on the webpage featuring the film clip before continuing on to the trial 
transcript.  Just as in Study Three, I did not want these laggardly participants to 
compromise the accuracy of my assessments.  To identify these extreme outliers, I again 
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created a “ClipLag” variable by subtracting the known duration of whichever film clip 
each participant viewed from the total time spent on the webpage featuring their 
randomly assigned film clip. 
 I defined an extreme outlier as a participant at or above the 97.5th percentile in 
terms of their ClipLag value.  Before calculating the extreme outlying 97.5th percentile, I 
eliminated a participant who waited 82,998 seconds (over 23 hours) to proceed to the 
next page.  Barring that individual, the 97.5th percentile for those participants who 
watched The Shining was 246.1 seconds delay, which resulted in two participants being 
identified as extreme outliers (259.3 and 585.1 seconds), while the 97.5th percentile for 
those participants who watched My Bodyguard was 1014.7 seconds, which also resulted 
in two exclusions (1136.1 and 1648.1 seconds), and the 97.5th percentile of submission 
time for those participants who watched Alaska’s Wild Denali was 790.9 seconds, which 
led to the elimination of two additional participants (842.2 and 2688.6 seconds), leaving a 
total of 285 participants at this stage. 
Step Six: Eliminating Extreme Outliers of Total Time Spent on Entire Study 
 In addition to using the delay between watching the film clip and proceeding to 
the next page as a criteria for exclusion, I also used the total time spent on the study as a 
way to identify atypical participants to exclude from analysis.  To standardize the values 
for total time spent on Study Four, I subtracted the duration of each participant’s 
randomly assigned film clip from the total time they spent on the study in order to 
eliminate the natural variances due to film clips of unequal length.  Defining extreme 
outliers as those participants in the 97.5th percentile of total time spent, I calculated 
separate values for each of the six experimental conditions since those participants who 
 399 
 
were exposed to the transcript version featuring inconsistencies (and who noticed any of 
them) would presumably take longer to complete the open ended and short answer 
questions than would those participants who were exposed to the transcript without any 
inconsistencies and who therefore would not have any reason to give lengthy answers to 
those questions.   
 The 97.5th percentile for those participants who watched The Shining and who 
were exposed to the trial transcript featuring inconsistent testimony was 10,477.2 
seconds, eliminating two participants who spent 13,363.2 and 14,135.6 seconds.  The 
cutoff for those participants who watched My Bodyguard and who were exposed to the 
trial transcript with inconsistencies had a 97.5th percentile of 13,802.1 seconds, excluding 
three participants (M = 46,620.7, SD = 34,612.1).  Those participants who watched 
Alaska’s Wild Denali and were exposed to the inconsistent version of the transcript had a 
97.5th percentile of 12,394.6 seconds, which eliminated six participants (M = 98,262.9, 
SD = 53,413.1).  For those who watched The Shining but did not have the inconsistent 
transcript, the 97.5th percentile was 13,635.7 seconds, which resulted in the elimination of 
three participants (M = 17,475.7, SD = 1,719.4).  Watching My Bodyguard in 
combination with the inconsistency-free transcript yielded a 97.5th percentile of 12,218.2 
seconds, eliminating six participants (M = 20,403.3, SD = 5,556.0).  Finally, the Alaska’s 
Wild Denali clip in conjunction with the inconsistency-free transcript had a 97.5th 
percentile of 11,958.3 seconds, which led to the elimination of five participants (M = 
59,975.0, SD = 30,045.7).  After this round of exclusions, 260 participants remained. 
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Step Seven: Eliminating Outliers of Total Time Spent 
 After eliminating those extreme outliers which would skew the overall 
distribution of time spent, I calculated the distribution of total time spent for the 
remaining 260 participants on a condition by condition basis, resulting in the elimination 
of ten participants whose total time spent was in excess of two standard deviations above 
the mean for their experimental conditions.  This resulted in the elimination of two 
participants with times of 12,257.0 and 13,802.1 from the My Bodyguard and inconsistent 
transcript condition; three participants from the Alaska’s Wild Denali and inconsistent 
transcript condition (M = 11,842.5, SD = 582.9), one participant each who watched The 
Shining (13,635.7 seconds) and My Bodyguard (12,218.2 seconds) with the 
inconsistency-free transcript, and three participants who watched Alaska’s Wild Denali 
and were exposed to the inconsistency-free transcript (M = 11,520.5, SD = 380.3).  There 
were no participants who completed the study in less time than two standard deviations 
below the means of their experimental conditions, leaving 250 participants remaining. 
Step Eight: Eliminating Outliers of Duration Between Clip Conclusion and 
Continuing 
 Having excluded the extreme outliers for the ClipLag duration and total time 
spent, and without those participants whose total time spent exceeded two standard 
deviations beyond the mean, I still wanted to eliminate those remaining participants who 
had an unusually long delay between the time their film clip ended and the point when 
they clicked the “Continue” button to load the next webpage.  I calculated the mean 
latency for each film clip (The Shining: M = 22.0, SD = 41.1; My Bodyguard: M = 41.1, 
SD = 61.1; Alaska’s Wild Denali: M = 44.7, SD = 68.5) and eliminated 26 participants 
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whose times were greater than two standard deviations past the mean, leaving me with 
224 participants. 
Step Nine: Eliminating Participants with Elevated Baseline Emotion Levels 
 Since validation of the film clips in Study Three required that I eliminate 
participants showing high levels of emotion during the pre-film report, and because my 
inductions of emotion would have less impact on participants who are already in a highly 
emotional state, I calculated the mean ratings on a scale of 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 
5 (extremely) as well as the standard deviation for each of the twelve emotions listed on 
the I-PANAS-SF which was administered during Part One (upset: M = 1.38, SD = .74; 
hostile: M = 1.21, SD = .66; alert: M = 3.00, SD = 1.21; ashamed: M = 1.21, SD = .68; 
angry: M = 1.29, SD = .72, nervous: M = 1.55, SD = .96; determined: M = 3.39, SD = 
1.27; attentive: M = 3.64, SD = 1.04; afraid: M = 1.29, SD = .71; active: M = 2.67, SD = 
1.30; inspired: M = 2.73, SD = 1.33; mad: M = 1.33, SD = .77).  I then calculated the 
value of the mean plus and minus twice the standard deviation, and created a twelve 
sorting variables to indicate whether each participant’s rating for each emotion was above 
or below two standard deviations from the mean.  Since the scale used only ranged from 
1 to 5, it was impossible for five highly rated emotions (alert, determined, attentive, 
active, and inspired) to have a value exceeding two standard deviations, while only one 
emotion (attentive) had values which would allow for a participant’s rating to be greater 
than two standard deviations below the mean. 
 I eliminated twelve participants who were beyond the boundaries on four or more 
of the eight possible ratings, which left 96.4% of the existing sample intact, or 212 
participants. 
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Step Ten: Eliminating Participants who Failed Attention Checks 
 I included several “attention check” questions throughout the inconsistency 
detection questions within Part Two of Study Four identical to the ones used in Studies 
One and Two.  I eliminated twelve remaining participants who failed to answer the 
multiple choice attention check question correctly as well as two participants who failed 
to answer the true/false attention check question correctly. 
 In all, these data reduction efforts left a total of 198 participants remaining. 
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APPENDIX Y 
Study Four Part Two Informed Consent 
 
 
ADULT ONLINE CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
Civil Juror Decision-Making 
  
Thank you for looking into our study.  This study is split into two separate online sessions.  This is the 
second portion, and you must have completed the first session prior to completing the second 
session.  Please do NOT complete Part Two until you have received an email instructing you to 
do so. 
 
This session will take about an hour and a half to two hours to complete and it is worth two research 
credits, making a total of three research credits for your full participation. 
  
During this session, you will view a short film clip, read a description of a civil trial and some jury 
instructions, and then answer some questions about the case. Before participating, please read the 
information in the official consent document below.  
  
**IMPORTANT: It is strongly recommended that you use any of the following web browsers AS 
LONG AS JAVASCRIPT IS ENABLED: Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, or Apple Safari.  
 
It is recommended that you DO NOT USE Mozilla Firefox.  
 
If you have JavaScript turned off, or use any add-ons, extensions, or shortcuts which block 
JavaScript, please either disable them, add qualtrics.com to the list of approved sites, enable 
JavaScript, or run your browser in Safe Mode** 
  
Please note, you must have cookies and JavaScript enabled on your browser in order to participate.  If 
you click the button below but do not leave this page, your browser is not supporting cookies.  Cookies 
are used only so that you can have a unique identification number for this study; no personal 
information will be stored in cookies. 
  
You must also have the capability to view Flash video clips on your computer (the same sorts of clips 
which are used on YouTube), and you must be able to listen to the video clips, either through the use 
of speakers or headphones. 
  
Please complete this study at one time.  If for any reason you are not able to complete the study in one 
sitting, you will have to start over.  The experiment takes roughly an hour and a half to two hours to 
complete.  
  
As a student in the FIU Psychology Participant Pool (enrolled in PSY 2012 or other class), you are 
invited to participate in a research study conducted over the Web. The following information is 
provided to help you make an informed decision whether or not to participate. Your participation is 
completely voluntary, and not participating will not affect your class grade in any way. You must be at 
least 18 years old to participate. 
  
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
You are being asked to be in a research study.  The purpose of this study is to investigate how jurors 
make decisions.  Completion of this study will take approximately 90 to 120 minutes for this session. 
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NUMBER OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
If you decide to be in this study, you will be one of approximately 360 people in this research study. 
  
DURATION OF THE STUDY 
Your participation will require approximately one and a half to two hours.  
  
PROCEDURES 
If you agree to be in the study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
You will be asked to watch a short film clip as well as read along with and listen to a case scenario 
involving a civil lawsuit in which a plaintiff is suing a defendant for negligence. You will be asked to 
answer questions about the events described on a Web page. You will be asked to imagine you are a 
juror in the case and to decide whether the defendant is liable and whether the plaintiff is entitled to 
any money-based damages. We will also ask how you feel and your opinion on various aspects of the 
case.  You can refuse to answer any question and cease participation at any time. 
 
RISKS AND/OR DISCOMFORTS 
The following risks may be associated with your participation in this study: First, you might become 
upset while viewing the short film clip from a popular movie.  Second, the only other risk to 
participating in this study is that you might become upset when you read or render a verdict about the 
case involving an automobile accident, especially if you or someone you know has been involved in a 
similar accident. This event is unlikely, but if you are concerned about it you may withdraw from the 
study at any time.  
  
BENEFITS 
The following benefits may be associated with your participation in this study: you may find the 
learning experience enjoyable, you may learn a little bit about how psychological research is 
conducted, and the process may help you better understand the legal process. The information gained 
from this study will help us better understand the factors that influence juror decision-making 
processes and to improve trial procedures. 
  
ALTERNATIVES 
You do not need to participate in this research. Your instructor may have alternative means for you to 
earn class credit, though your participation here may satisfy your instructor’s research requirements.    
  
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The records of this study will be kept private and will be protected to the fullest extent provided by law. 
In any sort of report we might publish, we will not include any information that will make it possible to 
identify a subject.  Research records will be stored securely and only the researcher team will have 
access to the records.  
  
Any information obtained during this study that could identify you will be kept strictly confidential. The 
study will collect information about your IP address and the browser you are using. No personal 
information will be placed on your browser by the use of cookies. So that participation credit may be 
given, you will be required to enter your Panther ID number and your name. The personal information 
collected will be deleted from the database once data collection is completed and credit has been 
given. The information gained from this study may be published in scientific journals or presented at 
scientific meetings, but your identity will be kept strictly confidential. 
  
COMPENSATION & COSTS 
There is no financial compensation to you as a result of participating in this study. Completion of this 
study earns partial credit toward the FIU Psychology Participant Pool requirements as outlined by your 
professor and on http://fiu.sona-systems.com/. For participating in the first session of this study you will 
have received one research credit, and for the second session you will receive two additional research 
credits for a total of three credits. You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw 
at any time without adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators or Florida International 
University. There will be no negative consequences for deciding not to participate or for withdrawing. If 
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you choose to not participate in this study, you may satisfy your course requirements through other 
studies registered with the FIU Psychology Participant Pool at http://fiu.sona-systems.com/, or you 
may contact your course instructor to arrange an alternative method of obtaining credit. Participation in 
human subjects research is not required to earn credit in any class, and your professor is required to 
offer an alternative method of obtaining credit. You will not be responsible for any costs to participate 
in this study. 
  
RIGHT TO DECLINE OR WITHDRAW 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You are free to participate in the study or withdraw your 
consent at any time during the study.  Your withdrawal or lack of participation will not affect any 
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  
  
RESEARCHER CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you have any questions about the purpose, procedures, or any other issues relating to this research 
study you may contact Stephen Joy at [PHONE NUMBER REDACTED] or [EMAIL ADDRESS 
REDACTED]. 
  
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you would like to talk with someone about your rights of being a subject in this research study or 
about ethical issues with this research study, you may contact the FIU Office of Research Integrity by 
phone at [PHONE NUMBER REDACTED] or [EMAIL ADDRESS REDACTED]. 
 
PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT 
I have read the information in this consent form and agree to participate in this study.  I have had a 
chance to ask any questions I have about this study, and they have been answered for me.  By 
clicking on the “consent to participate” button below I am providing my informed consent. 
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APPENDIX AA 
Rational-Experiential Inventory Scale 
 
Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential information 
processing styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 972-987. 
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI-40):
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APPENDIX AB 
Study Four Part One Informed Consent 
 
  
  
ADULT ONLINE CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
Civil Juror Decision-Making 
  
Thank you for looking into our study.  This study is split into two separate online sessions.  You will receive 
one research credit for the first session, which should take approximately 30 minutes to complete.  After 
completing this first session, you will receive an email several days later with instructions for how to sign up 
and complete the second online session.  The second session must be completed no less than two days 
later, and no more than nine days later.  The second session will take about an hour and a half to two hours 
to complete and it will be worth two research credits, making a total of three research credits for your full 
participation. 
  
The first session involves filling out some surveys about yourself.  During the second session, you will log on 
to the website, view a short film clip, read a description of a civil trial and some jury instructions, and then 
answer some questions about the case. Before participating, please read the information in the official 
consent document below.  
  
**IMPORTANT: You may use any of the following web browsers AS LONG AS JAVASCRIPT IS 
ENABLED: Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Apple Safari, and Internet Explorer.  If you have 
JavaScript turned off, or use any add-ons, extensions, or shortcuts which block JavaScript, please 
either disable them, add qualtrics.com to the list of approved sites, enable JavaScript, or run your 
browser in Safe Mode** 
  
Please note, you must have cookies and JavaScript enabled on your browser in order to participate.  If you 
click the button below but do not leave this page, your browser is not supporting cookies.  Cookies are used 
only so that you can have a unique identification number for this study; no personal information will be 
stored in cookies. 
  
You must also have the capability to view Flash video clips on your computer (the same sorts of clips which 
are used on YouTube), and you must be able to listen to the video clips, either through the use of speakers 
or headphones. 
  
Please complete this study at one time.  If for any reason you are not able to complete the study in one 
sitting, you will have to start over.  The experiment takes roughly thirty minutes to complete.  
  
As a student in the FIU Psychology Participant Pool (enrolled in PSY 2012 or other class), you are invited to 
participate in a research study conducted over the Web. The following information is provided to help you 
make an informed decision whether or not to participate. Your participation is completely voluntary, and not 
participating will not affect your class grade in any way. You must be at least 18 years old to participate. 
  
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
You are being asked to be in a research study.  The purpose of this study is to investigate how jurors make 
decisions.  Completion of this study will take approximately 30 minutes for the first session and 90 to 120 
minutes for the second session. 
  
NUMBER OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
If you decide to be in this study, you will be one of approximately 360 people in this research study. 
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DURATION OF THE STUDY 
Your participation will require approximately a half hour for the first session, and one and a half to two hours 
for the second portion.  
  
PROCEDURES 
If you agree to be in the study, we will ask you to do the following things: 
You will complete some surveys about yourself during the first session. 
During the second session, you will be asked to watch a short film clip as well as read along with and listen 
to a case scenario involving a civil lawsuit in which a plaintiff is suing a defendant for negligence. You will be 
asked to answer questions about the events described on a Web page. You will be asked to imagine you 
are a juror in the case and to decide whether the defendant is liable and whether the plaintiff is entitled to 
any money-based damages. We will also ask how you feel and your opinion on various aspects of the 
case.  You can refuse to answer any question and cease participation at any time. 
 
RISKS AND/OR DISCOMFORTS 
The following risks may be associated with your participation in this study: First, you might become upset 
while viewing the short film clip from a popular movie.  Second, the only other risk to participating in this 
study is that you might become upset when you read or render a verdict about the case involving an 
automobile accident, especially if you or someone you know has been involved in a similar accident. This 
event is unlikely, but if you are concerned about it you may withdraw from the study at any time.  
  
BENEFITS 
The following benefits may be associated with your participation in this study: you may find the learning 
experience enjoyable, you may learn a little bit about how psychological research is conducted, and the 
process may help you better understand the legal process. The information gained from this study will help 
us better understand the factors that influence juror decision-making processes and to improve trial 
procedures. 
  
ALTERNATIVES 
You do not need to participate in this research. Your instructor may have alternative means for you to earn 
class credit, though your participation here may satisfy your instructor’s research requirements.    
  
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The records of this study will be kept private and will be protected to the fullest extent provided by law. In 
any sort of report we might publish, we will not include any information that will make it possible to identify a 
subject.  Research records will be stored securely and only the researcher team will have access to the 
records.  
  
Any information obtained during this study that could identify you will be kept strictly confidential. The study 
will collect information about your IP address and the browser you are using. No personal information will be 
placed on your browser by the use of cookies. So that participation credit may be given, you will be required 
to enter your Panther ID number and your name. The personal information collected will be deleted from the 
database once data collection is completed and credit has been given. The information gained from this 
study may be published in scientific journals or presented at scientific meetings, but your identity will be kept 
strictly confidential. 
  
COMPENSATION & COSTS 
There is no financial compensation to you as a result of participating in this study. Completion of this study 
earns partial credit toward the FIU Psychology Participant Pool requirements as outlined by your professor 
and on http://fiu.sona-systems.com/. For participating in the first session of this study you will receive one 
research credit, and for the second session you will receive two additional research credits for a total of 
three credits. You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without 
adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators or Florida International University. There will be 
no negative consequences for deciding not to participate or for withdrawing. If you choose to not participate 
in this study, you may satisfy your course requirements through other studies registered with the FIU 
Psychology Participant Pool at http://fiu.sona-systems.com/, or you may contact your course instructor to 
arrange an alternative method of obtaining credit. Participation in human subjects research is not required to 
earn credit in any class, and your professor is required to offer an alternative method of obtaining credit. You 
will not be responsible for any costs to participate in this study. 
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RIGHT TO DECLINE OR WITHDRAW 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You are free to participate in the study or withdraw your consent 
at any time during the study.  Your withdrawal or lack of participation will not affect any benefits to which you 
are otherwise entitled.  
  
RESEARCHER CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you have any questions about the purpose, procedures, or any other issues relating to this research study 
you may contact Stephen Joy at [PHONE NUMBER REDACTED] or [EMAIL ADDRESS REDACTED]. 
  
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you would like to talk with someone about your rights of being a subject in this research study or about 
ethical issues with this research study, you may contact the FIU Office of Research Integrity by phone at 
[PHONE NUMBER REDACTED] or [EMAIL ADDRESS REDACTED]. 
 
PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT 
I have read the information in this consent form and agree to participate in this study.  I have had a chance 
to ask any questions I have about this study, and they have been answered for me.  By clicking on the 
“consent to participate” button below I am providing my informed consent. 
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APPENDIX AC 
 
Study Four Trial Transcript with No Inconsistencies 
 
 
Johnson v. McGraw   
 
The following trial transcript is an abridged version of a real trial from here in the state of 
Florida.  The trial, which has already taken place, and for which the jury has already 
rendered a verdict, involved a traffic accident which resulted in injury to the plaintiff, 
Amanda Johnson, an injury she alleged was the result of negligence on behalf of the 
defendant, Michael McGraw.  Although the circumstances of the accident involved 
multiple parties, Michael McGraw was the only defendant in this case. 
 
While the names of all parties have been changed, one of the attorneys has asked FIU 
researchers to conduct this study to see how real people like you perceive the case so that 
they can determine whether to appeal the outcome of the trial.  We will be using the data 
from this study to help the attorney, so please pay close attention as it will impact the 
final resolution of an actual civil case. 
 
Please listen to the trial transcript and read along as if you had been chosen to serve as a 
juror in this case. 
 
~~~~~ 
Judge Robert C. Underwood: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are about to hear 
testimony concerning an automobile accident that occurred in the late afternoon 
of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008 in the city of Clermont, located in Lake County, 
Florida.  The plaintiff is Amanda Johnson, and the defendant is Michael McGraw.  
There are no other plaintiffs or defendants in this suit, and all other disputes 
between these and any other parties related to the events in question have been 
resolved separately prior to this proceeding.   
 
~~~~~  
 
Opening Statement by Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff:  Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, what we have 
before us today is an unfortunate story of a young lady who was simply going 
about her business one day, on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008, up in 
Clermont, which is in central Florida to the west of Orlando.  This young lady, 
Amanda Johnson, was at the time a 26 year old waitress at a family restaurant.  
She was riding in the car with her boyfriend, Brock Collins, a 28 year old middle 
school teacher.  They were in his blue Toyota Camry on their way to catch a 
movie before meeting up with Amanda’s parents for dinner later that night.  
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Unfortunately, their plans were dashed by the negligence of another driver on the 
road that evening, Michael McGraw. 
 
Throughout this case, you are going to hear overwhelming evidence from a 
variety of witnesses—Amanda Johnson, Brock Collins, a host of different 
eyewitnesses to the accident, the emergency first responders on the scene, medical 
professionals, as well as professional scientists who specialize in the analysis of 
vehicles and crash scenes which they use to reconstruct accidents.  The testimony 
of all these witnesses will show you, with no uncertainty whatsoever, that Mr. 
McGraw, and only Mr. McGraw—not Mr. Collins, not the driver of the semi 
truck, not anybody else and not anything else other than Mr. McGraw’s negligent 
operation of his big, white van—was the direct cause of Amanda Johnson’s 
serious injury. I hope that you find him liable for all damages suffered by Ms. 
Johnson at his hand.  Thank you very much for your time, service, and attention 
today. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Opening Statement by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant:  Esteemed members of the jury—like my 
colleague, I thank you in advance for your attention, effort, and diligent 
fulfillment of your civic duty.  What we can all agree on is that you are here today 
to hear about a traffic accident that injured a nice young lady and her boyfriend.  
Everybody wishes that this accident hadn’t happened, but not everybody agrees 
about how it happened or how Ms. Johnson ended up being hurt. 
 
Ms. Johnson and her attorney would like for you to believe that her broken hip 
and other injuries are the result of negligence on the part of Mr. McGraw.  Now 
it’s certainly true that Mr. McGraw, while trying to avoid the out of control semi 
tractor trailer coming towards him, ended up hitting Mr. Collins’s car.  What 
we’re less certain about is how Ms. Johnson was injured.  You see, Ms. Johnson 
wasn’t wearing her seat belt, and we’ll be presenting evidence to you that will 
show that Ms. Johnson wasn’t injured because Mr. McGraw hit their car, but that 
she was injured when the car ran into the street lamp, and that if she had been 
wearing a seat belt, she wouldn’t have broken her hip. 
 
Ms. Johnson and her attorney would like for you to believe that her injuries are 
the fault of Mr. McGraw, but through the course of this trial, you will soon see 
that they don’t have any real evidence to support this allegation. Because they 
can’t show that the majority of the evidence undoubtedly proves that Mr. 
McGraw was the cause of Ms. Johnson’s injuries, you will come to the conclusion 
that Michael McGraw was not negligent, was not the direct cause of Amanda’s 
broken hip, and that he should not be held liable for her injuries and you should 
render a verdict in favor of the defendant. 
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~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Marc Zollinger, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Can you please state your name and 
occupation for the court? 
 
Marc Zollinger (Answerer):  My name is Marc Zollinger, and I’m an administrative 
assistant for Universal Translation Corporation. 
 
Q:  And where is your office located? 
 
A:  It’s on Foothill Drive, pretty close to the intersection of Foothill and Windsor, a little 
south of there, on the east side, or I guess northeast side of the road at that point, 
down by the bend. 
 
Q:  Tell me, Mr. Zollinger, what were you doing on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 
2008?  
 
A:  I needed some fresh air, so I went to the little walk-up coffee window a few doors 
down from our office, the one on the north side of the Cuban restaurant there.  
 
Q:  Okay.  And while you were there, did anything unusual happen? 
 
A:  As a matter of fact, yes.  While I was waiting in line, I was just standing around 
watching the cars go by when there was a big traffic accident behind me up the 
way a little bit at the corner. 
 
Q:  Up the way a little bit?  How far do you mean?  Help the jury to understand how 
close you were. 
 
A:  Oh, not that far really.  Probably a few hundred feet away, but I had a pretty clear 
view since it’s just the parking lot for the restaurant there to the north of the 
coffee window up to the corner. 
 
Q:  And can you tell us what you saw? 
 
A:  I saw a car, a van, and a tanker truck get into a wreck.  The tanker truck was kind of 
sideways, coming southbound towards the intersection and kind of weaving back 
and forth a little bit in the middle of the road.  I saw Mr. Collins’s car, a blue 
Toyota Camry make a left turn to go west on Windsor to get out of the way of the 
truck, but then Mr. McGraw’s white Ford work van came screeching around, and 
then the semi locked up its brakes and the tires started squealing but the tanker 
trailer swung around and kind of batted Mr. McGraw’s van on the passenger side 
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which then bounced into the back of Mr. Collins’s car which then crashed into the 
street light on the northwest corner of the intersection.  It was like one big chain 
reaction.  They almost hit some lady walking a German Shepherd.  
 
Q:  And what happened next? 
 
A:  I saw the guy with the black hair, Mr. McGraw, get out of his van to make sure 
everyone in Mr. Collins’s car was okay or something.  I couldn’t hear what they 
were saying or anything, but right away Mr. McGraw got on his phone, I guess to 
call 911.  After a minute or two, Mr. Collins, the bald one, got out of the car and 
went around to the passenger side and was talking to someone in the passenger 
seat.  He looked pretty worried based on all his movements and body language. 
 
Q:  And then what? 
 
A:  I placed my order, and by the time I got my coffee I could see that a police car was 
already on the scene so I grabbed my coffee and went over to tell him what I saw.  
I told him exactly how it happened, and he wrote it all down.  The officer’s name 
was Christopher Eaton.  He was a really big guy. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Zollinger.  No further questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Marc Zollinger, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for 
the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Could you describe for us in 
just a little more detail exactly what happened after all the vehicles came to a 
stop? 
 
Marc Zollinger (Answerer):  Sure.  Mr. McGraw got out of the white van pretty quickly 
and immediately ran over to Mr. Collins’s blue Camry, over to the driver’s side.  I 
couldn’t hear them, of course, but it looked to me like he was making sure 
everyone was okay, and then shortly after talking to Mr. Collins, McGraw got his 
cell phone out of his pocket and made a call.  A minute or two later, the police 
officer arrived, then I went over and told him what I saw, and then I went back to 
work. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Zollinger.  I have nothing further. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Barbara Feldman, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
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Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Hello there.  Could you please state 
your name and occupation for the record? 
 
Barbara Feldman (Answerer):  My name is Barbara Feldman, and I am a librarian. 
 
Q:  Thank you Ms. Feldman.  Now you’re familiar with the day in question here in this 
trial, right? 
 
A:  Yes I am.   
 
Q:  And did you witness the accident at issue here? 
 
A:  Yes I did.  I remember it all quite vividly.  I was driving southbound on Foothill 
Drive, north of the intersection with Windsor. 
 
Q:  And could you please describe for us what you saw? 
 
A:  Sure.  As I was driving, up ahead I noticed a Shell oil tanker trailer crossing over the 
line separating the two directions of traffic, kind of skidding its tires and 
fishtailing around.  The stop light ahead of us was green, so I’m not sure what the 
deal was.  It’s not like he was slamming on his brakes to keep from running the 
light or anything.  It was also driving southbound like I was, so I slowed down to 
stay away from the situation.  It was all over the place in the left turn lane in the 
middle, going back and forth into the oncoming lanes of traffic and stuff. 
 
Q:  And what happened next? 
 
A:  Well, the truck’s trailer sort of swung out into the intersection, where it hit Mr. 
McGraw’s white van, kind of side swiping it and kind of just smacking it on the 
passenger side, which forced the van into the back side of Mr. Collins’s blue 
Toyota Camry, which then crashed into a light pole on the northeast corner of the 
intersection. 
 
Q:  Okay, and what about after the accident? 
 
A:  I just stayed around until the police officer arrived, and once he got there, I gave him 
my statement and my contact information, and then I left to go home. 
 
Q:  Thank you Ms. Feldman.  I have no more questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Barbara Feldman, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for 
the Defendant 
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Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant:  I have no questions for this witness, your 
Honor. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Jill Randall, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Could you please give us your name 
and occupation? 
 
Jill Randall (Answerer):  My name is Jill Randall, and I sell Amway products from my 
home here in Clermont. 
 
Q:  Now could you please tell us about what you saw on Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  I was at the intersection waiting for the light to change so that I could cross Foothill 
heading west, and there was a semi truck that came out of nowhere from the 
north, skidding and screeching and swerving all over the place out of control. 
 
Q:  That must have been pretty scary.  Can you tell us more about the truck and what 
happened? 
 
A:  Well, I saw the truck blow the light going through the intersection kind of in the 
middle of the southbound and northbound lanes, and he was fishtailing a little bit, 
you know, the cab of the truck going in one direction while the trailer was 
slipping and sliding around behind him in another direction.  The truck swerved 
towards me, to the east, to the driver’s left, past me as it came through the 
intersection.  As the truck was getting itself under control, I could tell that there 
was some sort of additional accident on the opposite side of the trailer involving 
some other vehicles, but since I was on the east side of the trailer and that was all 
happening on the west side, I really couldn’t see too much about what exactly 
happened. 
 
Q:  Okay, so you weren’t able to see much of the actual contact between the vehicles? 
 
A:  Well, no, not of the actual contact when it was happening, but after everything came 
to a stop, I was able to see that the white van driven by Mr. McGraw had crashed 
into the back of the other car, the one driven by Mr. Collins, the blue Toyota 
Camry, and Mr. Collins’s car was up against the street lamp.  It looked like it had 
pretty much hit the lamppost head on, and Mr. McGraw’s van was stopped behind 
it, and it was all banged up on the passenger side.  
 
Q:  Well it sounds like you got a good look at the aftermath of the accident.  What 
happened after everything came to rest? 
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A:  The black-haired man, Mr. McGraw got out of his van pretty quickly and went to go 
check on the people in Mr. Collins’s car.  He was talking to Mr. Collins for a 
minute, and then he got out his phone and made a call, I assume to 911.  Mr. 
Collins got out of his car eventually, and when the police officer arrived a minute 
or two later, he was a real hunk, so I hung around and gave him my statement 
once the paramedics got there to take over making sure everyone got the medical 
attention they needed. 
 
Q:  We appreciate your testimony here today, Ms. Randall.  No further questions. 
 
Judge Robert C. Underwood:  Your witness, Mr. Kurtz. 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Jill Randall, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  So Ms. Randall, you weren’t 
able to describe exactly what happened during the wreck itself because the trailer 
from the tanker truck was blocking your view, is that right? 
 
Jill Randall (Answerer):  That’s right.  I saw the beginning and I saw the aftermath, but I 
didn’t see the actual accident between Mr. McGraw and Mr. Collins, no. 
 
Q:  I see.  Thank you very much, Ms. Randall.  I don’t have any more questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Steve Powell, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Could you please give your name and 
occupation for the record? 
 
Steve Powell (Answerer):  My name is Steve Powell, and I’m a real estate agent here in 
Clermont. 
 
Q:  And where were you on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  I was at the post office located there on the east side of Foothill Drive, a little ways up 
from, I mean north of, the intersection with Windsor Road.  
  
Q:  Okay.  And did you see anything unusual at the post office? 
 
A:  Well, just as I was leaving, I was looking out the window and I saw a Shell tanker 
truck go skidding down the street past the post office. 
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Q:  Down Foothill you say? 
 
A:  Yeah, it was traveling south but kind of screeching and sliding out of control. 
 
Q:  And what did you see after that? 
 
A:  Well, I didn’t really see exactly what happened next.  I was walking out of the 
building and didn’t have a constant, uninterrupted view so I missed the actual 
crash, but after I got outside, I saw the whole accident scene with the tanker truck 
stopped at a funny angle over on the east side of Foothill on Windsor, and the van 
and the car over on the corner by the Zales jewelry store.  The guy with the black 
hair, Mr. McGraw, was standing outside the vehicles.  There were a couple of 
people in the car, the blue Camry, and they looked kind of hurt.   
 
Q: How so? 
 
A: The bald guy, Mr. Collins, had some cuts and stuff on his forehead and he was 
bleeding a little bit, but the lady in the passenger seat was much worse.  It was 
kind of hard to see exactly how she was hurt, but it was clear she was pretty 
banged up. 
 
Q: And can you tell us what happened next? 
 
A: I had an important meeting I had to get to a little later on that afternoon so I didn’t 
have time to stick around, and I don’t know how I could have helped anyway, but 
as I was starting to walk back to my car, the bald guy, Mr. Collins, was out of his 
car and the police officer had showed up so I figured it would be okay now that 
there was an official emergency responder on the scene.  Right as I got to my car, 
which was parked over in the lot north of the coffee shop on the southeast corner 
of the intersection, I saw the ambulance arrive next, so I figured I might as well 
go over to the police officer and tell him what I had seen now that medical 
personnel were there before I left to go to my meeting.  As I was giving Officer 
Eaton my statement, I could see the paramedics getting Ms. Johnson out of the car 
and loading her into the ambulance.  It was at that time that I could see that her 
right leg was all mangled and busted up. 
 
 
Q:  Thank you for your time, Mr. Powell.  I don’t have any more questions for you. 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Steve Powell, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
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Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Mr. Powell, you were inside the 
post office when the actual accident occurred, and were unable to see exactly 
what happened at the intersection, is that right? 
 
Steve Powell (Answerer):  Yeah, I just saw the Shell truck go past the window out of 
control, but no, I couldn’t see the intersection or anything that far down from 
where I was. 
 
Q:  So you don’t have any idea exactly how any of the different vehicles crashed into 
each other, or the exact moment in which Ms. Johnson might have been hurt, or 
how she was hurt, or anything specific like that, correct? 
 
A:  That’s correct.  I just saw the truck go by and then by the time I was outside, I saw the 
wreckage and stuff where it had all come to rest. 
 
Q:  So basically everything at issue here happened when you couldn’t see it? 
 
A:  Well I did see two men, Mr. Collins and Mr. McGraw outside talking to each other 
when the police officer arrived at the time I was walking across Windsor, and 
then by the time I got to my car, I saw the ambulance had just arrived too.  
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Powell.  No further questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Lesley Jobin, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Hello there, could you please tell us 
your name, occupation, and city of residence for the record? 
 
Lesley Jobin (Answerer):  My name is Lesley Jobin, I’m a tour group coordinator, and I 
live here in Clermont. 
 
Q:  And what were you doing on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  Well, since there’s really no slow days at my company because of all the visitors to 
the area and different tourist attractions and stuff in and around Orlando, we’re 
open seven days a week, and I’m off on Mondays and Tuesdays each week.  That 
was a Tuesday, and I was out walking Finnegan, my German Shepherd.  
 
Q:  And can you tell us a little more about your walk with Finnegan that day? 
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A:  Sure.  I was walking west along Windsor Road, having just crossed Foothill. I was 
passing in front of the Zales jewelry store there at the corner, when the crash 
happened.  
 
Q:  So can you tell us what you saw? 
 
A:  Well, I saw the Shell truck fishtailing out of control, well, I guess there isn’t any way 
for a truck to fishtail but still be under control, but anyway, it was sort of sliding 
out toward its right side, and then it kind of smacked the side of the white van, 
and that’s when the van crashed into the back of the blue Toyota Camry, which 
then ran straight into a light post on the corner in front of Zales. 
 
Q:  Were you able to see anything that happened inside of either of the vehicles? 
 
A:  Yeah, when Mr. McGraw first hit Mr. Collins’s car, I could see that both Mr. Collins 
and Ms. Johnson’s heads went flying forward into the windshield.  
 
Q:  Thank you Ms. Jobin.  I don’t have any more questions for you. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Lesley Jobin, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  So Ms. Jobin, you were out 
walking your German Shepherd, Finnegan, that afternoon, is that correct? 
 
Lesley Jobin (Answerer):  That’s right. 
 
Q:  And were you talking on the phone, or listening to music, or anything like that on 
your walk? 
 
A:  Well, I was listening to my iPod. 
 
Q:  Hmm.  Okay.  And you were walking west, passing the Zales store when you heard a 
crash and turned around to look, is that right? 
 
A:  Yeah, Finnegan and I were both really startled, and we ran backwards a little bit just 
as Mr. Collins’s car hit the light post.  
 
Q:  I see.  Thank you very much, Ms. Jobin. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Brock Collins, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
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Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner): Hello there, could you please state 
your name, occupation, and city of residence for the record? 
 
Brock Collins (Answerer):  My name is Brock Collins, I’m a teacher at Windy Hill 
Middle School here in Clermont where I live. 
 
Q:  And just so we’re clear, what is your relationship with the plaintiff in this case, 
Amanda Johnson? 
 
A:  She’s my girlfriend.  We’ve been dating for a couple of years. 
 
Q:  And could you tell us a little bit about what happened on the afternoon of Tuesday, 
July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  Well, Amanda and I were on our way to see a matinee before going out to dinner with 
her folks later on, when we got into a big wreck at the corner of Windsor and 
Foothill. 
 
Q:  Can you tell us about what you remember happening before the accident and how it 
all unfolded? 
 
A:  Well, I was driving my car, a blue 2006 Toyota Camry four door, northbound on 
Foothill Drive, and Amanda was in the passenger seat.  We were coming around 
the bend, right where Foothill goes from kind of east/west to north/south, and 
once I got around the bend approaching the intersection, we had the green light, 
and I saw a semi truck skidding out of control towards us. 
   
Q:  Sounds pretty scary.  Can you describe how you reacted to the situation and what 
happened next? 
 
A:  Yeah, it was really crazy to see a big truck barreling down on us like that.  It took me 
a second to figure out what to do because I couldn’t tell which way the truck was 
going to go or what was going to happen next.  I kind of slowly turned to my left, 
to go west on Windsor because I was pretty sure that the truck was going to end 
up going to my right, east on Windsor.  Once I could tell for sure that that’s where 
he was headed, I was able to pull out of his way just barely fast enough to miss 
the end of his tanker trailer whipping around the corner behind him.  It was a real 
relief to miss it, but the relief was very short lived. 
 
Q:  How so? 
 
A:  Well, the guy behind me in the white Ford panel van wasn’t as lucky.  I guess he tried 
to get out of the way of the swinging trailer much the same way as I did, but he 
just ended up rear-ending us pretty much straight on, and our heads hit the 
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windshield, and we then crashed into the street lamp on the northwest corner of 
the intersection, all pretty much at the same time as his van was getting hit by the 
trailer. I got dinged on the head pretty good but wasn’t that messed up, no 
permanent scars or damage or anything, but Amanda was really hurt badly. 
 
Q:  She certainly was.  I’m really sorry you guys had to go through all of that.  Thank 
you, Mr. Collins.  I don’t have any more questions for you. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Brock Collins, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  So, Mr. Collins, are you and 
Ms. Johnson still together? 
 
Brock Collins (Answerer):  Yes, we are.  We’re starting to talk about marriage, in fact. 
 
Q:  Oh, how nice!  Let’s talk a little more about your car that you were driving that day.  
It was a blue 2006 four-door Toyota Camry, isn’t that right? 
 
A:  Yes sir. 
 
Q:  And how long had you owned that car, Mr. Collins? 
 
A:  I had it for a little less than a year before the accident, but my dad bought it brand 
new, and when he got tired of it after a year or so, he sold it to me at a good price 
since I was in need of a reliable car. 
 
Q:  So you’re familiar with the entire two-year history of the vehicle.  Tell me, Mr. 
Collins, had the car ever been in any sort of accident before? 
 
A:  Except for maybe tapping a bumper when parallel parking in a tight spot or 
something tiny like that, no, it hadn’t. 
 
Q:  It worked okay, pretty reliable car? 
 
A:  Certainly.  Wasn’t too flashy, but it was definitely reliable. 
 
Q:  And did the seatbelts in the car work properly? 
 
A:  Well, they got stuck when pulling them out a lot, so it was kind of a pain to put them 
on all the time. 
 
Q:  And were you wearing your seatbelt on the day of the accident? 
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A:  No, I wasn’t. 
 
Q:  Why not? 
 
A:  We weren’t going very far or anything, so I guess I just figured I didn’t need to mess 
with it. 
 
Q:  And was Ms. Johnson wearing her seat belt that day? 
 
A:  No. 
 
Q:  Nothing further, Your Honor. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Dr. Matthew Freeman, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney 
for the Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Hello, could you please give us your 
name, city of residence, and occupation? 
 
Dr. Matthew Freeman (Answerer):  My name is Matthew Freeman, I live in Jacksonville, 
Florida, and I am an accident reconstruction specialist. 
 
Q:  What exactly does that mean? 
 
A:  I examine vehicles, accident sites, traffic patterns, road conditions, medical records, 
and that sort of thing in order to figure out exactly how an accident occurred.   
 
Q:  Thank you.  And, just to avoid any confusion, you are being paid to discuss your 
findings with us here today, isn’t that right? 
 
A:  Yes, I’m being paid by the plaintiff’s side to share my conclusions.  What I do is 
complex and time consuming, and after all, this is my job.  But I assure you that 
my determinations are in no way shaped by anything besides the evidence. 
 
Q:  I appreciate your candor and your earnestness, Dr. Freeman.  So can you tell us what 
you found with regard to the accident involving Mr. Whitaker’s Shell tanker 
truck, Mr. Collins’s Camry and Mr. McGraw’s Ford Econoline work van? 
 
 
A:  Given where we know the truck stopped just beyond the intersection itself, Mr. 
Whitaker couldn’t have been going very fast at the time his trailer sideswiped Mr. 
McGraw’s van.  That means the impact from the trailer onto Mr. McGraw’s van 
wasn’t the determining factor in Ms. Johnson’s injuries, but rather Mr. McGraw’s 
driving itself was.  If Mr. McGraw hadn’t been driving so fast when the truck hit 
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him, then Amanda wouldn’t have been injured when he hit Mr. Collins’s car.  
Besides, if he had been going slower, he wouldn’t have been in the intersection 
anyway and the accident wouldn’t have happened at all. 
 
Q:  Interesting.  And what about your conclusions based on inspecting Mr. Collins’s 
vehicle? 
 
A:  Well, it was a 2006 Toyota Camry, four doors, blue, base model, and no aftermarket 
or custom modifications.  It was damaged uniformly across the rear from Mr. 
McGraw’s van hitting it, the front was damaged more deeply, but in a narrower 
span, consistent with hitting a tall, thin object like a street lamp pole, and while 
the seat belts appeared to be in reasonable working order, I suspect that the airbag 
deployment sensors may have been faulty.  For as hard as Mr. McGraw hit the 
car, the airbags should have inflated.  But because they didn’t, it is my opinion 
that Ms. Johnson broke her right hip as a direct result of that first impact with Mr. 
McGraw to their rear, not the second impact with the street lamp post.  
Unfortunately, due to a miscommunication between Mr. Collins’s insurance 
company and the salvage yard where the car was being stored after the accident, 
shortly after I had done my preliminary inspection of the car, it was disassembled 
for parts before I had a chance to check the status of the airbag sensors to verify 
that they were faulty. 
 
Q:  Thank you for your expertise, Dr. Freeman.  I have nothing further to ask. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Dr. Matthew Freeman, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, 
Attorney for the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Tell me, Dr. Freeman, do you 
have any medical training or licensure? 
 
Dr. Matthew Freeman (Answerer):  No, I hold a doctorate degree in mechanical 
engineering, as well as numerous other certifications related to my field, but none 
in health-related areas, no. 
 
Q:  And yet you’re willing to testify under oath that Amanda’s broken hip was a result of 
the first impact, when my client hit Mr. Collins’s car, and not that it was from the 
head-on collision with the lamp pole.  Very interesting conclusions, Dr. Freeman.  
No further questions.   
~~~~~ 
 
Plaintiff’s Witness Amanda Johnson, Direct Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
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Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Hello, Ms. Johnson.  How are you 
doing today? 
 
Amanda Johnson (Answerer):  Oh, just fine.  It feels good to finally have my day in 
court. 
 
Q:  I bet it does.  How is your hip? 
 
A:  It’s healed up pretty well so far, but it’s not back to normal by any means.  I’m not 
sure whether it will ever be like it was before the accident.  Still, I’m finally able 
to walk without a limp or the use of a cane, but I can’t run or do anything 
strenuous, and it really acts up during changes in barometric pressure and other 
weather changes.  I feel like an old person, and I’m only 28. 
 
Q:  How has your injury affected your life? 
 
A:  Well, at first, it cost me my job, since I was in the hospital for a couple of weeks at 
first and then unable to walk for a long time after that, and it’s pretty difficult to 
be a waitress if you can’t walk. 
 
Q:  Can you tell us a little more about your injury and the treatment you received? 
 
A:  Sure.  My right hip was broken just under the ball of my femur, the long bone at the 
top of your leg.  It required immediate surgery and a metal plate and a bunch of 
screws to be screwed into both halves of my legbone so that the two parts of the 
bone would grow back together again.  That surgery left me in the hospital for 
about a week, and I was under pretty heavy sedation for the pain, and then I had 
to stay in the rehabilitation center for another week before I was able to go home.  
I was in the wheelchair for another month before I was able to use a walker or 
crutches, and then it was another six weeks before I was able to walk short 
distances again.  That whole time I was going to rehab three times a week and 
doing exercises every day at home too.   
 
Q:  And how are you doing today, a little over two years since the accident occurred? 
 
A:  I’m doing alright.  Like I mentioned earlier, I can walk pretty much without a limp, 
but I still can’t do anything really active or athletic that requires running around or 
anything like that.  I’m able to sleep though the night okay now, and the pain 
doesn’t bother me all that often except when the weather is about to change, 
which, unfortunately for me, seems to happen all too often here in central Florida.  
The doctors tell me that’s never going to go away. 
 
Q:  Well, I guess at least you’ll always know whether to bring an umbrella with you when 
you leave the house in the mornings.  Now let’s talk a little bit about the accident 
itself. 
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A:  Okay. 
 
Q:  When you first saw the truck, where was it in relation to the car you were in? 
 
A:  It was directly in front of us, a little to the right of the center of our car. 
 
Q:  Was the truck over the double yellow lines in the road that separate the two directions 
of travel? 
 
A:  Yes. 
 
Q:  In your estimation, how far over the double yellow lines? 
 
A:  It was about three-quarters of the way over into our lanes of traffic, so far that I didn’t 
think we’d be able to swerve around it. 
 
Q:  And did the truck appear to swerve or deviate from its course at any time before the 
accident? 
 
A:  Yes, it did, it swerved to our right and ended up going off to our right, to the east.  
 
Q:  About how fast would you guess that you guys were going? 
 
A:  Not that fast.  Probably 25 miles an hour or so.   
 
Q:  And at what speed would you estimate that the truck was going? 
 
A:  It had to have been over 40 miles per hour.  We had slowed down, but it still came 
towards us very quickly and all we could see was the giant Shell tanker trailer 
swerving towards us.  
 
Q:  And then what happened? 
 
A:  Brock sort of hesitated for a quick second to figure out which direction was the safest 
way to get out of the way of the truck since we didn’t really know where it was 
going to end up, and after he quickly turned to the left, to go west down Windsor, 
we saw the tail end of the trailer go sliding past us and we thought we had 
managed to escape an accident. 
 
Q:  But that wasn’t the case, was it? 
 
A:  No, even though we barely missed colliding with the tanker, we were then suddenly 
hit from behind by Mr. McGraw, who had himself been hit on his passenger’s 
side by the trailer and knocked into us, and that’s when I went flying forward, 
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hitting my head on the windshield and smashing into the dashboard and breaking 
my right hip, and then we hit the street lamp post which caused us to finally come 
to a stop. 
 
Q:  So you were fine up until the point when Mr. McGraw crashed into you, is that right? 
 
A:  Yeah, if he didn’t hit us, I wouldn’t have been hurt. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Ms. Johnson. 
 
~~~~~ 
Plaintiff’s Witness Amanda Johnson, Cross Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for 
the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Ms. Johnson, I’d like to ask 
you a few more questions about the events leading up to the accident and the 
details of the accident itself, if that’s okay. 
 
Amanda Johnson (Answerer):  Of course. 
 
Q:  Ms. Johnson, could you please tell us exactly when you first noticed that the truck 
was on the wrong side of the road? 
 
A:  Before we got to the intersection, I could see that it was on the wrong side of the road.  
I could see the paint of the Shell logo and the chrome tank shining in the sun. 
 
Q:  And you are sure you could tell that the truck was on the wrong side of the road? 
 
A:  Yes, I’m sure. 
 
Q:  Ms. Johnson, if you saw the truck was on the wrong side of the road, why didn’t you 
warn Mr. Collins? 
 
A:  I don’t know.  It happened very quickly.  It was almost three quarters of the way over 
onto our side of the road, swerving to our right. 
 
Q:  Hmm.  I see.  Thank you, Ms. Johnson.  No further questions. 
~~~~~ 
 
 Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff:  Your Honor, we have no further witnesses to 
introduce, so the plaintiff rests. 
 
Judge Robert C. Underwood:  Thank you Mr. Blum.  Mr. Kurtz, you may now present 
the defense’s case. 
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 Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant:  Thank you, Your Honor. 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness Tom Gorham, Direct Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Hello, could you please state 
your name, city of residence, and occupation for the record? 
 
Tom Gorham (Answerer):  My name is Tom Gorham, I live in Orlando, and my wife and 
I own and operate a three-dimensional film and photography studio. 
 
Q:  How interesting!  That must be a really exciting business for you two to be in.  Now, 
could you please tell us where you were on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 
2008? 
  
A:  I was stopped at the light at the corner of Windsor and Foothill, waiting to cross 
Foothill to the east, and I saw this whole big accident unfold. 
 
Q:  Can you tell us exactly what you saw? 
 
A:  Well, I first knew that something was wrong when I saw Mr. Collins’s blue Toyota 
Camry flashing the lights and heard him laying on the horn as he came up to the 
intersection from the south.  Very shortly after that, I saw the Shell tanker truck 
come skidding and fishtailing into the intersection from the north.  He was pretty 
much swerving to his left, away from me, towards the opposite side of the 
intersection from where I was.  I was on the west side, waiting to cross Foothill 
and head east, and he was swerving over that way with the trailer kind of 
swinging out behind him. 
 
Q:  Okay, so after you saw the two vehicles both entering the intersection, what happened 
next? 
 
A:  I saw Mr. Collins’s car skirt around the trailer pretty much right in front of my car, 
when the trailer kind of swung around to its right, as the cab of the truck was 
making a hard left turn, and the trailer sort of swiped the passenger side of the 
white van.  Right after that, the van rear-ended the Camry, and then the Camry 
went and ran into the streetlamp. 
 
Q:  And how good of a look did you get at this whole sequence of events? 
 
A:  I had a perfect view, pretty much a front-row seat to the whole thing. 
 
Q:  So did you see either Mr. Collins’s or Ms. Johnson’s heads strike the windshield of 
their car? 
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A:  Definitely. 
 
Q:  And when did you see that happen? 
 
A:  Right after their car crashed into the lamp post.  
 
Q:  Right.  Now what happened next? 
 
A:  Well, I saw the guy with the black hair, McGraw, get out of the van right away and 
go over to the driver’s side of Collins’s car and it looked like he was checking to 
see if everyone was okay or to see how he could help.  Collins got out of the car 
shortly after that, and while his head was bleeding a little bit, and he seemed a 
little dazed, he didn’t really seem too badly hurt. 
 
Q:  Alright.  Anything else? 
 
A:  Yeah, I stayed around to see if there was anything I could do, but the cops showed up 
and pretty much got it all under control and then the ambulance got there and I 
watched them take Ms. Johnson out of the car.  It looked like her right leg was all 
messed up, and they loaded her and Mr. Collins into the ambulance and drove off. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Gorham.  I have no further questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
Defense Witness Tom Gorham, Cross Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Mr. Gorham, you stated that you saw 
Mr. Collins’s car flashing its lights and heard it honking its horn as it entered the 
intersection from the south, and that after that, you saw the Shell truck come 
skidding and screeching into the intersection.  Now if Mr. Collins was honking 
and flashing his lights and everything, obviously in response to something, 
doesn’t it seem strange to you that you didn’t notice what he was reacting to 
before you noticed him? 
 
Tom Gorham (Answerer):  Well, maybe, I guess.  I think I probably just noticed Mr. 
Collins’s car first because he was the one that was right in front of me, and since 
the truck was all the way on the other side of the intersection, further away, 
maybe I didn’t see it first for that reason.  Or maybe the angle of everything made 
the Zales store sort of block my line of sight.  I don’t know really know why I saw 
things when I saw them, I just know what I saw. 
 
Q:  If you say so.  Nothing more, Your Honor. 
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~~~~~ 
Defense Witness John Kindt, Direct Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the 
Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Hello there, could you please 
state your name and occupation for the record? 
 
John Kindt (Answerer):  My name is John Kindt, and I am the security guard for the 
Zales jewelry store located on the northwest corner of the intersection of Foothill 
and Windsor Road in Clermont. 
 
Q:  Can you tell us where you were on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  Yeah, I was at work.  
 
Q:  Tell me, did you happen to witness the events at issue in this case? 
 
A:  I saw the tail end of it.  I saw Mr. Collins’s car almost run over the lady out walking 
her German Shepherd.  She was walking on the sidewalk and nearly got creamed. 
 
Q:  Lucky thing for her that she didn’t.  So what else did you see then? 
 
A:  I saw the Shell trailer kind of smack the passenger side of Mr. McGraw’s van and 
knock it into Mr. Collins’s car. 
 
Q:  And did you see the consequences of the collision between the two vehicles? 
 
A:  Well, yeah.  I saw Mr. Collins’s car come crashing towards the store, and that lady 
and her dog, and hit the street lamp in front of our store. 
 
Q:  And did you see anybody get hurt? 
 
A:  Yeah, I saw Mr. Collins’s head and Ms. Johnson’s head smash into their windshield 
when they hit the lamp post.  I was kind of surprised that the airbags didn’t go off, 
but I guess they weren’t going fast enough or something. 
 
Q:  And what else did you see? 
 
A:  Not much.  I got a call about security issues for an upcoming delivery so I had to go 
look at some paperwork, and by the time I was through with that, the show was 
over. 
 
Q:  Thank you, Mr. Kindt.  I have no more questions. 
 
~~~~~ 
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Defense Witness John Kindt, Cross Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff:  I have no questions for this witness, Your Honor. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness Dr. Erik Dubberke, Direct Examination by Howard Kurtz, Attorney for 
the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Hello there, could you please 
tell us your name and occupation? 
 
Dr. Erik Dubberke (Answerer):  My name is Erik Dubberke, and I am a trauma surgeon 
at South Lake Hospital here in Clermont. 
 
Q:  That’s an emergency room doctor, right? 
 
A:  Yes, I’m one of the several surgeons on staff that are trained specifically for trauma-
related procedures.  Injuries, accident victims, things like that.  Immediate and 
sometimes life-or-death repairs, as opposed to planned, preventative, or purely 
cosmetic procedures. 
 
Q:  Ahh.  I see.  Tell me, Dr. Dubberke, were you on duty on Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  Yes, I was on call from noon until midnight that day. 
 
Q:  So, Dr. Dubberke, did you treat Ms. Amanda Johnson on that afternoon? 
 
A:  Yes I did.  She was brought in by ambulance, and the paramedics had stabilized her 
condition, but it was pretty clear to them by the time that they arrived that she had 
suffered some sort of localized trauma to her right leg or hip area. 
 
Q:  And was that consistent with your observations? 
 
A:  Absolutely.  We took some X-rays to see exactly what we were dealing with right 
after we cleaned up and stitched up her forehead.  Luckily, her facial lacerations 
were superficial enough that I was able to use dissolvable sutures which tend to 
leave little or no scarring, but they don’t work as well on really deep or difficult 
wounds. 
 
Q:  Thank heaven for small miracles.  Now what did the X-rays reveal? 
 
A:  Ms. Johnson suffered a broken hip up near the ball in the joint where the right leg 
meets the pelvis.  It’s a very nasty sort of injury. 
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Q:  So how did you treat Ms. Johnson? 
 
A:  I inserted a metal plate into her right leg that is held in place by five metal screws that 
are screwed directly into her bones.  By holding everything in place like that, it 
allows for the bone to gradually fuse back together at the site of the break.   
 
Q:  Sounds reasonable.  Tell me, Dr. Dubberke, in your experience with trauma victims, 
are you at all able to judge the severity of accidents or make any determination 
about what caused or maybe even what could have prevented an injury? 
 
A:  To an extent.  If what you’re asking me is whether having worn her seat belt would 
have prevented Ms. Johnson’s injury, then yes.  I’m almost certain that her broken 
hip resulted from being thrown forward in a frontal crash.   
 
Q:  Not from having been rear-ended? 
 
A:  No, that type of impact typically results in whiplash and soft-tissue injuries, not being 
launched forward into the dashboard.  
 
Q:  Thank you, Dr. Dubberke.  I don’t have any more questions. 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness Dr. Erik Dubberke, Cross Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney for the 
Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Dr. Dubberke, how long have you 
been working in the emergency room? 
 
Dr. Erik Dubberke (Answerer):  In my current capacity?  Almost eight years.  Counting 
assisting, residency, interning, volunteering, and all that?  Probably another four, 
five years total on top of that. 
 
Q:  That’s quite a long time.  You must have seen some pretty remarkable, unusual, and 
awful things in that time. 
 
A:  Yeah, but you get used to it.  If you can’t, you don’t last long. 
 
Q:  I bet.  Tell me, have you ever seen anything that just defied explanation, or didn’t 
make any sense, or just plain freak accidents or weird flukes? 
 
A:  Sure.  The human body is a very complicated, complex organism, with an almost 
limitless capacity for things to go wrong.  And the world can be a pretty strange 
place too.  Just when you start to think you’ve seen it all, something you could 
have never envisioned in a hundred years comes through the doors. 
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Q:  I can only imagine.  Thank you for all the good work you do, Doctor.  Nothing 
further. 
 
~~~~~ 
Defense Witness Officer Christopher Eaton, Direct Examination by Howard Kurtz, 
Attorney for the Defendant 
 
Howard Kurtz, Attorney for the Defendant (Questioner):  Good afternoon, Officer.  
Could you please give us your name, rank, department, and division? 
 
Officer Christopher Eaton (Answerer):  My name is Christopher Eaton, I’m a deputy with 
the Clermont Police Department, and I’m primarily assigned to the Patrol Section. 
 
Q:  Okay.  And is the intersection of Foothill and Windsor in Clermont part of your 
assigned beat? 
 
A:  Yes, sir.  It’s right smack dab in the middle of it, in fact. 
   
Q:  And is that where you were on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 8th, 2008?  
 
A:  I was patrolling not too far away when I heard the call on the radio about an 
automobile accident which also potentially involved a gasoline truck.  Mr. 
McGraw had called 911 pretty quickly, and it only took me a minute or two to get 
there, and I was the first responder on the scene.  
 
Q:  And what did you see when you arrived? 
 
A:  I observed Mr. Whitaker’s Shell gasoline tanker truck stopped in the rightmost lane, 
on the south side of Windsor Road, in the eastbound direction.  To the west of the 
intersection, on the north side of Windsor Road, in the westbound direction, I 
observed Mr. Collins’s blue 2006 Toyota Camry at rest up with the front up 
against the lamp post, and Mr. McGraw’s white 2000 Ford Econoline work van 
smashed up into the rear of Mr. Collins’s car.  Mr. McGraw’s van had sustained 
additional damage to the rear passenger quarter panel area, and Mr. Collins’s car 
had a broken windshield in the typical pattern found when the windshield is 
struck by the head of the occupants of the front seat.  In this case, that would be 
Mr. Collins and Ms. Johnson. 
 
Q:  And you’ve seen a lot of car accidents during your time on the force, I imagine? 
 
A:  Yeah, that’s probably one of the most frequent calls we get.  Hardly a day goes by 
that I don’t deal with at least one wreck. 
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Q:  I bet.  And in your experience, when you’ve seen patients with head trauma and 
broken bones, injured in cars that end up with cracked windshields like Mr. 
Collins’s car, do those accidents typically involve a car that has been rear-ended? 
 
A:  Well, I’ve never actually kept a count of something like that, but off the top of my 
head, I’d say that very few of them do, except for the sorts of multi-impact 
incidents like we had here. 
 
Q:  How do you mean? 
 
A:  Usually, passengers in cars who have cuts to their head and broken bones suffer their 
injuries as a result of having been forcefully thrown forward from the violence of 
a frontal impact.  You know, running into something, not being run into from 
behind.  
 
Q:  Okay, well thank you very much for your assistance, Officer.  I have no additional 
questions. 
 
A:  My pleasure, sir. 
 
~~~~~ 
 
Defense Witness Officer Christopher Eaton, Cross Examination by Seth Blum, Attorney 
for the Plaintiff 
 
Seth Blum, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Questioner):  Officer Eaton, you’ve undoubtedly 
seen plenty of car accidents in your time patrolling, haven’t you?  Accidents of all 
kinds? 
 
Officer Christopher Eaton (Answerer):  Yes, sir.  I couldn’t even offer a guess as to the 
total number. 
 
Q:  And in your eyes, was this your typical rear-ending? 
 
A:  No, sir.  Most rear-ending accidents do not involve an impact from a third vehicle like 
this incident. 
 
Q:  So this was a little out of the ordinary for how most rear-impact collisions occur? 
 
A:  Yes, sir.  I’m not sure whether I can recall anything quite like this in all my years on 
the force where a semi trailer smacks into one vehicle which then crashes into 
another in a chain reaction like that.  This was the result of some pretty unlikely 
combinations of forces and events. 
 
Q:  I’ll say.  Thank you, Officer. 
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A:  My pleasure, sir. 
 
~~~~~ 
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APPENDIX AD 
Liability Jury Instructions and Verdict Form 
Liability 
  
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is that degree of care 
which a reasonably careful person would use under like circumstances. Negligence may 
consist either in doing something that a reasonably careful person would not do under 
like circumstances, or in failing to do something that a reasonably careful person would 
do under like circumstances. To determine whether the defendant is liable for automobile 
negligence, you must determine whether the following conditions have been met:  
 
a. On or about Tuesday, July 8th, 2008, the defendant, Michael McGraw, owned and 
operated a vehicle in Lake County, Florida. 
 
b. At that time and place, defendant Michael McGraw negligently operated or maintained 
the motor vehicle so that it collided with the motor vehicle in which plaintiff Amanda 
Johnson was a passenger. 
 
c. As a result, plaintiff Amanda Johnson suffered physical injuries described during the 
trial. 
 
d. When determining liability, decide whether the defendant Michael McGraw was 
negligent using the burden of proof preponderance of the evidence: that is, based on the 
“greater weight of the evidence” 
 
e. An additional question for your determination on the defense is whether some or all of 
Amanda Johnson's damages were caused by her failure to use a seat belt. 
  
f. The issues for your determination on this question are whether the greater weight of the 
evidence shows that the automobile occupied by Amanda Johnson was equipped with an 
available and fully operational seat belt, that Amanda Johnson did not use the seat belt, 
that a reasonably careful person would have done so under the circumstances, and that 
Amanda Johnson's failure to use the seat belt produced or contributed substantially to 
producing the damages sustained by her. 
  
g. If the greater weight of evidence does not support defendant Michael McGraw on each 
of these issues, then your verdict on this question should be for plaintiff Amanda 
Johnson. 
  
h. If the greater weight of the evidence supports defendant on these issues, you should 
determine what percentage of Amanda Johnson's total damages were caused by her 
failure to use the seat belt.  
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1.  Based on the above legal definition of liability, do you find the defendant, 
Michael McGraw, liable for the plaintiff’s injuries? (Check one) 
YES, Michael McGraw is liable __________ 
NO, Michael McGraw is not liable __________ 
2.  Using the scale below, how liable is Michael McGraw in this case? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
No – He is not liable    Yes – He is liable
  
3.  How confident are you in your liability decision? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at all confident Somewhat confident Very confident 
 
If your answer to question 1 is NO, your verdict is for defendant, and you should 
not proceed further. If your answer to question 1 is YES, please answer question 4. 
 
4. Was there negligence on the part of Amanda Johnson which was a legal cause of 
her injury? 
 
  YES   NO   
5. Was there negligence on the part of Brock Collins which was a contributing legal 
cause of injury to Amanda Johnson? 
 
  YES   NO   
 
6. State the percentage of any negligence, which was a legal cause of injury to Amanda 
Johnson that you charge to: 
 
Michael McGraw  __________% 
   
Brock Collins   
__________% 
         Amanda Johnson  __________% 
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Total must be 100% 
   
(Note: For any response of “NO” to question 1, 2, or 3, place a zero as to that person  in 
answering question 6.) 
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APPENDIX AE 
Damage Award Form 
Damage Award Determinations 
Compensatory Damage Award: 
Below, determine the compensatory damages (if any) that Amanda Johnson should be 
awarded as a result of automobile negligence. Compensatory damages are based on a 
preponderance of the evidence. This means that if the weight of the evidence is in the 
plaintiff Amanda Johnson’s favor, then compensatory damages should be awarded. In 
determining the amount of compensatory damages, consider the following:  
a. Any economic losses or injuries incurred at the present time, or which will 
probably be incurred in the future, including: loss of earnings or wages, lost 
impairment of earning capacity, medical expenses, etc.  
b. Any non-economic losses or injuries incurred at the present time, or which 
will probably be incurred in the future, including: pain and suffering, 
impairment in the quality of life, mental anguish, inconvenience, emotional 
stress, etc.  
1. Dollar Award for economic damages   $ ________________ 
2. Dollar Award for non-economic damages   $ ________________ 
3. Total Compensatory Damage Award (Please add economic and non-economic 
damages) 
       $ ________________ 
4. In a few sentences, explain why you awarded this total dollar amount. 
 
 
 
Punitive Damage Awards 
If you find for plaintiff Amanda Johnson and against defendant Michael McGraw, you 
should consider whether, in addition to compensatory damages, punitive damages are 
warranted in the circumstances of this case as punishment and as a deterrent to others. 
 
Punitive damages are warranted if you find by clear and convincing evidence that 
Michael McGraw engaged in intentional misconduct or gross negligence. 
5. Punitive damage award $ _________________ 
6. In a few sentences, explain why you awarded this dollar amount.   
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APPENDIX AF 
Study Four Scoring of Inconsistency Detection Rates 
Verification of Inter-rater Reliability 
 Skewness and kurtosis values for the distribution of “Yes” and “Partial” detection 
scores on the open ended questions exceeded twice the absolute value of their standard 
errors for all eight inconsistencies calculated for two research assistants individually 
using their data sets from their individual ratings done before discussion with each other, 
after discussion with each other, and collapsing the “Yes” and “Partial” scores into a 
single total of scored detections for both research assistants individually before 
discussion and again after discussion for at least one value on thirteen of the 17 response 
classifications with a distribution consisting of more than one score.  The short answer 
questions were similarly non-normally distributed based on skewness and kurtosis values 
exceeding twice the absolute value of their standard errors for the same treatments and 
tests of data on thirteen of the 16 response classifications with a distribution of more than 
one score.  Because of this non-normal distribution, I relied on Kendall’s tau-b 
correlation to verify inter-rater reliability rather than Pearson’s or Spearman’s 
correlations. 
Open Ended and Short Answer Questions 
 Although the research assistants used different thresholds of scoring for the open 
ended and short answer codings, the nature of the data set and the logistics of 
interpretation was common to both, so they will be discussed jointly for the purposes of 
this description. 
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 The way I quantified the open ended data is based on the way both research 
assistants scored the set of data, and it takes into account the fact that they were recording 
the total number of mentions of a detection for each inconsistency (this turned out to be 
something I later recoded into a binary “present/absent” variable, since certain 
inconsistencies lended themselves to being described in response to more than one 
question—especially among the open ended questions—while others would only be a 
natural response to one question) so the number of mentions, which is reflected in all Yes 
and Partial values, is not a reliable means of distinguishing detection rates.  However, 
they remained useful as an index of agreement between research assistants, particularly 
when comparing the Before values (each assistant coded the data independently) to the 
After values (after meeting to compare the way they coded everything and to discuss and 
justify why they coded a particular response in a particular way with the goal of coming 
to a consensus if/when possible.) 
 For a full description of coding procedures and instructions, see Appendices K 
and L, but the primary difference between open ended and short answer coding 
instructions related to the degree of flexibility allowed in defining a “Yes” or a “Partial” 
detection.  Since open-ended questions lack specificity by nature, the degree of flexibility 
was greater for the open ended responses.  However, since the short answer questions 
were far more specific in their wording, the research assistants were instructed to be 
much more exclusive and strict in their scoring and interpretations.   
 Because of the room for interpretation inherent in these two subjective types of 
scores, I used the same two overall rates of detection as I did in Studies One and Two, 
with the strict criterion requiring that both research assistants each assign a “Yes” score 
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for a participant to be given credit for the detection, while the loose criterion simply 
required that both research assistants assign some sort of credit (either a “Yes” or a 
“Partial” detection) to the response in order for it to counted as a detection. 
Multiple Choice Questions 
 I did not split the multiple choice detection data into two separate loose and strict 
criterion levels as I had done in Studies One and Two (calculating the rates of detection 
for each inconsistency from the total number of participants as well as the percentage of 
detection among only those participants who correctly indicated having detected an 
inconsistency on at least one multiple choice question), as it was no longer my intention 
to identify which inconsistencies to retain and which to eliminate from the transcript.  
Instead, detection rates were simply the overall percentage of detections for each 
experimental condition. 
True or False Questions 
 Interpreting the true or false inconsistency detection rates was straightforward.  
Four of the eight non-dummy questions were phrased in a manner such that an 
inconsistency detection corresponded with a “True” response, and four of eight were 
phrased in a manner where a “False” response indicated an inconsistency detection.  
Detection rates for each inconsistency were simply the percentage of participants who 
answered the non-dummy questions in a manner indicating a detection. 
Point Blank Questions 
 Just as with the other objective forms of inconsistency detection questions, I did 
not employ separate methods of calculating a liberal, upper boundary of detection rates as 
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well as a stricter, lower boundary of detection rates, but rather only counted the 
percentage of participants who correctly identified each inconsistency. 
Scales to Summarize Relative Ease of Detection for Each Inconsistency 
 I did not use the same composite measures (strict: CombiHighYes and loose: 
CombiMed) from Studies One and Two to compare the overall detection rates of each 
inconsistency across question types in Study Four because those measures were used for 
the specific purpose of evaluating rates of detection for each inconsistency individually 
and relative to all other inconsistencies in order to identify which inconsistencies to retain 
in the transcript (those detected by between approximately 33% and 66% of all 
participants) and which inconsistencies to eliminate (those detected by percentages of 
participants greater or less than that middle range).  As mentioned in each section above, 
with the slight exception for the subjectively scored questions, I simply used the 
percentages of detection within each experimental condition for each inconsistency 
according to each question type without any additional adjustment or calculation.  See 
Table AF1 for detection rate percentages for each of the eight inconsistencies according 
to emotion induced and question type. 
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Table AF1 
 
Study Four: Comparison of Mean Detection Ratings by Transcript Version 
  
 Detections    
 Inconsistent 
Transcript 
Consistent 
Transcript        95% CI  
 
M SD M SD t df* p LL UL 
Cohen’s 
d 
PI4-Oil Co. 1.61 1.60 0.16 0.37 8.77 109 < .001 1.12 1.77 1.47 
PI5-Car Model 1.87 1.41 0.18 0.46 11.31 119 < .001 1.39 1.98 1.79 
PI7-Hair 2.23 1.65 0.24 0.57 11.40 118 < .001 1.64 2.34 1.83 
PI9-Year 1.39 1.39 0.22 0.44 7.99 118 < .001 0.88 1.46 1.27 
PI10-Color 1.59 1.53 0.29 0.50 8.01 119 < .001 0.97 1.61 1.28 
PI11-Jared 1.30 1.51 0.12 0.33 7.62 107 < .001 0.87 1.49 1.28 
PI12-Tree 1.44 1.41 0.34 0.50 7.33 122 < .001 0.80 1.40 1.16 
PI13-Dog 1.63 1.35 0.19 0.44 10.03 119 < .001 1.15 1.72 1.59 
Open Ended 
CombiHighYes 2.15 1.90 0.04 0.24 10.95 101 < .001 1.73 2.49 1.97 
Open Ended 
CombiMed 2.24 1.88 0.06 0.31 11.39 103 < .001 1.80 2.56 1.98 
Multiple Choice 2.80 2.46 0.01 0.10 11.26 98 < .001 2.30 3.28 2.18 
True False 4.08 2.35 0.48 0.83 14.39 122 < .001 3.10 4.09 2.26 
Point Blank 4.03 2.21 1.22 1.48 10.51 171 < .001 2.28 3.34 1.53 
Total Detections 13.06 7.91 1.76 1.83 13.86 108 < .001 9.69 12.92 2.32 
Note. *Levene’s test indicated unequal variances for all measures, so degrees of freedom 
have been adjusted from 196 to the values shown. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower 
limit; UL = upper limit.  Total Detections represents the sum of detection rates for Open 
Ended CombiHighYes, Multiple Choice, True False, and Point Blank question types 
only, with possible total scores ranging from 0 to 32 detections. 
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